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\ B S I R1\ C T
This thesis is concerned with the controversial problem
of the legal protection of' civilians and prisoners in non—
interstate armed conflicts, i.e., civil wars and wars of
national liberation. It examines the lengthy discussions which
took place at the Diplomatic Conferences of Ceneva in 1949 and
1974 to 1977, and evaluates the outcome.
Chapters One and Two examine the problem with regard to
civil wars, while Chapter Three examines the problem with regard
to wars of national liberation. Chapter Four examines the
fundamental principle of distinction between combatants and
non—combatants, including the problem of prisoner—of—war status
in wars of national liberation, as well as the distinction
between civilian objects and military objectives. Chapter Five
examines the more ctai1ed rules affording protection to the
civilian population and civilian objects against effects of
hostilities, while Chapter Six examines the field of' application
of these rules with special reference to their application by
a Party to the conflict to its own territory which is under
the control of' the adverse Party. The last, Chapter Seven, is
a general assessment of the major solutions within the frame-
work of the processes of law—making, law—determination, and law
enforcement.
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CHPIPTER ONE
1\PPLICPTION OF THE ENEV1\ CON\JENTIONS TO
CIVIL WARS: THE PROBLEM AT THE CENEVA
DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF 1949
21 •
	Introduction
The Geneva Diplomatic Conference of 1949 and its
summary records are of particular importance to our study,
for at least the following reasons:
First, the Diplomatic Conference of 1949 was the first
conference of its kind to consider the application of all or
part of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions to armed
conflicts said to be 'not of an international character'.
Second, it was the first international conference to
consider a proposal purporting to sever the applicability of
international humanitarian law from such controversial political
and legal criteria as the classification of the conflict,
the legal status of the parties to the conflict and so forth.
Third, from a positivist point of view, the conference
provided an opportunity to test certain claims said to be
customary international law criteria for the application to
civil war, of the rules of warfare customarily applicable to
interstate armed conflicts. In other words, it provided an
opportunity to test the claim that under traditional customary
international law, the laws of war applicable to armed con-
flicts between states become applicable to civil war:
a) upon recognition of the insurgents as belligerents,
by the government against which the armed conflict
is waged, or,
b) upon recognition of the insurgents as belligerents
by third states not taking part in the conflict, or,
c) upon fulfilment of the conditions said to justify
recognition of belligerency by third states
regardless of whether recognition of belligerency
3has been granted or not.
Fourth, the Diplomatic Conference adopted one article -
Article 3, common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 - that
expressly deals with armed conflicts "not of an international
character". But this article has been subjected to so many
distortions regarding its history and its field of application
as well as its interpretation.
Fifth, more recently the Diplomatic Conference on the
Reaffirmation and Development of Humanitarian Law Applicable
in Armed Conflicts held in Geneva in the years 1974, 1975,
1975 and 1977, adopted an additional protocol - Protocol II
relating to the prDtection of victims of non—international
armed conflicts. According to its own terms, the Protocol
develops and supplements Article 3, common to the four Geneva
Conventions of 1 949, without modifying its existing conditions
of application.
A study of the Diplomatic Conference of 1949 may thus
contribute to our understanding of Protco]. II and of the
general trend in the protection of victims of armed conflicts
said to be of a non—international character.
Finally, it may be remarked that the recent (1974-1977)
Geneva Diplomatic Conference had also adopted Protocol I
additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, relating to the
protection of victims of armed conflicts of an international
character. Paragraph 4 of Article 1 of' Protocol I character-
izes armed conflicts in which peoples fight against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes
in the exercise of their right of self—determination, as
armed conflicts of international, character. That is to say,
4they are governed by the law of armed conflict in its
entirety. Such armed conflicts, generally described as wars
of national liberation, are discussed in Chapter 4 of this
thesis. This Chapter, therfore, does not enter into the
question of the legal status of wars of national liberation
under the Geneva Conventions of 194 g m
 Indeed, this question
was not discussed by the Geneva Diplomatic Conference of
1949, and the question remained controversial until it was
settled by the adoption of Article 1 of Protocol I additional
to the Geneva Conventions.
Accordingly, the term "armed conflicts not of an
international character" must be considered now a reference
to civil wars in which peoples are not fighting in the
exercise of their right to self—determination.
2.	 From the Stockholm Draft to Article 3 Common to the
Four Geneva Conventions of 1949
In the present context the 'Stockholm Draft' refers to
paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Draft Conventions approved
by the Seventeenth International Red Cross Conference held
in Stockholm in 1948.1 These 'Draft Conventions' were the
basis of the discussions of the Geneva Diplomatic Conference
of 1949
Convention I is a convention for the amelioration of
1.. For the complete text see Final Record of the Diplomatic
Conference of Geneva of 1 949, Vol. I pp. 47 et seq.
5the conditions of the wounded and sick in armed forces in
the field; Convention II, is a convention for the amelioration
of the condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of
armed forces at sea; Convention III, is a convention relative
to the treatment of prisoners of war; and Convention IV, is
a convention relative to the protection of civilian persons
in time of ware
Paragraph 4 of rticle 2 of the 'Stockholm Draft' of
the Third and Fourth Conventions contained the following
common provision:
"In all cases of armed conflict not of an international
character which may occur in the territory of one or
more of the High Contracting Parties, each of the
Parties to the conflict shall be bound to implement
the provisions of the present Convention, subject to
the adverse party likewise acting in obedience thereto.
The Convention shall be applicable in these circum-
stances, whatever the legal status of the Parties to
the conflict and without prejudice thereto."1
2.1. The Origin and Development of the Idea of Inserting in
the Geneva Conventions a Provision Relating to Civil War
Traditional notions about sovereignty of the state and
domestic jurisdiction have always militated against the
extension of the law of armed conflict to civil war. Even
1.. Ibid., p . 73, and p. 113.
6relief action by the ICRC was looked upon as an unfriendly
act s
 The authors of the ICRC Commentary recorded the
experience of the ICRC in the following terms:
"In a civil war, the lawful government, or that which
so styles itself, tends to regard its adversaries as
common criminals. This attitude has sometimes led
governmental authorities to look upon relief given by
the Red Cross to the other Party to the conflict as
indirect aid to those who are guilty. Applications by
a foreign Red Cross or by the International Committee
of the Red Cross have more than once been treated as
unfriendly attempts to interfere in the internal affairs
of the country concerned. This conception still
prevailed when a draft Convention on the role of the
Red Cross in civil wars or insurrections was submitted
for the first time, to the International Red Cross
Conference in 1912. The subject was not even discussed."
It was natural therefore that the ICRC should seek some
legal footing for its relief action. The question of the role
of the Red Cross was again placed on the agenda of the Tenth
International Red Cross Conference in 1921, this time a
resolution was passed affirming the right to relief of all
victims of civil wars or social or revolutionary disturbances
in accordance with the general principles of the Red Cross.2
The resolution as such did not have the force of' a convention.
But it enabled the ICRC in at least two cases - the civil war
1 Pictet (edj, ICRC Commentary I, Geneva, 1952, p. 39.
2. Ibid., p. 40.
7in the plebiscite area of Upper Silesia in 1921, and the civil
war in Spain (1936_1939) - to induce both sides to undertake
more or less to respect the principles of the Geneva
1Convention of 192gm
Noting the results achieved by the International
Committee of the Red Cross in these two cases, the Sixteenth
(XVI) International Red Cross Conference in 1938 passed a
resolution in which it requested the International Committee
of the Red Cross and the National Red Cross Societies to
endevour to obtain:
a) the application of the humanitarian principles which
were formulated in the Geneva Conventions of 1 9 2 9 2 and
the Tenth Hague Convention 3
 of 1907, especially as
regards the treatment of' the wounded, the sick, and
prisoners of war, and the safety of' medical personnel
and medical stores;
b) Humane treatment for all political prisoners, their
exchange and, so far as possible, their release;
c) respect for the life and liberty of' non—combatants;
d) facilities for the transmission of news of a personal
nature and for the reunion of families;
e) effective measures for the protection of children.4
1 •
 Loc. cit.
2 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of' the
Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field; and Convention on
Treatment of' Prisoners of' Liar - Geneva, July, 1929 See
text in Friedman, The Law of War, A Documentary History,
Vol. 1, pp. 471 at seq., and pp. 488 at seq.
3. Convention for the Adaptation to Flaritime Warfare of the
Principles of the Geneva Convention of 1864. Text in
Friedman, The Law of War, A Documentary History, Vol. 1,
p. 354 et seq.
4. Pictet (ad.), ICRC - Commentary I, pp . 40-41.
8According to the ICRC Commentary, the Conference was
thus envisaging explicitly and for the first time, the
application by the Parties to a civil war, if not of all the
provisions of the Geneva Conventions, at any rate, of their
essential principles. 1 But the ICRC Commentary goes on to tell
us that this resolution encouraged the ICRC to 'reconsider'
the possibility of inserting provisions relating to civil war
2in the Conventions themselves. The word 'reconsider'
indicates that a previous suggestion to this effect had been
made, but we do not know for sure whether it was actually
made, and if so, by whom. It is possible, however, that the
suggestion was first made at the Fifteenth International Red
Cross Conference, held in Tokyo in 1934 For we know from the
remorandum of 20 September, 1948, of the Swiss Federal
Political Department to the signatories of the Geneva
Conventions of 1929, that the Tokyo Conference had prepared
a text which was known as the'Tokyo Draft', and which dealt
with the status and protection of civilians of enemy
nationality in time of war3
It is also possible that the suggestion to insert
provisions relating to civil war in the Geneva Conventions
themselves was made by the Sixteenth International Red Cross
Conference, held in London in 1938. For we also know from the
same '1emorandum that the Conference had revised the'Tokyo
Draft', and had also considered that it had become necessary
1. Jbid1, P. 41.
2. Loc.cit.
3. For the text of this '1emorandum, see Final Records of the
Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vol. 1, pp. 147-
148.
9to revise the Geneva Conventions of' 1929 and the Tenth Hague
Convention of 1907. We also know from the same Ilemorandum
that a Diplomatic Conference was in fact scheduled to take
place at Geneva in the early part of 1940 to revi5e these
Conventions, but it was prevented from doing so by the
outbreak of the Second World War.1
However, as soon as the war ended, the uork on revi5ing
the above mentioned Conventions was resumed. Indeed, even
before hostilitie5 had ended, the International Committee of
the Red Cross, the various national Red Cross Societies and
private associations had already collected the documents
required for that revision.2
In 1946 a Preliminary Conference of National Red Cross
Societies was convened. Pt that Conference the ICRC proposed
that in the event of' a civil war in the country, the Parties
to the conflict should be invited to state that they were
prepared to apply the principles of each of the Geneva
Conventions.3
This suggestion was based on the belief that an
invitation to the Parties to the conflict to make an, explicit
declaration (which it was believed would be difficult for them
to refuse) would encourage them to line up with the advocates
of humanitarian ideas, and the sufferings arising out of civil
1 •
 Ibid., p . 147.
2. Ibid., p . 147.
3. Report on the Work of the Preliminary Conference of
National Red Cross Societies for the Study of' the Conven-
tions and of Various Problems Relative to the Red Cross
(Geneva, July 26—August 3, 1946), 1947, cited in Picket
(ed.), ICRC Commentary 1, p. 4t.
1wars would thereby be appreciably reduced. But such a
suggestion would still leave civil wars outside the pale of
international law. Further, it shows that the ICRC was still
hesitant to make "substantive proposals" to be included in
the Geneva Conventions, in which case there would be no legal
basis even for the relief action of the Red Cross.
Be this as it may, the fact remains that the Preliminary
Conference of National Red Cross Societies found the
suggestion unsatisfactory. Instead, the Conference recommended
to insert at the beginning of each of the Geneva Conventions
an Article to the effect that:
"In the case of armed conflict within the borders of
a state, the Convention shall also be applied by each
of the adverse Parties, unless one of them announces
expressly its intention to the contrary"i
The Preliminary Conference of National Red Cross
Societies, thus went out for the application of the
Conventions as a whole, not merely their principles as the
ICRC had suggested.
In 1947 the ICRC convened a Conference of Government
Experts for the study of the Conventions. The Conference
admitted the necessity of making provisions in the Conventions
for at least a partial extension of their application to civil
war, and thus drafted an Article under which principles of
each of the Conventions were to be applied in civil uar by
the Contracting Party, provided the Adverse Party did the
2
same.
1. Pictet (ed.), ICRC Commentary I, p . 42.
2. Pictet (ed.), ICRC Commentary I, Geneva, 1952, p. 42.
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Obviously, thB proposal of' the Conference of' Government
Experts fell a long way short of that of the National Red
Cross Societies. It spoke only of the application of
'principles', and even then - on the basis of reciprocity.
It is not clear from the ICRC Commentary whether the
ICRC did in fact make any proposals to the Conference of'
Government Experts, and if so, what the Experts' reaction was.
In view of the fact that the ICRC had thus far been sceptical,
it seems likely that it did not make any proposals, and
probably was happy with the Experts' proposal. Indeed, apart
from the reciprocity clause, the ICRC seems to have adopted
the view of the Conference of Government Experts and had
made it its own at the Seventeenth International Red Cross
Conference held in Stockholm in 1948 for the purpose of'
studying and approving the text of' the Draft Geneva
Conventions to be submitted the following year (1949) to the
Geneva Diplomatic Conference.
The ICRC presented the following text to the Stockholm
Conference as paragraph 4 of' Article 2 common to the Draft
Geneva Conventions:
"In all cases of armed conflict which are not of an
international character, especially cases of civil uars,
colonial conflict, or wars of religion, which may occur
in the territory of one or more of the High Contracting
Parties, the implementing of the principles of the
present Convention shall be obligatory on each of the
adversaries. The application of the Convention in these
circumstances shall in no wise depend on the legal status
of the Parties to the conflict and shall have no effect
12
on that status."
The ICRC Commentary on this draft proposal seems
deliberately confusing, 1
 and amounts to distortion of facts.
Thus, the Commentary claims that the first part of this
paragraph gave effect to the recommendation of the Red Cross
Societies and had actually improved on it by omitting the
condition which the latter had contemplated.
In order to refute this allegation it may be sufficient
to recall the text of the recommendation of the National Red
Cross Societies adopted in 1946 It reads:
"In the case of armed conflicts within the borders of
a state, the Convention shall also be applied by each
of the Parties to the conflict unless one of them
announces expressly its intention to the contrary."
This recommendation seems to differ from the ICRC
proposal to the Stockholm Conference in at least four respects:
First, the recommendation of the Red Cross Societies
speaks of the Coventions, not merely their principles, as did
the ICRC proposal.
Second, omision of the words "unless one of them
announces expressly its indication to the contrary" actually
weakened the text and cannot be considered as an improvement.
Third, unless one takes too much for granted, the words
"In the case of armed conflict within the borders of a State"
which were used in the recommendation of the National Red
Cross Societies cannot be read to mean "In all cases of armed
conflict which are not of an international character,
1 See Pictet (ed.), ICRC Commentary I, p. 43, Commentary III,
p. 31, Commentary IV, p. 30.
13
especially cases of civil war, colonial conflict or wars of
religion which may occur in the territory of one or more of'
the High Contracting Parties..."
Fourth, the qualification "not of an international
character" was an absolutely new terminology, and as Tom
Farer commented, ... at the time the Geneva Conventions were
drafted, the words "not of an international character" had
no precise reference point in international practice..."1
Accordingly, it seems likely, that, by the long introductory
statement (in all cases of armed conflict etc.) the ICRC
meant to 'establish' a reference point, in particular, with
regard to'colonial conflicts', which in the ICRC view, were
armed conflicts not of an international character.
All this, however, was but one side of the distortion.
The other side is the extreme brevity of the Commentary on
the Stockholm Conference, as if in a deliberate attempt to
conceal what had happened. The authors of the ICRC Commentary
seem anxious to impress on their readers the view that the
Stockholm Conference, after a lengthy discussion adopted the
ICRC proposal. Indeed, all that the ICRC Commentary had to say
about the Stockholm Conference was this:
"The draft text (i.e., the ICRC proposal to the
Stockholm Conference) was the subject of a lengthy
discussion at the Stockholm Conference, at which
Governments as well as Red Cross Societies were
represented. In the end, the Conference adopted the
proposals of the International Committee of the Red
1. Tom Farer, Humanitarian Law and Armed Conflicts: Toward
the Definition of "International Armed Conflict", Columbia
Law Review, Vol. 71, 1971, p . 45.
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Cross for the First and Second Conventions, and in the
case of the Third and Fourth Conventions made the
application of the Convention subject to the proviso
that the adverse Party should also comply with it.
It was in this form that the p roposal came before
the Diplomatic Conference."1
Did the Stockholm Conference really adopt the ICRC
proposals? In this writer's view the Stockholm Conference
rejected the ICRC proposal and had in fact reasserted the
view of the Conference of the National Red Cross Societies.
This clearly appears by juxtaposing the Stockholm Draft and
the ICRC proposal, and making a comparison between them.
When thus juxtaposed and compared, the following
differences seem obvious:
First, that the Stockholm Draft does not contain the
words "especially cases of' civil war, colonial conflicts or
wars of religion." Why the Stockholm Conference had omitted
these words is unclear. But it would be too simplistic and
presumptious to consider such an omission as merely an
omission of' examples, the presence of' which might restrict
the field of application of the text. The question of when
does a civil war become of international character was a
very controversial issue in traditional legal thought. The
question of the legal status of' Non—Self—Governing territories
(colonies) was even more controversial in the United Nations,
and it was not within the competence of the Conference to
settle through the law of armed conflict what under the
1. Pictet (ed.), ICRC Commentary I, p . 43, Commentary iii,
p. 31, Commentary I\J, p. 30.
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Charter of the United Nations, was to be settled in accordance
with the right of peoples to self—determination.
Second the ICRC proposal to the Stockholm Conference
spoke simply of implementing the principles of each of the
Geneva Conventions, while the Stockholm Draft which was
adopted by the Conference spoke of implementing the
Conventions, not merely their principles. Certainly this is
not a negligable and insignificant difference.
Clearly t en, the Stockholm Conference did not adopt
the proposal of' the ICRC. In claiming that it did, the authors
of the ICRC Commentary were merely propagandistic. This also
transpires from the fact that they had given publicity to the
ICRC propsql (probably because it contained a reference to
colonial conflicts), while failing to produce to their readers
the very text which was the basis of the discussion at the
Geneva Diplomatic Conference, namely the Stockholm Draft of
paragraph 4 of' i\rticle 2 Common to the Draft Geneva
Conventions which were approved by the Stockholm Conference
of' 1948.
2.2. The Fate of the Stockholm Draft at the Geneva
Diplomatic Conference
Speaking at the recent (1974 - 1977) Geneva Diplomatic
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
Humanitarian Law Ppplicable in Armed Conficts, the Norwegian
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delegate, vir. Ofstad, expressed the fillowing view of his
Country. "All war	 he said, "must be protected,
regardless of the political and legal classification of the
conflict, and that was only possible if the applicability of
international humanitarian law were severed from all
controversial political and legal concepts. The distinction
between international and non—international conflicts", he
said,	 criterion for the application of
international humanitarian law."1
If the applicability of humanitarian law were to be
severed from all controversial political and legal concepts,
then, in the words of Professors 1'lcDougal and Feliciano,
humanitarian law must be applied
"to all forms of hostilities, irrespective of the
characterization of the resort to violence as lawful or
unlawful; of the formal character of one or the other
participant (i.e., Party to the conflict) as an
intrastate rebel group or unrecognized government or
authority, or international organization; of the
intensity of the violence and its extension in time and
space; and of the recognition or non—recognition of the
exjstance of a technical state of war."2
Indeed, if as all legal literature on the law of armed
conflict seems to contend, that the law of armed conflict is
the result of a compromise between the requirement of military
necessity and humanity (or standards of civilization, as
Schwarzenberger prefers to call it); 3 that military necessity
1 •
 CODH/I/SR. 14, para, 9.
2. McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public
Order, 1967, p. 72.
3. Schwarzenberger International Law, t/ol. 2 1968, p. 13.
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has been generally rejected as a defense for acts forbidden
by the customary and conventional laws of war inasmuch as the
latter have been developed and framed with consideration for
the concept of military necessity; 1 and that the essence of
prisoner—of—war status is custody, not revenge, 2 severing the
applicability of the law of armed conflict from political and
legal concepts must be regarded a matter of sound reason and
principle.
There seem to be an increasing awareness outside
governmental circles that this should be the case, especially
as far as the protection of the civilian population against
the dangers of hostilities is concerned. In this respect, the
weighty resolution of the Institute of International Law
adopted at the Session f Edinburgh (4_13 September, 1969)
may be mentioned. 3
 The Institute notes that the rules embodied
in its resolution "form part of the principles to be observed
in armed conflicts by any de jure or de facto government, or
by any authority responsible for the conduct of hostilities."
The resolution is concerned with "the distinction between
military objectives and non—military objects in general and
particularily the problem associated with weapons of mass
destruction." The ICRO and the vast majority of experts
consulted by the ICRE in 1969 and 1970 also felt that, in
principle, "the protection due to the civilian population
against the dangers of' military operations should be the
1 Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 10, pp. 298-299.
2 Schwarzenberger, ibid., p. 126, quoting Nuremberg
Judgement, (1946).
3. See text in ICRC, Doc. CE/3b, entitled, Protection of the
Civilian Population against Dangers of Hostilities, Geneva,
January, 1971, P p . 76-77, (Documqntar Annex) This willbe referred to as: ICRC, Doc. CE/3b, Ueneva, 1971.
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the same in all situations and in all types of armed
conflict.
tccordingly, in preparing the two draft protocols
additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the ICRC
proposed almost the same rules for both international and
non—international armed conflicts. 2
 More importantly, it
proposed that these rules should be applicable on the sole
condition that the insurgents be organized under a responsible
command. 3
 The ICRC in this respect was supported by a small
number of states on the 'threshold problem', and apparently
by the majority of states on the substantive side during the
Diplomatic Conference of Geneva (1974_1977). But in the last
days of the Conference many delegations changed their position
and the result was that the Protocol which was adopted at
Committee level during the work of the Conference was trans-
formed into a 'dwarf Protocol'. Nevertheless, the fact remains
that there was an increasing awareness among governments that
protection of the civilian population against the dangers of
hostilities must be the same in all situations and in all
types of armed conflict. This trend is bound in the end to
prevail for the simple reason that respect for human rights
is increasingly becoming an important element in international
relations, and the realization that repressive governmental
policies have often increased popular support to the anti-
government forces. In wars of national liberation against
colonial and alien and racist regimes the most that such
1 •
 ICRC Doc. CE/3b, Geneva, 1971, p. 8.
2 ICRC Draft 1dditional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions,
Commentary, Geneva, 1973.
3. See irticle 1 of Draft Protocol II, ibid., p . 132.
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regimes can hope for is to find some collaborators among the
peoples under their rule. The battle for winning the hearts
and minds of the peoples in such cases is already won by the
liberation movements concerned.
But while there seems to be a wide legal conviction
that protection of the civilian population against dangers of
hostilities must be the same in all situations and in all
types of armed conflict, especially outside governmental
circles, there seems to be less support for the view that
captured insurgents should be given the rights of prisoners-
of-war. All legal and political arguements in this respect
revolve round one idea - the deterrent force of' punishment.
Sovereignty of the state, the right of the government to
restore law and order, the duty of the government to execute
the national laws and to punish the law-breakers are all too
familiar defenses against the extension of the prisoner-of-
war status or 'treatment' to captured insurgents. The tragedy
of the sovereignty of the state and all ancillary concepts is
that they are invoked by democratic and oppressive governments
alike, without distinction as to the nature of the 'law and
order' to be restored. When the very 'law and order' which is
'broken' is the origin of the cause of the insurection, how
can one realistically speak of' the deterrent force of'
punishment? Probably all insurgents know that the severest
penalties await them if they are captured, and death or injury
is by no means excluded when they go to battle. Yet they rebel
and fight.
According to McDougal and Feliciano, experience in
previous major wars would seem to point to the minimal
20
deterrent value of expectations of death upon capture. The
very intensity and widespread character of guerrilla war in
the occupied countries during the Second World War, in spite
of the fact that neither the German nor the Japenese
occupation forces were particularly lenient with captured
guerrillas or partisans, "testify to the weak deterrent effect,
if any, of the execution and torture upon capture." 1 The
widespread character of' guerrilla war in the post—World War
era is even more to the point.
To this view, it may be added that the Occupying Power
is also under obligation to keep law and order, yet, it has
never been suggested by any state that the application of the
Fourth Geneva Convention would prevent the Occupying Power
from keeping law and order. So why should it hinder a
government involved in civil war? Nor has it been suggested
that the right of members of resistance movements operating
in occupied territories to prisoner—of—war statu; according
to the Geneva Conventions, would prevent the Occupying Power
from protecting its forces against guerrilla operations. So
why should it prevent a government involved in civil war? For
practical purposes, the occupying power and the government
of a state in civil war are in similar positions. So why
should governments involved in civil war be less subject to
the law than a belligerent occupant?
Clearly then, the Stockholm Conference of' 1948 was
justified in deciding to rid the applicability of humanitarian
law from most, if not all, controversial political and legal
concepts.
1 •
 McDougal and Feliciano, op. cit., p. 86 and notes.
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But reason seldom prevails when governments are asked to
restrict their discretionary powers in dealing with insurgent
movements which they regard as worse than common criminals.
Thus, without reading the Summary Records of the Diplomatic
Conferences held in Geneva in 1949 and the l970s, one can
imagine their reaction when asked to forego in advance their
discretionary powers and subject themselves to 'already'
prescribed rules, Of course they would not say that they were
prepared to let Hell loose if need be, There are more subtle
ways of saying and even putting it into practice and yet
waving the 'olive branch' of the sovereignty of the state and
even of public good. This is not intended as a judgement of
those who were in favour or against the Stockholm Draft. The
purpose is only to state that governments often say one thing
and do another, and vice—versa.
So, let us proceed temperately to examine the fate of
the Stockholm Draft; which, it may be recalled, states that:
all cases of armed conflict not of an international
character which may occur in the territory of one or
more of the High Contracting Parties, each of the
Parties to the conflict shall be bound to implement
tha provisions of the present Convention, subject to
the adverse party likewise acting in obedience thereto.
The Conventions shall be applicable in these circums-
tances, whatever the legal status of the Parties to
the conflict and without prejudice thereto."
It is worthwhile recalling that this text was common
to the Third Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of
prisoners of war, and the Fourth Convention relative to the
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protection of civilian persons in time of war.
This text was the subject of a lengthy discussion at
the Diplomatic Conference. It was given a first reading in
the Joint Committee. The discussion revealed widely divergent
views The delegations of Norway, f1exico, Hungary, Demark,
Rumania, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, mutatis
mutandis, supported the Stockholm Draft of' Article 2,
paragraph 4, quoted above. On the other hand, the delegations
of France, the United States of America, China, Canada, Italy,
Spain, Greece, and Australia, mutatis mutandis, wanted to
restrict the field of' application of the text by additional
conditions. Of' all those who spoke in the Joint Committee the
delegation of the United Kingdom was the only delegation
which opposed the Stockholm Draft without proposing an
alternative or indicating support to any of' the proposals
which hitherto had been advanced•1
After the first reading in the Joint Committee a Special
Committee was set up to examine the problem of the application
of the Conventions to "armed conflicts not of an international
character." The Special Committee was composed of the
delegations of Australia, United States of America, France,
Greece, Italy, 1onaco, Norway, United Kingdom, Switzerland,
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 2
 This Committee
was set up at the third meeting of the Joint Committee. At
its seventh meeting, the Joint Committee decided to include
in the membership of the Special Committee, Surma and Uruguay,
1. See the Final Record f the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva
of 1949, (published by the Swiss Federal Political
Department), Vol. 2B, pp. 9-16.
2. Ibid., p. 16.
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"so that Asia and Latin America might be reresented on it."1
The very composition of the Special Committee meant that the
Stockholm Draft of paragraph 4 of Article 2 was 'clinically'
dead, since most of the members of the Special Committee had
already pronounced themselves against its adoption in the
form it was presented. As to the outcome expected of such a
Special Committee, the views of its members in the Joint
Committee could easily foretell.
In the Joint Committee, the first speaker was Mr.
Lamarle of France. He started his speech by pointing out that
he did not contest the necessity of providing for the
situations envisaged in paragraph 4 of Article 2, but he felt
that the positive phraseology of the text might be dangerous
in certain connections. The Stockholm Conference in his view
had been mainly concerned with the protection of the rights
of individuals but it was also necessary not to loose sight
of the rights of the States, It was impossible in his view
to carry the protection of individuals to the point of
sacrificing the rights of states. In order to protect the
rights of states, the French delegation proposed an amendment
which he said, would make it impossible for "forms of disorder,
anarchy or brigandage to claim the protection of the
Conventions." The amendment indicated that
"the forces concerned must be organized military forces
belonging to a responsible authority capable of
respecting or enforcing respect for the Conventions,
in a given territory."2
1. Ibid., p. 120.
2. Final Records of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of'
1949, Vol. 2B, p. 10.
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The Italian delegation was disposed to support the
formula suggested by the French delegation, but the Italian
delegation suggested that the French formula should be
accompanied by a recommendation stipulating that "the
humanitarian principles which are the essence of the
Conventions should guide the conduct of states."1
The Greek delegation was also in agreement with the
French formula and remarks. With regard to suggestions made
by some delegations that the application of the Conventions
should be made conditional upon the recognition of belligerency,
he wondered who would be competent to recognize belligerency
in the case of civil wars? He suggested that a simple majority
of members of the Security Council of the United Nations
should be competant for that purpose.2
The delegation of the United Kingdom seem to have
understood the term 'armed conflict not of an international
character' as refering to both interstate armed conflicts in
which a state of war was not recognized as well as civil war.
"In the United Kingdom Delegation's view, paragraph 4
of Article 2 was a source of serious difficulties, not
only because the Conventions would be applicable to
situations which were not war, but because the
application of the Conventions would appear to give the
status of belligerents to insurgents whose right to wage
war could not be recognized. Even if paragraph 4 were
confined in its application to situations in which one
of the combatants was the lawful government (e.g. in
1 •
 Ibid., p. 13.
2. Ibid., pp. 10-11, and p. 16.
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the case of civil war) the difficulties would still
exist. Careful consideration of the provisions of the
Convention concerning civilians, in particular, left
little room for doubt that their application to civil
war would strike at the root of national sovereignty
and endanger national security."1
The remarks made by the delegation of the United States
of f%merica make a good summary of the various trends in
traditional legal thought. "Every government", said Mr.
Leland Harrison, "had a right to put down rebellion within
its borders and to punish the insurgents in accordance with
its penal laws. Conversely, premature recognition of the
belligerency of insurgents was a tortious act against the
lawful government and a breach of' international law" 2 The
United States of fUuerjca therefore considered that the
Conventions should be applicable only where the parent
government had extended recognition to the rebels or where
those conditions obtained which would warrant other states
in recognizing the belligerency of' the rebels,uhether or not
such recognition was accorded by the government against which
the insurgents were fighting. The conditions which should
obtain before the Conventions would be applicable were stated
by the delegation of the United States as follows:
1. The insurgents must have an organization purporting to
have the characteristics of a state.
1 •
 Ibid., p. 10.
2. It is not understood where did this 'right' come from, and
whether 'conversely', premature recognition of the
belligerency of the insurgents would also constitute a
tortious act against the 'unlawful' government.
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2. The insurgent civil authority must exercise de facto
authority over persons within a determinate territory.
3. The armed forces must act under the direction of an
organized civil authority and be prepared to observe the
ordinary laws of war.
4. The insurgent civil authority must agree to be bound by
the provisions of the Convention.1
The Canadian delegation was in favour of "complete
suppression of the proposed application of the civilian
Convention to civil war", but it was ready to support a
formula covering only a limited type of civil war, as
suggested by the delegation of the United States of merica.
However, the delegation of Canada qualified his support to
the United States' proposal by considering that the test as
to whether the conditions suggested by the United States were
fulfilled or not should be: recognition of belligerency of
the rebels by the lawful government. In other words, the
delegation of Canada would have liked to make the Conventions
applicable to civil war if five conditions were fulfilled:
the four listed by the Delegation of the United States, plus
recognition of belligerency of the rebels by the lawful
2government.
The 1us.tralian delegation pointed out that at that time
the Iustralian government was of the opinion that the
Conventions should apply when an armed conflict became a
full—scale war and when there was an organized form of
government which effectively controlled definite portions of
the national territory and the inhabitants therein.
1 •
 Final Record, op. cit., p. 12.
2 Final Record, op. Cit., p. 13
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To distinguish between the aforementioned state of'
affairs and local uprisings, the delegation of Australia
considered that 'the principles' of each of the Conventions
should be applied to the Parties to the conflict, provided:
1. The de jure government had recognized the insurgents as
belligerents; or
2. The de jure government had claimed for itself the right
of belligerent; or
3. The de lure government had accorded the insurgents
recognition as belligerents for the purpose only of the
present Conventions; or
4. The dispute had been admitted to the agenda of the Security
Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations as
being a threat to international peace, a breach of' the
peace, or an act of aggression.1
The latter proviso, according to the delegation of
Australia, indicates the fact that the matter was not one
coming within the domestic jurisdiction of a state according
to the terms of Article 2, paragraph 7, of' the Charter of the
United Nations. Moreover, no difficulty would arise with
regard to the veto because
	 the placing of a conflict on
the Agenda was purely a matter of procedure.2
According to the "Seventh Report drawn up by the Special
Committee of the Joint Committee", the delegation of' Australia
suggested that the expression 'armed conflict not of' an
international character', or 'non—international conflict'
1	 Final Records, Vol. 28, p. 121
2. Ibid., p. 15.
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should not be used, but be replaced by the terms 'civil war
in any part of the home or colonial territory of a Contracting
Party. ' But the Report says nothing about the fate of this
suggestion, nor does there seem to be anything about it in
the final record. However, point 4 of the Australian proposal,
if accepted, would have involved the United Nations effectively
in the protection of human rights in armed conflict at an
early stage, and would have made it clear that colonial wars
were governed by at least the principles of each Geneva
Convention.
There seems to have been a general trend to suppress any
role to the United Nations in this respect. Indeed, as early
as the Second Meeting of the Joint Committee, Mr. Bolla, the
delegate for Switzerland said that he was of' the opinion that
the Conference should refrain from any restrictive condition
or reference to the United Nations Organization.2
Burma, as noted above, was chosen by the Joint Committee
to represent Asia. At the second meeting of' the Joint Committee
the Burmese delegate, General Dung, uttered only one sentence
in connection with the Stockholm Draft of paragraph 4 of
common Article 2. "The proposed Convention should not give legal
status to insurgents who sought by undemocratic methods to
3
overthrow a legally constituted government by force of' arms" ,
he said. This sentence, however, appeared later to have meant
too much. At the 39th meeting of the Special Committee, General
Dung explained that the Eastern countries he represented in the
1 •
 Ibid., p. 121.
2. Ibid., p. 15•
3. Final Records, Vol. 28, p. 15
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Special Committee could not agree to an extension of' the
Conventions to civil war, nd if such a provision were included,
they would not be able to sign the Conventions.1
The delegation of Monaco was in favour of' amending the
Stockholm Draft according to the French proposal., 2 Uruguay did
not seem to have expressed any view on the Stockholm Draft
before it was chosen as a member of' the Special Committee, it
appeared later however, that it was not in favour of the
Stockholm Draft as it stood.
The delegation of Norway hoped that the proposals adopted
at Stockholm would be upheld. "It was a step forward in
international law", said the Norwegian delegate, Mr. Catsberg,
"to say that, even if war was not recognized, the rules
concerning the conduct of war should be applied." 3
 As to civil
war, he added, "the term 'armed conflict' should not be
interpreted as meaning 'individual conflict', or 'uprising'.
Civil war was a form of conflict resembling international war,
but taking place inside the territory of a State." 4
 Such an
interpretation, however, seems inconsistent with the wording
of the Stockholm Draft which expressly speaks of "all cases
of armed conflict not of an international character s " With
such an interpretation, the delegation of Norway came actually
1 •
 Ibid., p . 102.
2. Ibid., p. 14.
3. Final Record, Vol. 28, p. 11 • It is not clear whether he
was speaking with reference to paragraph 1 or paragraph 4.
If the latter, this would suggest that the delegation of
Norway, like that of the United Kingdom and China, seem to
have understood the term 'armed conflict not of an
international character' as ref'ering to civil war as well
as interstate wars where a state of war was not recognized.
4. Loc. cit.
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closer to the French proposal which it later supported in the
Special Committee, as a matter of 'compromise'.1
The Soviet delegate, General Slavin was not the last to
speak at the Joint Committee, but his speech serves as a round
up. He criticised the delegation of the United Kingdom for
implying (or so he understood the UK delegation as saying)
that civil and colonial wars were not regulated by internat-
ional law and therefore that decisions in this respect would
be out of place in the text of the Conventions. This theory,
said the Soviet delegate was unconvincing, 	 since although
the jurists themselves were divided in opinion on this point,
some were of the view that civil war was regulated by
international law. However, in his view, since the creation
of the Organization of the United Nations this question seems
settled. The Charter of the United Nations, he said, provided
that member States must ensure peace and world security. They
could therefore not be indifferent to the cessation of
hostilities, no matter the character or localization of the
conflict. Colonial and civil wars, he concluded, came
therefore within the purview of international law.2
With regard to the French proposal, the Soviet delegate
said that if the French proposal were followed, there would
be a danger of one party declaring, without proof, that the
other was not in a position to ensure order, and thus of
any violation of the basic humanitarian principles of the
Conventions.
1 •
 Ibid., p. 41.
2. Final Record, Vol. 28, p. 14.
3. Loc. cit.
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The Creek amendment 1
 was inacceptable to the Soviet
Union because it subordinated the application of the
Conventions in cases of armed conflicts of non—international
character,to formal recognition of the status of belligerents
to the parties to the conflict. This amendment restricted the
scope of the text of the Draft which was approved at the
Stockholm Conference and sapped its humanitarian basis.2
With regard to the proposal of the United States, the
Soviet delegate said that that proposal, by subordinating the
application of the Conventions to the decision of one party,
was no longer in harmony with the humanitarian principles
governing these Conventions.3
In conclusion, the Soviet delegation pointed out that
civil and colonial wars were often accompanied by violations
of international law and were characterized by cruelty of all
kinds. The suffering of the population in the instance of civil
and colonial wars was as distressing as that which led Henry
Dunant to realise the need for regulating the laws of warfare
Accordingly, the Soviet delegation considered it necessary to
maintain the text of Article 2 of the Conventions, as it was
drafted at the 15th and 17th Red Cross Conferences and which
extended the application of the Conventions to "all cases of
armed conflict."4
These, in brief, were the views of the 13 members of the
Special Committee, before the Committee was set up. It is
1 •
 The Final Record does not seem to have given prominence to
this proposal. See the speech of the Creek delegation,
ibid., p . 1O11.
2	 Ibid., p. 14.
3. Loc. cit.
4. Final Record, Vol. 2B, p. 14.
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probably obvious that at best, no more than two delegations
were in favour of the Stockholm Draft as it stood.
1t the third meeting of the Special Committee the
Chairman	 f the Committee felt that the time had come to
classify the views and that the Committee should in the first
place express itself on the following principles:1
1. Should the Conventions be extended to cases of armed
conflict which were not of an international character?
2 Would it be appropriate to define more clearly than
was in the case in the Stockholm text the cases of
armed conflict which were not of an international
chara cter7
3. Which of the following criteria should be adopted:
formal criteria, factual criteria, or a combination
of formal and factual criteria?
The delegations for Burma and Uruguay were not yet
members of the Special Committee and therefore could not take
part in the voting.
On the first question, by 10 votes to 1, with 1
abstention the Committee pronounced in favour of the extension
of the Conventions to cases of armed conflict not of an
international character.2
With regard to the second question the Chairman suggested
to the Committee that they pronounce either in favour of' the
Stockholm text or oP the new text which would define more
clearly the cases of armed conflict not of an international
chars cter.
1 •
 Ibid., p. 44.
2	 Ibid., p. 45.
3. Loc. cit.
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By 10 votes for, 1 against, and 1 abstention, the
Committee was of the opinion to abandon the Stockholm text
and to define more clearly the cases of armed conflict which
were not of an international character to which the Conventions
should apply.1
The Committee then went on to the examination of the
factors which should be included in the definition under
consideration. This question, together with such questions
as the application of the Conventions to the letter or by
analogy; the question of reciprocity; the situation of the
insurgents at the close of a conflict; and above all the lack
of political will, not only killed the Stockholm Draft, but
also prevented agreement in the Special Committee even on the
present text of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. It will
not be necessary for the purposes of our discussion to examine
the work of the Special Committee in detail. Such a discussion
could make a dissertation on its own. It is deemed sufficient
therefore to review the different proposals which the Working
Parties of the Special Committee had prepared at different
stages of the work of the Special Committee, although none of
them had actually been acce pted by the Special Committee
itself. Besides their historical value, the proposals made by
the Working Parties of the Special Committee have a great
evidential value regarding the aplication of the law of armed
conflict to civil wars under traditional customary international
law. Indeed, this is the main reason for reviewing them here
An additional purpose is to correct the history of Article 3,
1, Loc. cit.
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which some writers, including the ICRC Commentary on the four
Geneva Conventions seem to confuse with the Stockholm Draft.
These are the purposes of the following section.
2.3. The Search for and Alternative to the Stockholm Draft
It has been noted above that the Special Committee, had
decided by 10 votes to 1, with 1 abstention, to abandon the
Stockholm Draft and to define more clearly the cases of armed
conflict not of an international character to which the
Conventions should apply. The Special Committee then went on to
the examination of the factors which should be included in the
definition of such cases
As soon as the discussion began the French delegate, Mr
Lamarle, retreated from the position which he held at the First
meeting of the Joint Committee. He said that he was of the
opinion that civil war was a political and not a legal concept,
and that each case should be dealt with separately. The
Conference in his view was not competant to define civil war,
nor to confer competency on a body of a pnldtical character.
It was necessary, in his opinion, to allow the normal play of
international politics. He recalled in this connection the
non—intervention policy followed during the Spanish Civil War'
Similarly, the Italian delegate, Mr. Marcesa, considered
that the Conference was not competent to pronounce itself when
the laws of' war should be applied.2
1. Final Record, Vol. 28, p. 45.
2. Ibid., p. 47.
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fir. Catsberg of Norway did not share such opinions
regarding the competancy of the Conference. He considered
that a text which had come into force could attribute
competency to a specific body, on the sole condition that
the said body agreed to accept it. It might also be envisaged
that the decision relating to implementation of the Conventions
might be entrusted to an arbitrator, but the task of the
latter would be facilitated if precise criteria were specified
in the Covention.
fir. Yingling of the delegation of the United States of
America said that his country would not be willing to give a
free hand to any organism, whether the Security Council or any
other, with regard to deciding whether the Conventions should
come into effect. They were, however, not adverse to the
proposal that under certain circumstances some body should be
called upon to act as a fact—finding agency 1ü determine
whether the conditions governing the application of the
Coventions were fulfilled or not.2
Thus from the very beginning, the question of the
conditions upon which the application of the Conventions would
depend seems to have been closely associated with the question
of who would be competent to determine whether the conditions
for the application of the Conventions were fulfilled or not.
But behind this facade of argumentation about the competency
of the Conference and who would decide what, there was a
fUndamental difference of approach. The Rapporteur of the
Special Committee tells us that after the decision to abandon
'I. Ibid., p. 45.
2 Ibid., pp. 45-45.
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the Stockholm Draft and to define more clearly the cases of
armed conflict of non—international character to which the
Conventions should apply, two ways were then open to the
Special Committee:
- either limit the cases of' conflicts not of an
international character, to which the Conventions would
apply;
- or restrict the provisions of the Conventions which
should be applied in conflicts not of' an international
character.
He goes on to tell us that the two ways did not exclude each
other, and the possibility of solving the problem in different
ways in the four Conventions increased the number of solutions
to be envisaged. While in principle this appeared to be the
case, the fact remains that there was a growing tendency to
subvert any such compromise solution and to utilise the second
alternative to the exclusion of the first. In other words,
there was a growing tendency to abandon the idea of extending
the application of the Conventions, as a matter of' law, to
any armed conflict not of an international character. The
opportunity for this 'minimalist' tendency came when the
1ustralian delegation suggested the creation of a Working
Party to work out a compromise formula. The suggestion was
accepted and a Working Party (later known as the first
Working Party) was set up of' the delegations of; the United
States of America, Australia, France, Norway, and Switzerland.2
After four meetings, the Working Party submitted to the
1 •
 Final Record, Vol. 2B, p. 122.
2. Ibid., p . 46, p. 122.
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Special Committee the following Draft 1rticle:
"1 In the case of armed conflict not of an international
character occuring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall
be bound to implement the provisions of the present
Convention, provided:
a) that the de jure government has recognized the
status of belligerency of the adverse party,
without restrictions, or for the sole purposes of
the application of the present Convention, or
b) that the adverse party presents the characteris-
tics of a State, in particular, that it possesses
an organized military force, that it is under the
direction of an organized civil authority which
exercises de facto governmental functions over
the population of a determinate portion of the
national territory, and that it has the means of
enforcing the Convention, and of complying with
the laws and cu5toms of war; application of the
Convention in these circumstances shall in no wise
depend upon the legal status of the parties to the
conflict.
2. This obligation presupposes, furthermore, in all
circumstances, that the adverse party declares itself
bound by the present Convention, and, as is the de jure
government, by the laws and customs of war (and that it
complies with the above conditions in actual fact).
3. The provisions relating to the Protecting Powers
shall, however, not be applicable, except in the
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instance of special agreement between the Parties to
the conflict. An impartial humanitarian body, such as
the International Committee of the Red Cross, may 0ffer
to the Parties to the conflict to undertake the duties
conferred by the present Convention on the Protecting
Powers.
4. In the case of armed conflicts which do not fulfil
the conditions as determined above, the Parties to the
conflict should endevour to bring into force, by meanS
of special agreements, all or part of the provisions of
the present Convention, or, in all circumstances, to act
in accordance with the underlying humanitarian principles
of the present Convention.
5. In all circumstances stipulated in the foregoing
provisions, total or partial application if the present
Convention shall not affect the legal status of the
Parties to the Conflict."
The 'minimalist tendency' raised its head as soon as the
discussion on this Draft Article began in the Special
Committee at its fifth meeting.
This text, as the Chairman of the Working Party noted,
had been drawn up, taking into consideration, as far as
possible, the amendments, proposals and reservations submitted
by the delegations. 1
 Yet, it drew criticism from most of the
members of the Special Committee.
The French delegation, although a member of' the Working
1	 Final Record, Vol. 28, p. 124.
2. Final Record, Vol. 28, p. 47.
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Party itself was the first to criticise the text, and thus
lead the 'minimalist tendency' in the Special Committee. The
French representative, Mr. Lamarle, said that he remained in
favour of humanizing "all forms of armed conflict." His
delegation was in support of the extension of' the humanitarian
principles of the Conventions to cases of armed conflict not
of an international character, "but he did not feel it was
possible to extend automatically all the clauses of the
Conventions to internal conflicts." This impossibility in his
iiew was particularly obvious in the case of the Civilian
Convention. Mr. Lamarle therefore reserved the point of view
of his government on the Article, as a whole, and proposed to
submit further suggestions at a later stage of the discussion,1
Mr. Hart of the United Kingdom, "strongly supported the
remarks made by the Delegate for France with regard to the
danger in applying the provision of the (Civilian) Convention
as a whole to certain classes of conflict not of an internat-
ional character.
Mr. Maresca of Italy, considered that the words "without
restriction", in sub—paragraph (a) of the first paragraph were
redundant. Concerning sub—paragraph (b), he proposed to delete
the terms "present the characteristics of a State", which, in
his view, gives the impression that the rebels already
constitute a subject in international law." Likewise, in the
second paragraph, the declaration to be made by the rebels
presupposes a legal personality which they could not possess.
Lastly, Fir. flaresca considered that the Conference was not
1. See Final Record, Vol. 2B, p. 47.
2. Ibid., p. 47.
40
competent to pronounce itself when the laws of war should bB
applied. 1
Mr. Yingling of the United States of !\merica said that
his delegation was opposed to the insertion of the clause
contained within brackets at the end of the second paragraph.
The Conventions as they stood contained no conditions in this
respect with regard to war between states, and there seemed
no reson to include provisions of this kind to civil war.2
Mr. De la Pradelle of Monaco made a constructive
suggestion. In his view the text drafted by the Working Party
was indefinite, whereas the Stockholm text was unsound in
aiming at applying to civil war all the provisions of the
Conventions. He proposed that the Working Party, "should recast
its text, endevouring to eliminate the impracticable
conditions, and to determine which provisions of the
Conventions would be applicable in the case of civil war"3
The representative of the ICRC, Mr. Pilloud, was clearly
unhappy with the text drawn by the first Working Party. He
said that the text could never have been applied in any recent
case of civil war e It therefore did not represent a progress
with regard to the present situation. Moreover, he said that
it would often be difficult to determine which was the legal
government, since each Party to the Conflict would pretend
to be the legal government.4
With regard to paragraph 3 of the text of the first
Working Party which states that provisions relating to the
1. Ibid., p. 47.
2. Ibid., p. 48.
3. Ibid., p. 49.
4. See Final Record, Vol. 2B, p. 47-48.
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Protecting Power shall, however, not be applicable, the ICRC
representative said that the value of the Conventions depends
largely upon the means of controlling their application, hence
the need to provide for the intervention by a Protecting Power.
The latter would obviously act only with the approval of the
Detaining Power. 1 The ICRC, however, was in favour of the
Stockholm Draft.
In addition to the remarks made by the ICRC represent-
ative the delegate for the Soviet Union, Mr Morosov, was of
the opinion that the proposal submitted by the Working Party
rendered more difficult the application of' the Conventions to
civil war e He also pointed out that the last sentence of
paragraph 3 and paragraph 4 were mere recommendations, for
they did not stipulate any obligation. The Soviet delegation
were therefore not in favour of the Draft submitted by the
Working Party and preferred the Stockholm Draft!
The Draft of the Working Party was discussed by the
Special Committee at its fifth, sixth and seventh meetings
and at the close of the seventh meeting it was referred to the
same Working Party with the request to submit a new text
taking into account, in so far as possible, the many comments
3
made.
Before leaving the First Draft drawn up by the first
Working Party, it may be noted that when at a later meeting
the Special Committee voted on the various drafts submitted
to it, the Draft drawn up by the First Working Party was
1	 Ibid., p. 48.
2	 Ibid., p. 48.
3. Ibid., p. 122,
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rejected by 7 votes to 4. There was no abstention. 1 The
Stockholm Draft itself was rejected by Nil vote for, 9
against, with 1 abstention,2
The Second Draft drawn up by the First Working Party
was characterized by the fact that it comprised different
regulations for the Civilian Convention on the one hand, and
for the Wounded and Sick, Maritime, and Prisoners of War
Conventions on the other hand. With regard to the latter three
Conventions they were to apply in their entirety in case of an
armed conflict of non—international character, provided:
a) that the de jure government has recognized the status
of belligerency of the adverse party, even for the
sole purpose of the application of the present
Convention, or
b) that the adverse party possesses an organized civil
authority exercising de facto governmental functions
over the population of a determinate portion of the
national territory, an organized military force under
the direction of the above civil authority, and the
means of enforcing the Conventions and the other laws
and customs of war; application of the Conventions in
these circumstances shall in no wise depend on the
legal status of the Parties to the conflict.3
Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5, of the first Draft drawn up
by the first Working Party were also retained in the Second
Draft, and therefore it is unnecessary to reproduce them here
1. Ibid., p. 102.
2 Loc. cit. The 'Nil' vote is explicable by the fact that the
Soviet Union formulated its own alternative of the Stockholm
Draft.
3. Final Record, Vol.. 26, p. 125.
43
With regard to the Convention relative to the Protection
of civilians, the Second Draft drawn up by the first Working
Party had the following stipulation:
Civilian Convention (new rtic1e 2a)
"In the case of armed conflict not of an international
character occuring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, the parties to the conflict should
endevour to bring into force, by means of special
agreements, all or part of' the present Convention and in
all circumstances shall act in accordance with the
underlying humanitarian principles of the present
Convention.1
Thus, with regard to the protection of civilian persons
and their property, only the unspecified 'underlying
humanitarian principles' of the Convention were to be applied
according to the Second Draft of the first Working Party, even
if the de jure government had recognized the status of'
belligerency of the adverse party (the insurgents), or,
alternatively, the adverse party (the insurgents) fulfilled
the conditions as stipulated in (b) above.
The Chairman of the first Working Party, Mr. Plinio
Bolla of' Switzerland, who was also Chairman of the Special
Committee justified this approach to the Civilian Conventions
on the ground that:
"The application of the Civilian Convention raised the
greatest difficulties. \fter having successively
abandoned the idea of an application by analogy - which
1 •
 Final Record, Vol. 26, p. 76.
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was considered dangerous, because it permitted too much
freedom of interpretation - and that of enumeration of
the Articles which would be inapplicable in the case of
civil war - a system which appeared complicated and of
doubtful efficacy - the Working Party decided to impose
on the Contracting State only one obligation; that of
complying in all cases with the underlying humanitarian
principles of the Convention."1
It seems doubtful whether the Chairman himself felt
convinced when he was uttering these words which stop just
short of admitting the legitimacy of' total war. Why application
of' the Convention by analogy was dangerous even if it
permitted too much freedom of interpretation? The ICRC which
originally proposed that the Civilian Convention should be
applied by analogy to occupied territories did not consider
it dangerous. Further, why the most rational approach,namely,
enumeration of inapplicable Articles, or, alternatively,
enumeration of applicable Articles of the Civilian Conventions
was "complicated and of doubtful efficacy"? Is it complicated
and of doubtful efficacy to say, for instance, that the humane
treatment due to the civilian population and individual
civilians is laid down, inter alia, in Articles 27 to 34 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention; in Article 50 regarding the
protection of Children; in Article 53 regarding the prohibition
of destruction of property; in Article 55 regarding food and
medical supplies for the population; in Articles 79 to 131
regarding the treatment of' internees and the conditions
1	 Final Record, Vol. 28, p. 76.
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regarding places of internment, and so forth? Indeed, unless
the underlying principles of the Convention were to be devoid
from any substance it seems difficult to see how the violation
of any of the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention would
not at the same time be a violation of the principles
underlying the Convention. Tyrany and repression do not cease
to be so by describing them as being not illegal. It is
ridiculous that only by means of special agreements with
'outlaws' that governments become 'legally' bound by detailed
regulations regarding treatment of civilian detainees and
internees or other rules contained in the Convention.
But even assuming that the difficulties alluded to by
the Chairman were real difficulties, there was still the more
proper method of formulating the rules of' the Convention in a
language that is more suitable to the situation. After all,
the civilian does not cease to be a civilian whether the war
is international or non—international.
At any rate 'the minimalist tendency' was apparently
gaining ground, for immediatly after, or apparently concomitant
to, the Second Draft of the Working Party, amendments to that
Draft were submitted by the delegations of France, Italy,
Greece and Norway. The amendments submitted by the delegations
of Greece and Norway were withdrawn and nothing is said about
their contents in the Final Record. Sirnilarily, there is no
no trace of' the Italian amendment. The French amendment was
apparently submitted orally, and after a general discussion
on that amendment a Second Working Party including represen-
tatives from France, which had the Chairmanship, Italy, (vionaco,
the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, was set up to examine
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the French amendment and to report to the Special Committee.,1
The presence of the Soviet delegation in such a Working Party
was extremely odd. The Soviet Union had 50 far supported the
Stockholm Draft and therefore was a 'maximalist', while the
other four represented the 'minimalist tendency' which not
only opposed the Stockholm Draft, but were also against the
application of the Conventions to any armed conflict not of
an international character under any circumstances other than
the hypothetical case of special agreements. It was this
'minimalist tendency' which in the end prevailed, as the
present Ptrticle 3 common to the Geneva Convention of 1949
testifies.
The Second Working Party submitted its Draft Prticle to
the Special Committee at the latter's 28th meeting. That Draft,
with minor drafting changes became the text of present Ptrticle
3 common to the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 which will be
reproduced and commented on in the following section. It is
therefore unnecessary to reproduce the text of the Draft drawn
up by the Second Working Party.,2
The 28th meeting of the Special Committee was charact-.
erized by what amounts to a boycot by the delegation of the
Soviet Union. The Chairman of the Special Committee indicated
that the delegation of the Soviet Union had asked for
instructions from their government regarding the new Draft
drawn up by the Working Party and that they were unable to
take part in the discussions on that day because their members
1 •
 See Final Record, Vol. 2B, pp. 76-79.
2. See text in Final Record, Vol. 2B, p. 125-126.
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were occupied in other Cornmittees, 1
 There followed an exchange
of views between Vir . Lamarle (France), Sir Robert Craigie
(United Kingdom), Commander Smith (Australia), and General
Dung (Burma), on the "advisability of continuing the
examination of the new text in the absence of the Soviet
Delegation" 2 - which suggests that the law making process with
regard to the application of the Geneva Conventions to armed
conflicts not of an international character was surrounded by
an air of ideological warfare. The Committee, however, decided
to continue the discussion of the new text, but it postponed
its vote.3
It would be unnecessary to review the discussion on the
Draft drawn up by the Second Working Party under the
Chairmanship of France, since most of the discussion actually
concentrated on whether the Conference was competent to impose
obligations on the insurgents. Dpinion5 on this issue were
divided and it is deemed more appropriate to review the
different views in the context of' our discussion of Article 3
common to the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949
The Draft drawn up by the Second Working Party which
ultirnatly became Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions was
examined by the Special Committee at its 28th, 32nd, 35th and
38th meetings. 4 At the 37th meeting the delegation of the
Soviet Union proposed to reword the Stockholm Draft of'
paragraph 4 of Prticle 2 in the Four Conventions as follows:
1 •
 Ibid., p. 83.
2 Loc. cit.
3. Loc. cit.
4. See Final Record, Vol. 28, pp. 82-84, 89-90, 93-95, 100-101.
See also the Seventh Report drawn up by the Special
Committee of the Joint Committee, ibid., pp. 120-127, at 123.
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p . Wounded and Sick and Maritime Conventions..
the case of' armed conflict not of an international
character occu ing jn the territory of one of the States
Parties to the present Convention, each Party to the
conflict shall apply all the provisions of t' the present
Convention guaranteeing:
Humane treatment Par the wounded and sick; prohibition
of all discriminatory treatment of' wounded and sick
practised on the basis of differences of race, colour,
religion, sex, birth or fortune.0
B. Prisoners of War Convention,
"In the case of armed conflict not of an international
character occuring in the territory of one of the States
parties to the present Convention, each Party to the
conflict shall apply all the provisions at' the present
Convention guaranteeing:
Humane treatment for prisoners of t' war; compliance with
all established rules connected with the prisoners of'
war regime; prohibition of all discriminatory treatment
of' prisoners of' war practised on the basis of differences
of race, colour, sex, birth or fortune."
C. Civilians Convention.
"In the case of armed conflict not of an international
character occuring in the territory of one of the States
parties to the present Convention each Party to the
conflict shall apply all the provisions of the Convention
guaranteeing:
Humane treatment for the civilian population; prohibition
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on the territory occupied by the armed forces of either
of the parties, of reprisals against the civilian
population, the taking of hostages, the destruction and
damaging of property which are not justified by the
necessities of war, prohibition of any discriminatory
treatment of the civilian population practised on the
basis of differences of race, colour, religion, sex,
birth or fortune."1
In introducing his delegation's proposal, 1'1r Morosov
of the Soviet Union said that the guiding principle of his
delegation's proposal was that the obligation should be laid
down on both Parties in all the Conventions. Special emphasis
was laid in the Civilian Convention upon prohibition to
exterminate populations. The novel features of the Soviet
proposal, he said, were that the paragraph concerning special
agreements was deleted (i.e. paragraph 3 of' the Draft drawn
up by the Second Working Party). This deletion, in his view,
was preferable to the proposal drawn up by the Second Working
Party tending to set up a universal Convention in 	 minature
to be applied in the case of civil war. It would hardly be
possible to summarise in twenty—five lines the four hundred
Prticles of' the four Conventions as the working Party had tried
to do. Such a procedure inevitably entailed the renunciation
of many provisions drawn up by the Conference for the
protection of war victims. In the Soviet delegation's view,
"inhuman treatment of human beings and other acts which would
be condemned in the case of international wars between States
1. See Final Record, Vol. 2B, p. 127.
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should likewise be condemned in the instance of civil war."
In the view of the delegation of the Soviet Union, the
paragraph concerning the legal status of the Parties to the
conflict appeared redundant, since the legal status of the
Parties would in no way be affected by the application of the
Conventions. It also did not seem necessary to mention the
ICRC in the Soviet Proposal since the ICRC or any other body
would always be free to offer their services to perform
humanitarian duties.1
Sir Robert Craigie of the United Kingdom felt that the
Soviet proposal offered greater elasticity than the Stockholm
text. owever, he felt that the term "all the provisions", in
the Wounded and Sick and Maritime Conventions was not
appropriate, as the governments, as he put it, "would find
difficulty in applying all these provisions tn insurgent's
leaders." 2 lso, in his view, difficulty would be found in
determining which provisions of the Conventions concerning
humanitarian treatment would be applied 3
 He also could not
accept the deletion of the paragraph on the legal status of
the Parties to the conflict, the omission of the reference
to the ICRC and the deletion of the paragraph concerning
special agreements.4
Mr. Lamarle of France considered that the Soviet Proposal
was an "interesting suggestion by reason of its concision and
its purpose in reconciling the various points of view." He
1. See Final Record, Vol. 28, p. 98.
2 It is not understood why such a difficulty should exist.
3. ! government which cannot solve such a problem should not
be a government at all.
4. See Final Record, Vol. 28, p. 98.
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was therefore in agreement with Section '1%' of the proposal.
But like the British delegate, he took the term "all the
provisions" out of context and added:
"The French Government, however, could not see their way
to applying all the rules contained in the Conventions
to a non—i ternational war e The concept of national
sovereignty was intimately bound up with the idea of
civil war, and, in such cases, all governments would
insist that their sovereignty remains intact... Likewise,
all rules governing the regime of the treatment of
prisoners of war could not be applied in a civil war
because, here again, the mandates conferred upon the
Protecting Powers would thereby impair the sovereignty
of governments. The same remarks would hold for the
Civilian Conventions."
Such remarks are reminiscent of the past absolute
monarchies of the 18th century and the famous phrase of Louis
XItith "I am the State". It is extremely out of place to speak
of' the"sovereignty of the government" in the age of the
"sovereignty of' the people" and the right of' peoples to self—
determination. Besides, as the representative of Denmark, Mr.
Cohn pointed out, "the sovereignty of the state would remain
intact although humanitarian treatment was given to war
victims." Denmark herself was in favour of the Soviet proposal.,2
However, in reply to the criticism made by the British
and French delegates, the delegate of' the Soviet Union, Mr.
I'lorosov said that he would be in agreement with the
1. Final Record, Vol. 28, p. 98.
2. Ibid., p. 99.
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maintenance of the paragraph on special agreement, and with
the mention of the ICRC. With regard to the treatment of
prisoners of war and civilians, he said that the Soviet
proposal aimed at the application of the most humane treatment
possible, but this did not involve the application of all the
contractual provisions. The purpose was to apply the general
provisions, but not the technical ones, such as those relating
to courts and penal sanctions.1
The Soviet proposal may appear to have left unsettled the
question of the conditions under which the Conventions would
apply. The !\ustralian delegation understood it as leaving to
each of the Parties to the conflict to evaluate the conditions
under which the Conventions would apply. 2 8ut apparently this
was not the intention of the Soviet Union. In his criticism of
the Draft drawn up by the first Working Party, the Soviet
delegate, General Slavin said that the Draft did not give
satisfaction because, in his view,
"The object of the Conventions was to provide for their
immediate application in case of a conflict of non—
international character. It was not for the Parties to
the conflict to decide whether the Conventions should
be applied or not. It was of paramount importance that
upon the outbreak of a conflict, the application of the
Conventions should be automatic."3
Having now reviewed the work of the Special Committee
(not thoroughly of course), it is time to see what were the
1	 Final Record, Vol. 20, p. 99.
2. Loc. cit.
3. Ibid., p. 79.
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resu]. ts.
The Soviet proposal, despite all its merits was rejected
by the Special Committee by 1 vote for, with 9 against.1
The Committee then voted on the text drawn up by the
Second Working Party as amended by the Special Committee. This
text, it should be recalled, constituted a new Article 2A which
finally became Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions
of 1949. It was voted on paragraph by paragraph; paragraph 1
of Article 2A was rejected by 5 votes for, with 5 against;
paragraph 2 was rejected by 4 votes for, 5 against, with 1
abstention; paragraph 3 was rejected by 5 votes for, with 5
against; paragraph 4 fell because of the preceding vote.
Article 2A as a whole (i.e. present Article 3) was therefore
rejected by the Special Committee.,2
The Draft drawn up by the First Working Party considered
as an amendment to the Stockholm Draft, was rejected by 4 votes
for and 7 against.3
Article 2, fourth paragraph, of' the Stockholm text, was
rejected by Nil vote for, 9 against with 1 abstention.4
The Chairman of the Special Committee concluded that the
Committee had decided that Article 2, fourth paragraph, (of the
Stockholm Draft) should be deleted and should not be replaced
by another text.,, 5
 The delegations of Australia and the Soviet
Union objected to the Chairman's ruling on the ground that the
Special Committee was not competent to decide whether a text
1., Final Record, Vol. 26 p. 100.
2. Ibid., p. 101.
3. Ibid., p. 102.
4. Loc. cit.
5. Loc. cit.
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to cover the case of civil war should be inserted or not. It
was therefore agreed that the Special Committee should submit
a report to the Joint Committee about its work. And so it was;
the Special Committee submitted its report 1 to which it was
appended:
a) the first Draft drawn up by the First Working Party;
b) the second Draft drawn up by the First Working Party;
c) the Draft drawn up by the Second Working Party;
d) the Draft drawn up by the Second Working Party as
amended by the Special Committee;
e) the proposal submitted by the delegation of the Soviet
Union.
Apparently, there was no discussion in the Joint
Committee of these Drafts. In the Report drawn up by the Joint
Committee and presented to the Plenary Assembly we read the
follouing:
"The first and second Drafts of the First Working Party
reduced to their simplest terms, make it obligatory for
both Parties to apply the Conventions but subject to one
of the following two conditions: the recognition of
belligerent status by the legitimate government to its
adversary (the formal criterion), or the existance of
the features of a state on the rebel sides (the material
criterion). The Joint committee rejected them.
The Report does not say why they were rejected, nor does
it indicate the method by which the rejection took place.
1. See the Seventh Report drawn up by the Special Committee of
the Joint Committee, Final Record, Vol. 28, pp. 12O127.
2 Final Record, Vol. 28, p. 129
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However, in vieu of the fact that even Western Powers could
not agree among themselves on these criteria in the Special
Committee, even as a matter of lex ferenda, it must be admitted
that neither recognition of' belligerency, nor the fulfilment
of certain conditions by the insurgents, were customary
international law criteria for the application of the law of
armed conflict to the mutual relations of the Parties to the
conflict. This conclusion is further supported by the fact
that the Soviet proposal was rejected by the Joint Committee
by 25 votes to 9 with 3 abstentions.1
It is extremely unfortunate that the Soviet proposal was
rejected, but it seems that the majority of delegations in the
Joint Committee were reluctant to go further than the text
drawn up by the Second Working Party. This text, as mentioned
earlier, abandoned the idea of applying the Geneva Conventions
as a whole except by means of special agreement. It was
adopted by the Joint Committee by 21 votes to 6 with 14
abstentions. 2
 This text as stated before, constituted a new
Article 2A and has finally become Article 3 common to the
four Geneva Conventions of 1949
In the Plenary Assembly of the Diplomatic Conference
the Soviet delegation submitted its proposal as an alternative
to the text which was adopted by the Joint Committee and
recommended by it to the Plenary Assembly. The Soviet proposal
was introduced by an impressive speech by the Soviet delegate,
Ivir. 1lorosov, 3
 but the majority of' delegations were obviously
1 •
 Final Record, Vol. 28, p. 129.
2. Loc. cit.
3. Ibid., pp . 325-327.
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unimpressed. The Soviet proposal was this time rejected by 20
votes to 11, with 7 abstentions.1
The Plenary Assembly then voted on a proposal submitted
by the delegation of Burma to delete Article 2A, but the
proposal was defeated; Article 2A was finally adopted by 34
votes to 12, wit 1 abstention. 2 Article 2A is the present
Article 3 common to the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949.
It provides as follows:
"In the case of armed conflict not of an international
character occuring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall
be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities,
including members of armed forces who have laid down
their arms and those placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause,
shall in all circumstances be treated humanely,
without any adverse distinction founded on race,
colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or
any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall
remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever with respect to the above—mentioned
persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment
and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
1. Ibid., p. 338.
2. Final Record, Vol. 2B, p. 339.
57
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out
of executions without previous judgement
pronounced by a regularly constituted court,
affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensible by civilized peoples.
(2) The wo nded and sick shall be collected and cared
for.
Pn impartial humanitarian body, such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer
its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further
endevour to bring into force, by means of special
agreements, all or part of' the other provisions of
the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall
not affect the legal status of the Parties to the
conflict.
Clearly, this 1rticle does not envisage the application
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in their entirety, except
by the very remote possibility of a'special agreement' between
the Parties to the conflict.
In the light of the above discussion the following
concluding remarks seem to be justified:
First, the term 'armed conflicts not of an international
character' was a completely new term. Nothing wrong with
introducing it if the Geneva Conventions gave a definition,
or, which comes to the same thing, if the term 'armed conflict
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of an international character' was used and defined in the
Conventions. But since neither term was defined, the
distinction between international and non—international armed
conflicts remained controversial, with the inevitable
consequence that the efficacy of the Geneva Conventions in
alleviating the sufferings of the victims of armed conflicts
is reduced to the minimum.
Second, it appears from the above discussion that what
international lawyers have traditionally claimed to be rules
of customary international law pertaining to the applicablity
of the law of armed conflict in its entirety between the
contending parties, were no more than mere theories. This is
evidenced by the fact that the proposals of the First Working
Party to make the application of the Geneva Conventions in
their entirety mandatory, if the government against which the
armed conflict was waged recognized the insurgents as bellig-
erents, or if certain conditions of fact were fulfilled, were
rejected in all the Committees of the Conference. It would be
difficult to explain this rejection if the rules under
discussion were really rules of international law.
Third, it is probably fair to attribute the failure of
the Conference to go beyond the provisions of 1\rticle 3 to the
lack of political will on the part of Western States.
It is true that underneath the legal arguments for and
against every proposal made at the Diplomatic Conference there
were the traditional notions of the sovereignty of the state
and domestic jurisdiction, but probably the most powerful
factor which determined the result was the fact that the
atmosphere of the Conference was one of cold warfare between
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East and West. The reader of the summary records of the
Conference may not fail to observe that the Soviet Union had
advocated the widest possible application of the Conventions
to armed conflicts not of an international character. From
a Western point of view, and from the point of view of Third
World countries,which were at the receiving end of whatever
restraints the Conference might put on their freedom of action,
this meant interference in what they regarded as domestic
affairs. This may explain why the most traditional theories
generally advocated by Western writers, and even claimed to be
rules of customary international law, seemed too revolutionary
and have been abandoned. r\lthough as we have seen, initiially
at least, most Western delegations seemed in favour of a
regulation of the application of the Ceneva Conventions in
their entirety, on the basis of traditional legal thought.
Fourthly, and last, even the adoption of flrticle 3 in
such an atmosphere must be regarded as a revolutionary step.
The importance of' I\rticle 3 is not so much the fact that it
prohibits certain acts at any time and in any place whatsoever;
it is the fact that for the first time in the history of
international law the international regime of human rights had
turned to the offensive, and had penetrated the traditional
defences of sovereignty of the state and domestic jurisdiction.
3.	 Field of 1pplication of 1\rticle 3
To some writers, the words f armed conflicts not of an
international character' are a mystery. Tom Farer wrote:
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"One of the most assured things that might be said about
the words 'armed conflict not of an international
character' is that no one can say with assurance
precisely what meaning they were intended to convey.
There clearly was a compromise. But only the arts of
divinatio seem capable of establishing beyond dispute
its true nature."1
Protocol I dditional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
relating to the protection of victims of armed conflicts of
international charat2er may at least partly solve the problem of
the definition of armed conflicts not of' an international
charact r Prtocol I applies to interstate armed conflicts and,
according to tbe terms of its 1\rticle 1, paragraph 4, to armed
conflicts in which peoples are righting against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in
the exercise of their right to self—determination.2
There is some controversy as to whether t all' armed
conflicts in which peoples right for their right of self—
determination are of international character, or only armed
conflicts in which peoples fight against "colonial domination
and alien occupation and against racist regimes." In this
writer's view, all armed conflicts in which peoples fight for
their right of self—determination should be considered armed
conflicts of international character for purposes of intern-
ational humanitarian law.
1 Tom Farer, Humanitarian Law and !rmed Conflicts: Toward the
Definition of' International 1rmed Conflict, Columbia Law
Review, Vol. 71, 1971, pp. 43 and 51.
2. This subject is examined at length in Chapter 3 of this
thesis.
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1\ccordingly, one may reasonably start from the premise
that armed conflicts of non—international character are civil
wars in which peoples are not fighting for self—determination.
Factually, such armed conflicts may range from minor and
separate incidents to full—fledged civil war between well
organized parties to the conflict, each in control of a sig-
nificant part of national territory in which it exercises the
functions of a 1 cal government. It is therefore important to
determine the point at which 1\rticle 3 becomes applicable.
The authors of the ICRC Commentary, without a shred of
evidence, state that:
"it must be recognized that the conflicts referred to in
1\rticle 3 are armed conflicts, with armed forces on
either side engaged in hostilities - conflicts, in short,
which are in many respects similar to an international
war, but take place within the confines of a single
country. In many cases, each of the parties is in
possession of a portion of the national territory, and
there is often some sort of froot"1
Paradoxically, however, the authors of' the ICRC Commentary
think that the scope of 1rticle 3 must be as wide as possible.
"Uhat government", they say, "would dare to claim before the
world, in case of civil disturbances which would justly be
described as mere acts of banditry, that, 1\rticle 3 not being
applicable, it was entitled to leave the wounded uncared for,
to torture and mutilate prisoners and take Hostages 2
1, Pictet (edj, Commentary on the Fourth (civilian) Convention
of '149, Ceneva, ICRC, 1958,	 . 36.
2. Loc. cit.
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in the view of' the authors of the Eommentary, "no government
can object to observing, in its dealing with internal enemies,
uhateve the nature of the conflict between it and them, a few
essential rules which in fact it observes daily, under its own
laws, even when dealing with common criminals."1
However, e n with the most charitable interpretation of
the ICRC's conception of armed conflicts of non—international
character, as q ted above, it would be impossible to claim
that Article 3 applies to cases of internal disturbances and
mere acts of banditry.
Baxter also criticises the contradictory attitude of the
IGRC C mmentary, but he does not say when Article 3 becomes
applicable. He says that he is sure of one thing:
"There is no consensus as to the application of Article
3 to what are, in comparative terms, the lower leuels of
2
violence." But he did not explain what the"louer levels of
violence" are.
Draper notes that the current tendency is to consider an
Article 3 conflict to be in existence whenever the police are
no longer able to enforce the criminal law in a particular
area by reason of the rebel action, and a sustained troop
action is taken against the rebels, even though the rebels'
organization and control of any area is minimal. 3 This seems
reasonable.
1. •
 Loc. cit.
2. RR.Baxter, Jus in Bello Interno, in J.N1'loore (ed.), Law
and Civil Uar in the iviodern World, Princeton, 175, p. 526.
3. Draper, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, Recueil des Cours
of the Hague Academy of International Law, 1965, Vol I,
p. 94.
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A similar view was expressed by the representative of'
Switzerland, Mr. Bolla, during the debate in the Plenary
Assembly of the Diplomatic Conference of 1949. "An armed
conflict, as understood in this provision (Article 3)", he
said, "implies some form of organization among the Parties to
the conflict. Su h organization will, of course, generally be
founded on the governmental side; but there must also be some
degree of organization among the jflsurgent5•1
1\ similar view was also adopted by the Institute of
International Law in its resolution on the principles of
non—inter ention in civil uar Article 1 of this resolution
defined the 'concept of civil war' as follows:
"1. For the purposes of this resolution the term civil
war shall apply to any armed conflict not of an
international character which breaks out in the
territory of a state and in which there is opposition
between: (a) the established government and one or
more insurgent movements whose aim is to overthrow
the government or the political, economic, or social
order of the state; or (b) two or more groups contend
with one another for the control of the state.
2 Within the meaning of this resolution the term civil
war shall not cover local disorders or
It should be noted that all the above mentioned criteria
still fall within the traditional approach which distinguishes
1 Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949,
iol. 2B, p. 335.
2 See in the Annuaire of the Institute of' International Law,
1975, pp. 545 - 47.
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between 'armed conflicts' and 'civil disturbances and
tensions', an approach which also round expession in the
second paragraph of' Article 1 of Protocol II additional to the
Ceneva COnv8ntions of 1949, and relating to the protection of
victims of armed conflict of non—international character. The
Protocol went so far as to state that:
"1 ternal disturbances and tensions, such as riots,
isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of
a similar nature, are not •.. armed conflicts."
From a humanitarian point of view, this provision was a
set back even by the standards of the 1949 Diplomatic
Conference, because it implies that Article 3 does not apply
to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, riots,
sporadic acts of violence and the like. It is true that
governments are in the habit of glossing over the scale of
armed opposition and even dehumanize their opponents who take
to arms by calling them 'terrorists' - a term which is in
vogue these days. But that should not be at the expense of
humanity. No one in 1949 had said that sporadic acts of
violence carried out by an organized insurgent movement is not
an armed conflict. It will be useful therefore to quote some
of what has been said at the Diplomatic Conference with regard
to the application of' Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.
The text of Article 3 was drafted by the Second Working
Party with Mr. Lamarle of France as Chairman. Introducing the
text which became Article 3, Mr. Lamarle said that, "it
offered in all cases and circumstances the chief advantage of
permitting the automatic implementation of concrete and precise
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provisions which were the essence of humanitarian rules to be
observed in cases of' armed conflict not of an international
character. •.. The text, moreover, contained no clause of a
political character which could possibly lead to contestation."1
At another meeting Mr. Lamarle said: "The French
Government was prepared to apily the principles contained in
the text of the Second Working Party (i.e. Article 3), even
to bandits."2
The Australian delegate Colonel Hodgson considered that
"the de iure government would be bound to carry out all the
provisions of' the Article even if the insurgents were mere
bandits, whereas no obligation whatsoever would rest on the
latter.
The representative of Greece, Mr Agathocles said that
"any insurgent or bandit would be a national of a Signatory
State, and would ipso facto be bound by the Convention (i.e.
Article 3)•4
No delegate had objected to these statements, and it is
not in vain that it was insisted that Article 3 is applicable
even when insurgents are described as mere bandits and even to
banciits proper. This simply means that the treatment required
by the Article is applicable whatever may be the intensity of
the conflict. The Conference seem to have acted on the premise
that the humane treatment and the particularized prohibitions
. Final Records, Vol. 28, pp. 82-83. This, however was belied
by the attitude of France during the Algerian War of'
Independence, see, Arnold Fraleigh, The Algerian Revolution
as a Case Study in International Law, in Falk (ed.), The
International Law of Civil War, pp. 179 et seq., esp. pp.
194 - 203.
2. Final Records, Vol. 28, p. 99.
3. Ibid., p. 94.
4. Loc. cit.
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referred to in paragraph 1 oP Article 3 are underogable human
rights which apply in peace and continue to apply in armed
conflicts. No more definite language could have been chosen
for the purpose be ter than the words: "To this end the
following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and
in any place whatsoever with respect to the above mentioned
persons." The phrase "at any time and in any place whatsoever"
was deliberately added, and was the subject of a special vote.
Certainly it cannot mean that until the armed conflict had
reached a certain degree of intensity, or until the Parties to
the conflict had reached a certain degree of organization, no
obligation would devolve on the Parties to the conflict. \fter
all, persons protected by Article 3 are persons uho do not
take an active part in the hostilities.
In brief, notwithstanding the term 'armed conflict not
of an international character, the protection due to the
persons referred to in Article 3 remains due to them,
irrespective of' the intensity of the conflict; of the
organization of the insurgents; of their control of any part
of' the national territory; or of' the general or local
character of' the conflict, Those who are still obsessed with
the distinction between the concept of' 'armed conflict' and
the concept of internal disturbances and tensions are well
advised to absorb the basic and simple fact that what is
prohibited by the laws of armed conflict is afortiori
prohibited when there is no armed conflict at all. Moreover,
the humane treatment and the particularized prohibitions in
paragraph 1 oP Article 3, all constitute human rights from
which no derogation is permissable even "in time of public
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emergency which threatens the life of the nation."1
4.	 Obligations of the Parties to the Conflict
One may read in the text of' Article 3 common to the Four
Geneva Conventions of 1Y49 too much or too little, depending
on one's conception of the definition of persons protected by
the Article nd of the humane treatment to which they are
entitled.
The definition of protected persons is all the more
important since among the prohibitions which have to be
obser	 'at any time and in any place whatsoever" is the
prohibition of "violence to life and person."
According to its o n terms, Article 3 protects person5
taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of
the armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed
hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other
cause "
The phrase 'taking no active part in hostilities' must
be understood to mean 'taking no active part in military
operations'. This interpretation is supported by the fact that
members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and
those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or
any other cause, are protected by the Article. Afortiori,
therefore, civilians who support the insurgents cause by words
or deeds but otherwise do not take part in military operations,
1 •
 Article 4, of' the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
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and passive civilians, are also protected by the Prticle. But
this does not solve the problems of the definition of' protected
persons.
1\ccording to tne French representative, 1r. Lamarle, who
was the architect of Prticle 3, the 1\rticle protected "all
persons, except combatants at the time they were engaged in
fighting," 1
 This seems imprecise inasmuch as it suggests that
even members of' t e armed forces (other than those who have
laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat) are also
protected by P1rticle 3, while not taking an active part in the
hostilities, Of' course, from a governmental point of' view, all
violence committed by the insurgents is illegal, and all action
taken by governmental forces is usually classified as 'police
action' to keep law and order. But it is unlikely that members
of' the armed forces on either side, other than those expressly
included in the definition of protected persons, were intended
to be protected by article 3. However, exclusion of the members
of the armed forces on both sides (other than those expressly
included in the P1rticle) does not solve the problem of the
definition of protected persons.
rjor does the suggestion that the Geneva Conventions are
not concerned with the conduct of' hostilities, which however,
is controversial, solves the problem, for it is still
necessary to determine who are the persons against whom
"violence to life and person" is prohibited at any time and in
any place whatsoever. Moreover, some rules relating to the
conduct of hostilities may be read in 1\rticle 3 without doing
1, Final Records of the Diplomatic Conference of' Geneva of'
1949, Vol. 28, p . 84.
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violence to its wording. Furthermore, neither customary
international law, nor any treaty on the law of' armed conflict
affords absolute protection to persons taking no active part
in the hostilities. 1rticle 3, therefore, seems contradictory.
In order to remove this apparent contradiction the
protection afforded by f\rticle 3 must be read subject to the
rules relating to the conduct of military operations. Where
such rules do not interfere with the protection afforded by
1\rticle 3, as for instance in the case of persons detained or
interned for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether
they were civilians or members of the armed forces of the
Parties to the conflict, the absolute minimum of prohibited
acts referred to in sub—paragraph 1 (a) to (d) remains
operative.
Pis for the rest of the population who do not take a
direct part in military operations, the prohibitions also
remain operative for each Party to the conflict, with regard to
such persons in the territory under its control, as well as in
the territory under the control of the adverse Party, subject
to the rules regulating the conduct of military operations.
In no other way the phrase 'persons taking no active part
in hostilities' can be reconciled with the absolute character
of the acts prohibited by paragraph '1 of Article 3. Moreover,
the above analysis is compatible with the human rights
approach to Article 3.
Article 4 of' the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights allows states tn derogate from their
obligations under the Covenant "jn time of public emergency
which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of
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which is officially proclaimed", only to the extent strictly
required by the exigences of the situation. Nevertheless,
there are certain human rights from which no derogation is
allowed even in time of public emergency, prominent among which
is the right to life (1\rticle 6), and the right to humane
treatment (prticle 7).
Pkrticle 6, paragraph 1 of the Covenant provides:
"Every human being has the inherent right to life. This
right shall be protected by law. No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his life."
It is clear from the last sentence that protection of the
right to life is not absolute; what the provision seems to
prohibit is the arbitrary deprivation of life, but it did not
elaborate on the cases where the deprivation of life is not to
be regarded as arbitrary. In this respect, i\rticle 2 of the
European Convention on Human Rights 1 , is more detailed. It
states in paragraph 2 that "deprivation of life shall not be
regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Pirticle when it
results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely
necessary:
"(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to affect a lawful arrest or to prevent the
escape of a person lawfully detained;
(c) in action taken for the purpose of quelling a riot
or insurrection."
1\rticle 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
like !\rticle 4 of' the International Covenant on Civil and
1 .
 Text in Brownlie (ed.), Basic Documents in International
Law, second (revised) edition, 1978, pp. 206 et seq.
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Political Rigths, allows for derogation from human rights in
time of war or public emergency. But no derogation from
Article 2 (the ri ht to life) is allowed "except in respect of
deaths resulting from lawful acts of war," As Professor Draper
had noted, "in Article 15(2) of the European Convention, deal-
ing with derogat n from the right to' life - the most funde-
mental of all human rights, the whole of the law of war as to
killing has been ncorporated by reference,"1
I us t e human rights approach to Article 3 common to the
Four Geneva Conventions clearly supports the view stated above
- that the prohibition of violence to life and person in that
Article should be read subject to the laws regulating the
conduct of military operations.
Admittedly, this conclusion modifies the wording of the
Article - "To this end the following acts are and shall remain
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with regard
to the above—mentioned persons", - with regard to violence to
life and person, which in any case is modified by the
Conventions on human rights, If, however, one has to insist on
the absolute nature of the prohibition, the price would be to
limit the definition of "persons taking no active part in the
to those who have been detained or interned for
reasons relating to the conflict, which, in the light of
general international law, would be a clear distortion.
It should be noted, however, that even within the
absolutist approach one may still read in the text of Article
1, Draper, The Relationship Between the Human Rights Regime
and the Law of Armed Conflict, in Israel Year Book on Human
Rights, Vol. 1, 1971, pp
	
191 et seq. at p. 197.
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3 some of the rules relating to the conduct of hostilities
without doing any violence to the wording of the Article. This
is particularly true of' the fundemental rule that attacks
directed exclusively at the civilian population or individual
civilians are prohibited 1 , and of the rule which prohibits
attacks against	 rsons placed hors de combat.2
Thus, which ever way one looks at Prticle 3 common to
the Geneva Conve tions, it seems difficult to escape the
conclusion that, at least, some of the rules relating to the
conduct of military operations also apply in the case of armed
conflicts of non—international character governed by Article
3, even before the conflict reaches the level required by
3
Protocol II.
So far, we have focused on the prohibition of violence to
life as regulated in Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions
and in international conventions on human rights. Closely
connected to the prohibition of violence to life is the
prohibition of the taking of hostages. Until the Geneva
Coventions of 1949 the taking of hostages was not prohibited
under customary international law, and the taking of hostages
was closely integrated with reprisals. 4 The following are
excerpts from "The Hostage Case" decided by the United States
Military Tribunal V at Nuremberg, on February 19, 1948:
1	 This rule is now codified in Article 13(2) of' Protocol II,
and in Article j1(2) of Protocol I, additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949k
2. See Article 41 of Protocol I. A corresponding provision in
draft Protocol II was adopted in Committee but was deleted
in Plenary.
3. On Protocol II, see Chapter 3 of this thesis.
4. See Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 10, pp.
321 - 324.
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t t Hostages under the alleged modern practice of nations
are taken (a) to protect individuals held by the enemy,
(b) to force the payment of requisitions, contributions,
and the like, and (c) to ensure against unlawful acts by
enemy forces or people. We are concerned here only with
the last provision. That hostages may be taken for this
purpose cannot be denied."1
. . . . . . . •....... •. •. •I. •. •I ....... . I• I ........I
' t Nationality or geographic proximity may under certain
circumstances afford a basis for hostage selection,
depending upon the circumstances of' the situation. This
arbitrary basis of selection may be deplored but it
cannot be condemned as a violation of international law,
but there must be some connection between the popDlation
from whom the hostages are taken and the crime commit-
ted.
•	 S •• •• • • S •S ••••• •S•S• ••• • • t•••. ..••S... . •...••••
"It is essential to a lawful taking of hostages under
customary law that proclamation be made, giving names
and addresses of hostages taken, notifying the population
that upon the recurrence of stated acts of war treason
the hostages will be shot. The number of hostages shot
must not exceed in severity the off'ences the shooting is
designed to deter. Unless the foregoing requirements are
met, the shooting of hostages is in contravention of
international law and is a war crime in itself."3
1 •
 Ibid., p. 321.
2. Ibid., p. 322.
3. Ibid., p. 323.
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For the purposes of the judgement the term 'hostages' was
used to refer to persons of the civilian population taken into
custody for the purpose of guaranteeing with their lives the
future good conduc of the population of the community from
which they were taken. The term 'reprisal prisoners' was used
to refer to persons taken from the civilian population to be
killed in retaliation for offences committed by unknown
persons within th occupied area.1
The Nure berg Tribunal notes that the taking of hostages
and 'prisoner reprisals' was practised extensively by Germany
during the two World Wars. "The right to do so", said the
Tribunal, was"recognized by many nations including the United
2States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union."
That was 'state terrorism' par excellence, and it was
rightly prohibited by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 with
regard to both international and non—international armed
conflicts. Nevertheless the taking of hostages is still widely
practised by insurgent movements, and it is clearly insuffi
-
cient to say that the practice is illegal, and to denounce it
as acts of terrorism. It has proved to be an effective weapon
in the hands of insurgents and it is unlikely to be abandoned
by them until governments change their treatment of captured
insurgents. Every time a 'hostage 	 arises governments are
caught in the dilema of negotiating with persons they regard
as mere 'terrorists' or endangering the safety of the hostages.
In many cases governments have had to swallow their pride and
negoiate either openly or by prnxy, and in some cases hostages
have in fact been killed before negotiations began. The practice
1 •
 Ibid., p. 322.
2. Ibid., p. 323.
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is unlikely to stop simply because governments have decided to
make it illegal or because public opinion finds it repugnant.
What is needed is a more realistic approach to the treatment
of captured insurg nts, since in most cases the taking of
hostages was actually done for the purpose of either improving
the treatment of captured insurgents or securing their release.
In view of' this fact, it may be the best remedy in case of' an
armed conflict of non—international character is to grant
prisoner—of—war status to all captured insurgents irrespective
of the intensity of the conflict; of' the legal staus of the
parties to the conflict; of control of' territory by the
insurgents; or of any other consideration. Indeed, in so far
as the prisoner—of—war status does	 not exempt the prisoner
from prosecution for war crimes, it might prove to be one of
the most effective weapons in countering insurgency, and at
the same time, of humanizing the armed conflict. This may be
done in the knowledge that denial of prisoner—of—war status
always, politically, plays into the hands of the insurgents,
and in the knowledge that nothing would disgrace a combatant
more than proving him in a fair trial to be a war criminal.
Unfortunately for humanity in warfare, governments have
not yet realized the importance of humanity in warfare as a
weapon in countering insurgency, and the importance of
'granting', rather than 'denying' the prisoner—of—war staus
in particular.
However, prticle 3 does not contemplate the prisoner—of-
war status except by means of a special agreement between the
parties to the conflict. Indeed, it does not contemplate the
application of' any of' the other provisions of the Geneva
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Conventions except by means of special agreement. All that
Article 3 aFfords to persons taking no active part in the
hostilities is the minimum of' humane treatment that actually
provides no incentive to the insurgents to abide by the
Conventions. It may be noted in this respect that the recent
Geneva Diplomatic C nference (1974_1977), a provision making
it mandatory for courts to take into consideration the fact
that the person pro cuted for the sole reason of' having taken
part in hostilities, having respected the Protocol, that in
such a case the death penalty should not be carried out until
the end of' the armed conflict, was rejected in Plenary by 26
votes to 12 with 49 abstentions. The provision was considered
an interference in t e so e eignty of' the state. 1 All that
Article 3 pro ibits in this respect is "the passing of' senten-
ces and t e carrying out of executions without previous
judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court,
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispens ble y ivilized p ol s."
In addition to the prohibition of violence to life, in
particular murder of' all kinds, Article 3 also prohibits
violence to person, particularly mutilation cruel treatment
and torture. These acts are prohibited by Article 7 of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also, from which no
derogation is allowed even in public emergency. It provides:
"No one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no
one shall be subjected without his free consent to
1. See CDDH/SR.50, para. 56 - 86.
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medical or scientific experimentation."
The prohibition of torture is particularly important since
it is often used by interrogators to extract confessions and
to collect information a out the insurgent movement and its
members.
(irticle 3 also protects the dignity of persons. Outrages
upon personal dignty, in particular, humiliating and
degrading treat ent are prohibited.
T e wounde , sick and shipwrecked, merited one line in
the !\rticle: they shall be collected and cared for.
The s - alled right of umanitarian initiative is
guaranteed y t e 1\rticle; an impartial humanitarian body,
suc as t e Internatonal Committee of the Red Cross, may
off r its services to the Parties to the conflict. But there
i5 no obligaton on th Parties to the conflict to accept the
services of suc a
	 manitarian body. Similarly, the !\rticle
exhorts the P rties to t e conflict to endevour to bring into
force, by means of a special agreement, all or part of the
other provisions of t e Geneva Convention5. But no government
had endevoured to do so, probably for fear that its action
might be interpreted as implying some sort of recogntion of
the insurgents' movement. This seems to have been so, although
expressly states that the application of its provisions "shall
not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict."
In conclusion, it may be stated that the obligations of
the Parties to the conflict under Prticle 3 have been kept to
an absolute minimum. But there is no international machinery
to supervise the application of that minimum which, in many
cases, has remained a pie in the sky.
7e
CHAPTER TUO
PROTOCOL II ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA
COVENTIONS OF 1949 RELATING TO THE
PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF NON—INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICTS
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1	 Introduction
No doubt Article 3 common to the Four Geneva Conventions
of 1949 did not work well in practice, partly because
governments tended to deny the existence of an armed conflict,
and partly (in this writer's view) because the standards of
respect for human rights demanded by Article 3 are higher than
that which many governments would be prepared to concede under
their emergency laws or perhaps even in time of peace. The
paradox of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions becomes evident
from the fact that, while almost all states are parties to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, the International Covenants on
Human Rights had collected only 35 accessions or ratifications
by 1976, and thus entered into force, although these Covenants
were in fact adopted in 1966.
Yet, the International Conference on Human Rights which
was held in 1968 in Teheran to commemorate the twentieth
anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
called out for more 'law' for respect of human rights in armed
conflicts. 1
 Thus, in Resolution No. XXIII, the Conference
considered (incorrectly I think), that the Geneva Conventions
not sufficiently broad in scope to cover all armed
when in fact the question was not one of breadth
or scope, but one of interpretation and classification - that
is, a question of determining whether the armed conflicts in
1. Of course the laws of armed conflict needed revision; what
is suggested is that governments should bring into force
the International Covenants On Human Rights and by doing so
prevent most, If' not all, civil wars from happening.
2. For the text of resolution (xxiii) of' the international
Conference on Human Rights, see Schindler and Toman, The
Laws of Armed Conflict, 1973, pp. 189 - 190.
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which peoples are fighting in the exercise of their right of
self—determination are of' international or non—international
character. This was a question that had not been decided by
the Geneva Diplomatic Conference of 1949 and aroused much
controversy at the Teheran Conference itself, at the United
Nations and at the International Conferences on the reaffir-
mation and development of international humanitarian law
applicable in armed conflicts, held in Geneva in 1971 and 1972,
and on and off from 1974 to 1977
However, the fact remains that the Teheran Conference set
in motion the process of' reaffirmation and development of
international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict by
requesting the General Assembly of the United Nations to
invite the Secretary—General of the United Nations to study:
"(a) Steps which could be taken to secure the better
application of existing humanitarian international
conventions and rules in all armed conflicts;
(b) The need for additional humanitarian international
conventions or for possible revision of existing
Conventions to ensure the better protection of
civilians, prisoners and combatants in all armed
conflicts and the prohibition and limitation of the
use of certain methods and means of warfare."1
The General Assembly of' the United Nations gave effect to
this request by its famous resolution 2444 (xxiii) of' 19
December 1968, in which it also recognized "the necessity of'
applying basic humanitarian principles in all armed conflicts",
1, Ibid., p. 190.
81
and affirmed the following principles "for observance by all
governmental and other authorities responsible for action in
armed conflict:
(a) That the right of the parties to a conflict to adopt
means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited;
(b) That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the
civilian population as such;
(c) That distinction must be made at all times between
persons taking part in the hostilities and members of
the civilian population to the effect that the latter
be spared as much as possible."1
In the equally famous resolution 2675 (xxv) of 9 December,
1970, the General Assembly, "bearing in mind the need for
measures to ensure the better protection of human rights in
armed conflicts of all typesI, affirmed "basjc principles for
the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts,
without prejudice to their future elaboration within the
framework of progressive development of the international law
of' armed conflict."2
To cut it short, without going into matters of detail of
the process of reaffirmation and development of international
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict, it may be
sufficient to note that although for the first time the United
Nations played an important role in the process, the ball, as
may be expected, had finally rested in the court of the
International Committee of the Red Cross. In preparing the two
1. Ibid., p. 191.
2. Text in ibid., pp. 195 - 196. See also Section 1 of Chapter
4 of this thesis.
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draft Protocols which servsd as a bajs for discussions at the
Conference of Government Experts (1971 and 1972) and then at
the Diplomatic Conference (1974 to 1977), the ICRC took the
General Assembly of' the United Nations at its word - that
protection of the civilian population should in principle be
the same in all types of armed conflict. 1 Moreover, in an
attempt to curb the authority of governments in denying the
existence of an armed conflict requiring the application of
Article 3 and the additional Protocol II which "develops and
supplements Article 3 without modifying its existing condit-
ions of application", the JCRC proposed a definition of armed
conflicts of non—international character for purposes of
Article 3 and the Additional Protocol II.
Protocol II had a strange fate at the Diplomatic
Conference with regard to both; its field of application
(i.e., the problem of threshold) and its substantive rules.
It is the purpose of this Chapter to examine that fate, to
explore the curious relationship between Article 3 common to
the Geneva Conventions and Protocol II and to comment on the
latter's substantive rules which afford protection to civil..
ians and prisoners in armed conflicts of non—international
character.
1. See ICRC, Doc. CE/3b - Protection of the Civilian
Population against Dangers of Hostilities, Geneva, January,
1971, p . 8.
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2	 The Problem of the Material Field of Application of
Protocol II at the Conference of Government Exerts
2.(1) The First Sesson (1971)
Introducing the subject, the representative of the
ICRC stressed that Article 3 of the Geneva Convention did
not define non—international armed conflicts. Governments
therefore were left considerable discretion in respect of
events occuring on their territories. In order to improve
the situation the representative of the ICRC considered that
the concept of non—international armed conflicts should be
made mor precise by a non—exhaustive list of examples,
inter alia, of situations in which the existance of the
armed conflict could not be disputed by the government.1
From the outset, the idea of a definition was contested
by some experts on several grounds. One expert firmly
opposing such an attempt considered that a correct
definition would entail rights and duties and that it would
have to be applicable and applied. Another expert stated
that it would be difficult to reach a consensus on the crit-
eria to be specified in the definition. A third expert
reminded the Commission 2 of the difficulties which the
Conference of 1949 had encountered and which in his opinion
were still existing. Some experts feared that a definition
might come into conflict with state sovereignity.3
1, ICRC Report, 1971, p. 36.
2. The Conference constituted four Commisions, Commision 2
discussed the problem of the protection of victims of
non—international armed conflicts. See Ibid., p. 17•
3. For these opinions, see Ibid., p.37.
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In general, the experts were at pains to stress the
complexity of the matter and the wide variety of types of
conflict situations.1
However, the majority of experts considered it
necessary to define n n—international armed conflicts 2 , and
the adoption of a lexible general formula accompanied by a
non—exhaustive list of cases to which it would apply was
recommended.
The discussion then concentrated on the proposal
submitted by the ICRC which reads as follows:
"The following situations, among others, will be
idered non—international armed conflicts entailing
the application of the provisions of the pre5ent
Protocol when they occur on the territory of one of
the High Contracting Parties and involv military or
civilian victims:
1 • p hostile organised action;
a) Which is directed against the authorities in power,
by armed forces
b) Which constrains the authorities in power to have
recourse to their regular armed forces to cope
therewith.
2. Hostile organised actions which take place between
the armed forces of two or more factions, whether
or not these hostile actions entail the interven-
tion of the authorities in power."4
1 •
 ICRC Report, 1971, P. 34.
2. Ibid., p.3?.
3. Ibid., p.38.
4. ICRC, Document CES, p. 76.
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Though simple and clear, this proposal provoked a host
of criticisms and a large number of amendment5 and formal
proposals.
Regarding the text of the ICRC, the idea of a 'hostile
organised actjon', was the subject of a criticism calling
for supplimentary definition. The words 'involve military or
civilian victims', were thought by one expert to be
superfluous. One expert regreted that the alternative char-
acter of (a) and (b) in paragraph 1 of the ICRC proposal was
not clearly specified. One expert wondered whether any
government in the world would accept such a definition,
while another considered paragraph 2 to be academic. 2
 It
seemed to him inconceivable that such a state of anarchy
should remain unquelled by some form of intervention. One
expert proposed that the 'hostile organised action', be
defined as 'military operations on a scale and of a duration
comparable to those of a conflict between states."3
Faced with such complexities and a wide variety of'
proposals, the Chairman of Commision 2 suggested the setting
up of a Drafting Committee to examine the different proposals,
and to put forward a proposal which would enable the Commision
resume discusion on the subject.4
The Drafting Committee submitted the following text
which it considered as "no more than a satisfactory starting
1. The proposals were submitted by experts from: Norway,
Canada, Spain, France, Belgium, United Kingdom, Indonesia,
Austria, Australia. For texts see ICRC Report, 1971, pp.
61-65.
2. The civil war in the Lebanon in 1958 is an example of
paragraph 2 situations, and therefore it is not academic.
3. See ICRC Report, 1971, pp. 38-39.
4. Ibid., p. 39.
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point for further debate on the question of definitions":1
"This Protocol shall apply to any case of armed conflict
not of an international character which is carried on
in the territory of a High Contracting Party for a
substantial period of time and in which,
1 •
 Organis d armed forces carry on hostile activities
in arms against the authorities in power and the
authorities in power employ their armed forces
against such persons, or,
2 Organised armed forces carry on hostile activities
in arms against other armed organised forces,
whether or not the authorities in power employ
their armed forces for the purose of restoring
The view was also expressed within the Drafting
Committee that there should be a third category of non—
international armed conflicts to which the Protocol would
also apply, to be described as follows:
3. "Hostilities have reached such a level as to make
application of the Protocol a humanitarian need.."2
Evidently, this text with the exception of the phrase
a substantial period of time", is but another version of
the initial proposal of the ICRC. It was natural therefore
that it raised once again a similar criticism. In addition,
one expert pointed out the impossibility of discussing, or
subsequently of voting on a proposed definition refering to
a Protocol whose nature and extent were unknown.3
1. Ibid., p.63.
2. ICRC Report, 1971, p. 63-64.
3. Ibid., p. 40 para. 174,
B?
Some experts felt that paragraph 2 should be struck out,
while others felt that (1) and (2) could be combined. 1 Some
experts considered the phrase 'for a substantial period of
time' as being vague. 2 Some wanted to include in the
definition the notion of the occupation of a territory over
which each of the Parties to a conflict exercised authority.3
The idea of'intensity' as indicated by paragraph 3 was
also contested by some experts. They wondered who could be
the judge of the degree of violence.4
At the conclusion of the discussion, no vote was taken
even to indicate the general sentiment. 5
 The Chairman of the
Drafting Committee summarised the train of thought expressed
during the debate as follows:
1. Some experts continued to be hesitant in accepting
a protocol to Article 3.
2. The majority of the experts subscribed to the idea of
a protocol and Some F them considered that such an
instrument should not contain any definition or at
most should contain only a summary definition.
Others however, were in favour of a precise
definition but could not fully support that proposed
by the Drafting Committee.
3. Only a few experts were in favour of the third part
of the Committee's tripartite definition and most
were opposed to the second part.
4, There seemed to be a substantial amount of sentiment
1.Ibld.,, p. 40, para. 176.
2.Ibid., P. 40, para. 185
3.Ibid., p. 40, para. 186.
4.Ibid., p. 40, para. 187.
5.IbId., p. 40, para. 1g•
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in favour of an express statement excluding the
types of lower—level conflicts, (e.g. riots and
disturbances), from the scope of the Protocol.1
The Chairman of the Drafting Committee regreted the
fact that the Commisjon had not been able to go any further
and stressed that it lay with the ICRC to decide how the
work on the subject was to continue.2
Thus the first sessjon of the Conference of Government
Experts came nowhere.
22. The Second Session of the Conference of Government
Experts 1972
At the second session, the ICRC presented the Confer-
ence with two draft Protocols on which the work of the
Conference focused. 3 Article 1 of Draft Protocol II defined
the material field of application as follows:
"The present Protocol which elaborates and 5upplements
Article 3, common to the four Geneva Connventions of
August 12th, 1949, shall aply to conflicts not of
an international character, refered to in Article 3,
and in particular, in all situations where in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
hostilities of collective nature are in action
between organized armed forces under the command of
1 •
 ICRC, Report, 1971, p. 41
2. Loc. cit.
3. For the texts of the two Draft Protocols and an account
of the work of the second session, see ICRC, Report, 2
volumes, Geneva, July, 1972
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a responsible authority."1
This text seems to be another, but elaborated version
of the initial proposal of the ICRC cited above. The notion
of the use by the government of its military forces has been
restated. The notion of 'organized hostilities', is more
fully elaborated by requiring that the hostilities be of a
'collective nature' and that the insurgents be organized
under the command of a responsible authority. These
conditions obviously exclude the so—called lower levels of
violence from the Protocol as the majority of experts
desired. Thus the text seems simple, clear, and could be
objectively substantiated.
In spite of these merits the text provoked a host of
criticisms, amendments, and new proposals. Suffice it to
mention that 13 formal proposals were submitted throughout
the discussion,2
Ms to the extent and nature of the criteria embodied
in these proposals, they seem to range from simple
objective, to subjective—objective, or subjective in
disguise, to clearly subjective criteria, that make the
application of the Protocol subject to recognition by the
government of the internal armed conflict, its character,
and its constituent elements. Ms to their extent, they seem
to range from criteria that cover simple internal disturb-
ances to criteria which according to the classical view
1	 ICRC Report, 1972, Vol. 1, p. 67.
2. See the texts of these proposals in the ICRC Report,
1972, Vol. 2, pp. 33-36.
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would have justified a recognition of' belligerency and
which according to some writers would have entailed the
application of the law of armed conflict as a whole.
The Commisjon referred the written proposals to its
Drafting Committee, but instead of submitting a compromise
text, the Drafting Committee examined the proposals and
submitted them again in the form of "six options and four
possibilities." 1 These options, as the Chairman of the
Drafting Committee pointed out, "reduced to systematic form
the 13 amendments introduced • " and "attempted to present the
issues in a logical way."2
The Chairman's remark sounds more ironical than
serious; the disagreement on the type of conflict to be
regulated was the very reason for having such a number of
proposals. It was natural therefore that the Conference of
Covernment Experts could not make any progress.
The various proposals and the contradictory comments
evoked thereby, as the Report of Commision 2 pointed out:
"created a general feeling that the final decision to
be taken depended on two basic hypotheses. Either the
definition chosen could allow for a wide field of
application, in which case the rules for protection
would no doubt be more limited, or the definition
could be narrower, in which case greater latitude
might be allowed in applying the protection."3
By way of answer to the latter ootion the Report of
1. See ICRC Report, 1972, pp. 70-71, (Vol. 1).
2. Ibid., p. 71.
3. Ibid., p. 69.
CommisSion 2 noted that:
"the explicit omission of internal disturbances, the
need for clearly—defined territorial limitations,
and the reduction of the concept to the notion of
civil war definitely expressed in terms of intensity
and duration, met with the favour of some experts."1
Others however, favoured a broader definition, but one which
would cover only provisions of humanitarian law, but not the
conduct of military operations.2
Thus once again, the Conference of Government Experts
failed to agree on a proposed text, and once again the text
to be sub itted to the Diplomatic Conference was left to the
ICRC.
3. The Problem of the Material Field of application of
Protocol II at the Diplomatic Conference
On the eve of the Diplomatic Conference, the Twenty
Second International Conference of the Red Cross met in
Teheran and discussed the question of the field of applic-
ation of Protocol II. There also, widely divergent views
were expressed. Some delegates favoured a narrow field of
application in which the Protocol would take effect in
conflicts of great intensity only, along with a complete
set of regulations. Other5 favoured a wide field of
1	 Ibid., p. 69
2. Loc. cit.
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application, with the Protocol applying to all non-intern-
ational armed conflicts, including those of minor intensity,
along with regulations limited to the most basic provisions.,1
As a compromcise between these two divergent views, the
ICRC submitted to the Diplomatic Conference the following
provisions as Artcle 1 of Draft Protocol II:
"Article 1 - Material Field of' Application.
1. The pre ent Protocol shall apply to all armed
conflicts not covered by Article 2 Common to the
Geneva Convention of August, 1949, taking place
between armed forces or other organized groups
under resposible command.
2. The present Protocol shall not apply to situations
of' internal disturbances and tensions, inter alia,
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and
other acts of similar nature.
3. The foregoing provisions do not modify the
conditions governing the application of Article 3
common to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1 949•112
Introducing the Protocol in general, the represent-
atjve of the ICRC emphasised the need to strengthen the
protection of victims, to prevent an increase in violence,
and to prevent the opposing forces from taking action that
would render national reconciliation difficult.3
1 ICRC Report, 1977, submitted to the 23rd International
Conference of the Red Cross, p. 27.
2. ICRC, Draft Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions
of August 12, 1949, Commentary, Geneva, Oct. 1973, p. 132.
3. CDDH/I/SR., 17-41, p. 71.
Taking into account the particular material conditions
in which hostilities take place because of the inequality of'
the opposing Parties, the ICRC had endevoured to draw up
simple rules which all the Parties to a conflict should apply
to the entire population affected by it, thus avoiding the
establishment of special categories of protected persons.1
As to the material field of application of the
Protocol, the repre5entative of the ICRC pointed out that a
broad field to cover all non—international armed conflicts
had been chosen. For that purpose, the ICRC had endevoured
to specify the characteristics of' a non—international armed
conflict by means of objective criteria, so that the Protocol
could be applied when those criteria were met and not be
made subject to other considerations.2
The text of the ICRC was subject to a lengthy
discussion 3 very similar to that of' the Conference of
Government Experts.
At its 24th meeting, Committee 1 decided on the
Chairman's proposal to refer Draft Article 1, together with
the whole of Part one of Protocol II, to Working Group B.
The Working Group spent the greater part of 15 meetings
discussing Draft Article 1. At its fourth meeting it set up
a sub—working group, "to carry out informal consultations
among delegates with a view to agreeing a text for Article
1 •
1. Ibid., p. 72.
2. Ibid., p. 74.
3. See ICRC Doument CDDH/SR1/17-41, p . 70 et seq.
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The Sub—Working Group met six times and submitted the
result of its work to Working Group B, which decided by
consensus to approve the text submitted by the Sub—Working
Group.
At its 29th meeting, Committee 1 adopted the text
submitted by Working Group B, by consensus, without
discussion and then heard the explanation of votes by a
number of delegates. 1 The same text was finally adopted by
the Diplomatic Conference.2
It reads as follows:
"Article 1 - material field of application.
1 •
 This Protocol, which develops and supplements
Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions of 12th
August, 1949 without modifying its existing
conditions of application, shall apply to all armed
conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of' the
Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12th August, 1949, and relating to the protection
of' victims of international armed conflict,
(Protocol I), and which take place in the territory
of a High Contracting Party, between its armed
forces and dissident armed forces or other
organized groups, which under responsible command
exercise such control over a part of its territory
as to enable them to carry out sustained and
concerted military operations and to implement
1. See Document CDDH/219/Rev. 1 p 21-22.
2, 9y 58 votes to 5 with 29 abstentions, CDDH/SR.47-..59,
plenary meetings Vol. 2, p. 70. See in particular CDDH/
SR. 49.
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this Protocol.
2. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of
internal disturbances and tensions such as riots,
isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other
acts of' a similar nature, as not being armed
conflicts."
It is probably obvious, that the field of application
of Protocol II is narrower than any of the ICRC proposals in
this respect.
The material field of application of Protocol II, has
thus been delimited by a combination of negative and positive
conditions.
Negatively, or by way of exclusion, the Protocol shall
not apply to armed conflicts covered by 1\rticle 1 of Protocol
I. These include, in addition to interstate armed conflicts,
armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against
colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist
regimes in the exercise of their right of self—determination,
as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the
declaration of the Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co—operation among states in
accordance with the Charter of' the United Nations.
The Protocol does not apply to situations of internal
disturbances and tension, such as riots, isolated and
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of similar nature,
as not being armed conflicts.
Moreover, armed conflicts in which the government
concerned does not use it armed forces are also excluded
from the scope of the Protocol.
Positively, or by way of inclusion, two conditions are
expressly required for the application of the Protocol. They
are:
1. That the anti—government forces be they dissident
armed force5 or other armed groups, be organized
under a responsible command; and
2. Exercise such a control over a part of the national
territory.
At the 49th plenary meeting the issue which dominated
the discussion was, who would determine whether the
conditions for the application of the Protocol have been
fulfilled and whether a decision by a third state would
constitute an intervention in the internal affairs of the
state on whose territory the internal conflict occurs.
To some Latin American, African, Asian, and East
European countries, the determination of whether the
conditions of Article 1 were fulfilled was a matter
exclusively reserved for the state in which the conflict
occurs, and therefore, any determination by other states
constituted an illegal intervention in the internal affairs
of that state.1
Strictly speaking, such a condition cannot be read in
Article 1 of Protocol II. Ioreover, to make the application
of the Protocol subject to such a condition amounts to no
less than the abrogation of the protection of civilians and
prisoners in armed conflicts of non—international character,
or at iBast make that protection purely a matter of
convenience.
1 •
 See CDDH/SR. 49.
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In the following sections a critical analysis of these
conditions will be made. Also, the relation between Protocol
II and Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions will be
discussed as well as the notion of internal disturbances
and tensions which has become of crucial importance to the
concept of armed conflicts of non—international character.
4. A Critical Analysis of the Field of Application of
Protocol II
4.1. The Condition that Anti—Government Forces be Organized
U	 r a Responsible Command
Organization and the political purpose are sine qua
non of any political movement. It is natural therefore, that
the Protocol requires that the insurgents, or the 'dissident
armed forces or other organized groups', as the Protocol
refers to them, must be organized.
According to the ICRC Commentary, organization implies
that these armed forces opposing the government, are subject
to a sufficiently firm discipline that will ensure respect,
in the conduct of hostilities, of the provisions laid down
in the Protocol. 1 It should be noted, however, that
disrespect of the provisions of the Protocol is no proof
that the insurgents are not organized. Discipline, whether
on the part of the government, or on the part of' the insur-
gents, is no guarantee that the Protocol will be respected.
1 •
 ICRC, Commentery on the Draft Additional Protocol, Geneva,
1973, P. 132.
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fQrga flj zat j on ,
 necessarily presupposes the existance
of a responsible command. This, according to the ICRC
Commentary, means a commanding authority, whose leadership
is recognized by its subordinates and is able therefore, to
assume responsibility for their acts.,,1
Here again, it should be noted, that unified command is
not a condition. The insurgents may consist of several organ-
izations each having its own commanding authority or leader-
ship. It is also immaterial whether the commanding authority
consisted of one man, or it was collective leadership.
4. 2. The Condition of Territorial Control by Anti—Government
Forces
This condition was not included in any of the ICRC drafts
of Article 1	 jt was added by the Diplomatic Conference despite
the objection of many states.
The apparent justification for this condition, as appears
form the text of Article 1, is to enable the insurgents "to
carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to
implement this
Obviously the proponents of this condition were thinking
in terms of classical war with territrjal lines of
confrontation and conventional armed forces on both sides.
However, it is gravely doubtful - in view of' modern guerrila
warfare - whether the exercise of control over a part of the
national territory by the insurgents is necessary for
sustained and concerted military operations, or even for the
1., Loc. cit.
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implementation of the Protocol,
The prerequisit?s of sustained and concerted military
operations in guerilla warfare, are the organization and
means of communication, rather than the exercise of control
over a part of the national territory, by the insurgents.
As for the implementation of the Protocol, an examin-
ation of the Protocol article by article, reveals that the
dependence of its implementation on the control of a part of
a territory by the insurgents, is a fallacy. No stretch of
imagination can establish a link between the exercise of'
control over a part of the national territory and the
prohibition to attack the civilian population, individual
civilians, objects indispensible to the survival of the
civilian population, works and installations containing
dangerous forces, cultural objects and places of worship,1
Similarily, the protection of medical and religious
personnel, the protection of medical units and transports,
respect for the distinctive emblems of humanitarian bodies,
(such as the Red Cross, Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun), the
prohibition of forced movement of civilians and the protection
of relief societies and relief action is not dependent on
territorial control by the insurgents,2
Articles 19 to 28 are 'final provisions', relating to
dissemination, signature, ratification, accesion, entry into
force, amendment, denunciation, notification, registration
and authentic texts of the Protocol, Obviously these matters
1. See Articles 13 to 16 of Protocol II.
2, See Articles 9 to 12 and Articles 17 and 18 of Protocol II.
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have nothing to do with the control of a part of the national
territory by the insurgents.
Articles 7 and 8 provide for the protection, care and
search for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked and Article 4
provides for fundemental guarantees, to which all persons who
do not take part, or who have ceased to take part in
hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted,
are entitled. These fundemental guarantees, already provided
for in Article 3 Common to the four Geneva Conventions of
1949, are enlarged to include the prohibition of' collective
punishment, the prohibition of slavery and terrorism, as uell
as detailed provisions for the protection of children under
the age of 15 years. In addition to Article 4, Article 5
specifies the rights of persons whose liberty has been
restricted, while Article 6 enumerates the judicial guarantees
and principles that should govern the prosecution and
punishment of criminal of'fences related to the armed conflict.
It is undeniable that the control of a part of the
national territory of the insurgents enables them to implement
some of the fundamental guarantees enumerated in Articles 5
and 6. But the irony is that the insurgents would not be in
a position to violate some of' the requirements of these
provisions before they control a part of the national
territory. In other words, Article 5 relating to the treatment
of persons whose liberty has been restricted, and Article 6
relating to the penal prosecution and punishment of' criminal
of'fences relating to the armed conflict, are addressed to the
party to the conflict who is in a position to establish
detention or internment centres and to prosecute and punish
1 01
those who commit acts prohibited by the Protocol. Yet, by a
strange fate, or so the condition of territorial control
suggests, the government would not be required to implement
the Protocol before the insurgents control a part of the
national territory.
This preliminary survey of the provisions of Protocol
1.1 clearly reveals the fallacy of the governmental argument
that the requirement of territorial control by the insurgents
had a humanitarian purpose in vieu•
It is important to note here that the ICRC had not
required the condition of territorial control in any of its
proposals regarding the field of application of Protocol II.
Had the control of a part of the national territory by the
insurgents been necessary for the implementation of the
Protocol the ICRC would have insisted on that condition.
Even more significant is the fact that resistance
movements in occupied territories are required to respect the
laws and customs of war, and so are the national liberation
movements in armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting
against colonial and alien domination and against racist
regimes. Yet, no territorial control by these movements was
considered necessary for the implementation of provisions
which far exceed their scope those of Protocol II.
It is indeed a strange governmental logic that makes
the protection of' the civilian population dependent on the
success of those whom the government concerned consider as
criminals.
Clearly then, the condition of territorial control was
not needed for humanitarian reasons; it was needed for
1 02
political reasons 1 The heart of the matter is that the
majority of the delegations present at the Diplomatic Confer-
ence did not want a 'Protocol' relating to the protection of
victims of armed conflicts o? non—international character.
It is not suprising therefore that one delegation to
the Diplomatic Conference thought that, "no convincing
arguement had been put forward to justify the need for 'Draft'
Protocol II, the provisions of which would not be acceptable
to his delegation." 1 He reiterated his position at a plenary
meeting. In his view, "the application of an international
instrument in an internal situation, militated against the
sovereignty of the country concerned and constituted an
2interference in that countries internal
Other delegates, also, explicitly objected
to the material field of the Protocol, on the grounds that it
infringed the sovereignty of the state13
It was proposed that the text of the ICRC be supplemente
by the terjtorja codjtj, and even more, by the subject-
ive condition "that the Protocol applies only upon an express
recognition by the government concerned, of the existence of
armed conflict and its constituent elements.4
But what sovereignty i8 for, if not to make laws to
1. See the speech of the Indian Delegate, Doc, CDDH/I/SR,
(17_41), p.94. See in particular the Indian explanation of'
vote in plenary, CDOH/SR. 49, Annex.
2, ICRC Document CDOH/SR. 47-59, Plenary F'ieetings, Vol, 2 p.72.
3. E.G. Argentina, German Democratic Republic, Romania, flexico,
Brazil, for the texts of their speeches respectively, see
ibid., p.?5, 76-77. 102, and 158.
4. See in this regard the proposals submitted by: the experts
of Romania, Doc. CE/COIl 11/4, Indonesia, CE/COIl 11/6,
Argentina, CE/COF'l 11/16, p. 36, ICRC Report, 1972, p.33,34,
36, respectively. In plenary, this remained the position of
e.g. Colombia, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Chile, Iraq, (corit.)
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protect those who take no direct part in hostilities? And is
not the making of law an exercise of sovereignty?1
Thus, the inclusion of the territorial condition
represents a compromise among the objectionists, but not
between them and the other extremes, which favoured the same
protection to all victims, regardless of their legal or
political classification, 2 nor between them and the moderates,3
who favoured a lower threshold for the Protocol, than the one
which was finally adopted. It is true that Committee 1 adopted
Article 1 by consensus and without discussion, but the
explanation of the votes which followed, revealed once again
the divergence of views • 4 In plenary it appeared that there
5
was no consensus.
The territorial condition, however objective it may
appear, fell just short of the aspirations of the extreme
objectionists, who wished to have the Protocol applied after
an express recognition by the government of the existence of
armed conflict in its territory. In fact it is a subjective
condition in objective disguis3, providing governments with
a considerable manouvering capacity. The government may always
(cont. from note 4, previous page), Indonesia, Ecuador,
Philipines, India, Canada, and Tanzania, see CDDH/SR.49,
and Annex.
1, See In this sense the speech of the Norwegian Delegate,
ibid, pp. 87-88. See also Kaishoven, Humanitarian Law,
Netherland Year Book of Int, Law, (iw(.LL.), 1977, pp.110-ll5
2. E.g. Norway, see CDDH/SR.1, 17-41, p. 87 and 163-64.
3. E.g. U.S.A., Egypt, U.K., New Zealand, W.Germany, Austria,
Yugoslavia, Ukrain, Italy, see ibid., p.?l et seq. and 16-62.
4. See ibid., p• 155 at seq.
5. See the rmarks of the delegation of Syria. CDDH/SR.49, para
47. The Rapoorteur of Committee I said: It would be truer to
say that there had been approval by the majority and silence
on the part of others." CODH/SR.49, para. 49.
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contest the claim by insurgents, that a territory has come
under their control. The absence of a fact finding body
competent to ascertain the facts of the situation, may also
encourage the game of claim and counter claim of controlling
a territory, if only for the sole purpose of psychological
warfare. Territorial control, is of course de facto control.
But what degree of control is required ? Is it a control
analgous to that required by international law for the
application of the lau of occupation?1
In sri interstate armed conflict, it is usual to
distinguish invasion from occupation. Thus according to
Oppenheim's international law, "the differencebetween mere
invasion and occupation, becomes apparent from the fact that
an occupant sets up some kind of administration whereas the
mere invader does not." 2
 Does it follow,by analogy, that the
setting up of some kind of administration isa coristitutive
element of the control of a part of a territory by the
dissident armed forces or other groups?
The Protocol does not seem to exclude a positive answer.
If so, it would always be open to the government concerned to
contest the fulfilment of the territorial condition, at least
until the exercise of control over a part of national
territory by the dissident armed forces, or other organized
armed groups had gained a certain degree of stability. More-
over, if the territorial condition, among others, had once
been fulfilled and the Protocol was applied, would it later
1. See below, Chapter 6, Section 5.
2. Oppenheim - Lauterpacht, International Law, Vol. 2, 7th
ed,, p. 434.
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4.3. Determination of the Existence of an Prmed Conflict
and of its Constituent Elements
\t the fourty—ninth plenary meeting of the Diplomatic
Conference during which Prticle 1 of Protocol II was adopted,
the Colombian representative, fir. Charry Samper asked what
was the precise interpretation to be given to the last part
of paragraph 1 relating to the dissident armed forces, and
who would decide when the condition laid down in that
conectjon should be applied.1
Mr. Obradovic of Yugoslavia who also was Chairman of
Working Group (B) of Committee I which worked out the text of
Prticle 1 of Protocol II through private consultation and
secured its adoption on Committee level by consensus, replied
that P1rticle 1 represented a very fragile consensus reached
only after lengthy considerations. In the circumstances, he
felt that it would be extremely inadvisable to seek to
interpret its provisions.2
The Colombian delegate said that, in that case, he would
propose the addition at the end of paragraph 1, of the follow-
ing sentence, which he said would make the text clearer;
"The determination of the conditions referred to above
shall be a matter for the state in which the conflict
3
occurs•"
The Colombian oral amendment (or proposal) was supported
by some delegates mostly, although not exclusively, from
1 •
 000H/SR. 49, para. 37.
2. CDDH/SR. 49, para. 38.
3. CDDH/SR. 49, para. 39.
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Latin American Countries.
After a brief discussion the Colombian delegation
decided to withdraw jt amendment "in order to meet the wishes
of the ICRC representative and of the President who feared to
compromise the approval of Protocol II at that stage of the
Conference", as the Colombian delegation put it in its
explanation of the vote on Article
The President of the Conference did in fact ask the
Colombian representative "not to press his amendment." 3 But
the Article was not adopted by consensus as some delegations
had hoped; it was adopted by roll—call vote of 58 to 5, with
29 abstentions. Thus, formally at least, Article 1 of Protocol
II was adopted by a comfortable majority. Analysis of these
figures, however, is like the analysis of 'opinion polls';
it is everyone's guessing. For example, Saudi Arabia voted in
favour of Article 1 of Protocol II. But in the explanation of
vote, the Saudi representative, Mr. Nematallah said that in
view of the rejection of the Colombian amendment, he wished
to make clear that any definition of the terms of Article 1
was solely the concern of the state on whose territory the
armed conflict was taking place. "Decision by any other
country", he said, "would constitute interference in the
domestic affairs of the State concerned and an infringement
1 •
 e.g., Brazil, CDDH/SR.49, para. 43; Saudi Arabia, CDDH/SR.49
para. 45; Chile, ibid., para. 48; Iraq, ibid., para. 57;
Philipines, ibid., para. 63; Indonesia, ibid., para. 70;
Argentina, CDDH/SR.49, (Annex). Ghana, CDDH/SR.49, (Annex),
(explanation of vote); India, ibid., explanation of vote.
Actually, India was against the Protocol altogether. Also in
support of the Colombian view, Kenya, ibid., explanation of
vote; and the United Republic of Tanzania, ibid., explanation
of vote.
2. CDDH/SR. 49, Annex., (Colombia, explanation of vote).
3. CDDH/SR. 49, para. 44.
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of that states sovereignty."1
By contrast, /rgentina and Chile voted against the
article because "it includes no safeguard clause providing
for a mechanism or reasonably objective parameters for
determining in each case whether the conditions for the
application of the Protocol have been met"2
Suprisingly Colombia and Brazil abstained, together
with Iraq, Indonesia, Kenya, Philipines, and the United
Republic of Tanzania.3
The Colombian explanation of vote was more detailed and
therefore merits quotation. It reads, inter alia, that:
"The field of' application of Irticle 1 remains subject
to unilateral interpretation in view of the
impossibility of including a norm to determine who would
decide the following:
a) Liheri a dissident group or an organized armed group
acts under responsible command,
b) Who would clearly define that control was exercised
over part of the territory?
c) Who would decide when sustained and concerted
military operations were involved?
Within the context of this %rticle the insertion of'
subjective elements gives rise to difficulties of
interpretation and my delegation believes that in the
exercise of' sovereignty resides the right to determine
such situations. The text approved does not contradict
that in any way."4
1 •
 CDDH/SR. 49, para. 67.
2. From the explanation of vote by lrgentina, CDDH/SR. 49 Annex.
3. See CDDH/SR. 49, para. 65.
4. CDOH/SR. 49, Annex, written explanation of' vote.
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One may wonder how many delegations had voted on this
understanding. The majority appears to have preferred to
remain silent on this issue. One may also wonder what would
have been the answers to thee questions If the Colombian
delegation pressed its amendment to the vote.
It would not be necessary to speculate on what was in
the minds of the different delegations. For what they had 'In
mind was clearly demonstrated by the fact that irLc t€
same plenary meeting (the 4th meeting), a mini—Protocol
worked out by the delegations of Canada and Pakistan was
submitted as alternative to the more detailed and cornoreherisive
Protocol which was worked out during six years of' hard labour
- first by the Conference of Covernment Experts, and then
by the Diplomatic Conference itself. The result speaks for
itself; one only needs to read the two texts (the one adooted
by the Conference at Committee level, and the alledgedly
simplified version submitted by the delegation of Pakistan)
to realise what was in favour of governments was retained
and what was in favour of the civilian population was LareL'1
deleted.
This question will be discussed later, but let us first
see whether the text of frticle 1 of the Protocol, or for
that matter, the text of frtic1e 3 of the Protocol regarding
'non—intervention' do really justify the interpretation made
by the supporters of the Colombian view.
Of course, the best way of clarifying the issue was to
put the Colombian amendment to the iiote, but this did not
happen, apparently for fear that such a procedure could have
killed the very idea of a protocol relating to the protection
1 1
of victims of armed conflicts of non—international character.
Moreover, there was the'simplified' Canadian—Pakistani draft
which actually served as a face—saving formula. Therefore,
there was no need to wreck Protocol II altogether.
On the other hand, the representatives of Italy and the
ICRC reminded the Conference that an identical ammendment to
that of the Colombian delegation had in fact been put forward
before a small working group, and then in Committee I, and
that it had been discussed thoroughly but was not endorsed
1by either.	 If so, then it is reasonable to conclude that the
amendment had in fact been rejected. Accordingly, those who
insisted that the determination of the terms of Article 1 was
solely the concern of the government of' the State on whose
territory the armed conflict takes place, may only stick to
their guns by means of reservations at the time of accession
or ratification, and even then they would have to wait for
the reaction of other states. The question of whether the
decision by any other country would constitute an intervention
in the domestic affairs of the state on whose territory the
armed conflict takes place will be discussed in the following
sub—section.
4.4. Protocol II and Non—Intervention
As noted in the previous sub—section, a number of
delegations stated that in their view, it was a matter solely
for the state on whose territory the armed conflict
1	 See CDDH/SR. 49, para. 41, (Italy), and para. 51, (ICRC rep.)
112
takes place to determine whether the conditions of the
application of Protocol II had been fulfilled. It was also
stated that any decision by any other country would constitute
an interference in the domestic affairs and an infringement of
the sovereignty of the state on whose territory the armed
conflict takes place.
At the first sight, Article 3 of the Protocol might
seem to support these contentions. It provides:
"1. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the
purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or
the resposibility of the government, by all legit-
imate means, to maintain or re—establish law and
order in the State or to defend the national unity
and territorial integrity of the State.
2. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked as a
justification for intervening, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in
the internal or external affairs of the High
Contracting Party in the territory of which that
conflict occurs."
On the authority of such statements and of Article 3
of Protocol II, a Professor of International Humanitarian Law
- Kaishoven - went so far as to state that Protocol II,
"although moulded in the form of' an international instrument
complete with a ratification procedure and all its trappings,
bears a close resemblance to a non—binding declaration of
principles for non—international armed conflicts."1
1 •
 Kalahoven, Reaffirmation and Development of Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Netherlands Yearbook
of International Law, 1977, pp. 112-115, at p. 115
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Indeed, a similar view was expressed by the Sudanese
delegate Mr. El—Hasseen El—Hassan who said that "Protocol II
entailed no international obligations, but represented a
commitment by a State to its citizens for humanitarian
purposes, without infringing its sovereignty."1
It must be emphasised that all the above—mentioned
statements regarding the nature of Protocol II and interference
in the domestic affairs of the state whose territory the
conflict occurs have nothing to support them in public
international law.
I\s an international agreement, Protocol II entitles
third states to expect that it be implemented in good faith.
Surely, any subjective interpretation of the kind expressed
in the above mentioned assertions is inconsistent with the
principle of good faith. Moreover, the very effect of
regulating a matter by international agreement is the taking
of that matter out of the domestic jurisdiction of individual
2
states. Thus, the assertion that Protocol II entailed no
international obligations, is tantamount to a denial of the
force of international agreements to generate international
obligations, and must be rejected.
It is true that Protocol II is to be applied within,
not between states, and that third states parties to the
1 CDDH/SR. 49, para. 73.
2 See Quincy Wright, Non—Military Intervention, in Deutsch
Hoffman, (ed.), The Relevance of International Law, where
he states that"International law has defined domestic
jurisdiction as a matter concerning which the state is
under no obligation of' international law or treaty." See
also Schuarzenberger, International Law, Vol. 2, p. 116.
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Protocol are not direct bearers of' the rights sanctioned in
the Protocol, but this does not detract from the fact that
the obligations laid down in the Protocol are international
obligations. The international concern in what takes place
within the boundries of a given state, and above all, the
international concern in humanizing the armed conflict, is
the very reason underlying the Protocol.1
The prohibition of intervention in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the state,
(Article 2, para. 7, of the U.N. Charter), does not exclude
action short of dictatorial interference undertaken with a
view to implementing the purposes of' the U.N. Charter.2
Indeed, Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter of' the United
Nations expressly states that the principles of domestic
jurisdiction shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
Thus with regard to the protection of human rights and
freedoms - a prominant feature of the Charter - the
prohibition of intervention in matters essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction does not preclude study, discussion,
investigation and recomendation on the part of the various
1 •
 In the past, international concern in cases of gross
violation of' human rights found expression in the use of'
force by third states according to thre so—called "right
of humanitarian intervention." See Greenspan, The I1odern
Law of' Land Warfare, 1958, p. 623, and the authorities
there cited, note 17, to the effect that this alledged
'right' is inconsistent with Article 2, para. 4. of the
U.N. Charter, and for the survey of the practice of' states
since 1945, see Akehurst, The Use of Force to Protect
Nationals Abroad, International Relations, Vol.V, No, 5,
lay, 1977, p. 3 et seq. especially pp . 1-9.
2. See Oppenheim—Lauterpacht, International Law, Vol.2, p.
320, 416.
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organs of the United Nations. 1 Thus, despite Prticle 2 (7),
of the U.N. Charter, it is arguable that the United Nations
is entitled to take whatever measures it deems proper to
compel a government to respect its obligations under
international humanitarian law, which by definition are not
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the state,
Third states, in the absence of a United Nations action, are
probably entitled individually and collectively, to take
measures, short of the use of force, to prevent gross
systematic violations of' humanitarian law, but no use of force,
or threat of the use of force, is permitted. /s Dr. Akehurst
convincingly argues, "claims by some states that they are
entitled to use force to prevent violations of human rights
may make other states reluctant to accept legal obligations
concerning human rights. What is needet is more effective
international machinery for the protection of human rights.
Humanitarian intervention is an inadequate substitute for
such machinery and may even delay or discourage its
establishment.
In brief the claim that Protocol II entailed no
international obligations, has no grounds in international
law.
Similarly, the claim that the government on whose
territory the armed conflict takes place is alone competent
1 •
 Ibid., P. 320; see also Rosayn Higgins, The Development of
International Law through the Political Organs of the U.N.
p . 118 et seq., especially p. 128 et seq., where the author
convincingly argues that, "human rights questions, cannot
be essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the
state"
2. Akehurst, The Use of Force to Protect Nationals Pbroad,
International Relations, Vol. 5, No. 5, may, 1977, p.l9.
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to pronounce on the fulfilment of the conditions of' the
Protocol have nothing to support it in international law in
general or in Protocol II in particular. Further there is
nothing to support the view that pronouncements by other states
on the fulfulment of the conditions required by the Protocol
constitutes an interference in the internal affairs of the
state on the territory of which the armed conflict occurs.
It should not be forgotten that, according to the
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co—operation among States in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, (adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations in 1970):
"Every State has the duty to promote through joint
and separate action universal respect for and observance
of human rights and fundemental freedoms in accordance
with the Charter."
It should not be forgotten that according to the same
Declaration on Principles, the principle of non—intervention
should be construed in the context of the principle of equal
rights and self—determination of peoples, as well as the other
principles elaborated in the Declaration.
Thus, if in the judgenient of the General Assembly of
the United Nations, the state on the territory of which the
armed conflict occurs was proved to be not conducting
itself in accordance with the principle of equal rights and
self—determination of peoples, and not possesed of a
government representing the whole people belonging to the
territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour,
conflict becomes ipso facto, one of international character
1 ¶7
to which the Geneva Conventions as a whole and their
and their additional Protocol I become applicable.
In brief, it seems that all the fuss created by the
Colombian amendment, and all the obsession with the
sovereignty of the state and non—intervention was 'ado about
nothing'. Indeed, Article 3 of Protocol II itself requires
the government concerned to 'naintain or re—establish law and
order in the State or to defend the national unity and the
territorial integrity of the State" - "by all legitimate means."
Certainly, no government is its own judge as to what const-
itutes 'legitimate means' • The legitimacy of means has to be
judged by others in accordance uith the law of human rights
and the law of armed conflict regardless of any recognition
of the existance of an armed conflict by the government of'
the state on whose territory the armed conflict occurs, and
regardless of whether conditions of the application of the
Protocol were fulfilled or not. Indeed, the underogable
human rights and the very concept of derogation from the full
respect for and observance of human rights have rendered any
talk about armed conflicts in terms of intensity, superfluous
and illogical.
5.	 The Relationship between Protocol II and Article 3
of the Geneva Convention
Article 3 and Protocol II are concerned with armed
conflicts of non—international character. But, while Article
3 deals with non—international armed conflicts in general,
Protocol II applies to one type of armed conflict, whose
11
characteristics are defined in the first article of the
Protocol. Thus, Protocol II does not regulate a new kind of'
armed conflict, but it does regulate a particular type of
non—international armed conflict, already existing within
the domain of Article 3.
Nevertheless, the title of' Protocol II as "additional
to the Geneva Conventions", and not merely to Article 3, might
look somewhat ambiguous, as Article 3 is the only article of'
the Geneva Conventions which explicitly deals with armed
conflicts of non—international character. The Protocol also
develops and supplements Article 3, without modifying its
BXIStiflg condition of' application. Thus it might appear more
logical to consider Protocol II as additional to Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions.
To be sure, Protocol II was initially intended to
'elaborate' and supplement' Article 3 common to the four Geneva
Conventions. 1 That is to say, it was initially intended to
define the scope of application of Article 3 and to supplement
its provisions. It was not untili. the Second Session of' the
Conference of' Government Experts, that it was suggested to
'dissociate' the Protocol from Article 3. The suggestion was
first made by the delegation of the United States of America
2
and was supported by some other experts. Illogical as it
seems, the suggestion was not without some practical value,
although it kept the relation between Article 3 and Protocol
II in a state of flux.
1. See ICRC Report, 1972, Vol. 1, pp. 61-72.
2. See ICRC Report, 1972, p. 6, para. 2.59 and 2.60.
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The preliminary debate of the Conference of Government
Experts, revealed that a considerable number of delegations
preferred a 'high threshold', for the application of Protocol
II. This eventually raised the fear that the Protocol might
be interpreted as defining the field of application of Article
3,1 which however, is believed to be wider than that of the
Protocol. 2
 Accordingly, the formula that the Protocol "devel-
ops and supplements Article 3, without modifying its existing
conditions of application, seems to have been intended to
dispel that fear.
Two corrollaries may follow from this relationship.
First, the provisions of Article 3 which are not reproduced in
the Protocol, such as the provision concerning the services of
a humanitarian body, the conclusion of special agreements, and
the provision that the conclusion of special agreements and
the services of a humanitarian body, shall not affect the
legal status of the parties to the conflict remain also
operative under the Protocol. 3 Second, Article 3 being of a
general nature, will continue to cover all types of armed
conflict of non—international character, while Protocol II
covers only one particular type, defined by its first article.
While these may seem to be advantages, it nevertheless
seems difficult to argue that Protocol II has left the field
of application of Article 3 intact. Even in 1949 it was not
1. See ICRC Report, 1972, p. 62.
2. See ICRC Report, Geneva, August, 1977, p. 28, (a report
submitted to the 23rd International Conference of the Red
Cross, Bucharest, October, 1977.).
3. To this effect, see the written explanation of vote by
Belgium CDDH/SR. 49, (Rnnex), Italy, CDDH/SR. 50, (Pnnex).
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difficult to argue that, Article 3 should be applied in
"situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts
of simiar flaet• We have already cited, in the previous
chapter, several statements made at the Diplomatic Conference
of 1949, in conection with the field of application of Article
3. Now by the 'vice' of paragraph 2 of Article 1 of Protocol
II, which unequivocally declares situations of internal
di5turbance and tension, "as not being armed conflicts", it
has become more difficult than ever before to argue that
Article 3 as such, covers internal disturbances and tensions.
Even more drastic is the stipulation itself in Article
1 paragraph 2, that this Protocol "shall not apply to situa-
tions of internal disturbance and tensions..., as not being
armed conflicts." Does this simply state the obvious in
relation to the conditions laid down for the Protocol to apply?
The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany thought
it does. In a written explanation of vote on Article 1 of
Protocol II, the delegation of' the Fecfersl RepublIc of Germany
stated that:
"This Article constitute5 a corqtomise solution which
was difficult to reach. An essential element of this
compromise is the fact that the existing conditions of
application of Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions are not modified. This is clearly expressed
in ticle 1, paragraph 1, of Protocol II. It also applies
to paragraph 2 of the same article. Consequently, the
negative definition of the term 'armed conflict' in
paragraph 2 applies only to Protocol II, not to Article
3 common to the Geneva Conventions. This is the under-
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standing of the Federal Republic of Germany as to the
interpretation of Article 1 of Protocol II. It does not,
however, intend to express any view, be it only by
implication, on the meaning of the term 'armed conflict'
as used in Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions.1
Actually the answer may swing between 'yes' and
but no one can confidently assert either. Where it approaches
'yes' one may be tempted to think of the unexhaustive examples
of internal disturbances and tensions, as setting the tone
for Article 3 to step in once the conflict crossed that
threshold. But when it approaches 'no', it signals to Article
3 to stay away until the Protocol's conditions have been
fulfilled. In either case, the fact remains that paragraph 2,
of Article 1, of Protocollj would provide governments with a
legal pretext not to recognize the application of either
Article 3, or Protocol II, as long as the conflict is labelled
disturbances and tensions."
Indeec as early as the Second Session of the Conference
of Government Experts, the Canadian delegation saiti that,
would not be wise to include an explicit provision in Article
1, of Protocol II, to the effect that the Protocol should not
be applied to isolated incidents and situations of internal
tensions", as there, he feared,"governments might find a
2
loophole to limit the application of the Protocol." It should
be noted that at that stage, Protocol II was still intended
to define the scope of application of Article 3 and to develop
and supplement its provisions.
1. CDDH/SR. 49, (Annex.
2 ICRC Report, 1972, \Iol.l, p . 69, para. 2.63.
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It is likely that 'disqualifying' internal disturbances
and tensions as armed conflicts was intended to appease
governments, in order to rally their support to the ICRC's
proposed field of application of Protocol II. Whether this
was the case or not, the fact remains that ill—intentioned
governments (and there were many) grasped the opportunity to
narrow the field of application of Article 3, and at the same
time kept the relation between the Protocol II and Article
3 in a state of flux. As one writer commented after the
adoption of the text of Article 1 of Protocol II, by Committee
I, in 1975, "the alledgedly compromise text that was adopted
by consensus is but an expedient way to hide the f'undemental
di5agreement which still persists among the governments as to
the relationship between draft Protocol II and Article 3
common to the four Geneva Conventions,"'
Perhaps the clearest language in this regard was that
of fir. De Icaza of Plexico, speaking as Rapporteur of Committee
1. In reply to an innocent view expressed by the delegation
of Cameroon that the words "without modifying its existing
conditions of application" in Article 1, paragraph 1, of
Protocol II, were unecessary and could be deleted, 2 the
Rapporteur said that "Committee I had considered the phrase
to be very important, inasmuch as it en5ured that the
application of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of
1 •
 Dan Ciobanu, The Attitude of the Socialist Countries, in
Cassese (ed.), The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict,
p. 441. Indeed, many delegates expressed the view that
there actually was no consensus.
2. The delegation of Cameroon voted against Article 1 of'
Protocol II because of its high'threshold'. In particular,
it wanted the deletion of' the condition of territorial
control by insurgents. CDDH/SR. 49, para. 46.
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1949 should not be jepordized." But at the same time, he
appealed to delegations, irrespective of their attitude
towards draft Protocol II, to safeguard Article 3 Common to
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.1
Thus while it may be fair to state that the attempt to
make the material field of application of Protocol II coincide
with that of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, had
failed, and therefore each retained its field of application,
it seems also fair to state that the point at which Article
3 becomes applicable has remained uncertain, as it always
has been. This requires a clarification of the notion of'
internal disturbances and tension,
6. Protocol II: Substanti,e Protection
6.1. General Remarks
The substantive rules oic Oraft Protocol II as adopted b'
the Diplomatic Conference at Committee level had a strange fate
in the Plenary. In the course of' its four sessions in the
period from 1974 to 1977 the Diplomatic Conference adopted an
elaborate set of rules dealing with such topics as the humane
treatment of persons in the power of the Parties to the conflict;
treatment of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons, medical
units and transports, and medical and religious personnel;
methods and means of combat; protection of the civilian
1 •
 CDDH/SR.49, pare. 50.
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population and civilian objects; civil defence; relief action
in favour of the civilian population; and a set of final
provisions relating to the execution of' the Protocol. In
Plenary, in the last week of the Conference, the delegation of
Pakistan proposed an alternative Protocol which, with minor
modifications was adopted by the Diplomatic Conference and thus
constituted the present Protocol II. As the speech of' the head
of the Pakistani delegation, Mr. Hussain, summarizes very well
the motives behind its move and the philosophy underlying the
present Protocol II, it seems more approoriate to quote the
relevant parts of' the speech as they appear in the summary
records of the Conference.
"Mr. Hussain ( akistan) said that his delegation had
played a significant part in negotiating the various texts
submitted by the Committees to the Conference in Document CDDH/
402, with the aim of' producing an instrument which could
alleviate the human misery associated with non—international
armed conflicts. During contacts with many other delegations
of both developed and under—prIvILeed countries, tt
	
ct
realized that there was considerable dissatisfaction uith the
length of the text as well as with the fact that it ventured
into domains which they considered sacrosanct and inappropriate
for inclusion in an international instrument. A cross section
of opinion held the view that the text entered into unnecessary
details, rendering it not only cumbersome but difficult to
understand and to apply in the peculiar circumstances of a
non—international conflict.
"Perceiving, therefore that such a view might endanger
its adoption or ratification, and after consultation with other
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delegations, the delegation of Pakistan had prepared a version
of Protocol II (CDDH/427 and Corr. 1) which, while simplified,
adhered to the original language •.. It was based on the
following theses: its provisions must be acceptable to all and,
therefore, of obvious practical benefit; the provisions must
be within the perceived capacity of those involved to apply
them and, therefore, precise and simple; they should not
appear to affect the sovereignty of any State Party or the
responsibility of its Government to maintain law and order and
defend national unity, nor be able to be invoked to justify any
outside intervention; nothing in the Protocol should suggest
that dissidents must be treated legally other than as rebels;
and lastly, there should be no automatic repetition of the more
comprehensive provisions, such as those of civil defence, found
in Protocol I. To i dude such provisions would risk changing
the material field of application to such an extent that states
would either fail to ratify Protocol II or tend to argue for
its non—application in situations falling within its scope,
thereby leaving the victims of those conflicts without
adequate protection.
It does not seem necessary to quarrel with this philosophy
which degrades governments more than anything else. Peoples
are presumed to know the law. More importantly, governments
are under obligation to disseminate the law of armed conflict
as far as possible. It is not understood, for instance, how the
civilian population can be presumed to know and understand the
detailed rules of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the
1	 CDDH/SR.49, para. 10 - 11•
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protection of civilians in time of war, and not be able to
understand the concept of military objective, the basic rule
of distinction between civilians and combatants, the prohibition
of indiscriminate attacks, the definition of the wounded, sick,
shipwrecked, medical personnel, medical units and transports,
and so forth. Such were the matters of detail which, according
to the Pakistani thesis ventured into domains which governments
considered sacrosanct and interfere with the sovereignty of' the
state. No one in 1949 had considered that the reference to
anti—government forces as a 'Party to the Conflict ? or even
concluding an agreement with them to bring all or part of the
Geneva Conventions into force as being interference in the
sovereignty of the state. Yet, the sensitivities in the
Diplomatic Conference in 1977 were such that the term 'Party
to the conflict' was considered an interference in the sover-
einty of the state and therefore was deleted from the Protocol.
Similarly, the definition of military objectives and the basic
rule of distinction between civilians and combatants were
deleted because they give the impression that there are cjecte
which it is permissable to attack, Even the rule which protects
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population
did not figure in the Pakistani draft; it was retained only
after a strong attack by the representative of' the Holy See.
Such were the matters which in the view of many delegations
were unnecessary details and infringed upon the sovereignty of
the state.
Ironically, the deletions were effected by a so—called
'gentlemans agreement' whereby rules on which there was no
consensus were deleted, or, which comes to the same thing,
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delegations were not to vote in favour of articles opposed by
other delegations. Consequently, although the Pakistani draft
Protocol was treated as an amendment to the draft Protocol
adopted by the Committees, any rule which was not included in
the Pakistani draft was either deleted by consensus, or failed
adoption as a result of too many abstentions.
Nevertheless, it is still fair to say that, notwithstand-
ing its deplorable high threshold, Protocol II is a far more
advanced step t an that of 1rticle 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949. It is also fair to say that, although
simplified, Protocol II has much in common with Protocol I. Of
course, Protocol II does not even contemplate prisoner—of—war
status to the insurgents, but it does contain details of the
humane treatment due to all persons who do not take a direct
part or who ave ceased to take part in hostilites, whether or
not their liberty has been restricted. The humane treatment of
persons whose liberty has been restricted is also laid doun in
considerable detail. There is also a part (Part iii) on the
protection of t e wounded, sick and shipwrecked which also
regulates the protection of' medical and religious personnel,
medical duties and medical units and transports, as well as the
respect due to t e distinctive emblem of the red cross, red
crescent or red lion and sun. Part IV of the Protocol which
deals with the protection of the civilian population and
civilian objects is of' course less detailed than its counter-
part in Protocol I since it was this part which suffered more,
as a result of the deletion of some important rules, partic-
ularly the rule prohibiting indiscriminate attacks.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that what is
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prohibited in time of armed conflict is necessarily and
afortiori prohibited in time of peace and in the absence of
armed conflict. !\nd since derogation from repect of human rights
is only permitted by international law "in time of public
emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the
existence of which is officially proclaimed," 1 and since, even
then, there are rights from which no derogation is permitted, it
logically follows that the protection proiided by Protocol II
is in addition to the underogable human rights. Moreover, since
the Protocol's provisions and the underogable human rights are
nothing else than human rights in time of armed conflict, it
is difficult to see how they can legally be denied to persons
in time of peace. In other words, the 'threshold problem' of
Protocol II as laid down in Pirticle 1 of the Protocol may be
considered not only as an exercise in irrelevance, but also
unconstitutional and may be declared as such in the courts of
any law—abiding state.
Indeed, in coutries where human rights are protected by
law the problem of threshold may not arise at all. It is in
countries whose peacetime laws or practices are at variance
with the substantive rules of Protocol II that the 'threshold'
problem of the Protocol is really a problem.
1. See J\rticle 4 of the United Nations Convention on Civil
and Political Rights.
129
62 Humane Treatment of Persons in the Power of the Parties
to the Conflict
Part II of Protocol II is entitled "Humane Treatment". i:t
Consists of three articles; Article 4 provides for fundemental
guarantees for all persons who do not take a direct part or
have ceased to take a direcr part in hostilities, whether or
not their liberty has been restricted, while Articles 5 and 6
provide for an additional 'minimum' standard of' treatment of'
persons whose liberty has been restricted and persons who are
liable for prosecution and punishment for criminal offences
related to the armed conflict. By and large the provisions of
these Articles are self—evident; only occasional remarks to
clarify the texts may be needed. Indeed, as the representative
of Pakistan had noted, the provisions of Protocol II are
"within the perceived capacity of those involved to apply them
and, therefore, precise and simple." The student of law,
afortiori, should have no problem in understanding them. We
begin with Article 4 since its scope is more general.
According to paragraph 1 oF Article 4, "All persons who
do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in
hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted,
are entitled to respect for their person, honour and convictions
and religious pratices. They shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction. It is
prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors."
The term "take a direct part.., in hostilities" must be
understood to mean taking a direct part in military operations.
Accordingly, all persons who do not take part in military
13Q
operations and persons who have ceased to take part in military
operations, whether or not their liberty has been restricted,
are entitled to the protection of Article 4 without adverse
distinction founded on race, colour, sex, language, religion
or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
wealth, birth or other status, or any other similar criteria.
Without prejudice to the generality of' paragraph 1 of'
Article 4, the following acts against the persons referred to
in paragraph 1 "are and shall remain prohibited at any time
and in any place wht5oever	 violence to life, health and
physical or mental wellbeing of persons, in particular murder
as well as cru 1 treatment such as torture, mutilation or any
form of' corporal punishment; collective punishment; taking of
hostages; acts of terrorism; outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced
prostitution and any form of indecent assault; slavery and the
slave trade in all their forms; pillage; and threats to commit
any of the foregoing acts1
It should be noted that the content of' paragraphs I and 2
of Article 4 of Protocol II corresponds to Articles 27, 29, 31,
32, 33 and 34 of' the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 •
 Indeed,
the ICRC Commentary refers to these articles in its interpret-
ation of' Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
which suggests that the acts prohibited under Article 4 of
Protocol II are already prohibited by P1 rticle 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions. 2 It should also be emphasized that the acts
1 •
 Article 4(2) of Protocol II.
2 See ICRC Commentary, (Pictet (ed.) Commentary on the Fourth
Geneva Convention of 1949, Geneva, 1958, pp. 38-40.
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prohibited by Article 4 are prohibited "at any time and in any
place whatsoever." This clearly indicates that the prohibitions
are absolute and are applicable irrespective of the level of
the conflict. The remainder of Article 4 is devoted to the
protection of children. It requires that all appropriate steps
be taken to facilitate the reunion of families temporarily
separated. It also stipulates that children who have not
attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited
in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in
hostilites. If nevertheless they were rec.ruited, took part in
hostilities and were captured, they remain entitled to the
special protection provided by Article 4, but it is not clear
whether they would be liable to prosecution and punishment for
taking part in military operations. Another measure for the
protection of children is their evacuation temporarily from the
area in which military operations are taking place, if
necessary, and whenever possible with the consent of their
parents. The party taking such a measure, which is usually the
government, has to ensure that the children are accompanied by
persons responsible for their safety and well—being.
Turning now to the treatment of persons whose liberty has
been restricted we find that Article 5 of Protocol II provides
that in addition to the provisions of' Article 4, the provisions
of Article 5 "shall be respected as a minimum with regard to
persons deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the
armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained."
The wounded and the sick persons whose liberty has been
restricted, whether or not they have taken part in hostilities
are entitled to be respected and protected. In all circumstances
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they shall be treated humanely and shall receive, to the
fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay,
the medical care and attention required by their condition,
without distinction among them founded on any grounds other
than medical ones.1
With regard to the treatment of persons deprived of their
liberty, \rticle 5 says that they shall, "to the same extent
as the local civilian population, be provided with food and
drinking water and be afforded safeguards as regards health
and hygiene and protection against the rigours of the climate
and the dangers of the armed conflict." They shall also be
allowed to receive individual or collective relief; practice
their religion and, if requested and appropriate, to receive
spiritual assistance from persons such as chaplains, performing
religious functions; and, if made to work, they shall have the
benefit of working conditions and safeguards similar to those
enjoyed by the local civilian population.2
It should be noted that the criterion "to the same extent
as the local civilian population" is a very vague one; There
are rich and poor civilians. Moreover, local civilians may get
what they need from various sources, while the detainee or
internee cannot. The standard therefore ought to have been that
of' the armed forces of the party in whose power the prisoners
are s But it seems that the local civilian population was chosen
as a standard in order not to give the impression that the
insurgents are equal to the members of the armed forces in any
1 •
 See Article 5(1) (a) and Article 7 of Protocol II.
2. Sub—paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e) of para. 1 of Article
5 of Protocol II.
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respect.
In addition to the above mentioned, detainees and
internees shall be allowed to send and receive cards, the
number of which may be limited by competent authority if it
deems necessary; they shall have the benefit of' medical
examination; and, more importantly, their physical or mental
health and integrity a all not be endangered by any unjustified
act or ommisssion. Accordingly, it is prohibited to subject
persons deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the
armed conflict "to any medical procedure which is not indicated
by the state of' health of the person concerned, and which is
not consistent wit the generally accepted medical standard
applied to fr a persons under similar medical circumstances."1
Finally, Article 5 requires that, except when men and
women of a family are accomadated together, women are to be
held in quaters separated from those of men and are to be put
under the immediate supervision of' women. It also reqires that
places of' detention or internment not be located close to the
combat zone and that the detainees or internees be e'.aat.d
when the places of' detention or internment become exposed to
danger arising out of the armed conflict, if the evacuation
can be carried out under adequate conditions of safety.2
Turning now to'penal prosecutions' (Article 6), it may be
noted first that Protocol II does not envisage prisoner—of'war
status to combatants of' either party to the conflict s
 But it
may be useful to note that the ICRC had submitted to the
1 See sub—paragraphs (b), (d)and (e) of paragraph 2 of Article
5 of Protocol II. Quotation from sub—paragraph (a).
2 5ee sub—paragraphs (a) and (c) of' paragraph 2 of Article 5
of Protocol II.
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Conference of Government Experts two proposals which envisaged
the application of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 The
first proposal was formulated as follows:
"When in the case of armed conflict not of an international
character in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties, the Party opposing the authorities in power has
a government which exercises effective power, by means of
its administration and adequately organized forces, over
a part of t e territory, the Parties to the conflict
shall apply all the provisions of the four Geneva
Conventions of \ugust 12, 1949 and the p1dditional protocol
to the said Conventions."
The second proposal related to the case when the
authorities in power or both parties to the conflict receive
foreign aid in troops from other states. In such a case also
the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1\dditional Protocol
2
I would be applicable.
To the first proposal, the main objection raised by many
experts was that states could not be expected to sicn ac
instrument whereby they would be obliged, as soon as certain
conditions implying a high degree of intensity of the struggle
had been met, automatically to grant the rebels the benefit of
the Four Geneva Conventions, in particular prisoner—of—war
status to captured combatants, as in conflict between states•3
The second proposal was objected to by numerous experts
on the ground that its adoption would place the authorities
1 •
 ICRC Report on the Work of' the Conference of Government
Experts, Second Session, 1972, Jol. 2, p. 97.
2. Loc. cit.
3. Ibid., p. 98, para. 2.336.
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in power in a difficult position whenever they felt obliged to
seek foreign Bid, Since such intervention would entail treating
their rebels as prisoners of war.1
In brief, the Conference of Government Experts rejected
the ICRC proposals, and the subject was not raised at the
Diplomatic Conference where, predictably, it would have met the
same doomed fate.
Protocol II, thus, did not envisage prisoner—of—war status,
except perhaps as may be inferred from Article 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions, that is to say, only by special agreement
between the parties to the conflict.
Accordingly, captured insurgents are liable to prosecution
and punis ment for criminal offences related to the armed
conflict as the penal Co e of the authorities in power may
provide, and irrespective of whether the authority against
which the armed struggle is being waged was a dictatorship or
a democracy. Violations of the Protocol are of Course also
punishable, alt ough the Protocol does not expressly say so.
Thus, at least as far as the vioLations Of tb 	 ot.cc.c. a
concerned, both Parties to the conflict are entitled to
prosecute and punish the offenders, although, here again, the
Protocol does not expressly say so Summary justice, however,
is prohibited. Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of'
1949 prohibits "at any time and in any place whatsoever" the
passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which
1. Ibid., p. 98, para. 2.345. For other arguments, see ibid.,
P p . 97-99.
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are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
Those judicial guarantees, whose respect during armed
conflicts is usually the exception rather than the rule, are
now elaborated (or summarized) in !rticle 6 of Protocol II.
The opening sentence of' paragraph 2 of rticle 6 lays down the
general principle:
?Q sentence shall be passed and no penalty shall be
executed on a person found guilty of an offence except
pursuant to a conviction pronounced by a court offering
the essential guarantees of indepe-idence and impartiality."
Constitutions,	 written and unwritten, usually provide for
the 'indepen ence and impartiality' of the judiciary, as a
matter of principle. In practice, however, especially in the
field of political crimes, the judiciary are often subservient
to the executive authority. Or, put rather differently, the
judiciary will ha e to apply the law regardless of its fairness.
The indepen ence and impartiality of the court is thus purely
a matter of form, and the most that can be expected is a fair
assessment of the available evidence and of applying the law
to the facts. But even in applying the law to the facts the
judiciary usually espouse the view of the executive in matters
of international law, particularly in matters of recognition
and entitlement to prisoner—of—war status.1
Protocol II, ho ever, does not envisage prisoner—of—war
status, thereby facilitating the task of' the judiciary.
I\ccording to Irticle 6 of Protocol II, the following basic
principles must in particular be respected:
'1. See below, Chapter 4, Section 3, of this thesis.
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t(a) the procedure shall provide for an accused to be
informed without delay of the particulars of the
offence alleged against him and shall afford the
accused before and during his trial all the necessary
rights and means of defence;
(b) no one shall be convicted of an offence except on
the basis of individual responsiblity;
(c) no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence
on account of any act or omission which did not
constite a criminal offence under the law, at the
time when it was committed; nor shall a heavier
penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at
the time when the criminal offence was committed; if'
after the commission of' the offence, provision is
made by the law for the imposition of a lighter
penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby;
(d) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right
to be tried in his presence;
(f) no one shall be compelled to testify against himself
or to confess guilt."
In addition to these judicial guarantees, paragraph 3
provides that a convicted person shall be advised on conviction
of his judicial and other remedies and of the time—limits
within which they may be exercised. Further, paragraph 4
provides that the death penalty shall not be pronounced on
persons who were under the age of' eighteen years at the time
of the offence and shall not be carried out on pregnant women
or mothers of young children.
Finally, while Protocol II does not provide for prisoner-
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of—war status, paragraph 5 of 1\rticle 6 does require the
authorities in power, at the end of hostilities, to 'endevour'
to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have
participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their
liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they
were interned or detained.
6.3. General Protection of the Civilian Population and Civilian
Objects /'tgainst Effects of Military Operations
Until the last week of' the Diplomatic Conference the whole
work on the reaffirmation and development of humanitarian law
applicable in armed conflict was based on the belief that, in
principle, the protection due to the civilian population
against the dangers of military operations should be the same
in all situations and in all types of armed conflict. This was
the attitude of the ICRC since at least 1965 when the Twentieth
International Conference of the Red Cross held in Vienna in
that year adopted resolution XXVIII which "solemly declares
that all governments and other authorities responsible for
action in armed conflicts should conform at least to the
following principles:
- that the rights of the Parties to a conflict to adopt
means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited;
- that it is prohibited to launch attacks against the
civilian population as such;
- that distinction must be made at all times between
persons taking part in the hostilities and members of
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the civilian population to the effect that the latter
be spared as much as possible;
- that the general principles of the law of war apply to
nuclear and similar weapons.1
This resolution was expressly affirmed by the General
1\ssembly of the United Nations in resolution 2444(XXIII) of
19 December 1 68, which was adopted by a unanimous vote of 111
vote5 to none. 2
 In the first preambular paragraph of this
resolution, the General assembly taco iiad the nest'i to1
applying basic humanitarian principles in all armed conflicts."
In 1969, at Its session at Edinburgh, the respectable
Institute of International Law adopted its famous resolution
on "the distinction between military objectives and non—military
objects in general and particularly the problems associated
with weapons of mass destruction." The Institute noted that
the rules embodied in that resolution "form part of the
principle5 to be observed in armed conflicts by any de jure or
de facto government, or by any other authority responsible for
the conduct of hostilities." 3
In 1970 the General l:\ssembly of the United Nations matched
the resolution of the Institute of International Law with its
resolution 2675 (xxv) of 9 December, which was adopted
unanimously by a vote of 109 votes to none, and affirmed "basic
principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed
conflicts, without prejudice to their future elaboratIon within
1. Text in Schindler and Toman, The Laws of 1\rmed Conflict,
1973, pp. 187 - 188.
2. Text, ibid.,	 j. 191...192 i roll—call vote did not take
place.
3. Text, ibid., pp. 193-194 !Uso in Section 1 of Chapter 4
of this thesis.
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the framework of progressive development of the international
law of armed conflict."1
Thus, by 197U, there was a general consensus in govern-
mental and non—governmental organizations that protection of
the civilian population against the dangers of military
operations should be the same in all types of armed conflict.
The ICRC reflected this trend in its draft Protocols which
served as a basis for discussion at t e Conference of
Government Experts (1971 and 1972) and the Diplomatic
Conference for reaffirmation and development of international
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict (1974 - 1977).
i\lthough the Diplomatic Conference had adopted a 'threshold'
for Protocol II which was much higher than that proposed by
the 1CRC, the substantive rules affording protection to the
civilian population were virtually the same in both Protocol5
until the Pakistani draft Protocol came to bear on it.
Consequently, many important basic rules were deleted one after
the other s
 Since this was t e first time that an international
conference had attempted to regulate the conduct of military
operations in non—international armed conflicts (civil war in
brief), it will be useful to have a look at some of the more
important rules which were deleted.
The first to be mentioned is the basic rule relating to
methods and means of combat and which prohibits unecessary
injury. This rule was contained in Article 20 of draft Protocol
II, which stated that "in any armed conflict to which this
Protocol applies, the right of the Parties to the conflict to
1. Text, ibid., pp. 195-196. Also in Section 1 of Chapter 4
of this Thesis.
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chose methods or means of combat is not unlimited. It is
forbidden to employ weapons, projectiles, and material and
methods of combat of a nature to cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering." This rule was adopted by consensus by
Committee III on 4th June, 176. 1
 It was deleted in Plenary by
25 votes to l y , with 33 abstentions, and without discussion.2
It is not clear therefore why the rticle was deleted.
Pnother basic rule was also deleted in Plenary, this was the
basic rule of distinction which was contained in draft p1rticle
24. It provided as follows:
"l •
 In or er to ensure respect and protection for the
civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties
to t e conflict shall at all times distinguish between
t e civilian population and combatants and between
civilian objects and military objectives and shall
direct their operations only against military
objectives.
2 Constant care shall be taken when conducting military
operations, to spare the civilian ç?aculatiGc, cicuil^ans
and civilian objects. This rule shall, in particular,
apply to the planning deciding or launching of an
attack."
Paragraph 1 of this rule corresponds to Prticle 48 of'
Protocol	 while paragraph 2 reiterates the basic principle
1. See Cassese, [leans of Warfare: The Traditional and New Law,
in Cassese (ed.), The New Humanitarian Law of /\rmed Conflict,
1979,	 p. 192-193.
2 CDDH/SR.51, para. 55.
3. See Further, Section 1 of Chapter 4 of this thesis.
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1
of Article 57 entitled "precautions in attacks." Apart from
the general objection to the phrase "Parties to the conflict"
which, at any rate, was deleted systematically from draft
Protocol II In Pl e nary, the main objection to draft Article
24 was stated by the representative of the United States of
America, Mr. Aldrich, He said that Article 24 "implied that
rebels were allowed to chose their objectives. He was there-
fore against the Article." 2 When nevertheless many delegations
insisted on a roll—call vote, only 19 delegations voted against
3the rule, while 36 voted ici f'avur arc M 	 taineti. 'taving
failed to obtain the necessary two—thirds majority, Article 24
was not adopted. However, it is important to note that In fact
there was not really much opposition to the article and that
the only stated objection to the Article was really ridiculous,
for even if the Article implied that rebels were allowed to
chose their objectives the Protocol does not make such a choice
legal. At any rate, the insurgents do not lose anything by
deleting the rule, nor gain anything by its retention. The
loser is the civilian population whose legal protection was
undermined,
However, deletion of the rule of distinction contained in
draft Article 24 was only a prelude to the deletion of even
more important rules, particularly the rules relating to the
prohibition of indiscriminate attacks. 4 Indeed, since many
delegations had anticipated that deletion of Article 24 would
1 •
 On the precautions in attack, see Section 9 of' Chapter 5 of
this thesis.
2 CDDH/SR. 52, para. 63.
3. CDDH/SR. 52, para. 78.
4. On the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, see Section
8 of Chapter 5 of this thesis.
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inevitably lead to the deletion of the rules prohibiting
indiscriminate attacks, namely paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of' draft
Article 26, many delegations wished to see the fate of' those
paragraphs decided first. The proposal to retain paragraphs
4, 5, and 6 of draft Article 26 was rejected by 30 votes to 25,
1
with 34 abstentions. No specific reason was given for this
deletion, and it is unnecessary to speculate, for no reason
whatsoever can justify the deletion of the rule of distinction,
or, for that matter, the rules prohibiting indiscriminate
attacks. It may be sufficient in this respect to note that such
deletions would only benefit oppressive governments in terms
of law, for their advocates may now legally argue that
indiscriminate att cks do not violate any recognized rule
applicable in civil war•
Deletion of the basic rule on methods and means of combat;
the basic rule of distinction between civilians and combatants
and between civilian objects and military objectives; and the
rules prohibiting indiscriminate attacks made the deletion of
the definition of military objectives (draft Article 26 bis)
and the definition of a ivilian and the civilian population
(draft Article 25) inevitable. These Articles were more than
just definitions. Article 26 his dealt with the"general
protection of civilian objects." It stated that civilian objects
shall not be made the object of attack, and that attacks shall
be strictly limited to those objects which by their nature,
location,	 purpose or use make an effective contribution to
the armed action of the Parties to the conflict. This rule was
1	 CDDH/SR.52, para. 78.
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deleted by consensus and without discussion.1
Similarly, draft Article 25 was deleted by consensus and
without discussion. This p rticle defined a civilian as "anyone
who is not a me ber of the armed forces or of an organized
armed group", and defined the civilian population as comprising
all persons who are civilians. Uhile these definitions may seem
superfluous, the Article contained a provision which was
particularly important for the protection of the civilian
population. It stated that "the presence within the civilian
population of individual civilians who do not fall within the
defjntjon of civilians does not deprive the population of its
civilian character." In other words, the attack in such a case
would constitute an attack against the civilian population as
such.
After all these deletions one may legitimately ask, what
is left of t e legal protection of the civilian population and
civilian o jects against the dangers of military operations?
The answer to this question seems to depend on the legal status
of the rules whic have been deleted and on the interpretation
of existing rules of Protocol II, some of which cannot be
properly interpreted without invoking one rule or another of
those which have been deleted. This is particularly true of
Article 13 of Protocol II which states that:
"l The civilian population and individual civilians shall
enjoy general protection against the dangers arising
from military operations. To give effect to this
protection, the following rules shall be observed in
1	 CDDH/SR.52, pare. 77.
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all circumstances.
2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual
civilians shall not be made the object of attack.
1\cts or threats of violence the primary purpose of
which is to spread terror among the civilian
population are prohibited.
3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection of this Part
unless and for such time as they take a direct part
in hostilites."
The principle of"general protection", as distinguished
from "special protection" which verges on imunity from attack1,
necessarily implies that civilians and civilian objects are
not protected against unavoidable incidental losses caused by
attacks directed at military objectives. The principle of
distinction between civilians and combatants and between
civilian objects and military objectives, with the consequence
that attacks should be strictly limited to military objectives,
is a part and parcel of the concept of general protection. It
also necessarily invokes the concept of indiscriminate attacks,
the concept of' military objectives, as well as the precautiQs
in attacks. !\ccording to rticle 51 of Protocol I, rules
regulating these problems are necessary to give effect to the
principle of general protection. It cannot be said, therefore,
that paragraphs 2 and 3 of Prticle 13 of Protocol II are by
themselves sufficient to give effect to the principle of
general protection. Moreover, these two paragraphs cannot
properly be interpreted without the aid of some of the rules
1. On the principle of general protection, see Section 2 of
Chapter 6 of this thesis.
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which have been deleted.
Thus paragraph 2 of Article 13 which states that the
civilian population, as well as individual civilians shall not
be made the object of attack, has traditionally been understood
to mean that attacks which are directed exclusively at the
civilian population or individual civilians are prohibited. The
concept of military objectives is therefore indispensible for
determining whether an attack was directed exclusively at the
civilian population or individual civilians. It is also
necessary for distinguishing acts of violence, the primary
purpose of' which is to spread terror among the civilian
population, from those which may cause terror, but are
primarily directed against military objectives.
Similarly, deletion of the definition of civilians makes
it difficult to determine the scope of paragraph 3 of Jrticle
13 of Protocol II, which states that civilians shall enjoy the
protection of Part It.! of the Protocol, "unless and for such a
time as they take a direct part in hostilities." The term
'hostilities' was not defined, but a number of delegations
expressed the view that the term included preparations for
combat and return from combat. 1 This clearly indicates that
the taking of a direct part in hostilities means the taking of
a direct part in military operations. Consequently, according
to paragraph 3, civilians forfeit their protection only during
such time as they take a direct part in military operations.
ut it is not clear whether the term 'civilians' includes those
referred to in Article 1 of' the Protocol as "other organized
1. Report to the Thire Commission of' the Working Group,
Committee III, Doc. CDDH/III/224, 24 February, 1975.
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armed groupsH, as distinguished from "dissident armed forces."
If the definition of civilians was retained, there would have
been no doubt that such "other organized armed groups" were
not included under the denomination 'civilians'.
It thus appears that even from a purely technical point
of view the deletions were unwarranted. International lawyers
will therefore be justified if they continue to read in the
Protocol the provisions which have actually been deleted, if
only to clarify the meaning of the rules which have been
retained.
Before leaving !rticle 13 of Protocol II, it should be
noted that its three paragraphs reproduce the fir5t three
paragraphs of 1\rticle 51, respectively, which are examined at
length in Chapter Five of this thesis. In order to avoid
duplication the reader is kindly referred to the relevant
sections • 1
With regard to the protection of civilian objects it has
already been noted above that draft Pirticle 26 bis which would
have provided for general protection of civilian objects had
been deleted. In Protocol I, civilian objects are defined
negatively: "Civilian objects are all objects which are not
military objectives", and military objectives are "those
object5 which by their nature, location, purpose or use make
an effective contribution to military action and whose total
or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
advantage.
1. See Sections 3, 4 and S of Chapter Five of this thesis.
2. rrticle 52 (2) of Protocol I.
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had decided to delete any reference to 'Parties to the Cof1f-t
in Protocol II", said the representative of the Holy See, "It
had, as it were, abandoned attempts to draft a real legal
instrument and instead had restricted itself to a statement of
good intentions which in terms of humanitarian law came down
to a 'legal ectoplasm', for the text will be devoid of any real
humanitarian substance and of any mandatory character. Yet, its
creators were daring to claim that it would serve to control...
civil wars w ich, as everybody was aware, were the most cruel
and pitiless of all conflicts."1
In eed, Article 14 of' Protocol II itself is no more than
a legal ectoplasm since it prohibits only acts which are
intended to cause starvation, not acts which cause starvation.
Consequently, it would always be possible to argue that the
destruction of t e objects mentioned in Article 14 was intended
to deprive the insurgents of food and water, and not to starve
the civilian population.
However, it should e noted that the question of starvation
of the civilian population is closel' )1
 connct	 \it tne
question of relief actions. Article 18, paragraph 2, of Protocol
II provides in this respect, that:
"If the civilian population is suffering undue hardshio
owing to a lack of the supplies essential for its
survival, such as foodstuffs and medical 5upplies,
relief actions for the civilian population which are of
exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature and which
are conducted without any adverse distinction shall be
1	 CDDH/SR.52, para. 79 - 81.
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undertaken subject to the consent of' the High Contracting
Party
This means that relief, even when it is exclusively
humanitarian and impartial in nature, should not be given to
the civilian population in the territories under the control
of insurgents without the consent of the government against
which a civil war is being fought. Governments thus arrogated
to themselves not only the right to represent their peoples
until t ey were overthrown, but also the power of life and
death, of granting and depriving, and of determining whether
the hardship of the civilian population was 'due' or 'undue'
This is really too much. One may understand a rule which would
giv a overnment the right to pronounce on the nature of the
relief action undertaken by relief organizations or third
st tes, but one cannot understand a rule that goes so far as
to give even to tyrants the power of determining whether the
civilian population should die or survive. There is not even
an obligation to allow such relief even when it is of an
exclusively umanitarian and impartial nature. 1\rticle 18,
paragraph 2, therefore, does not amount even tc 'Lecai
ectoplasm'.
Relief action which is of an exclusively humanitarian and
impartial nature cannot be regarded as an interference in the
armed conflict and should not be made subject to the consent
of the parties to the conflict. It should be determined by the
needs of' the civilian population. However, it is clear that the
consent of the High Contracting Party on whose territory the
armed conflict takes place is necessary although one delegation
had expressed the view that the phrase "subject to the consent
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heritage of' peoples, and to use them in support of the
1
military effort."
Finally, with regard to the protection of' the civilian
population, Protocol II prohibits the forced movement of
civilians for reasons related to t e conflict. According to
Article 17 of the Protocol, the displacement of' the civilian
population s all not be ordered for reasons related to the
conflict "unless the security of the civilians involved or
imperative military necessity so demand." In such a case, all
possi le measures have to be taken in order that the civilian
population may e received under satisfactory conditions of
shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition. 1ore importantly
the Article insists that "civilians shall not be compelled to
leave their own territory for reasons connected with the
co flict." Ths usually happens in wars of secession, religious
wars and colonial wars as happened in Palestine in 1948, where
t e Arab population of Palestine were compelled to leave their
own territory y the Zionist organizations.
It should be noted that rticle "17 is modelled on Article
49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of' 1949 relative to the
protection of civilians in time of war, which also allows the
Occupying Power to undertake "total or partial evacuation of'
of a given area if the security of the population or imperative
military reasons so	 But the Article expressly requires
that persons thus evacuated have to be transferred back to
their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have
ceased It goes without saying that this also must be the case
1. See further, Section 6.1. of Chapter 5 of this thesis.
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in civil wars. Nevertheless, this writer is of the view that
no exceptions to the prohibition of forcible movement (or
relocation) should be allowed since such exceptions are always
open to abuse.
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CHAPTER THREE
WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION IN
INTERNATIONAL HUIIANITARIAN LAW
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1 .
	 Introduction
In modern political and legal literature, wars of
national liberation refer to armed conflicts in which
peoples fight for their liberation and self—determination.
The right of peoples to self—determination is recognized in
the Charter of the United Nations, especially in Article 1,
paragraph 2, and Article 55, 73, 76, and 80, and has been
elaborated in many legally important instruments such as the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and peoples adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly in Resolution 1514 (xv) on 14 December 1960,1 and the
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co—operation among States in accordance
2
with the Charter of the United Nations, as well as in a great
number of General Assembly resolutions bearing on the right
of self—determination in general and its application to
concrete cases. 3 The right of self—determination has also
been recognized as a fundamental human right of' peoples in
the Universal Declaration of' Human rights adopted by the
U.N. General Assembly on December 10, 1948, and more
expressly in Article 1 common to the International Covenants
on Human Rights of 1966.
1. See text in Brounlie (ed.), Basic Documents in International
Law, (second rev s ed., 1978), P p . 188-189.
2. Text in ibid., Pp. 32-40, esp. pp . 38-39.
3. For a survey of' "I'9easures to Promote and Protect the Right
to Self—Determination" taken by the United Nations, see,
United Nations Publication, l yg o, (sales No. E. 79.xiv.6)
entitled "United Nations Action in the Field of Human
Rights", esp. pp. 23-44, and passim.
4. Text in Brownlie, op. cit. pp. 145-149 Article 21, para. 3
of the Declaration states: "The will of the people shall
be the basis of' the aughority of government...".
5. Text in Brownlie, ibid., pp. 152, 162
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But although the right of peoples to self—determination
was recognized in so many international legal instruments
the right of' peoples fighting for their right of self—
determination, and the right of liberation movements to be
protected by humanitarian law in its entirety was the
subject of a long controversy in the United Nations, in the
Conference of Government Experts held in Geneva in 1971 and
1972, and in the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation
and Development of Humanitarian Law applicable in Armed
Conflicts, held in Geneva (1974_1977). This controversy is
the focus of' this chapter.
2	 An Over View
The controversy over the legal status of wars of
national liberation, (i.e. armed conflicts in which peoples
are fighting for their right to self—determination,
particularly, against colonial and alien and racist regimes),
was between a group of' states known in United Nations
parlance as "the western and others group", 1
 on the on8
hand, and the rest of the world, on the other hand.
To the group of' 'Western states and others', wars of
national liberation represented a species of armed conflicts
not of an international character and therefore must at best
1. The others being such regional atypical states as Israel
and South Africa, according to Abi—Seab, 165 Recueil des
Cours of the Hague Academy of International Law, 1979
IV, p.385. See also, Keith Suter, An International Law of
Guerrilla Warfare, 1984. passum.
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be governed by Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of'
1949, and by Additional Protocol II. To African, Asian, Latin
American, and East European, as well as some western states,
wars of national liberation wae of an international
character and therefore the peoples involved in such a war,
and members of liberation movements must be protected by
humanitarian law in its entirety as in the case of an
inter—state armed conflict.
From a purely technical legal point of view, the
controversy, may be said to have centred on the
interpretation of one word - the word 'power' in paragraph
3 of Article 2, common to the four Geneva Conventions of
1949 k The text of Article 2, reads as follows:
"In addition to the provisions which shall be
implemented in peacetime, the present Convention shall
apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more
of the High Contracting Parties, even If the state of
war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of
partial or total occupation of the territory of a
High Contracting Party, even If the said occupation
meets with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not
be a Party to the present Convention, the Powers who
are parties thereto shall remain bound by it In their
mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by
the Convention in relation to the said Power, If the
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latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof."
(Emphasis added)
In the 'Western—and—others' group there were two views
regarding the term 'Power' in Article 2(3) common to the
four Geneva Conventions. One view held that the term 'Power'
meant only 'states', while the other view held that, in
addition to states the term also included state—like
entities. 1
 Different arguments were advanced to support this
thesis, most of which, as will be shown, were neither
convincing nor were even relevant to the point under discu-
ssion. 2 Indeed, this group of states made no effort to prove
that the term 'Power' meant only states, and the main
argument they advanced was that the requirements of the
Geneva Conventions could be fulfilled only by states
according to one view. 3 To this the proponents of the
international character of wars of national liberation
replied, with justice, that practically, liberation movements
are in the same position of a state whose territory is under
occupation or of resistance movements in occupied territories,
to which the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are applicable.
To be sure, the question before the Conference was not
whether the Geneva Conventions could or could not be applied
to entities other than states; the question was whether wars
of national liberation were armed conflicts of international
character in the light of general international law.
1 •
 It should be noted that only Professor Cassese of the
delegation of Italy, spoke at' Article 2(3) explicitly.
2. See below, Section 4.2.1. of this Chapter.
3. Draft Report of Committee I, First Session, (CDDH/I/8l.
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To cut it short, the controversy over the legal status
of wars of national liberation was concluded by the adoption
of Article 1 of Protocol I. Additional to the Geneva
Conventions. The full text of this Article, entitled
t General Principles and Scope of Application tt , reads as
follows:
1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect
and to ensure respect for this Protocol in all
cir cums tances.
2. In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other
international agreements, civilians and combatants
remain under the protection and authority of the
principles of international law derived from
established custom, from the principles of humanity
and from the dictates of public conscience.
3. This Protocol which supplements the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of
war victims, shall apply in the situations referred
to in Article 2 common to those Cor,i'entions.
4. The situations referred to in the preceeding
paragraph include armed conflicts in which peoples
are fighting against colonial domination and alien
occupation and against racist regimes in the
exercise of their right of self—determination, as
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and
the Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co—operation among
States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations.
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The first paragraph of this Article is a restatement of'
the principle enshrined in Article 1 common to the Geneva
Conventions of l949 The second paragraph is a useful
codification or restatement of a principle already expressed
in the preamble to the Hague Convention of 1907 (Convention
IV) respecting the laws and customs of war on land, 1 and is
generally known as De Marten's clause. In terms of the
history of' Article 1 of Protocol I, it represented the
initial attitude of the main group of Western states towards
wars of national liberation. The third paragraph prescribes
the scope of application of Protocol I and the link between
the Protocol and the Geneva Conventions. Treaty relations
upon entry into force of' the Protocol are governed by
Article 96 of the Protocol, which also makes explicit what
has always been implicit in Article 1, paragraph 4, of
Protocol I, regarding the manner in which a liberation move-
ment is required to express its will to be bound by the
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocol I.
Since Article 96 of Protocol I is indissolubly linked
with paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 1 of Protocol I, it will
be useful here to reproduce it in full. Article 96 is
entitled "Treaty relations upon entry into force of this
Protocol." Its text reads as follows:
1. When the Parties to the Conventions are also Parties
to this Protocol, the Conventions shall apply as
supplemented by this Protocol.
2. When one of the Parties to the conflict is not bound
1. For the text of the preamble, see "Documents on the Law of
War", edited by Adam Roberts and Richard Guelf, 1982, p.45.
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by this Protocol, the Parties to the Protocol shall
remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They
shall furthermore be bound by this Protocol in
relation to each of the Parties which are not bound
by it, if the latter accepts and applies the
provisions thereof.
3. The authority representing a people engaged against
a High Contracting Party in an armed conflict of the
type referred to in Article 1, paragraph 4, may
undertake to apply the Conventions and this Protocol
in relation to that conflict by means of a unilat-
eral declaration addressed to the depositary. Such
declaration shall, upon its receipt by the
depositary, have in relation to that conflict the
following effects:
(a) the Conventions and this Protocol are brought
into force for the said authority as a Party to
the conflict with immediate affect;
(b) the said authority assumes the same rights and
obligations as those which have been assumed by
a High Contracting Party to the Conventions and
this Protocol; and
(c) The Conventions and this Protocol are equally
binding upon all Parties to the conflict.
It is probably obvious that paragraph 3 of' Article 96
of' Protocol I (which was not among the original ICRC
proposals) is merely a technical clarifiction of' paragraph
4 of Article 1 of Protocol I, as well as of' Article 2,
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paragraph 3, common to the Geneva Conventions. It is also a
technical clarification of paragraph 2 of Prtic1e 96 of
Protocol I with regard to wars of national liberation.
1nother purpose of Irticle 96(3) of Protocol I, was to
dispel the fear voiced by some Western delegations that the
characterization of wars of national liberation as
international armed conflicts would introduce a 'just war'
concept into humanitarian law. In other words, they feared
that the intention of the proponents of wars of national
liberation was to 'free' liberation movements from any
humanitarian law obligations towards their enemies while
saddling their enemies (the colonial and alien and racist
regimes) in all the humanitarian law obligations without
giving them any corresponding rights. Such, at any rate, was
a misguided conception; proponents of the international
character of' wars of national liberation have not even
hinted that the ponents of liberation movements are any
less entitled to legal protection, what they have hinted at
is that there must be distinction between the aggressor and
the victim of' aggression. In other words, what they
questioned is the aggressor's claim to a 'legitimate'
military necessity.
This latter point, however, was not pursued with the
vigour it deserved, and the result was that "the Conventions
and this Protocol are equally binding upon all Parties to
the conflict", as stated in sub—paragraph 3(c) of frticle 96
of Protocol I. This is indeed a prime example of an injustice
in equality before the law. For the aggressor, or those who
continue to deny peoples their right to self—determination
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will incur no responsiblity beyond those breaches of
humanitarian law which, as a rule, have always been sent to
oblivion, during, and at the end, of every war of aggression,
from the Second World War till the present time.
The rule that humanitarian law must a p ply equally to
the aggressor as well as to the victim, in our view, must be
complemented by making the aggressor, and especially those
who deny, or continue to deny the peoples their right to
self—determination, responsible for all the cost of the war.
Unless, and until such a rule is put into practice, there
will be no determent to aggression, and the prohibition of'
the use of force in international relations and "in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations't,
will continue to be the daydream of humankind.
Accordingly, while the proponents of the international
character of wars of national liberation may congratulate
themselves on making the Geneva Conventions and the Protocol
equally binding on all Parties to the conflict, they can
hardly be considered to have stood between the greedy dog
and its bone. This being said, we revert now to the less
ambitious battle over the international character of wars of
national liberation in humanitarian law.
3.	 A Legal Framework
The pupose of this section is to introduce and to put
in perspective the different questions relating to wars of
national liberation in humanitarian law and to serve as a
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background to the rest of this chapter. The length of the
two following sub—sections is ex p licable by the fact that
the different questions related to wars of' national
liberation are closely interrelated. A general view is
therefore thought to be desirable although technically might
not be necessary,since all the questions raised here will be
dealt with in detail later on. However, it is always useful
to have a general view before going into details.
3,1	 The Basic Questions Explained
Humanitarian law issues relating to wars of national
liberation can be reduced to four basic questions:1
- Which status ?
- For what conflicts ?
- Between which parties ?
- For what purpose ?
This chapter is concerned with the first three of these
questions. The fourth question (i.e. for what purpose ?) is a
question that in fact pervades any discussion of humanitarian
law as it refers to the policy (or policies) underlying the
rules of humanitarian law. In a more general sense, the
purpose of humanitarian law is to protect victims of armed
conflict, and it is this sense that writers generally speak
of the purpose of humanitarian law and enquire about the
success or failure of the law to acheive this objective.
1. See Abi—Saab, 165 Recueil Des Cours (1979-1%!), pp. 364-365.
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1. Which Status? This is the fundementa]. issue of'
determining whether wars of' national liberation constituted
armed conflicts of international character, or, armed con-
flicts of non—international character, for purposes of
humanitarian law. Article 1, paragraph 4, quoted above,
clearly characterizes wars of national liberation as armed
conflicts of international character. But unless one takes
Article 1, paragraph 4, as given, it uould be necessary to
examine its history in order to assert whether it is
declaratory of existing international law, or whether it is
merely a new rule that ultimately depends for its operation
on such formalities as accession and ratification by the
Party to the conflict against whom a war of national
liberation is being waged.
2. For What Conflicts 7 This is the question of the
definition of wars of national liberation for purposes of
humanitarian law. Normally, one would have started with this
question. But the present formula of Article 1, paragraph 4,
is a compromise formula developed during the debate on the
legal status of wars of national liberation. Whether it
differs in substance from other formula used in U.N. General
Assembly resolutions is a matter of opinion, as will be
explained later. However, the fact remains that Article 1,
paragraph 4, is still open to different interpretations. On
the uider interpretation, it may cover all armed conflicts
fought for self—determination. But on the narrower interpre-
tation, it covers only armed conflicts in which peoples are
fighting against "colonial domination and alien occupation
and racist regimes." It may be summarily stated that the
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narrower interpretation draws much support from the drafting
history of Article 1., paragraph 4, of Protocol I, and there-
fore, is likely to prevail. But it should be pointed out
that the wider interpretation had also its supporters, and
indeed, was the subject of' a proposal submitted to the
Diplomatic Conference by more than fifteen states.
3. Between Which Parties ? This is the question of the
identification of liberation movements and of their locus
standi in Humanitarian Law. In other words, this is the
question of the representation of a people fighting for its
liberation and self—determination. During the work of the
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development
of Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, held in
Geneva in the years 1974 to 1977, the question of the locus
standi of liberation movements came up at three different
stages of the work of the Conference. At the begining, and
even before the Conference had elected the presidents and
rapporteurs of its various committees, the question before
the Conference was whether liberation movements should be
invited to take part in the work of the Conference, and if
so, which liberation movements were to be invited, and how
far their participation should go?
With regard to these matters it may be remarked in
passing that the Diplomatic Conference decided by consensus,
without vote, to invite the liberation movements recognized
by the regional intergovernmental organizations, to
participate fully in the deliberations of the Conference and
its main committees. It was understood however, that only
delegations representing states would be entitled to vote.
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Paradoxically, recognition by the regional intergovernmental
organization is not among the conditions which a liberation
movement has to fulfil in order to make a declaration under
Article 2(3) common to the Geneva Coventions of 1949, or
Article 96(3) of the Additional Protocol I, of' 1977, as will
be shown later.
It may be noted here that although the problem of
invitation and participation was procedural in appearance,
it was in fact substantive, or, as Baxter put it "a
procedural harbinger of what was to follow on the substantive
side of the adoption" of what he calls "new humanitarian
It will be shown in due course that the so—called
"new humanitarian law" of wars of national liberation was
not new at all, except, perhaps, with regard to the 'Republic'
of South Africa. Recognition of the international character
of wars of national liberation in paragraph 4 of Article 1
of Protocol I (which is the substantive side to which Baxter
refers), is in complete harmony with the common sense of
international law - that common sense which has been
arbitrarily defied at least since 1949. The international
character of the armed conflicts in which the liberation
movements which were, or are recognized by regional
intergovernmental organizations, was already a foregone
conclusion since 1963 and definately so since 1973 when the
General Assembly of the United Nations adopted resolution
3103 (xxviii) of 12 December, 1973, which 'solemnly'
proclaimed "Basic Humanitarian Principles in all Armed
1. R.R.Baxter, Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian Politics ?
The Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 16, 1975, o.11.
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Conflicts and Principles of the Legal Status of the Combat-
ants struggling against Colonial and Alien Domination and
Racist Regimes." What in fact, the question of invitation
and participation was a harbinger of, was the watering down
of the concept of the struggle of peoples for self—determin-
ation, from one embracing the principle of self—determination
as elaborated in the Declaration on Principles of Internat-
ional Law (U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2625), down to
the situations where peoples are fighting against "colonial
and alien domination and racist regimest, and further down
to "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against
colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist
regimes."
How and why this down—the—scale movement had happened
will be explained later. Suffice it here to note that, in
addition to Guinea—Bissau which was admitted in the capacity
of a state, fourteen other liberation movements were invited
and had in fact participated in the work of the Diplomatic
Conference.
The fourteen liberation movements which participated
in the work of the Diplomatic Conference were the following:
1. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
2. The Ilozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)
3. The Angolan People's Liberation Movement (MPLA)
4. The Angolan National Liberation Front (FNLA)
5. The African National Congress (South Africa) (ANC)
6. The Panafricanist Congress (South Africa) (PAC)
7. The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)
8. The Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)
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9. The South—West African People's Organization (SWAPO)
10. The Somali Coast Liberation Front (FLCS)
11. The Djibouti Liberation !'lovement (MLD)
12 •
 The Seychelles People's Unity Party (SPuP)
13. The Sao Tome and Principe Liberation movement (MLSTP)
14. The Comoro National Liberation movement (r'1OLINAc0).1
When the Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference was
opened for signature, to wit, on the 10th of June, 1977,
only the representatives of the following national liberation
movements signed the Final Act:
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
Panafrjcanist Congress (South Africa) (PAC)
South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).2
The other liberation movements had by then either reached
their immediate goal of' self—government or independence, or
were in their way of exercising 'peacefully' their political
right of self—determination and therefore did not feel the
need to sign the Final Act as liberation movements.3
1 •
 Cf. the list given by Frits Kaishoven, in Netherlands Year
Book of International Law, 1974, p. 28, n. 50, and the
list given by R.R.Baxter, Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian
Politics ? Harvard International Law Journal, t.Iol. 16,
Number 1, Winter 1975, p. 9-10. Baxter's list does not
include the liberation movements of the Somali Coast
Ojibouti, Sao Tome and Principe, and Comoro, and Kalshoven's
does not include the Zimbabwe African People's Union
(ZAPU). For the list of countries which became self—
governing or independent during the period 1973 - 1977,
see the following foot note.3.
2. CODH/SR.59, para. 5.
3. The following countries became self—governing or
independent during the period 1973-1977: Angola, the Bahamas,
Cape Verde, Comoros, Ojibouti, Grenada, Guinea—Bissau,
mozambique, Niue, Papua New Guinea,Sao Tome and Principe,
Seychelles, Suririame. See "United Nations Action in the
Field of Human Rights, United Nations Publication, (Sale
No. E. 79. XIV. 6), New York, 1 980, p.29.
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It may be interesting to note that, just as the
Conference opened with the problem of the locus standi of
liberation movements in humanitarian law, it also ended with
a controversy over whether liberation movements were entitled
to sign the Final Act. In between, there was of course the
problem of the legal status of wars of' national liberation
- which is a substantive matter, and the problem of the
expression of the will to be bound by the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 and Additional Protocol I, by liberation movements.
As noted above, this latter problem is now governed by
Article 96(3) of' Protocol I, and of course, by Article 2 (3)
common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.
Having now broached the main issues involved, a quest-.
ion of approach seems to impose itself. If as available legal
literature seems to suggest, that Israel and South Africa
are the last vestiges of "colonial domination and alien
occupation and racist regimes", why not undertake a case
study of these political entities (South Africa and Israel)
and of the struggle against them, instead of a discussion of
the theory of wars of national liberation in humanitarian
law ?
As a matter of fact the two approaches do not exclude
each other; they overlap, and the choice between the two
approaches is one of emphasis than of substance. For a case
study would still raise theoretical issues, and theoretical
studies would still need some illustrations.
But there are more fundamental reasons why we must
concentrate on the theory of wars of' national liberation in
humanitarian law. First, as noted above, Article 1, paragraph
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4, of Protocol I, is open to different interpretations and
must not be surrendered to the narrower interpretations,
whatever might be the odds against the wider interpretation
in present circumstances of world politics. Secondly,
whatever conception of wars of national liberation prevails
in the future, it will be based on 1rticle 2(3) of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Article 1(4) of Additional
Protocol I. In brief, the international character of armed
conflicts in which peoples fight for their right of
self—determination has been a long awaitea achievment and
must not be let to wither away uith transient situations as
now exists in Palestine, South Africa, and Namibia Article
1, paragraph 4 of Protocol I, is an abstract rule of general
application and must be treated as such.
Indeed, if the international lawyer is to be more than
just an advocate of narrow national interests as perceived
by opportunistic national policy—makers, and if he were to
be more than just a positivist trailing behind what
short—sighted policy—makers say about the rules of internat-
ional law, he must realise that national interests are best
served by upholding the right of' peoples to self—determina-
tion and by the enjoyment of human rights by everyone
everywhere.
To uphold a concept of wars of national liberation
that coincides with the right of peoples to self—determin-
ation in the widest possible sense is therefore tantamount
to upholding an international legal order that allows all
peoples all over the world to prosper together politically,
economically, socially. Those who think that national
172
interests are really served by maintaining political spheres
of influence and economic empires, or think that the
greatness of the nation is measured by the sLrength of its
armed forces and its ability to defeat others are strongly
advised to re—think their policies and attitudes. It is not
in vain that the Charter of the United Nations provides in
Article 1, that the purposes of the United Nations are;
"1. To maintain international peace and security,...
2. To develop friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self—determination of' peoples, and to
take other appropriate measures to strengthen
universal peace;
3. To achieve international co—operation in solving
international problems of an economic, social,
cultural, or humanitarian character, and in
promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion.
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of
nations in the attainment of common ends."
This is the sort of' international legal order envisaged by
the Charter of the United Nations. It is an international
legal order based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self—determination of' peoples, and respect for
human rights and for t'undemental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.
Accordingly, for the law of' armed conflict to be in harmony
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with the Charter of the United Nations, it must also be
based on the respect for the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples and resçject for human rights.
Actually, Article 1, paragraph 4, of Protocol I, by and
large, and notwithstanding its drafting history, may still
respond to the view advocated here, especially if the terms
"colonial domination and alien occupation and racist regimes"
are interpreted in the light of the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples as enshrined in the
Charter of the United Nations and elaborated in the
"Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and co-operation among States in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations t1 , adopted
by the General A5sembly of the United Nations in Resolution
2625 (xxv) of 24th October, 1970. For purposes of our
discussion, it would seem sufficient to introduce this
declaration and reproduce the portions relative to the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peDEiles.
It is worth recalling here that this 'Declaration' is
referred to in Article 1, paragraph 4, of PrOtOCOL I, acc
therefore, it constitutes an indispensable framework for
any discussion of the problem of wars of national liberation
in humanitarian law.
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3.2. The Principle of Equal Rights and Self—Determination
of' Peoples: A Statement of the Principle
A comprehensive 'authoritative' 1 statement of the
principle of equal rights and self—determination of peoples,
beside the provisions of the United Nations Charter, is
embodied in the "Declaration on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co—operation among
States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations." This Declaration was painstakingly elaborated by
a special committee established by the General Assembly of
the United Nation5 in 1963 - "Special Committee on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co—operation among States in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations." The Committee was
composed of the follouing twenty seven Member States:
Argentina, Australia, Burma, Cameroon, Canada,
Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, France, Ghana, Guetemala, India,
Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Madagascar, Mexico, Netherlands,
Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of' Soviet Socialist
Republics, United Arab Republic (Egypt), United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of' America,
Venezuela and Yugoslavia.,2
The special Committee was instructed by the General
Assembly to consider the Iprogre55ve development and
codification" of the following seven principles of the
1 •
 According to Schwarzenberger, International Law, Vol. 1,
3rd ed., (1957), p. 531: "any judicial interpretation of'
a treaty is authoritative. Used in the narrower meaning,
authoritative interpretation is the interpretation of the
treaty by the parties themse1vs."
2, See overleef.
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Charter of the United Nations:
(a) The principle that States shall refrain in their
international, relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of
the United Nations;
(b) The principle that States shall settle their
international disputes by peaceful means in such
a manner that international peace and security and
justice are not endangered;
(c) The duty not to intervene in matters within the
domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance
with the Charter;
(d) The duty of States to co—operate with one another
in accordance with the Charter;
(e) The principle of equal rights and self—determin-
ation of peoples;
(f) The principle of sovereign equality of States;
(g) The principle that States shall fulfil in good
faith the obligations assumed by them in
accordance with the Charter.
It is probably worth recalling that all these
principles have already been expressly laid down in Chapter
One of the Charter of the United Nations (Articles 1 and 2).
But as they involve most of the fundamental areas of
2 (From previous page)
Chris N. Okeke, Controversial Subjects of International
Law, Rotterdam University Press, 1974, p. 111, n • 4.
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international relations, it is hardly suprising that the
Committee had experienced many difficulties in reaching
agreed formulations. The difficulties were all the greater
as the Committee agreed to work in general on the basis of
unanimity.1
The decision to work on the basis of unanimity or
consensus reflects both the degree of' seriousness with
which the Committee viewed the nature of the task entrusted
to it, and the degree of' forbearance the delegations were
required to show in a spirit of' co—operatw? anO Oeteri?rirr-
ation to bring the Committee's mission into a conclusion,
acceptable, not only to the members of the Committee, but
also to all other members of' the United Nations. The
consensus or unanimity procedure has of course its inherent
points of weakness and of strength. In bad faith, it can
obviously be overdone and turned into a nightmare of vetoes,
and thus, may either lead to the paralysis of the organ
functioning on the basis of unanimity, or, it may produce
the lowest common denominator.
But there are times when working by consensus is
particularly useful. As Robert Resenstock remarked:
"The decision to uork on the basis of consensus was
based on the view that any other approach would
produce a far less useful document, which would
record the level and degree of disagreement rather
than set forth a body of' norms to which all the
1. See Robert Rosenstock, The OecLaration of' Principles of'
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey,
A.J.I.L., Vol. 65, 1971, pp. 713-735, at pp. 713-14.
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states in the Committee could adhere and which could
be regarded as an authoritative statement of key
principles of the Charter. This agreement was strained
nearly to the breaking point on several occasions, and
at no time were the General Assembly Rules of Procedure
suspended. Any delegation had at all times the right
to insist on their application and consequently on
having decisions taken by vote. It is the writer's
view that the Iotbearance shown by the delegations in
adhering to the consensus aporoach was well rewarded."1
In the light of these remarks, it may be assumed that
the provisions of the Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co—operation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations individually and collectively, have been adopted
unanimously. In other words, the Declaration was adopted by
a strong and 'active' (not passive) unanimity since every
member—state of the Committee could exercise its right to
Jj' any formulation unacceptable to it. Inevitably, this
is bound to result in general formulations. But it is true
of almost every rule of international law that touches on
matters which states consider to be vital to their interests,
or restrict their freedom of action. The generality of the
language used in the Declaration, therefore, "does not
deprive this instrument of its significance as the most
important single statement representing what the Members of
the United Nations agree to be the law of the Charter on
1. Robert Rosenstock, ibid., p. 714, n. 2
178
these seven princip1es."
Similar views on the legal significance of the
Declaration have been expressed by other writers. Professor
Brounlie states:
"The legal significance ot the Declaration lies in the
fact that it provides evidence of the consensus among
Member States of the United Nations on the meaning
and elaboration of the principles of the Charter.
Though it is a document of the first importance, it
is not, of course, an amendment of the Charter.
Moreover, it is not to be construed 'as prejudicing
in any manner the provisions of the Charter."2
Subrata Roy Choudhury (Senior 1%dvocate of the Supreme
Court of India, New Delhi, and of the High Court at Calcutta),
is of the view that the Declaration here under discussion
"is to be treated as a subsequent agreement between the
parties providing an authoritative interpretation of the
rights and obligations under the Charter and the application
of its provisions."3
The delegation of the United States of T%merica
expressed the following view during the work of the Special
Committee:
"The significance of this gradual accumulation of
areas of agreement can best be undsrsteed in light
of the nature of the operation in which we are
1	 Ibid., p. 714.
2. Brounlie, Basic Documents in International Law, 1978, p.32.
3. Subrata Roy Choudhury, The Status and Norms of Self—deter-
mination in Contemporary International Law, in Netherlands
International Law Review, Vol. 24, 1977, pp . 72-91, at p.73.
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involved. For some years the P1ssembly has been engaged
in formulating legal texts which will be authoritative
interpretation of broad principles of international
law expressed in the Charter."1
The Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co—operation among States
in P1ccordance with the Charter of the United Nations was
unanimously adopted and 'solemly' proclaimed by the General
Pssembly of the United Nations in Resolution 2625 (xxv), of
October 24, 1970. The Section of the Declaration elaborating
the principle of equal rights and self—determination of'
peoples provides as follows:
1	 "By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self'—
determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the
United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to
determine, without external interference, their political
status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural
development, and every State has the duty to respect this
right in accordance with the çirovisians a 1c the Charter.
2.	 "Every State has the duty to promote, through joint
and separate action, realization of the principle of equal
rights and self—determination of peoples, in accordance
with the provisions of the Charter, and to render
assistance to the United Nations in carrying out the
responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter regarding
the implementation of the principle, in order:
1. Cited in Robert Rosenstock, op. cit., p. 714.
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(a) to promote friendly relations and co-operation
among States; and
(b) to bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due
regard to the freely expressed will of the peoples
concerned;
and bearing in mind that the subjection of peoples to
alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes
a violation of the principle, as well as a denial of
fundemental human rights, and is contrary to the Charter.
3. "Every State has the duty to promote through joint
and separate action universal repa't for and observance
of human rights and freedoms in accordance with the
Charter.
4. "The establishment of a sovereign and independent
State, the free association or intergration with an
independent State or the emergence in any other political
status freely determined by a people constitute modes of
implementing the right of self-determination by that
people.
5. "Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible
action which deprives peoples referred to above in the
elaboration of' the present principle of their right to
self-determination and freedom and independence. In their
action against, and resistance to, such forcible action
in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-
determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and
receive support in accordance with the purposes and
principles of the Charter.
6. "The territory of a colony or other non-self-governing
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territory has, under the Charter, a status separate and
distinct from the territory of the State administering
it; and such separate and distinct status under the
Charter shall exist until the people of the colony or
non—self—governing territory have exercised their right
of self—determination, and particularly its purposes and
principles.
7. "nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed
as authorizing or encouraging any action which would
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
States conducting themselves in compliance with the
principle of equal rights and self—determination of
peoples as described above and thus possessed of' a
government representing the whole people belonging to the
territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.
8. "Every State shall refrain from any action aimed at
the partial or total disruption of the national unity and
territorial integrity of any other State or country."1
In the general part of the Declaration, the General
Assembly declares that, "in their interpretation and
application", the principles embodied in the Declaration
"are interrelated and each principle should be construed in
the context of the other principles." The General Part
contai-ns also the following clause:
"Nothing in this Declaration shall be construed
1. Numericals are not in the original, they have been added
here to facilitate the reference to them
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as prejudicing in any manner the provisions of the
Charter of the rights and duties of' Member States
under the Charter or the rights of peoples under the
Charter, taking into account the elaboration of' these
rights in this declaration."
This is a very important 'saving'clause; it means that
the Declaration i3 neither an amendment nor a final
interpretation of' the principles which it elaborates.
Finally the Ceneral ssebly declared that'
"The principles of the Charter which are embodied in this
Declaration constitute basic principles of international
law, and consequently appeals to all States to be guided
by these principles in their international conduct and to
develop their mutual relations on the basis of the strict
observance of these principles."
4.	 The Legal Status of Wars of National Liberation in
International Humanitarian Law
In its advisory opinion on Namibia in 1970, the
International Court of Justice stated that:
"The Court must take into consideration the changes which
have occured in the supervening period, and its
interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent
development of law, through the Charter of the United
Nations and by way of customary law. Moreover, an
international instrument has to be interpreted and
applied within the framework of' the entire legal system
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prevailing at time of interpretation.
It is immaterial therefore what the law-makers thought in
1949 of' the scope of' application of' the Geneva Conventions and
of the concept of armed conflicts of international character or
that of non-international character. What matters is that
common Articles 2 and 3 of the Geneva Conventions must be
interpreted and applied within the framework of' the entire
legal system prevailing at the time of interpretation. When so
interpreted, it will appear that even in 1949 the prevailing
legal system could not be invoked in support of the view that
all wars of national liberation, however defined, were armed
conflicts of non-international character.
In other words, the thesis advanced here is that Article
1, paragraph 4, of Protocol I, which states that armed conflicts
of international character within the meaning of Article 2
common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 "include armed conflicts
in which peoples are fighting against colonial and alien
occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their
right of self-determination as enshrined in the Charter of the
United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relation and Co-operation among States
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations", is
partly reaffirmation, and partly a development of' international
law, and that it is in conformity with present international
law and therefore is already binding on the parties to the
Geneva Conventions, notwithstanding the formalities of
1 •
 "Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (Sout,h West Africa) notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ Reports, 1971,
para. 5 p. 31.
184
signature, accession and ratification.
This thesis may be substantiated even without the aid of
the history of Article 1, paragraph 4, but since all possible
objections to the international character of wars of national
liberation had been raised at the first session of the Geneva
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
Humanitarian Law applicable in Armed Conflicts in 1974, it will
be useful to review the debate which took place at that
Conference.
4.1. The Diplomatic Conference: ICRC Proposal and Amendments
Between 1968 and 1973 the General Assembly of the United
Nations adopted a great number of resolutions bearing on the
legal status of wars of national liberation in international
humanitarian law, some of which were of general nature while
others related to specific situations in Southern Africa and
the Middle East. The most important of these resolutions was
Resolution 31Q3 (xxviii) of 12 DecembBr, 1973, in hich t-a
General Assembly solemnly proclaimed the following "basic
principles of the legal status of combatants struggling against
colonial and alien domination and racist regimes" without
prejudice to their elaboration in future within the framework
of the development of international law applying to the protec-
tion of human rights in armed conflicts:
"1. The struggle of peoples under colonial, alien
domination and racist regimes for the implementation of
their right to self—determination and independence is
legitimate and in full accordance with the principles of
185
international law;
2. ny attempt to supress the struggle against colonial
and alien domination and racist regimes is incompatible
with the Charter of' the United Nations, the Declaration
on Principles of' International Law concerning friendly
Relations and Co—operation among States in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples and constitutes a threat to international peace
and security;
3. The armed conflicts involving the struggle of peoples
against colonial and alien domination and racist regimes
are to be regarded as international armed conflicts in
the sense of the 1949 Geneva Convention and the legal
status envisaged to apply to the combatants in the 1949
Geneva Conventions and other international instruments
are to apply to the persons engaged in armed struggle
against colonial and alien domination and racist regimes;
4. The combatants struggling against colonial and alien
domination and racist regimes captured prisoners are to
be accorded the status of' prisoners of' war and their
treatment 5hould be in accordance with the provisions of
the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of' War of 12 /ugust, 1949;
5. The use of' mercenaries by colonial and racist regimes
against the national liberation movements struggling for
their freedom and independence from the yoke of
colonialism and alien domination is considered to be a
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criminal act and the mecenaries should
	
accordingly
be punished as criminals;
6. The violation of the legal status of the combatants
struggling against colonial and alien domination and
racist regimes in the course of armed conflicts entails
full responsibility in accordance with the norms of
international law."
Resolution 3103 was adopted by 83 votes in favour, 13
against, (namely, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, France, Fedral
Republic of Germany, Israel, Luxemburg, Portugal, South Africa,
United Kingdom, U.S.A., Uruguay), and 19 abstentions.
Thus the majority of states considered that armed conflicts
in which peoples are fighting against colonial and alien
domination and racist regimes were of an international
character, in the sense of the Geneva Conventions.
Similarly, at the Confernce of Government Experts which
the ICRC convened and organized in 1971 and 1972, with a view
"to obtain expert opinion on the reaffirmation and development
of international humanitarian law applicable in armed
conflicts u1 , most of tt experts tho
	
t
according to the ICRC Reports, considered that wars of national
liberation were international armed conflicts.2
However, in spite of all the indications as to the great
importance which a very large majority of' states attached to
the issues of wars of national liberation, the Draft Protocols
submitted to the Diplomatic Conference to serve as basis for
1 •
 Rule 1 of the Conference's Rules of Procedure, text in ICRC
Report, 1971, p . 15.
2. ICRC Repprt on the Work of' the Conference of Government
Experts, 1971, pp. 52-56, at 54.
187
discussion practically evaded the issue s
 Article 1 oF Draft
Protocol I proposed by the ICRC simply stated that:
"The present Protocol, which supplememnts the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949, for the protection of
War Victims, shall ap p ly in the situations referred to
in p,rticle 2 common to these Conventions."
Actually, in the study prepared by the ICRC and submitted
to the Conference of Government Experts, the ICRC was of the
view that the armed conflicts in southern Africa (i.e., those
waged by the peoples of Angola, llozambique and Guinea—Bissau,
against Portugal, and the struggle of' the peoples of Namibia
and South Africa against the racist regime of South Africa, and
the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia)
against the racist White Flinority which unilaterally declared
independence from Britain in 1965 but was never recognized by
any state, were armed conflicts of non—international character2
In the ICRC Draft Protocols the issue of wars of national
1 •
 ICRC Draft Protocols - Commentary, 1973, p.6. It should be
noted that the ICRC Commentary on this Article, when judged
by the ICRC Report mentioned in the previous note, appears
to be a complete distortion of facts. For example, in the
Commentary on draft Article 1, the ICRC says that only
"several experts" considered that wars of national liberation
were international armed conflicts but the"majority" did not
concur, ibid., p.6, while in the ICRC Report, 1971, para. 321,
p.54, the Report expressly states that "host of the Experts
of' Commission II who spoke on the subject considered that
wars of liberation were international armed conflicts."
Similarly, in the study prepared by the ICRC for the
Conference of Government Experts, the ICRC says that "very
many experts" consulted by the ICRC in 1969 and 1970
expressed the view that wars of national liberation were of'
international character, and that only "a few experts
considered that the theory that wars of' liberation against
colonial governments were international conflicts was based
on fictitious grounds." See ICRC, Doc. CE/Sb, Geneva,
January, 1971, p.28.
2. See ICRC, Doc. CE/5b, Geneva, January, 1971, p.26.
188
liberation was relegated to a 'Note' to draft Article 42 which
was erroneously entitled "New Category of Prisoners of War"
stating that if, as many governments wished, the Diplomatic
Conference should decide to mention in the present Protocol
members of' movements of' armed struggle for self—determination, a
solution would be to include in this Article a third paragraph
to the effect t at members of organized liberation movements
who comply with the conditions of being under a responsible
command, distinguish themselves from the civilian population in
military operations, and conduct their military operations in
accordance wit the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I, "shall
be treated as prisoners of' war as long as they are detained."1
This was obviously a far cry from resolution 3103 (XxIJII1)
of' 12 December, 1973, which expressly states in operative
paragraph 3 t at "The armed conflicts involving the struggle of
peoples against colonial and alien domination and racist
regimes are to be regarded as international armed conflicts in
the sense of' t e 1949 Geneva Conventions and the legal status
envisaged to apply to combatants in the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and other international instruments are to apply to the persons
engaged in armed struggle against colonial and alien and racist
regimes."
It is unnecessary to dwell any further on the ICRC's
approach to wars of national liberation. 2 Suffice it to mention
1. Text in ICRC Draft Protocols - Commentary, Geneva, 1973,
p . 47 . Questions of' international law relating to combatants
and prisoner—of—war status are discussed at length in
Chapter 4 of' this thesis.
2. For a criticism of the ICFC's approach to wars of national
liberation, see David P. Forsyth, Humanitarian Politics,
1977, pp. 124 - 126.
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that no organization has been so heavily involved in the aid
of victims of non—interstate armed conflicts as the ICRC, yet
probably no organization has argued against the very interests
it wishes to serve as the ICRC has often done with respect to
non—interstate armed conflicts.
However, even before Committee I of the Diplomatic
Conference started its substantive discussion on the field of
application of Protocol I, four amendments were submitted,
three of which with a view to making explicit the international
character of wars of' national liberation in the sense of the
Geneva Conventions. In the course of discussion more amendments
were submitted. In the following, all these amendments will be
reviewed in a chronological order.
The first amendment was submitted by Algeria, Bulgaria,
Czecholovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, I1orroco,
Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and United
Republic of Tanzania. It purported to add a second paragraph to
Draft Article 1 of Protocol I, stating that:
"The international armed conflicts referred to in Article
2 common to the Conventions include armed conflicts
where peoples fight against colonial and alien
domination and against racist regimes"1
This amendment was dated 7 t1arch, 1974, and was
classified as amendment CDDH/I/5 and Add.1 and 2.2 It is
1 •
 Text in Levie, Protection of War Victims, Vol. I, 1979, p.l;
also Abi—Saab, Wars of National Liberation, Collected
Courses of' the Hague 1cademy of International Law (Recueil
des Cours), Vol. 165, (1979—IV), p . 375.
2. It is important to remember the classification numbers of'
the different amendments because delegates usually refer to
amendments by their classification numbers.
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probably obvious that the language of this amendment was taken
from resolution 3103 (xxviii) of 12 December, 1973, adopted by
the General !\ssembly of the United Nations by 83 votes in
favour, 13 against, and ig abstentions.
The second and more important amendment was basically a
non-aligned initiative, it wa submitted by the following 15
Powers who were later joined by a substantial number of
additional co-sponsers: \lgeria, Egypt, Pustralia, Democratic
Yemen, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kuwait, Libya, 1adayascar,
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Senegal, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia,
United Irab Emirates, Cameroon, Yugoslavia, Zaire. The
amendment purported to add a second paragraph to draft Prticle
1 of Protocol I reading as follows:
"The situation referred to in the preceding paragraph
include armed struggles waged by peoples in the exercise
of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in
the Charter of the United Nations and defined by the
Declaration on principles of international Law
concerning Friendly Relation and CD-operation among
States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations." 1
This amendment was dated 8 rlarch, 1974, and was classified
as amendment CODH/I/11 and 1dd,1 to 3. It was the best proposal
ever made at a law-making conference, but apparently was ahead
of its time. Many governments were not yet prepared to go
co-extensively with the right of peoples to self-determination
and thus consider as legitimate combatants, not rebels, those
1 •
 Text in Levis, Protection of' War Victims, Vol. I, 1979, p.1;
and I\bi-Saab, op. cit., p. 375.
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who fight for their people's right of self—determination as
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and defined in
the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co—operation among States in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations.
The third amendment - which was not really an amendment,
was submitted by Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Federal Republic
of Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Pakistan, United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It proposed to replace
draft Article 1 proposed by the ICRC by the following:
"1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and
to ensure respect for the present Protocol in all
circumstances.
"2. The present Protocol shall apply in situations
referred to in Article 2 common to the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949, for the protection of
war victims.
"3. In cases not included in this present Protocol or in
other instruments of conventional law, civilians and
combatants remain under the protection and the authority
of the principles of international law, as they result
from established custom, from the principles of' humanity
and the dictate5 of public conscience."1
This amendment was submitted on the Bth of I"larch, 1974,
and was classified as document CDDH/I/12 and Corr 1.
Substantively however, it could hardly be considered an
amendment to the ICRC proposal; the first paragraph simply
1. Quoted from Levie, ibid., p. 1-2.
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reproduced Article 1 common to the four Geneva Conventions, the
second paragraph reproduced the ICRC proposal but failed to
point out that the Protocol supplements the Geneva Conventions,
and the third paragraph simply reaffirms the famous de Marten's
clause which is already a rule of customary law and may even
be considered a rule of jus cogens. At any rate, paragraph 2 of
the amendment, like the ICRC proposal, only begs the que5tion.
Clarification of the scope of application of the Geneva
Conventions and of Protocol I was the very issue confronting
the conference - an issue on which even the sponsars of' this
amendment were not in agreement. Pakistan and Argentina held
different views from those of the rest of the sponsors of the
same amendment on this issue. However, the sponsors of the
other amendments were not against amendment CDDH/I/12, but they
wanted in addition a clear statement that international armed
conflicts in the sense of the Geneva Conventions include armed
conflicts in which peoples fight for their right of self—
determination, a statement which the majo'rity of Western states
at that stage were unwilling to make or accept.
The fourth amendment was submitted by Romania. It purp-
orted to add the following at the end of the ICRC proposal:
"... and in armed conflicts in which the people of a
colony, a non—self—governing territory or a territory
under foreign occupation are engaged in the exercise of
the right of self—determination and the right to self—
defence against aggression, with a view to ensuring
more effective protection for the victims of aggression
and oppression."1
1 •
 Text in Levie, op. cit., p. 2.
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This amendment was submitted on 11 March, 1974, and was
classified as document CDDH/I/13.
The stage was thus set for what Professor Abi—Saab
described as "the great debate on wars of national liberation."1
But as the same writer observed, however convincing the argu-
ments and counterarguments which constituted the great debate
on wars of national liberation in the Diplomatic Conference,
they were not sufficient by themselves in parliamentary or
conference diplomacy to determine the outcome of the issue; an
outcome which was ultimately to be decided by a vote on
different possible solutions which were put forward and backed
by competing coalitions, each trying to secure for its proposal
the largest possible acceptance.2
That 'great debate' on wars of national liberation began
at the second meeting of Committee I of the Diplomatic
Conference. During that meeting the majority of Uestern states
supported amendment CDDH/I/12 and attacked the other three
amendments which purported to make explicit the international
character of wars of national liberation. Such an all out
attack was bound to baci, 'i. 3 Conqrt1'y, tppoiters anO
most of the sponsors of the other three amendments papered over
their differences on thescopeof'the concept of wars of national
1 •
 Abi—Saab, op. cit., p. 384
2. Loc. cit.
3. Indeed, at the third meeting of Committee I the represent-
ative of the Soviet Union remarked that "The three proposed
amendments before the Committee were not contradictory and,
though his delegation favoured the text of which it was a
co—sponsor (CDDH/I/5 and Add. 1) as being more precise and
in conformity with United Nations General Assembly
resolution 3103 (xxviii), his delegation would consider the
possibility of' merging the text with two others (CDDH/I/11
and Add. 1 and CDDH/I/13). CDDH/I/SR.3, para. 2.
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liberation and submitted at the fourth meeting of Committee I
an amendment sponsered by 51 states from Africa, Asia, and
Eastern Europe. This was amendment CDDH/I/41 and Add. 1 to 7,
dated 14 Ilarch, 1974. It proposed to add a second paragraph
to the ICRC proposal reading as follows:
"The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph
include armed conflicts where peoples fight against
colonial and alien domination and against racist regimes
in the exercise of their right of self—determination, as
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and
defined in the Declaration on Principles of International
Law concerning friendly Relations and Co—operation among
States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations.
This was immediately followed by an alternative proposal
submitted by Turkey (amendment CDDH/I/42). The Turkish proposal
purported to add a second paragraph to the original ICRC
proposal reading as follows:
"The present Protocol shall also apply to armed conflicts
waged by the national liberation movements recognized by
the regional intergovernmental organizations concerned
against colonial and foreign domination and racist
regimes in the exercise of the principle of the self—
determination of' peoples as set out in the Charter of
the United Nations."2
At its sixth meeting, Committee I deided to refer the
proposals in documents CDDH/I/11, 12, 41, and 42 to a Working
1 •
 Levie, op. cit., p. 22.
2. Loc. cit.
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Group whose task was to explore the possibility of submitting
a single amendment to draft Article 1 of Protocol 1.1 The
Working Group consisted of' the delegations who had sponsored
those amendments and other delegations wishing to take part.
The Working Group met on 19 and 20 IVlarch, 1974, but according
to the Draft Report of Committee I:
"It was not possible, however, to reach agreement nor was
it possible to determine whether the differences between
the various proposals were a matter of form or of
substance.
When the Draft Report was examined in Committee I, the
delegation of the Soviet Union remarked that the differences
referred to in this sentence were "undeniably a matter of
3
substance." Afterwards, however, on the 5uggestlon of the
Chairman, the Committee deciced to delete the words "nor was it
possible to determine whether the differences between the
various proposals were a matter of form or
It was certainly of primary importance to let the
discussion go to its fullest possible length, especially as the
discussion on the Draft Report took place after Committee I had
adopted Article 1 of Protocol I. In particular, the discussion
would have shed some light on the material scope of Article 1,
paragraph 4, of Protocol I, but the wisdom of the Chairman has
deprived us of what might have constituted crucial evidence in
1. Amendments CDDH/I/5 and 13 were withdrawn by their sponsors
who joined in sponsQring amendment CDDH/I/41. See Draft
Report of' Committee I, first session, para. 9, in Levie,
Vol. I, p . 51.
2. Levie, Vol. I para. 'Ii., p. 51•
3. Ibid., para. 27, p . 54.
4. Ibid., para. 28, p . 54.
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this respect.
Reverting now to Committee I, it may be noted that after
the Working Group had failed to reach agreement on a single
amendment to draft Article I, two initiatives were made with a
view to breaking the deadlock. One was completely ignored and
not even discussed despite requests made by some states for a
discussion, 1 the other was successful.
The initiative which was ignored was procedural in
character. It was proposed by the delegations of Canada and
NeuZealand in the form of' a draft resolution to be adopted by
the Conference and by which it decides to set up an inter—
sessional Working Group to study the problem of armed conflicts
in which peoples fight for their right of self—determination
and to report to the second session of the Diplomatic
Conference. It is unnecessary to comment on this initiative
since the Conference had decided to continue the discussion of
draft Protocol I and the various amendments submitted by the
various groups of states,2
The initiative which was successful and finally became
Article 1 of the present Protocol I was made by a group of
Latin American countries, namely, Argentina, Honduras, flexico,
Panama, and Peru. They 5ubmitted amendment CDDH/I/71 which in
their view represented a compromise between amendment CDDH/I/12
and amendment CDDH/I/41. 3 The provisions of paragraphs 1, 3 and
1 •
 E.g. by the delegations of the U.S.A., CDDH/I/SR.13, para.
12, and Colombia, CDDH/I/SR.13, pare. 14.
2. For the text of the Canada/New Zealand draft resolution, see
Levie, Protection of War Victims, Vol. I, 1979, p. 37. For
the speech of the delegation of Canada introducing the draft
resolution, see ibid., p. 37-38, or CDDH/I/SR.13, para. 1 -
3. See the speech of the delegation of Argentina on behalf of
the 5ponsurs of amendment CDDH/I/71, CDDN/I/3R.13, para. 16.
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4 of amendment CDDH/I/71 were virtually those of amendment
CDDH/I/12, but the ICRC text was preferred to the corresponding
provision of amendment CDDH/I/12. Paragraph 2 of amendment
CDDH/I/71 was a modified version of amendment CDDH/I/41. The
modification concerned the terms 'colonial and alien
which Latin American countries proposed to replace by 'colonial
domination and alien occupation', but as a compromise the words
t colonial and alien occupation' had initially been used in the
1
Latin American amendment. Subsequently, however, the Indian
delegation, speaking on behalf of the sponsors of amendment
CDDK/I/41 proposed to replace the words 'colonial and alien
occupation' by the words 'colonial domination and alien
occupation', thus reverting to the original Latin American
proposal. 2
 The Syrian delegation, speaking on behalf of the
Arab group said that the group preferred the wording of
amendment CDDH/I/41, but the group, in a spirit of reconcilia-
tion was ready to support the Latin American amendment CDDH/I/-
3	 .71. Thus the terms 'colonial domination and alien occupation'
finally replaced the terms 'colonial and alien domination' which
were used in amendment CDDH/I/41. In other respects amendment
CDDH/I/41 remained the same and constituted paragraph 2 of the
Latin American amendment as thus modified.
To the Western sponsors and supporters of' amendment
CDDH/I/ 1 2 the Latin American amendment CDDH/I/71 did not
constitute a compromise; it was merely a combination of
amendment CDDH/I/12 and amendment CDD/I/41. The sponsors of
1 •
 Loc. cit.
2. CDDH/I/SR.13, para. 18.
3. CDDH/I/SFL13, para. 19.
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amendment CDDH/I/12, according to the Belgian delegation, "did
not in any way envisage the situations described in amendments
CDDH/I/11 and CDOH/I/41. Paragraph 2 of amendment CODH/I/71
contained a provision which was wholly alien to the spirit of
amendment CDDH/I/12 and it was in no sense a compromise."1
Actually, neither the spirit nor the letter of' amendment
CDDH/I/12 were averse to amendment CDDH/I/41 or to any of' the
other amendments as evidenced by the attitudes of the vast
majority of delegations in 1974, and even by the attitudes of'
Western states in 1977. True, all of the Western delegations
(except Norway) had voted against the Latin American amendment
or abstained in 1974 But by 1977 the opposition to the inter-.
national character of uars of national liberation had abated
and many Western delegations including the Belgian delegation
itself had voted in favour of the Latin American amendment as
adopted in Committee I in 1974 • In Plenary, in 1977, the Latin
American amendment as it presently stands in Article 1 of
Protocol I was adopted by an impressive majority of 87 votes in
favour, one against (Israel), and 11 abstentions. 2
 The following
delegations abstained; Monaco, United Kingdom, Federal Republic
of Germany, Canada, Spain, United States of America, France,
Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, and Japan. Indeed, If it were not
for the insistance of the delegation of Israel to put Article
1 of Protocol I to the vote, the Article would have been adopted
by consensus, as the delegation of the United States had
requested.
It should be noted, however, that in the explanation of
1. CDDH/I/SR.13, para. 26.
2. CDDH/SR.36, para. 58.
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votes which followed the adoption of' Article 1 of Protocol I,
none of the delegations which had abstained 5aid that it was
against the classification of armed conflicts in which peoples
fight in the exercise of their right to self—determination as
international armed conflicts. They said that they had abstained
because, in their view, the terms used in paragraph 4 of
Article 1 were political rather than legal. For example, the
delegation of the United Kingdom said that it had abstained in
the vote on Article 1 as a whole and would have abstained on
paragraph 4 if a seperate vote had been taken "because it had
seen legal difficulty in the language used, which seemed to be
cast in political rather than legal terms."1
This, however, seems unconvincing, for in the last analysis
it is the right of peoples to self—determination which is the
criterion of whether a none—interstate armed conflict is of
international or non—international character.
4.2. The Debate on the Legal Status of Wars of National
Liberation at the First Session of the Diplomatic
Conference of Geneva, 1974
The importance of the debate on the legal staus of wars
of national liberation for the present and future of
international humanitarian law can hardly be exaggerated, and
it is perhaps unfortunate that the debate cannot be summarized
1 •
 CDDH/SR.36, para. 83. In the same vein were also the explan-
ations of votes made by the delegations of France, CDDH/I/SR.
36, para. 91; Canada, CDDH/I/SR.36, para. 93; Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, CDDH/I/SR.36, Annex; Spain, CDDH/I/SR.36,
Annex; and Guatemala, CDDH/I/SR.36, Annex.
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without causing great damage to its substance. The Rapporteur
of Committee I of the Diplomatic Conference seems to have
pleased no one when he tried to sumarize the debate in
paragraph 10 of his report stating that:
"The majority of delegations were in favour of Article 1
mentioning that the international armed conflicts
referred to in Article 2 common to the four Geneva
Conventions include those armed conflicts in which
peoples, in the exercise of their right to self—
determination, fight against colonial and foreign
domination and against racist regimes. Other delegations
considered that the four Conventions and Protocol I
could not be applicable to entities other than States."1
During the discussion of this paragraph of the report by
Committee I, several amendments were put forward. Thus, the
delegations of Austria, Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of
Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the United States of
America, proposed to relace the last sentence of' the above
quoted paragraph by the following:
"Other delegations considered, however, that such a
procedure was unacceptable in that, in their view, it
involved the introduction into Protocol I of criteria of
political motivation. Some of' these delegations made it
clear that they accepted that the four Geneva Conventions
and Protocol I could apply to armed conflicts other than
between States, but only in so far as the Parties to the
conflict accepted the provisions thereof and were
1. Draft Report of' Committee I, First Session, Doc. CDDH/I/B1,
pare. 10.
2Q1
willing and able to apply them."1
The representative of Uganda considered this amendment,
especially the last sentence, to be completely inappropriate.
The Committee, he said, had not sought to determine whether
Article 2 would be applicable only to States, but had tried to
determine whether wars of national liberation were international
conflicts. 2
On the other hand, the delegation of Australia suggested
the addition of the following sentence at the end of paragraph
1 LI:
"yet other delegations, while accepting the principle
that Protocol I should apply to armed conflicts of
self—determination considered that this should be
expressed without qualification."3
The delegation of Norway said it had no objection to
these amendments, but if these amendments were adopted, then a
sentence should be added at the end of the Australian amendment
(that is at the end of paragraph 10) reading as follows:
"It was emphasized that this would merely be a restate-
ment of positive international law, and that it would
not involve any subjective or political motivation as
criteria for the application of' international
humanitarian law.
In the end, however, none of these amendments were
adopted. Instead,the Committee decided to replace the last
sentence of paragraph 10 of the Report by: "Other delegations
1 Amendment CDOH/I/81, as reproduced in Levie, Vol. I, p. 52.
2. CDOH/I/SR.15, para. 19
3. CDDH/I/SR.15, para. 20.
4. CDDH/I/SR.15, para. 21.
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did not share this view. The various opinions expressed on the
subject appear in the summary records of' the second to the
1fourteenth meetings of the Committee." It is necessary
therefore to revert to the summary records of those meetings
for the various opinions expressed on the subject.,2
The substantive debate on the legal status of wars of'
national liberation was opened by the Egyptian delegate,
Professor Abi—Saab, introducing the 15—Power amendment CODH/I/11
and Add. 1 • He said that wars of national liberation had formed
a very important category of' armed struggle in the post—l945
period and a number of' them were still continuing. Contemporary
international law recognized such wars as international armed
conflicts. United Nations General Assembly resolution 3103
(xxviii) of 12 December, 1973, was the latest in a stream of
resolutions of' important international bodies proclaiming that
1 •
 CDOH/I/SR.15, para. 24.
2 A compilation of the summary records of these meetings may
be found in Levie, Protection of War Victims, Vol. I, 1979,
pp . 1-52.
In legal literature, the Western thesis that wars of national
liberation were armed conflicts of' non—international character
was advocated by Professor R.R.Baxter, "The Geneva Convent-
ions of 1949 and Wars of' National Liberation", published in
Rivista Di Dirrito Internazionale, Vol. LVII, 1974, pp. 193-
203. After the first session of the Diplomatic Conference
Professor Baxter modified much of his views •
 See R.R.Baxter,
Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian Politics? The 1974
Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law, In the Harvard
International Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. I, Winter 1975, pp.
1-26, especially pp. 11-17.
For a critical review of the various arguments put forward
by Western delegations at the first session of' the Diplomatic
Conference, see Abi—Saab, Wars of National Liberation in
Geneva Conventions and Protocols, in Recueil des Cours of
the Hague Academy of' International Law, Vol. 165 (1979—IV),
pp. 374-384; See also, Charles Lysaght, The Attitude of'
Western Countries, in Cassese(ed). The New Humanitarian Law
of Armed Conflict, 1979, pp. 349-356; and Jean J..A.Salmon,
Los Guerres De Liberation Nationale, in Cassese, ibid., pp.
68-82.
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principle. The General Assembly had, indeed gone further by
recommending sanctions against colonial, alien and racist
regimes and the provision of assistance to specific liberation
movements, and the Security Council in one case had ordered
mandatory sanctions. It would be difficult to explain all such
international action if wars of liberation were to be considered
merely as armed conflicts of non—international character0
Existing practice provided abundant proof of the international
nature of such conflicts.
Noting that, for some, the very words 'liberation movement'
and 'wars of national liberation' are objectionable, not to say
frightening, the Egyptian delegate went on to say:
"We have not used in our draft amendment of Article I
the words 'wars of national liberation'... We have tried
use generally acceptable legal concepts as a frame of
reference to allay any legitimate worries that some may
have. We refer them to one of the basic principles of
contemporary international law, that of self—determin-
ation, and again we refer to it as it is recognized and
consecrated in two legal istruments of the highest
significance and which enjoy the widest acceptance,
namely the Charter of the United Nations and the authen-
tic interpretation of its major legal principles by the
General Assembly in the Declaration on Friendly
Relations... We are thus not asking the participants in
the Conference to accept something new s We are just
proposing to them to state explicitly in the field of
humanitarian law what they have already accepted as
existing and binding lau within the framework of the
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United Nations and General International Law."1
Along the same lines also was the speech of' the
representative of Yugoslavia, rir Obradovic, who said that
Article 1 of Protocol I should be drafted clearly so as to
avoid any misinterpretation and to ensure that it conformed to
contemporary international law. It was with that in mind that
his delegation had co—sponsored the amendment introduced by the
Egyptian representative (CDDH/I/11 and Add. 1). The amendment,
he said, contained nothing new; all it did was to make explicit
a rule which had developed gradually over the past quarter of a
century and had now been generally accepted. In acordance with
substantive international law, he added, any armed struggle
carried on to achieve the right of peoples to self—determination
was an international armed conflict within the meaning of
Article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. That
principle, he said, had been affirmed in numerous United Nations
General Assembly resolutions of which the most recent was
resolution 3103 (xxviii) of 12 December, 1973.2
In brief, as the delegation of Norway put it, "the
sponsors of amendment CDDH/I/11 and Add. 1 were simply asking
for the Geneva Conventions to be interpreted within the
framework of the existing international legal system. That was
the only framework which to some extent could claim to be
objective. 1,
This was also the view of delegations from Eastern Europe
sponsoring amendments CDDH/I/5 and CDDH/I/13. Pir. Cristescu of
1 CDDH/I/SR.2, para. B - 11, quotation from pare. 10.
2. CDDH/I/SR.2, para. 16 - 29, esp. para. 16 and 17•
3. CDDH/I/SR.3, para. 34.
205
Romania, introducing his delegation's amendment (CDDH/I/13),
said that some of the reasons for its submission had already
been explained by the Egyptian representative in introducing
his own group's amendment (CDDH/I/11 and Add. 1). Among the
international instruments which justified his delegation's
amendment, said Mr. Cristescu, were Article 1 of the Charter
of the United f\ations, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples (General Assembly resolution
1514 (xv) of 14 December, 1960), and the Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Co—operation among States in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations (General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV)
of 24 October, 197O). But the delegation of Romania
injudiciously introduced into the discussion the rather
controversial notion of aggression when he remarked that
international law considered aggression as an international
crime, and that humanitarian law came within the general
framework of international law and should conform to its
principles, hence the reference in the Romanian amendment to
the right of peoples in colonies and non—self—governing
territories to defend themselves against aggression.2
The representative of the German Democratic Republic,
introducing amendment CDDH/I/5, also invoked the notion of'
aggression. He said that it was increasingly recognized that
forcible maintenance of a colonial regime was an international
crime, equivalent to permanent aggression. In international
1 •
 CDDH/I/SR.2, para. 13.
2. CDDH/I/SR.2, para. 15.
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practice, a people under colonial oppression had the same right
of self—defence as a state under armed attack. 1 But like the
representative of Romania, the representative of' the German
Democratic Republic did not explain the relevance of the notion
of' aggression to the applicability of international humanitar-
ian law. It is possible however, that the communist delegations
had invoked the notion of aggression in preference to self—
determination which is not mentioned in amendment CDDH/I/5 or
amendment CDDH/I/13. Indeed, the delegation of Romania went so
far as to state that a general reference to the right of self—
determination would not be appropriate in the context of
Article 1 of Protocol I because, in its view, United Nations
jurisprudence in that Field covered only one aspect of' the
right of peoples to self—determination. 2 Such a statement, at
any rate, is belied by the very definition of' the right of
peoples to self—determination as laid down in the Declaration
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Co—operation among States in accordance with the
Charter of' the United Nations. The reality is that East
European delegations (except Yugoslavia) were reluctant to make
unqualified reference to the right of' peoples to self'—determin-
ation. That was probably why they adhered to the language of
resolution 3103 (xxviii) of' 12 December, 1973.
Apart from these differences between the sponsors of
amendment CDDH/I/11 and the sponsors of amendments CDDH/I/5 and
CDDH/I/ 1 3, all the sponsors of these amendments claimed that
their proposals contained nothing new • Thus, the delegation of'
1 •
 CDDH/I/sr.2, pare. 36.
2 CODH/I/SR.2, para. 54.
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the German Democratic Republic stated that:
"The new paragraph which sponsors of amendment CDDH/I/5
and sldd. 1 were proposing to add to article 1 of draft
Protocol I embodied the principles of resolution 3103
(XXVIII) and was designed to codify international law
already in force."1
To the same effect was the following statement made by
the delegation of the Soviet Union with reference to amendment
CDDH/I/S of which it was a co—sponsur:
"The right of peoples to govern themselves was recognized
in international law, and their struggles to that end
were international armed conflicts covered by the Geneva
Conventions and other agreements in the field of
humanitarian law. Consequently, the sole object of the
propsal was to embody in humanitarian law a rule which
was already in existence and which took into account the
realities of the times."2
The position of the proponents of the international
character of' wars of national liberation may thus be summarized
as follows: first, that article 2 of the Geneva Conventions
should be interpreted within the framework of general
international law; second, that in accordance with general
international law armed conflicts in which peoples fight in the
exercise of their right to self—determination - mutatis mutandis
- are of international character within the meaning of' P1rticle
2 of the Geneva Conventions; and third, that the international
charater of such armed conflicts has been evidenced in
1 •
 CDOH/I/SR.2, para. 38.
2. CDDH/I/SR.3, para. 1•
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international practic e , particularily in resolution 3103
(xxviii) of 12 December, 1973, adopted by the UN. General
Assembly.
By contrast, at least until 1974, Western delegations
(except Norway and Australia who were co—sponsors of amendment
CDDH/I/ 11 ), advocated the view that wars of national liberation
are armed conflicts of non—international character s
 The
arguments they advanced in support of this view and the object-
ions they raised against amendments CDDH/I/5, 11 and 13, and
the counter—arguments made in reply will be reviewed in the
remainder of this section. In this review, it is proposed to
follow the example of Professor Abi—Saab in his lectures at the
Hague Academy of International Law and to classify these
arguments into three categories: objections on ground5 of' legal
feasibility, objections on grounds of opportunity (legislative
policy), and objections on grounds of practicability. 1 This
categorization is preferrable to that of Dan Ciobanu who
classified the variou5 arguments put forward by Western delega-
tions into arguments pertaining to the advisability, arguments
pertaining to the admissability, and arguments pertaining to
the feasibility of assimilating wars of national liberation to
international armed conflicts.2
It should be noted that from the point of view of the
supporters of' the international character of wars of national
1 Abi—Saab, Wars of National Liberation in the Geneva
Conventions and Protocols, 165 Recueil des Cours of the
Hague Academy of International Law, 1979—iV, pp. 376-384.
2. Dan Ciobanu, The Attitudes of Socialist Countries, in
Cassese (ed.), The New Humanitarian Law of' Armed Conflict,
1979, pp. 406-409. Ciabanu did not discuss the various
arguments advanced by Western delegations; he only
summarized them.
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liberation the que5tion was not one of assimilation but of
codification. To speak of assimilation is to equate the term
'international' with the term 'inter—state' and thus assume
what ought to be proved. Moreover, Dan Ciabanu's classification
seems too subjective to contribute to our understanding of' the
discussion.
However, it should be noted that Western delegations did
not present their arguments schematically, and that any
classification is the work of writers. This being said, we turn
now to the actual debate which took place at the first session
of the Diplomatic Conference of 1974.
4.2.1. Objections on the Grounds of Legal Feasibility:
The first argument to be mentioned in this series of
objections relates to the relevance of the work of' the United
Nations in legal matters to the work of' the Conference on the
reaffirmation and development of international humanitarian law
applicable in armed conflicts. Thus, to the speech made by the
Egyptian delegation introducing amendment CDDH/I/11, the French
delegate, Mr. Girard put forward the following objection:
"... two completly different concepts were emerging from
the discussion. The first was the concept upon which the
Egyptian representative had based his statement and the
second was the concept to which his Government
subscribed, namely, that the United Nations and the ICRC
pursued their activities on different levels. The United
Nations is the political body whose role was to find
political solutions to specific problems of the moment
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whereas humanitarian law must provide protection for all
war victims at all time5 ••. 
Ill
I\pparently, the French delegate had meant to say that the
United Nations has nothing to do with law—making because the
United Nations is a political body. If so, the French argument
would be as absurd and nonsensical as "arguing that legislation
by parliament has no legal significance because parliament is
2
a political body."
Nor the artificial dichtomy between the United Nations as
a political body and the Diplomatic Conference as a humanitarian
and a legal one is convincing; it suffices here to meditate the
import of the adjective "Diplomatic".3
I1oreover, nobody can reasonably deny today that the
United Nations has become the principal inatrumentality for the
codification and development of international law, whether
through the work of the International Law Commission or other
United Nations bodies. It is therefore unconvincing to argue
that codification and development of international law was
irrelevant to the work of a Diplomatic Conference held under
the auspices of the ICRC because it was done in the United
Nations.
The relevance of the work of the United Nations to the
work of the Diplomatic Conference was contested in other forms.
Thus, it was said that self—determination was mentioned in the
Charter of the United Nations "as a principle, not as a right;"4
that terms like 'self—determination' and 'peoples' were all too
1 CDDH/ISR.2, para. 49.
2. 1\bi—Saab, op. cit., p. 378,
3. Loc. cit.
4. Draper (UK), CDDH/I/SR.2, para. 46.
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vague and elastic and could not be used as a basis for law
making; 1 that the General Pssembly of' the United Nations has no
legislative powers and that at most it was competent to "prepare
legislation and invite States to work out treaties;" 2 that
United Nations resolutions, even when adopted unanimously were
not a component of positive international law; 3 that no
resolution of the United Nations (incuding the Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Co—operation among States in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations) could amend the Charter, which would remain
inviolate until amended in the proper manner.4
It seems doubtful whether all these arguments were
relevant to a discussion of' the international character of wars
of' national liberation. Nevertheless, these arguments were not
left unanswered.
The argument that "self—determination was mentioned in
the Charter as a Principle, not as a right, was rightly
answered by categorically stating that it did not matter
whether the "right of peoples to self—determination was called
a 'right or a 'principle'; what counted was that it was part of
contemporary international law."5
With regard to the criticism that terms like 'self—
determination' and 'peoples' were too vague and elastic to
serve as a basis for law—making, it should be noted first of'
all that almost all concepts of international law have a more
1. Draper (UK), CDDH/I/SR.2, para. 45; de Breucker (Belgium),
CDDH/ISR.2, para, 35; Lysaght (Ireland), CDDH/I/SR.5, para.lO.
2. De la Pradelle (Elonaco), CDDH/I/SR.4, para. 20.
3. Loc. cit.
4. Draper (UK), CDOH/I/SR.2, para. 46.
5. 1bi—Saab (Egypt), CDDH/SR.5, para. 4.
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or less large margin of vagueness around them and that
vagueness and alasticity has never prevented them being used as
a basis for law—making. In the case at hand, it was argued in
reply that:
"It was true that the concept of 'peoples' still had to
be more precisely defined in legal terms; although that
task was difficult, it was not impossible •.• the
Declaration on Principles of International law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co—operation among States in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
(General l\ssembly Resolution 2625 (xxv) provided an
adequate basis for determining, in a given situation,
whether the right of peoples to self—determination was
applicable
fmendment CDDH/I/11 doubtless still contained some
imprecision, but no more than other texts of the same nature:
unfortunately, international law always allowed for a wide
margin of interpretation, which could always be used in bad
faith. That was an unavoidable deficiency which must be
mitigated, as far as possible, by satisfactory guarantee5 of
implementation and by reducing the margin of divergent
interpretation as far as possible which was exactly the purpose
of the amendment.2
The alleged vagueness of the concept of 'people' had also
been used in a tactical move to dissuade delegations from
supporting amendment CDDH/I/ 11 . "The amendment in document
CDDH/I/11 spoke of 'peoples", said the Belgian representative,
1 •
 Ibid., para. 4.
2. Ibid., para. 6.
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"but what were 'peoples' in international law ? It would be
impossible to speak of an international armed conflict every
time an ethnic community wished to sever itself from a State."1
Such a tactic, however, did not work. The representative
of Nigeria, for example responded by saying that he could assure
the Belgian representative that some of the points he had made
had not entered the sponsor's minds at all when they were
drafting their amendment (CDDH/I/11). His delegation had
sponsored the amendment in the belief that it was based on
generally accepted principles of international law. He (the
representative of Nigeria) understood the right to self—
determination not as encouraging secessional and divisive
subversion in multi—ethnic nations, but as applying to a
struggle against colonial and alien domination, foreign
occupation and racist regimes.2
Speaking on the same point the representative of Egypt
said
"Delegations which were afraid that the principle (of
self—determination) would apply to all states where
there was a variety of races, languages or religions
need not be alarmed: according to the Declaration 3 , it
applied only in cases where such grounds were used as
a basis for systematic discrimination."4
The arguments that the General 1ssembly of the United
Nations has no legislative powers; that General /ssembly
1 •
 Oe Breucker (Belgium), CDIJH/I/SR.2, para. 35.
2. Clark (Nigeria), CDDH/1/SR.2, para. 41.
3. Declaration on Pr±nciples of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co—operation among States in accord-
ance with the Charter of the United Nations.
4. Abl—Saab (Egypt), CDDH/I/SR.5, para. 5.
214
resolutions, even when adopted unanimously were not a component
of positive international law; and that no resolution of the
United Nations could amend the Charter are at best only
indirectly relevant to the discussion, for the question at hand
is not a question of law—making but a question of law—determin-
ation, and states are free to express their views on the rules
of international law at any forum and in whatever form.
It is uncontestable that states are the primary law—
determining agency, 1 and that "the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations" are but "subsidiary
2
means for the determination of rules of law." f1oreover,
according to Prticle 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, there shall be taken into account, together with the
context of a treaty:
a) any subsequent agreement between the Parties regarding
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of
Its provisions;
b) any subsequent practice in the application of the
treaty which establishes the agreement of the Parties
regarding its interpretation;
c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in
the relations between the Parties.3
The Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co—operation among States in
1 •
 On the "law making processes and law—determining agencies,"
see generally, Schwarzenberger, International Law, Third
edition, 1957, pp. 25 et seq.
2. article 38 of the Statute of the International. Court of
Justice, text in Brownlie (ed), Basic Documents in
International Law, second edition, 1978, pp. 267 et seq.
3. Article 31 (3) of the Vienna Convention, text in Brounlie,
ibid., pp. 233 et seq.
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accordance with the Charter of the United Nations is a
subsequent agreement between the members of the United Nations
on the interpretation of the principles of international law
elaborated in the Declaration. Moreover, the Declaration
expressly states that "Nothing in this Oeclaration shall be
construed as prejudicing in any manner the provisions of the
Charter ..." In other words, no question of amending the Charter
is involved. Those who claim otherwise must be captives of their
own conceptions (or misconceptions) of the law of the Charters
The argument that United Nations resolutions, even when
adopted unanimously, were not a component of positive
international law (whatever this was supoosed to mean), is
untenable. The components of positive international law are the
rules of international law. The question whether a rule of
international law exists on a certain matter is a question of
evidence. No one can reasonably deny that United Nations
resolutions provide an important source of evidence on rules of
international law, whether with regard to the existence of the
rule itself or with regard to its meaning.
The last objection on grounds of legal feasibility to be
examined in this subsection was made by the Italian represent-
ative, Professor Cassese.
"His delegation could not share the view that wars of
national liberation were already covered by Article 2
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions in that those movements
were 'Powers' under the Third paragraph of that article
and as such entitled to accept and apply the Geneva
Conventions. In his delegation's opinion, the word
'Powers' used in the third paragraph of Article 2 of
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the Geneva Conventions could only mean States and not
authorities other than States."1
Professor Cassese alledged that this interpretation was
born out not only by the letter and spirit of the Conventions
but also by the circumstance that many of' the provisions of the
Geneva Conventions called for a complicated machinery which was,
generally speaking, available only to States,2
It may be noted that Professor Cassese was the only
Western delegate to articulate the argument in the manner quoted
above. Other Western delegates who apparently shared the same
view contended that the requirements of the Conventions could
only be fulfilled by states, according to some delegates, 3 or
by other equally responsible bodies, according to others. 4 We
shall revert to these arguments in the discussion of the variety
of objections on grounds of practicability. Here, it is propsed
to concentrate on the argument that the term 'Powers' in
Article 2, paragraph 3, common to the Geneva Conventions could
only mean states and not authorities other than states.
For a start it is undeniable that the term 'Powers' in
diplomatic language normally refers to 'States' and therefore,
strictly speaking, there is a presumption that the term 'Powers'
in Article 2, paragraph 3, common to the Geneva Conventions,
could only mean States. This presumption, however, is rebuttable,
and there i5 strong evidence to rebut it.
First, the Geneva Conventions, being humanitarian
1. CDDH/I/SR.3, pars. 38.
2. Loc. cit.
3. E.g. Draper (UK), CDOH/I/SR.4, para. 25; De Breucker
(Belgium), CDDH/I/SR.2, pars. 32.
4. E.g. Prough (U.S.A.), CDOH/I/SR.2, para. 51•
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Conventions (or so they are supposed to be), commend the widest
possible application of their provisions. Indeed, even in armed
conflicts of non—international character, the parties are urged
to apply in addition to Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions, and by virtue of that Article, all or part of the
Geneva Conventions by means of special agreements. floreover, it
is particularly revealing of' the purpose and object of the
Geneva Conventions that their provisions constitute no obstacle
to the humanitarian activities which the International Committee
of the Red Cross or any other humanitarian organization may,
subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned,
undertake for the protection and relif of the victims of armed
conflict. 1 It is the consent of the Parties to the conflict (or
the lack of it), not the provisions of the Conventions, which
constitutes the real obstacle in the way of the application of
the Conventions. It is too formalistic therefore to invoke some
of the provisions of the Conventions in order to restrict their
field of application.
Second, the claim that the term 'Powers' could only mean
'States' seems to be too formalistic even by classical
standards. According to classical criteria even a purely 'civil
war' becomes of international character and the law of armed
conflict becomes applicable in its entirety upon recognition of
the insurgents as belligerents by third states or by the
established gOvernment against which the civil war is being
waged. It is also generally held that recognition of belliger-
ency does not imply the reocgnition of the insurgents as a
1. See !\rticles 9/9/9/10, of the four Geneva Conventions
respectively.
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state • In other words, the Conventions in this case would apply
to the insurgents in their capacity as a belligerent power, a
belligerent community, or a de facto government of the part of
national territory under their control, but not as a state.1
Indeed, Professor Cassese himself admits that "in the event
that the insurgents are recognized as a belligerent Power
either by the lawful Government or by third States, ... the
internal conflict turns into an international war and the rules
regulating warfare become applicable." 2 It is difficult to see
how the Geneva Conventions would apply in this case if the term
'Powers' meant only 'states' and that only states were entitled
under the Geneva Conventions to accept and apply the Conventions
by virtue of Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Conventions.
Thirdly, according to paragraph 3 of Article 4 of the
Third Geneva Convention, the Convention applies, inter alia, to
"Members of the regular armed forces who profess
allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized
by the Detaining Power."
The ICRC Commentary seems to insist that this provision
must be interpreted, in the first place, in the light of the
actual case which motivated its drafting - that of the forces
of General de Gaulle which were (during the Second World War)
under the authority of' the French National Liberation Committee.3
Such insi5tance however does not seem necessary, since the
1 •
 See also Abi—Saab, 165, Recueil des Cours, 1979, pp. 400-401;
0. Schindler, 153 Recueil des Cours, 1979, pp. 135-136
2. Cassese, The Spanish Civil War and the Development of
Customary Law Concerning Internal Armed Conflict, in Cassese
(ed), Current Problems of International Law, 1975, p. 287.
3. Pictet (ed.), Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention,
Geneva, 1950, p. 62.
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forces of General de Gaulle were 'co—belligerents', and,
according to the ICRC Commentary itself, "the authors of the
Convention deliberately dropped the requirement that such armed
forces should be fighting in conjunction with a State recognized
1
as a regular belligerent," In other words, the government or
authority which is not recognized by the adversary, may itself
be a Party to the conflict, notwithstanding the fact that the
adversary does not recognize this 'authority' as a Party to the
conflict.
It may be noted that the ICRC Commentary does not say
explicitly what the term 'authority' means in the context of
the Geneva Conventions, but the following quotation from the
Commentary suggests that the 'authority' in question is neither
a state nor a government nor even a Party to the conflict in
the eyes of its adversary. The ICRC Commentary in this regard
says
"The distinguishing feature of such armed forces (referred
to in Article 4, paragraph 3, of the Third Geneva
Convention) is simply the fact that in the view of their
adversary, they are not operating ... under the direct
authority of a Party to the conflict in accordance with
Article 2 of the Convention."2
As in the view of the authors of the ICRC Commentary, a
Party to the conflict in accordance with Article 2 of the
Conventions means a 'state', this quotation may be read as
saying that the distinguishing feature of the 'authority'
referred to in Article 4, paragraph 3, of the Third Geneva
1 •
 Ibid., p. 64.
2, Ibid., p. 63.
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Convention, is simply the fact that in the eyes of its adversary,
it is not operating under the direct authority of a State Party
to the conflict. Indeed, this was the actual case of the "Free
French National Committee" or the "Free French Movemnet" of
General de Gaulle; it was not recognized as a State or a
government even by its allies, 1
 moreover, it was not recognized
by Germany as a Party to the conflict since France had concluded
an armistice agreement with Germany, dated 22 :June, 1940, of
which Article 10, paragraph 3, went so far as to stipulate that
French nationals who continued to bear arms against Germany
2
would not be entitled to the protection of the laws of war•
In a word, the 'authority' referred to in paragraph 3 of
Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention is simply a liberation
movement.
This 'authority', which is neither a state nor a government
nor even recognized by the adversary as a state, a government,
or a Party to the conflict, inorder to benefit from the Geneva
Conventions, should, according to the ICRC Commentary, "either
consider itself as representing one of the High Contracting
Parties, or declare that it accepts the obligations stipulated
in the Convention and wishes to apply them."3
Accession to the Geneva Conventions by means of an ad hoc
declaration of acceptance is a procedure open to non—contracting
'Powers' by virtue of paragraph 3 of Article 2 common to the
1. Britain, for example, recognized the French National Committee
of General de Gaulle as "representing all Free Frenchmen
wherever they may be, who rally to the Free French Iviovement
in support of the Allied Cause." Whiteman, Digest of
International Law, Vol. 2, p. 471.
2. Pictet (ad.), Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention,
Geneva, 1960, p. 62.
3. Ibid.,p. 63.
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Geneva Conventions. Accordingly, unless it is submitted that
the term 'Powers' refers to 'states' as well as to entities or
authorities other than states, it would be difficult for such
authorities as mentioned in Article 4, paragraph.3, of' the Third
Geneva Convention to be bound by the Conventions. Indeed, it
does not need much ingenuity to prove that this iS actually the
case; the Third Geneva Convention speaks throughout of' the
'Detaining Power' and of the 'Power on which the prisoner
dependsI, and unless these terms refer to entities other than
states, it would be impossible to operate paragraph 3 of Article
4 of the Third Geneva Convention, or to bind such authorities
by the provisions of the Conventions as a whole.
1
Fourth, in legal literature , as well as in the practice
of the United Nations, the term 'authorities' has normally been
used to distinguish entities not representing states from
'governments' representing states. For example, the Security
Council, in resolution No. 50, of the 29 May, 1948, which called
for a cessation of all military activities for four weeks and
for the protection of the Holy Places in Palestine, no less than
five times used the descriptive formula 'Governments and
Authorities.' The same resolution invited "the States Members
of the Arab League and the Jewish and Arab authorities" to
communicate to the Security Council their acceptance of this
resolution. In a previous resolution (Resolution No. 46, of 17
April, 1948, the Security Council called upon "all persons and
organizations in Palestine and especially upon the Arab Higher
1 See for example, Oppenheimer, Governments and Authorities in
Exile", 36 A.J.I.L., 1942, pp. 568-574; Whiteman, Digest of
International Law, Vol. 2, p. 467 et seq.
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Committee and the Jewish Agency ...". It is these
'organizations' which were described as 'authorities' whereas
the participating'states' were referred to as 'States' or
'Governments'. Pratice, with regard to the usuage of' terminology
was thus settled long before the Geneva Conventions were adopted.
This clearly supports what has been said above; that the term
'authority' in paragraph 3 of Prticle 4 of the Third Geneva
Convention referred to entities other than 'Governments'
representing states, and that these authorities were 'Powers'
within the meaning of paragraph 3 of Article 2 common to the
Geneva Conventions.
FifIh, it is really a naive formalistic logic which assumes
that wars of' national liberation would automatically fall into
the category of armed conflicts of non—international character
once the term 'Powers' in Article 2, paragraph 3, of' the Geneva
Conventions were construed to mean only states, and not entities
other than states. For such an interpretation might well lead
to the absurd conclusion that at least some wars of national
liberation would be put outside the pale of the Geneva Conven-
tions altogether. This, for instance would be the case of' the
peoples of mandated, trust, and non—self—governing territories
which had not yet exercised their right of self—determination.
Armed conflicts of non—international character are
described in Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions as armed
conflict "occuring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties." This decription, to say the least, can
not be extended to mandated territories, since the legal status
of these territories and their native inhabitants was established
long before the Geneva Conventions were created It is a matter
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of common knowledge that the mandates were established on the
principle of non—annexation. Moreover, the creation of' the
League Mandates did not involve "any cssation of territory or
transfer of sovereignity" to the mandatory., 1 This view was
expressed by the International Court of Justice in its I\dvisory
Opinion on the Legal Status of South West Pfrica (Namibia), and
was expressed as early as 1923 by the Permanent Mandates
Commission of the League of Nations. In its report of that year
(1923), the Commission examined the opinions of writers for and
against the attribution of sovereignty to the mandatory and
accepted view that the mandatory has no sovereignty on the
mandated territory. 2 The report of the Commission unequivocally
stated that "under the mandate system the mandatory state is
merely the government of' a territory which does not belong to
it," 3 and that, the mandated territory, even when administered
as an integral part of the mandatory (as in the case of C
mandates)", "constitutes a distinct entity from the international
point of view"4
Thus, the legal status of mandated territories makes
I\rticle 3 of the Geneva Convention inapplicable, and therefore
excludes the characterization of' the conflict between the native
inhabitants of' a mandated territory and the mandatory Power, as
non—international, moreover the legal status of' the native
mandated terrotories clearly calls for the application of the
Fourth Geneva Convention, and thus testifies to the international
1. See ICJ Reports (1950), pp. 128-133, at 132.
2. Quincy Wright, Status of the Inhabitants of Mandated
Territories, A.J.I.L., Vol. 18, 1924, pp. 306315, at 306.
3. Ibid., p. 308.
4. Ibid., pp. 309-10.
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character of such armed conflicts.
The legal status of the native inhabitants of mandated
territories was made absolutely clear in a resolution adopted
by the council of' the League of Nations in its meeting of \pril
23, 1923 The text of the resolution runs as follows:
"The Council of the League of Nations,
Having considered the report of the Permanent Mandates
Commission on the national status of the inhabitants of
territories under B and C mandates;
In accordance with the principles laid down in Prticle 22
of the Covenant;
Resolves as follows:
1. The status of the native inhabitants of a mandated
territory is distinct from that of' the nationals of the
Mandatory Power and cannot be identified therewith by any
process having general application.
2. The native inhabitants of a mandated territory are not
invested with the nationality of the Mandatory Power by
reason of the protection extended to them.
3. It is not inconsistent with (1) and (2) above that
individual inhabitants of' the mandated territory should
voluntarily obtain naturalization from the Mandatory
Power in accordance with arrangements which it is open
to such Power to make, with this object under its own law.
4. It is desirable that native inhabitants who receive the
protection of the Mandatory Power should in each case be
designated by some form of descriptive title which will
specify their status under the mandate."1
1 •
 Quoted from Quincy Wright, Ibid., pp. 313-14k
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(\s the native inhabitants of a mandated territory were not
nationals of' the 11andatory Power, the Fourth Geneva Convention
relative to the protection of civilian persons became applicable
to them. According to Artcile 4, paragraph 1, of the said
Convention:
"Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a
given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find
themselves, in case of conflict or occupation, in the
hands of a Party to the conflict or occupying Power of
which they are not nationals." (Emphasis added).
Thus, on the authority of the legal status of mandated
territories and their peoples, it cannot reasonably be argued
that the term 'Powers' in Article 2, paragraph 3, common to the
Geneva Conventions, referred only to states, and not to entitj
other than states. In a word, the peoples of mandated
territories were 'Powers' within the meaning of Article 2 common
to the Geneva Conventions.
The legal status of colonies and their inhabitants (i.e.,
non—self—governing territories) was not as clear as that of
mandated territories. But by 1960, the separate and distinct
status of the territory of 'a colony or other non—self-
governing territory' from that of a colonial Power was clearly
recognized. This was done by the General Assembly of the United
Nations in its famous "Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples", and was expressly
laid down in the Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co—operation among States in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations:
"The territory of a colony or other non—self—governing
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territory has, under the Charter, a status separate and
distinct from the territory of the State administering it;
and such separate and distinct status under the Charter
shall exist until the people of the colony or non—self-
governing territory have exercised their right of self—
determination in accordance with the Charter, and
particularly its purposes and principles."1
This 'separate and distinct' status of the territory of
a colony or other non—self—governing territory from that of the
state administering it, clearly prevents the characterization
of the armed conflict between the administering state and the
people of' te colony or other non—self—governing territory, as
an armed conflict of' non—international character.
As Profes5or Schindler had stated in his lectures at the
Hague Academy of International Law:
"The position of a liberation movement as a 'Power' within
the meaning of Article 2 (3) (of the Geneva Conventions)
and possibly of the provisions of accession 2
 is
particularly strong, if a territory can be ascribed to it
with a status separate and distinct from the State
administering it, as is the case for colonies, mandates
and trust territories. In such case, the international
character of' a conflict is intensified by the element of
territory.
1 Text in Brownlie (ed.), Basic Documents in International
Law, (Second edition, 1978), p. 39.
2 Articles 60/59/139/155 of the First, Second, Third and
Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949, respectively.
3. 0. Schindler, 163 Recueil des Cours, (1979 - II), p. 138.
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Nevertheless, it should be noted that the talk about wars
of' national liberation and liberation movements in terms of
'colonies, mandates and trust terrjtorjes' is too classical and
does not correspond with the modern concept of wars of national
liberation, as Professor Schindler himself seems to admit. 1 But
such talk is sufficient to prove the point that the term 'Powers'
in Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Geneva Conventions, referred
to states, as well as to entities other than states.
4.2.2.	 Objections on Grounds of Legislative Policy
The amendments (CDDH/I/5, CDDH/I/11 and CODH/I/13) which
explicitly characterized wars of national liberation as armed
conflicts of international character within the meaning of
Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions have also been criticised
by a number of Western delegations on the grounds that they
were based on political and subjective criteria; that they
confused jus ad bellum with jus in bello; that they resurrected
the old concept of just war; that they were discriminatory;
that they were modelled on certain particular situations. These
criticisms were apparently the result of misconceptions and lack
of communication between the proponents and opponents of the
amendments, but they have the merit of bringing into sharp
focus the very policy underlying the so—called international
humanitarian law and the traditional distinction between armed
1. See, ibid., pp. 136 - 139. See further, this Chapter, Section
6.
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conflicts of international character and armed conflicts of
non—international character. In this discussion each of these
grounds of criticism will be taken as basis for further
elaboration.
a) A frequently recurrent objection on ground of
legislative policy was that the amendments proposed by
supporters of the international character of wars of national
liberation were based on purely political and subjective
criteria in the sense that the characterization of the conflict
would depend on the political motivation or subjective judgement
of one of the parties to the conflict - elements which cannot
serve as valid legal criteria and which go against the very
essence of humanitarian law. 1 Some statements in this respect
may be quoted for illustration.
Thus the French representative said:
t Considerations of elements such as motivation, justice
and legitimacy, which it was quite normal to discuss in
the United Nations, would be fatal in an assembly held
under the auspices of' the ICRC. Humanitarian law must
remain free of any notion of political motivation or
subjective judgment
	
,,2
The representative of the United States of America agreed
with the French representative and went on to say:
"Who was to decide whether a struggle in which people
were involved against their own government was an
international struggle? Humanitarian law and its
1. See also Abi—Saab, 165 Recueil des Cours, ( 1 979_flj), pp.
380 - 382.
2. Girard (France), CDDH/I/SR.2, para. 9.
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attendant responsibilities could not be based on vague
concepts which introduced the concept of rightness and
wrongness of a conflict, and thus jeopardized the granting
of an equal degree of protection to all concerned.
Internal terrorism could ndt be made legitimate merely by
calling it an international conflict. Concepts such as
"alien domination" and "racist regimes" had yet to be
defined. Political considerations should be banished from
the discussion, and the Committee should confine itself
to ensuring better protection for all war victims through
the development of humanitarian law."1
And in the view of the representative of the United Kingdom:
"... it was a basic principle of the Geneva Conventions,
The Hague Conventions and other instruments that legal and
humanitarian protection should never vary according to
the motives of those engaged in a particular struggle.
Moreover, to discriminate between the motives of those
engaged in the struggle would violate essential principles
2
of human rights."
And in the view of' the representative of' Belgium:
"Wars of national liberation were anachronisms which would
oori be ended and ought not to be covered by Protocol I.
It would be imprudent to create a precedent by changing
the categories of' international law (Sic) because of' the
motivation behind a given type of conflict."3
And in the same vein the representative of Switzerland said:
1. Prugh (U.S.A.), CDDH/I/SR.2, para. 51-52
2. Draper (UK), CDDH/I/SR.2, para. 45.
3. Breuker (Belgium), CDDH/I/SF. 2, para. 34.
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"The other proposed amendments (i.e. other than emendment
CDDH/I/ 1 2) tended to establish a particular category of
conflicts on the basis of subjective criteria stemming
from the causes of those conflicts and the aims of the
parties ... His delegation believed that it would be very
dangerous, and against the spirit of' humanitarian law,
to classify armed conflicts on the basis of non—objective
and non—legal criteria."1
Also in the same vein the representative of Canada said
that:
"He would view with anxiety the inclusion of' provisions
which would make the protection of the victims of armed
conflict depend upon the motivations of such conflicts."2
Perhaps the most misleading statement in this respect was
that made by the repre5entative of Spain who said that:
"Humanitarian law should aim at the protection of all
mankind without distinction, and that Protocol I should
apply to all armed conflict whatever their motivation
and should include no subjective criterion. His delega-
tion was therefore against amendments CDOH/I/1 1 and Add.
1, CDDH/I/13, and above all, CDDH/I/5 and Add.
It has been rightly observed with regard to these
criticisms that they reveal a fundemental misunderstanding. For
what is 'legal' in contrast to political in international law?
'Legal'is an adjective describing what is based on a rule of law;
and according to amendment CDDH/I/11, the criterion of the
1	 Pictet (Switzerland), CDOH/I/SR.3, para. 13.
2. Caron (Canada), CDDH/I/SR.3, para. 16.
3. Rodriguez Roman (Spain), CDDH/I/SR.3, para. 1g
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envisaged category of conflicts is the principle of self—
determination, which is a. legal principle. 1 It is true that
amendment CDDH/I/5 did not refer to self—determination but to
struggles against 'colonial and alien domination and racist
regimes', but even then a stable meaning has developed within
the United Nations for these categories as special cases of
denial of self—determination, though they may fall slightly
short of covering the full scope of the principle of self—
determination as elaborated in the Declaration on Principles
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co—opera-
tion among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations. 2
If, however, 'political
	
referred not to the
criteria of the amendments, but to the intentions of their
sponsors (supposedly to upgrade wars of national liberation)
one may ask with Professor Abi—Saab whether consciously ignoring
one of the major forms of post—war (1945) armed conflicts was
less political and more humanitarian than explicitly providing
for them in Protocol I, with a view to alleviating the suffer-
ings they are bound to occasion.3
As for the criticism of' 'subjectivity', it has also been
observed that it was based on a misunderstanding, because the
amendments, including the one which has finally become paragraph
4, of Article 1, of Protocol I, did not refer to the intention
of liberation movements, but to their objective situation, and
whether it warranted the application of the principle of' self-
1 • Abi—Saab, 155 Recueil des Cours, (1979_Itl), p. 3so
2. Loc. cit.
3. Loc. cit.
232
determination or not. 1 it is true, as was noted above, that
the principle of' self—determination has its ambiguities, but
it is also true that these are no more than in the case of other
generally accepted principles of international law, and even of
some provi5ions of the Conventions and Protocols.2
Finally, it should be noted that in reply to the above
mentioned criticisms, supporters and sponsors of the amendments
which came under attack rejected these criticisms out of hand.
Some statements may be quoted for illustration. The represent-
ative of Romania said that there could be no question of
introducing political concepts into humanitarian law. The
question was that of the relationship between humanitarian law
and general international law, since the former could not be
conceived in isolation from the latter. He stressed that the
conflicts referred to in proposed amendments CDDH/I/5, CDDH/I/li
and CDDH/I/13 were a reality and charged those who wished them
to be included in the category of internal war of being
"motivated by political considerations."3
The representative of Cameroon said that he would be
prepared to follow the advice of some delegations that juridical
and political questions should not be confused provided a
1. Loc. cit. In his article or, "The Attitude of Uestern
Countries", Professor Charles Lysaght of' Ireland who
represented his country at the Diplomatic Conference stated
that the "case was, in essence, founded on the nature of' the
conflict rather than its motivation or justification. It was
the existance of a colonial, alien or a racist regime and
the absence of self—determination rather than any motivation
of those taking up arms that made the conflict international."
Cassese (ed.), The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict,
1979, p. 351,
2. Abi—Saab, op. cit., p. 380.
3. Cristescu (Romania), CDDH/I/SR.2, para. 53; and CDDH/I/SR.3,
pare. 30.
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satisfactory reply was given to two questions. First, according
to the theory put forward by some Western delegates (that wars
of national liberation were armed conflicts of non—international
character), the repressive operations carried out in Flozambique
by the Portugese Government would qualify as police operations
which were essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
Portugal; was that purely a question of law or a question of
politics? Secondly, was it the Conference's intention to draw up
an abstract body of law with no roots in reality? Indeed, was
it possible to ignore all realities of a political nature?1
The representative of Tanzania was not so diplomatic; he
put it bluntly thus:
"Struggles for national liberation were undeniably
international conflicts, and his delegation was not
prepared to accept a humanitarian law drawn up solely
in the interest of the imperialist Powers."2
The representative of' the r1ozambique Liberation Front
(FRELIP1O) regarded the international character of wars of
national liberation as "a matter of simple logic; unless it was
claimed that the members of FRELIf'lO were Portugese, it had to
be recognized that the struggle they were waging was internat-
•	 3ional."
Indeed, the representative of FRELIMO put his finger on
one of the objective criteria for distinguishing an armed
conflict of an international character from that of a non—
international character within the meaning of' the Articles 2
1 Plbya (Cameroon), CDDH/I/SR.2, para. 57.
2. Kabuaye (Tanzania), CDDH/I/SR.3, para. 23.
3. CDDH/I/SR.5, para. 15
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and 3 of the Geneva Conventions. As we shall see later in the
discussion, international law provide5 three objective tests or
criteria for determining objectively whether an armed conflict
is of' an international or non—international character. These
are: nationality, territory, and the principle of' self—
determination. At this stage, it may be sufficient to note that
if the insurgents and the incumbents were of the same
nationality, belong to the same national territory, and the
government was conducting itself in accordance with the right
of peoples to self—determination and thus was representative of
the whole people belonging to the territory of the State without
distinction as to race, creed or colour, the conflict would
undoubtedly be of a non—international character. If any of these
three conditions were missing, the armed conflict must be
treated as one of an international character.1
Other delegates had in fact touched on one or more of
these criteria. Thus the representative of Guinea—Bissau said:
"The legitimate and organized struggle of peoples who
wished to regain their national independence could not
be regarded as an internal conflict, since the
adversaries were different peoples of differr,t races
2from different geographical backgrounds."
The representative of' the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)
was more elaborate. He said that:
"by far the most important issue in relation to Article
1 was that of national liberation wars. In that
connexion a number of' very pertinent questions had been
1. See below, this Ohapter, Section 5.
2. CODH/I/SR.5, para. 3.
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asked: for example, who was to define such concepts as
'peoples', 'national liberation wars', 'national liberation
movements' or the 'right to self—deterrnination?'The answer
was that they would be defined in the same way as
definitions had been arrived at in the case of the 1949
Geneva Conventions and earlier Conventions. In other words,
the work would be done by legal experts and diplomatists.
When they had done so, national liberation wars would
have been definitively identified as international confl-
icts. For that was what they certainly were regardless of
their degree of' intensity. The Africans of' Ilozambique,
Angola and Guinea—Bissau were nations, and totally
different nations from the Portugese nation, not 'parts'
of it. The same applied to the inhabitants of' all the
islands which surrounded the African continent and were
under foreign domination, to the African inhabitants of
South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia and to the Palestinians.
The separate and independent national existence of the
peoples subject to foreign domination was recognized by
the entire national community, except of course by the
alien groups which exercised authority over them."
The last statement to be quoted here in conection with
the criticisms made by Western delegations and quoted above,
is the statement of' the representative of Nigeria, introducing
amendment CDDH/I/41 and Add, 1, on behalf of the 51 Powers
which sponsored it. He said:
"The arguments on which that amendment was based were
1. CDDH/1/SR.6, para. 14.
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those that had been invoked with regard to the earlier
amendments. In that conection, operative paragraphs 3 and
four of' Resolution 3103 (xxviii), adopted by the General
Assembly on the report of the Sixth Committee, were of
outstanding importance. Iloreover, the amendments reiter-
ated some of the actual terms used by the jurists of' the
Sixth Committee, such as 'peoples', 'colonial and alien
domination' and	 acjst regimes	 Self—determination was
one of the basis principles of the United Nations Charter,
and its interpretation could not lead to any confusion.
All such terms had now been incorporated in international
legal terminology. The position of' peoples engaged in
liberation struggles was similar to that of peoples living
in occupied territory, which was referred to in Aricle 2
common to the four Geneva Conventions."1
a) Another series of objections on the ground of
legislative policy contended that the amendments entailed a move
from jus in bello to jus ad bellum; that they had resurrected
the dangerous doctrine of 'just war' and had introduced a
discrimination in the field of' humanitarian law, thus violating
a basic principle of humanitarian law - that of the equality of
the parties.2
Here again the objections misconstrued the amendments.
For while many delegations had spoken of' the legitimacy of the
armed struggle against colonial and alien domination and against
racist regimes, and while this legitimacy had been reaffirmed in
1 •
 CDDH/I/SR.5, para. 45.
2. Prugh (U.S.A.), CDDH/I/SR.2, para. 51; Pictet (Switzerland),
CDDH/I/3, para. 13; Kaishoven (rJetherland), CDOH/I/SR.4,
para. 40.
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many United Nations resolutions of both the Security Council
and the General Assembly, it was the fact of the denial of self—
determination, and not simply the legitimacy of the struggle
for self—determination, which constituted the basis for the
international character of these armed conflicts. As to the
alleged ensuing discrimination it was answered as follows:
"Other delegations had criticised the proposal (CDDH/I/ll)
on the ground that it confused jus ad bellum with the
preferential treatment to one of the parties to a conflict.
Yet it was the existing system that gave preferential
treatment to one of the parties, by refusing protection
to the national liberation movements. On the contrary,
according to emendment CDDH/I/ 11 , humane treatment
should be afforded equally to both parties."1
To this it should be added that the Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Co—operation among States in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations reiterates more than once that:
"Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible
action which deprives peoples ... of their right to
self—determination and freedom and jndepefldence•
Violation of this duty has no other name than 'aggression',
and the resistance to such forcible action by the peoples has
no name other than self—defence. But even If we use the milder
descriptions - 'forcible action' instead of 'aggression', and
'resistance' to this forcible action instead of 'self—defence',
equality of the parties to the conflict before humanitarian law
1 Abi—Saab (Egypt), CDDH/I/SR.5, para. B.
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would still constitute a discrimination between the parties to
the conflict in the sense that the state which resorts to
'forcible action which deprives peoples of their right to
self—determination and freedom and independence' would still be
entitled to 'legitimate military necessity'. The 'forcible
action' which is illegal would thus, paradoxically, become legal
when committed under the jus in bello, and a double discrimina-
tion ensues when the conflict is characterized as one of non—
international character since the lawful resistance would be
denied legitimate military necessity and members of national
liberation movements would become 'criminals'. Nowhere has
international law been so divested of any sense of justice as
in the claim that wars of national liberation were armed
conflicts of non—international character.
It should be emphasised that recognition of the
international character of wars of national liberation means no
more than that the national liberation movement is entitled to
a legitimate military necessity in accordance with the laws and
customs of wars and that members of national liberation
movements are lawful combatants. This leaves the adversary
equally entitled to a 'legitimate' military necessity and to
the protection of the laws and customs of war. The whole
transaction therefore is still in favour of the party to the
conflict which denies a people its right to self—determination,
freedom and independence. If the justice of the cause of
liberation movements were to be pushed to its logical
conclusions the 'legitimate' military necessity which is allowed
to the party against whom a war of liberation is waged must be
withdrawn.
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! comparable case was made by the Chief French and British
Prosecutors before the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremburg. The Chief Prosecutor M. Francois de Menton said:
"What does this (the Kellog - Briand Pact) mean, if not
that all acts committed as a consequence of this
aggression for the carrying on of' the struggle thus
undertaken will cease to have the juridicial character
of acts of war?
!\cts committed in the execution of' a war are assaults on
persons and goods uhich are themselves prohibited but
are sanctioned in all legislations. The state of war
could make them legitimate only if the war itself was
legitimate. In as much as this is no longer the case,
since the Kellog—Briand Pact, these acts become purely
and simply common law crimes."1
In closely comparable argument in his closing address,
Sir Hartley Shawcross, the Chief British Prosecutor stated:
"The killing of combatants in war is justifiable, both
in international rd in Municipal laws, only where the
war itself' is legal. But where a war is illegal,
there is nothing to justify the killing, and these
murders are not to be distinguished from those of any
other lawless bands."2
rccording to McDougal and Feliciano, the International
Military Tribunal did not explicitly deal with the arguments
1. Cited in McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum Uorld Public
Order, 1967, p. 531. See also Schwarzenberger, International
Law, Vol. 2, (1\rmed Conflicts), 1968, pp. 100-105.
2. Ibid., p. 531.
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put forward by Sir Hartley Shaucross and 1. de 1enthon, but the
judgement as a whole suggests that their argument was not
accepted. 1
 However, the United States Iiltary Tribunal of
Nureniberg, they argue, was more explicit in rejecting the
prosecutors' argument. Some of their illustrative examples may
be indicated.
In the case of the United States v. List et al., the
prosecution contended that since Germany's wars against Greece
and Yugoslavia were aggresive wars, the German occupation troops
were there unlawfully and gained no 'rights' whatever as an
occupant. The tribunal met this contLention by saying:
t fj the purpose of this discussion, we accept the
statement as true that the wars against Yugoslavia and
Greece were in direct violation of the Kellog—Briand Pact
and were therefore criminal in character. But it does not
follow that every act by the German occupation forces
against persons or property is a crime or that any or
every act undertaken by the population of the occupied
country against the German occupation forces thereby
became legitimate defence
In another case (United States v P1lstotter), the same
tribunal refused to consider as relevant the criminal nature of
Germany's aggression in determining whether the harsh German
penal laws and the court decisions under those laws constituted
war crimes or crimes against humanity. The Tribunal was unable
to accept the conclusion that every German soldier who marched
under orders, or who fought in his homeland was a criminal and
1. Ibid., p. 533.
2. Loc. cit.
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a murderer. It was pointed out by the Tribunal that if this view
were accepted, the rules of' warfare would no longer be the
criteria of' unlawful conduct in hostilities and that the
pronouncement of guilt in any particular case would be reduced
to a mere formality.1
The gist of all these arguments by the Tribunal is that
the criminal character of the war is irrelevant to the conduct
of hostilities; that even the aggressor has a 'legitimate'
military necessity as the victim of aggression; and that the
rules of jus in bello are the only valid criteria for
determining whether the conduct of hostilities in Sfly particular
case was lawful or unlawful.
This indeed amounts to saying that although the whole war
on the part of the aggressor is illegal the aggressor has a
legal right to destroy the victim of' aggression, provided that
the destruction is carried out in accordance with the rules of'
jus in bello, which is logically absurd. If the whole war is
illegal its parts must be illegal and the aggressor must be
resonsible for the whole cost of' the war in human and physical
resouces.
This does not mean that jus in bello would become
redundant. This law must be respected by all parties to the
conflict, since its rules constitute criteria for determining
individual criminality', and above all, constitute standards
of' the humane treatment due to the victims of armed conflicts,
regardless of the characterization of the resort to force as
legal or illegal. But until, and unless, the so—called
1. Ibid., p. 533 - 34.
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'legitimate military necessity' is denied to the party which in
the judgement of the international community is considered to
be guilty of unlawful use of force, the just and lasting peace
which is the main purpose of the United Nations, would remain
as remote an objective as it has always been in an international
system of' power politics, and the so—called humanitarian law
would continue to serve as an instrument of power politics in
disguise.
c) 1nother criticism of the amendments which explicitly
characterized wars of national liberation as international in
character was that the amendments envisaged only particular
cases. This criticism was suggested, rather explicitly formulated,
and was answered as follows:
"The sponsors of the proposal (CDDH/I/ ll ) had been
reproached with placing undue emphasis on special
situations. Nevertheless, a number of important
principles in international humanitarian law had
originated in such situations: thus the second paragraph
of Prtic1e 2 of the Geneva Conventions 1 had been adopted
because of' what happened in Denmark during the Seceond
World War; paragraph 3 of rticle 4 of the Third Geneva
Convention had its origin in General de Gaulle's French
Liberation Ilovement and in italian resistance to the
facist authorities ... the latter of those tio provisions
clearly supported the proposition that liberation
1. •
 The second paragraph of Prticle 2 common to the Geneva
Conventior-,s provides: "The Convention shall also apply to all
cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a
High Contracting Party, even jP the said occupation meets
with no armed resistance."
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struggles •.. had to be considered as international
conflicts in the sense of the Geneva Conventions of 1949•"
To the same effect was the following statement made by
the representative of Egypt:
"... it had been said that the proposal in document CDDH/
I/il envisaged only particular cases; but that was true
of international law as a whole, and the Geneva
Conventions in particular, which had been gradually built
up on the bais of specific situations revealed in
international practice.
d) \nother criticism on grounds of legislative policy was
that	 of liberation were anachronisms which would soon be
ended" 3 , and that the Protocol should be restricted to
4
"permanent rather than transitory situations."
This objection had been anticipated by the Egyptian
delegate in introducing the 15 - Power amendment (CDDH/I/11).
He said:
"We all hope that the occasion for wars of national
liberation will not arise, and that wisdom will prevail.
But we have to plan our action, especially in such a
major legislative endevour, on the assumption that
unfortunately they may be with us for some time to come."5
1 •
 Longva (Norway) CDDH/I/SR.3, para,. 35.
2. bi-5aab (Egypt, CDDH/I/SR.5, para. 3.
3. De Breucker (Belgium), CDDH/I/SR.2, para. 34.
4. Partsch (Federal Republic of Germany), CDDH/I/SR.3, para. 17.
5. bi—Saab (Egypt), CDDH/I/SR.2, para. 9, quoted verbatim by
1bi—Saab, 165 Recueil des Cours, p. 382.
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4.2.3.	 Objections on the Grounds of Practicability
These were the most substantive objections concerning the
applicability of the substantive regulations of the Geneva
Conventions and Protocol I to wars of national liberation.
It was said in this regard that the amendments were
incompatible with the structure and economy of the Geneva
Conventions and Protocol I; that the substantive rules of these
Conventions were modelled on conventional warfare and required
for their implementation by the parties the existance of mech-
anisms available only to states; that their application to wars
of national liberation would impose on liberation movements
heavy obligations which they would be in no position to fulfil,
whence the discrimination between the parties to the conflict.1
The ascertainment of the veracity and import of' these
objections would require the examination of' the Geneva
Conventions and Protocol I article by article, an examination
which cannot be made her.. 2 For the purposes of' this discussion
it may be sufficient to note that in view of' these objections a
Working Group representing the various regional groups of states
was in fact set up to examine the implications of the adoption
of Article 1 of' Protocol I. The Working Group met throughout
the Second Session of' the Diplomatic Conference (1975) and had
unanimously concluded that no changes in the Protocol were
1. See in this respect the statements made by : De Breucher
(Belgium), CDDH/I/SR.2, para. 31-32, and CDDH/I/SR.4, para.25;
Cassese (Italy), CDDH/I/SR.3, para. 38; Kaishoven (Netherlands)
CDDH/I/SR.4, para. 39; Draper (U.K.), CDDH/I/SR.2, para. 44,
and CDDH/I/SR.4, pare. 25; Prugh (U.S.A.), CDDH/I/SR.4, para.
4. See also Baxter, The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Wars
of National Liberation, in Rivista Di Dirritto Internazionale,
Vol. LVII, fasc 2 - 1974, pp. 196 - 197.
2. Abi—Saab, 165 Recueil des Cours, 1979, pp. 382 - 83.
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required. 1
This conclusion should come as no suprise. Ps the
representative of Norway, replying to the representative of the
Netherlands who claimed that application of the Geneva
Conventions would be difficult in cases where hostilities only
took the form of infiltration, had said:
"The problem involved might be compared with that of
upholding the equality between the occupiers and the
occupied, a problem which had never prevented military
operations from being regarded as international conflicts
in the sense of the Geneva Conventions."2
The representative of Egypt put it more forcefully:
"Some delegations had said that the national liberation
movements would be unable to apply the provisions of the
Conventions and the Protocol because the conditions of
their struggle were different in practice from those of
international conflict5. That was a false distinction: the
material conditions of national liberation struggles were
similar to those of resistance movements against foreign
occupation, which were specifically mentioned in the
(Geneva) Conventions and were classified as international
conflicts; it had not been considered that the special
conditions of the struggles of such movements would prevent
them from applying the Conventions."3
It is also useful to recall that in 1948, the Seventeenth
1 •
 Charles Lysaght, The Attitude of Western Countries, in
Cassese (ed.) The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict,
1979, p. 354. See also the statement made by the represent-.
ative of Egypt !bi—Saab, CDDH/SR.36, para. 69.
2. Longva (Norway5, CDDH/I/SR.4, para. 45.
3. Abi—Saab, Egypt, CDDH/I/SR.5, para. 7.
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International Fed Cross Conference which met in Stockholm had
approved a fourth paragraph common to the draft (Geneva)
Conventions extended the application of' the Conventions to
armed conflicts of' non—international character, It was not
adopted by the Geneva Diplomatic Conference of 1949, not because
of any unsurmountable legal difficulty or impossiblity of
application, but because of the lack of' political will on the
part of the majority of' States at that time to go that far.
However, the main point remains that the proposal was made by
the ICRC, the organization most intimately involved with the
application of the Conventions. The ICRC and the many
delegation5 which at that time supported the Stockholm text of
paragraph 4 of common frticle 2 of the Draft Geneva Conventions
would be disrupted by the adoption of the Stockholm text,
Moreover, at the very Diplomatic Conference in which all
the objections discussed so Par had been made there were states
like Monaco, Lichtenstein and the Holy See, which are parties
to the Geneva Conventions. Can it be realistically argued that
their material capacity to fulfil the obligations under the
Geneva Conventions are greater th2n, or even equal to, some of'
the liberation movements which participated in the work of' the
Di p lomatic Conference ?
Liberation movements at the Diplomatic Conference were
particularly sensitive to the argument that only states were
capable of applying the Geneva Conventions; they pointed out
that they had been applying the Conventions, while their
adversaries, which were supposedly capable of applying the
Conventions had always violated them. 1 The representative of
1. See footnote 1 on next page.
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the flozambique Liberation Front - FRELI11O, after giving specific
examples of the application of the Geneva Conventions by
liberation movements, quite correctly, summed up the problem of
the application of the Geneva Conventions by saying:
"The essential requirement, indeed, was not the technical
apparatus or the material means, but the will to apply
the principles of humanitarian law and the political
outlook of the parties. Cases were known where the States
had departed from the established rules far more grossly
than the liberation movements. If the rules had to be
adapted, that might be due to the special conditions of
guerrilla warfare and not to the fact that the parties
were or were not states."
5.	 The einding Quality of Prticle 1, Paragraph 4, of Prtocol
I which Proclaims_the International Character of Wars of
National Liberation
So far, the various amendments to the ICRC text of draft
1\rticle 1 of Protocol I have been reviewed, as well as the
various arguments put for and against the amendments. The
outcome - paragraph 4 of P1rticle 1 of' Protocol I - has already
been quoted at the beginning of this Chapter. It provides that
armed conflicts of international character within the meaning
of 1\rticle 2 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949
1 •
 rrmaly (Palestine Liberation Organization - PLO), CDDH/I/SR.
5, para. 34; rvlonteiro (Mozambique Liberation Front - FRLIMO),
CDDH/I/SR.4, para. 46.
2. Monteiro (Mozambique Liberation Front - FRLLI1O), CDDH/I/SR.
5, para. 18.
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"include armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against
colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist
regimes in the exercise of their right of self—determination,
as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co—operation among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations." A motion for a separate
vote on this paragraph was put forward by the Israeli delegation,
but the Conference rejected the motion, and Article 1 as a whole
was adopted by 87 votes in favour, one against (Israel), and 11
abstentions. It seems that the result would not have been
different had paragraph 4 been put to a separate vote, for no
state had said that it would have voted differently If the
paragraph was put to a separate vote. Indeed, if it were not
for the Israeli delegation which insisted on a vote, the Article
would have been adopted by consensus.
However, according to Article 95 of Protocol I, the
Protocol shall enter into force 6 months after two instruments
of ratification or accession have been deposited. As of 31 [larch
1981, the Protocol had been ratified or acceded to by 17 states.
The Protocol is therefore already a binding law to those states
which had deposited instruments of' ratification or accession.
The Protocol was also signed by 62 states. This includes all
Western States, all East—European States (except Albania), and
some African, Asian, and Latin American States. 1 In addition,
three liberation movements had also signed the Protocol: the
Palestine Liberation Organization, (PLO), the South West Africa
1 •
 See, ICRC, Doc. OD/JUR - No. 9/6, dated 31.03.1981 - JJS/gr.
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People's Organization (SWAPO), and the Pan—African Congress
( p P1c) of South Africa.
By virtue of Article la of' the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (1969), the signing of' a treaty by a state
obliges that state "to refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and purpose" of the treaty "until it shall have made its
intention clear not to become a party to the treaty."
However, none of the states which had signed the Protocol
were apparently engaged in a war of national liberation in the
narrow sense of the term. By contrast the states which are
currently engaged in wars of national liberation in the narrow
sense of the term, e.g. Israel and South Africa, have not even
signed the Protocol. Indeed, as noted above, Israel had voted
against Article 1 of' Protocol I. Ioreover, Article 95 of Protocol
I expressly states that the Protocol "shall enter into force six
months after two insruments of' ratification or accession have
been deposited", and that;
each Party to the Conver?tions (i.e. the Geneva
Conventions) thereafter ratifying or acceding to this
Protocol, it shall enter into force six months after the
deposit by such Party of its instLument of ratification or
2
Does this mean that the state, or government, against which
a war of national liberation is being fought, cannot be bound by
the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I until it had acceded to
the Protocol ?
To Professor Dinstein of Tel—Aviv University the answer to
1 •
 CDDH/SR.59, para. 5.
2. Protocol I, Art. 95, para. 2.
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this question appears to be "yes" He says so in two slightly
different ways. Thus in an article published in 1975 (i.e. two
years after the adoption of Ilrticle 1 of Prd.tocol I by Committee
I of the Diplomatic Conference), he wrote:
"In recent years, Ifro—sian countries - bolstered by the
Eastern European bloc - have been pressing for a
automatic application of the laws of inter—state warfare
to "wars of liberation", i.e. wars of peoples under alien
domination for the implementation of their right of self—
determination. But, under existing international law, the
applicability of the laws of war to an internal conflict
- of whatever type - is determined not by the justice of
its cause, but by the fact of' recognition of' the rebels
as a belligerent party. It matters not If the rebels are
fighting for or against self—determination. Either way,
the laws of' warfare will be operative in relations between
the rebels and the Government only if the latter has
recognized the former as a belligerent party1
Iviuch has been said about this alleged rule of "existing
international law" in Chapters One and Two of this thesis. It
has been indicated there that such a rule has never been a rule
of customary international law and that even if it ever existed,
(and there is no evidence in the practice of states to suggest
that it ever did exist), it is no longer a rule of existing
international law. The alleged rule that the laws of warfare
become operative in the relations between the'rebels' and the
'government' only if' the latter had recognized the rebels as a
1. Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of' Civil Liars and Human
Rights, Israel Year Book on Human Rights, 1976, p. 75 - 77.
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b e lligerent power, had existence only in the minds of a minority
of writers. In theory, dependence of the applicability of the
laws of warfare to civil war upon recognition of belligerency
by the government engaged in civil war or by third states, was
a Iprogre55jve theory at a time when it was contended that
international law governs only the relations between states.
But it has never acquired the status of a customary rule of
international law. Indeed, such a theory was proposed at the
Geneva Diplomatic Conference of 1949 by one or two delegates,
but the Conference rejected it. Nevertheless, in legalliterature,
the alleged rule ofDinstein's 'existing' international law
survived as a Zombie, often resurrected to cloak with legal
texture, vindictiveness, depravation and depravity.
Dinstein's other argument is mare directly relevant to
our discussion. In an article published in 1979, he stated that
what paragraph 4 of Pirticle 1 of Protocol I purports to do is
to lay down an authoritative interpretation of P,rticle 2 common
to the four Geneva Conventions of' 1949 • But he described this
interpretation which has been accepted explicitly or implicitly
by all states except Israel, as being "as abitrary as it is
obligatory (for contracting parties of the Protocol)."1
In commenting on this view it should be remebered first
that the Protocol as a whole has been adopted within the
framework of' 'reaffirmation and development' of' existing
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts. In part, it
provides "a detailed elaboration of the basic rules of the
Hague Regulations, which has passed in to customary
1. Yoram Dintein, The New Geneva Protocols, Year Book of World
1ffairs, '979, p. 26b.
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while in another part "its provisions assert themselves
as the proper interpretation of' the Geneva Conventions." 2
 Indeed,
with few exceptions, such as the rules relating to 'civil
defence' 3 which are wholly new, it is arguable that there is
a presumption to the effect that the Protocol's provisions are
already binding on the parties to the Geneva Conventions of
194 g , either as elaborations of customary rules (and therefor
provide evidence on the content of such rules), or as
authoritative interpretation of conventional rules laid down
in the Geneva Conventions. Such a presumption does not conflict
with the requirements of accession and ratification, it simply
puts the onus of proof on the persons or party to the conflict
which contends that a certain rule is not binding.
In this respect it should be noted that Professor Dinstein
did not offer any explanation or produce any argument as to why,
in his view, crticle 1, paragraph 4, of Protocol I, which,
accarding to him, purports to lay down an authoritative
interpretation of rrt-Lcle 2 common to the Geneva Conventions
of 1949, can only bind tha Parties to the Protocol. 1rticle 2
common to the Geneva Conventions is binding on all the parties
to these Conventions, so why its authoritative interpretation
should not be binding even on those who had ppposed that
interpretation ? 1\uthorjtative interpretation is not an offer
to contract; it iS a determination of' the meaning of the text
so interpreted - a determination of the most persuasive
1. Israel in Lebanon - The Report of the International
Commission to enquire into reported violations of
International Law by Israel during its invasion of the
Lebanon. published by Ithaca Press, London, 1983, p. 28.
2. Loc. cit.
3. See flrticj.es 61 to 67 of' Protocol I.
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character which no court of law may conceivably ignore,
regardless of accession or ratification. It certainly binds the
parties to the treaty which explicitly or implicitly had
accepted the interpretation or at least estops them from
challenging that 'authoritative' interpretation. But would such
an interpretation bind or estop an objecting state ?
In raising this question one is not oblivious to the
distinction usually made between 'interpretation' and
'application' of treaties. 'Interpretation' is the process of
determining the meaning of the text, while 'application' is the
process of determining the consequences which, according to the
text, should follow in a given situation. 1 In the case of
\rticle 1, paragraph 4, of Protocol I, however, this distinction
seems merely technical. The question is simultaneously one of
interpretation as well as of application of the Geneva Conven-
tions to wars of national liberation. If, nevertheless, it was
advisable to keep this distinction, the above question may be
formulated as follows: what are the consequences of the
authoritiative interpretation of a multilateral treaty to an
objecting party ?
Neither the Jienna Convention on the law of treaties, nor
legal literature (to my knowledge) seem to give an explicit
answer to this question. But the common sense of law suggests
that authoritative interpretations must be considered as being
conclusive on the objecting state. Thus, as long as the state
which objects to rtible 1, paragraph 4, of Protocol I, remains
1. See Briggs, The Law of' Nations, 1952 (second edition), p.896;
Schwarzenberger, International Law and Order, 1971, p. 116.
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a party to the Geneva Conventions, it will be regarded by
other parties as being in violation of these Conventions.
Reservations and denunciation are the only possible means
by which an objecting state may protect itself against the
consequences of authoritative interpretations of a treaty. In
the case of Article 1, paragraph 4, of Protocol I, neither of
these options seems possible. Reservation is not possible because
it will be incompatible with the object and purpose of the
Geneva Conventions and Protocol 1.1 However, denunciation is
possible under the Geneva Conventions. But common Articles 63/
62/142/158 of the four Geneva Conventions respectively, restrict
the effects of denunciation. These Articles inter alia, provide
th t "a denunciation of which notification has been made at a
time when the denouncing Power is involved in a conflict (to
which the Conventions are applicable) shall not take effect
until peace has been concluded, and until after operations
connected with release, repatriation and re—establishment of the
persons protected by the present Convention(s) have been
Finally, it is probably worth emphasizing that Article 1,
paragraph 4, of Protocol I, has been presented by the vast
majority of states as being a codification of a customary rule,
or more precisely, a customary interpretation of an existing
rule. Initially, Western States opposed thi5 rule, but later on
they seem to have acquiesced in, as their vote on Article 1 of
Protocol 1 indicates. The only state which persisted in its
1. See Article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (1969), text in Brownlie (ed.), Basic Documents in
International Law, second edition, 1978, pp. 233 et seq.
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objection was Israel. In such a case, the question to be
asked is whether a state can prevent a rule of' customary
international law from becoming binding on it. !\ccording to Dr.
kehurst the answer appears to be yes, "provided that the state
opposes the rule in the early days of the rule's existence
(or formation) and maintains its opposition consistently
1
thereafter." But in a footnote to this statement he added:
result can be avoided if the 'new rule' can be presented
as an interpretation of and old rule which is binding on the
dissenting State." 2 In other words, opposing, and consistently
maintaining opposition to a new customary rule d-es not prevent
the new rule from becoming binding on the dissenting state, if
the new customary rule can be presented as an interpretation of
an old rule which i binding on the dissenting state. It seems
irrelevant whether the 'old rule' which is binding on the
dissenting state was of conventional or customary character. In
either case the 'new customary rule' would still be binding on
the dissenting state.
I\s a matter of fact, this is precisely the case of'
paragraph 4, of Irticle 1, of Protocol I. \s Professor !bi—Saab
stated with reference to the amendments which finally became
paragraph 4 of Irticle 1, of Protocol I.
"The position of the sponsors of the amendments was based
on the idea that there already exist a legal conviction
and international practice, hence a customary rule of
1 •
 I\kehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, The
British Year Book of International Law, 1974-75, p. 24. Dr.
1\kehurst probably had in mind a 'new rule' interpreting an
'old customary rule' which is binding on the dissenting state•
2. IbicL, p . 24, n.2.
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general international law to the effect that wars of
national liberation are of an international character."1
The summary records of the Diplomatic Conference provide
abundant evidence on the position of' the sponsors just stated.
Some of these statements may be quoted in evidence. Thus, in
introducing amendment CDDH/I/ 1l and Add. 1 to 3 on behalf of
its 15 sponsoring states, the Egyptian representative Professor
Abi—Saab said:
"Participants were thus not being asked to accept anything
new; it was merely proposed that they should affirm
explicitly in the field of' humanitarian law what they had
already accepted as binding law within the United Nations
2
and within General International Law."
With reference to the same amendment, the representative of
Yugoslavia said:
"The amendment contained nothing new; all it did was to
make explicit a rule which had developed over the past
quarter of a century and had now been generally accepted3
The representative of the German Democratic Republic, in
introducing his groups amendment, said:
"The new paragraph which the sponsors of amendment CDDH/I/5
and Add. 1 were proposing to add to Article 1 of draft
Protocol I embodied the principles of resolution 3103
(xxiIii) and was designed to codify international law
already in force."4
With regard to the same amendment the representative of the
1 •
 Abi—Saab, 165 Recueil des Cours, (1979—lU), p. 376.
2. Abi—Saab,(Egypt), CDDH/I/SR.2. para. 10.
3. Obradovic (Yugoslavia), CDDH/I/SR.2, para. 17
4. Graeftath (German Democratic Republic), CDDH/I/SR. 2, para. 38.
257
Soviet Union said:
"The sole object of the proposal was to embody in human-
itarian law a rule which was already in existence and
which took into account the realities of time."1
More conclusive of course, is the language of resolution
3103 (XXVIII) of 12 December, 1973, which was adopted by the
General i\ssembly of the United Nations by 3 votes in favour,
13 against, and 19 abstentions. It may be recalled that
operative paragraph 3 of this resolution, proclaims in the most
positive language, that:
"The armed conflicts involving the struggle of peoples
against colonial and alien domination and racist regimes
are to be regarded as international armed conflicts in
the sense of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the legal
status envisaged to apply to combatants in the 1949
Geneva Conventions and other international instruments
are to apply to the persons engaged in armed struggle
against colonial and alien domination and racist regimes."
It was this rule which paragraph 4 oP Rrticle 1 of Protocol
I was intended to codify. Clearly then, paragraph 4 was not a
new rule, but an authoritative interpretation of common article
2 of the Geneva Convention. It is also clear that this
interpretation was presented as a codification of a customary
rule. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, it must
be submitted that paragraph 4 of article I of Protocol 1
legally binding on dissenting states notwithstanding the
Protocol's provisions regarding accession and ratification.
1 •
 Boulanevkov (USSR), CDBH/I/SR.3, para. 4.
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6.	 The Locus Standi of Liberation 1ovements in International
Humanitarian Law
The international character of wars of national liberation
entails the application of international humanitarian law in
its entirety to these wars, but the legal basis of this
application vary according as to whether the rules of intern-.
ational humanitarian law were of customary or of a conventional
nature.
Rules of customary international law apply to wars of
national liberation de plein de droit. They are binding on the
parties to the conflict irrespective of any declaration of
consent to be so bound, and irrespective of the fact that the
customary rules have been laid down in conventions. In this
respect mention may be made of the Hague Regulations annexed
to the Fourth Hague Convention of' 1907 on the laws and customs
of War on Land. The wide—spread view on this Convention is that
it had already passed into customary international law. 1 The
classical evidence on the cutomary character of the rules laid
down in this Convention is the dictum of the Nuremberg
International Tribunal stating that:
"The rules of land warfare expressed in the Convention
undoubtedly represented an advance over the existing
international law at the time of its adoption •.. but by
1939 these rules laid down in the Convention were regarded
1. See for example, Abi—Saab, 165 Recueil des Cours (1979),
p . 399; Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, Documents on the
Laws of War, 1982, p. 44; Israel in Lebanon - The Report of
the International Commision to enquire into reported
violations of International Law by Israel during its invasion
of the Lebanon, published by Ithaca Press, 1982, p. 27.
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as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war."1
The situation with regard to the Geneva Conventions and
their additional Protocol I is, however, rather different.
1\lthough these Conventions are based on the principles of
customary international law, they are still summarily treated
as Conventions whose application to a certain armed conflict
requires the parties to the conflict to be also parties to these
Conventions. In other words, application of these and other
applicable conventions to wars of national liberation raises
the problem of the accession of liberation movements to these
Conventions, which is the main subject of this section.
It should be noted that the problem of the locus standi of
liberation movements in international humanitarian law is wider
than the problem of accession. It includes - in addition to the
problem of accession - two other problems raised at the Diplo-
matic Conference for the Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law Ppplicable in !\rmed Conflicts,
namely, the problem of the representation and participation of
liberation movements in the Diplomatic Conference, and the
problem of signing the Final P1ct of the Conference by liberation
movements. Both problems have already been discussed briefly in
this chapter, and it seems unnecessary to examine them in detail.2
1. Cited in Abi—Saab, op. cit. p. 441, n. 58.
2. See below, Section 3.1. of this chapter. For more details,
see Abi—Saab, 165 Recueil des Cours (1979_It)), pp. 403 - 405;
Baxter, Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian Politics? The
Harvard Law Journel, vol. 16, 1975, pp. 9_li; Kalshoven,
Reaffirmation and Development of' the International
Humanitarian Law 1oplicable in r%rmed Conflict, Netherland Year
Book of International Law, 1974, pp. 26-29. On the Controversy
over signing the Final ct of' the Diplomatic Conference by the
liberation movements which participated in the work of the
Conference, see CDDH/SR.59.
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Suffice it here to note that these two problems were not merely
procedural matters, but affirmations of the international
personality of liberation movements (or the peoples which they
represent), as well as of the legal equality of the parties to
the conflict as far as international humanitarian law is
concerned. This section, therefore, will concentrate on the
problem of the accession of liberation movements to the Geneva
Conventions and Protocol I.
6.1. f\ccession of Liberation Movements to the Geneva Conventions
and Protocol I: The Problem in General
The consent to be bound by a treaty may be expressed in
different ways. It may be expessed by signature, exchange of
instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance,
approval of accession, or by any other means if so agreed.1
Multilateral treaties normally provide for two of these
procedures, namely, ratification and accessi q n. The difference
between the two seems to be a matter of form rather than of'
substance. 2 However, it may generally be said that ratification
is the procedure open to the 'Power' which had already signed
the treaty, while accession is the proceedure open to the
'Power' which had not signed the treaty. This seems to be the
implication of the common P1rticle of the Gneva Conventions
regarding accession, which is quoted below.
1. See f^rticles 11 to 18 of the Jjenna Convention (1969) on the
Law of Treaties. Text in Brownlie, Basic Documents in
International Law, second edition, 197B, pp. 231 et seq.
2. See Abi—Saab, op. Cit. p . 400.
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The Geneva Conventions of 1949 provide for two kinds of'
accession. The first is full accession by virtue of common
1rticle 60/59/139/155, which provides:
"From the date of its coming into force, it shall be open
to any Power in whose name the present Convention has not
been signed, to accede to this Convention." (Emphasis
added)
The ot er is ad hoc accession or acceptance of the Convention
for the purposes of a given conflict by virtue of paragraph 3
of common I\rticle 2, which provides:
"Ptlthough one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party
to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties
t reto shall remain bound by it in their mutual
relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the
Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter
accepts and applies the provisions
(Emphasis added)
The main difficulty facing liberation movements in
resorting to either of these procedures is that the accession
has to emanate from a 'Power', a term which the colonial Powers
maintained referred only to 'states', and not to entities
other than 'states'. This matter has already been discussed
at length in a previous section in this Chapter. 1 The basic
thesis in that section was that the interpretation of common
Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions in the light of
international law as existed at the time of their adoption, as
well as in the light of the text of the Conventions, supports
1 See below, this Chapter, Section 4.2.1
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the thesis that the term 'Powers' in Article 2, paragraph 3,
common to the Geneva Conventions, includes, in addition to
states, entities other than states, that is to say, peoples
fighting against colonial and alien domination and racist
regimes, in the exercise of their right of self—determination.
That such peoples were	 within the meaning of the Geneva
Conventions, was implicit in the practice of the United Nations
since 1968, which culminated in the adoption of resolution 3103
(xxviii), of 12 December, 1973, and was finally laid down (also
implicitly) in Article1, paragraph 4, of °rotocol I, and finally,
in Article 96, paragraph 3, of Protocol I, which provides:
"The authority representing a people engaged against a
High Contracting Party in an armed conflict of the type
referred to in Article 1, paragraph 4, may undertake to
apply the Conventions and this Protocol in relation to
that conflict by means of a unilateral declaration
addressed to the depositary. Such declaration shall, upon
its receipt by the depositary, have in relation to that
conflict the following effects:
a) the Conventions and this Protocol are brought ioto force
for the said authority as a Party to the conflict with
immediate effect;
b) the said authority assumes the same rights and obliga-
tions as those which have been assumed by a High
Contracting Party to the Convotions and this Protocol;
and
c) the Conventions and this Protocol are equally binding
upon all Parties to the
Article 95 of Protocol I, as a whole, was adopted in
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plenary by an impressive majority verging on unanimity; only
Israel voted against the Article, while two other states
(Thailand and Spain) abstained. The result of the vote was 93
in favour, one against, and two abstentions. 1 It is probably
obvious from the text of Article 96, paragraph 3, that it was
heavily inspired by that of common Article 2, paragraph 3, of
the Geneva Conventions, in that it adopts the procedure of ad
hoc accession to the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I.
The effects of the unilateral declaration addressed to the
depository which are laid down in sub—paragraphs (a), (b), and
(c), are self—evident. Yet to remove any doubt about their
proper meaning, a few remarks may be necessary.
According to sub—paragraph (a) the Geneva Conventions of
1949 and Protocol I are brought into force for the liberation
movement as a Party to the conflict with immediate effect. The
'immediate effect' is not a concession to liberation movements;
it is in conformity with common Articles 61/60/140/157,
respectively, of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which provides:
"The situations provided for in Articles 2 and 3 shall
give immediate effect to ratifications deposited and
accessions notified by the Parties to the conflict before
or after the beginning of hostilities or occupation. The
Swiss Federal Council shall communicate by the quickest
method any ratifications or accessions received from
Parties to the conflict."
Nor indeed the method by which the Conventions and the
Protocol are brought into force for the liberation movement is
1 •
 CDDH/SR. 46, para. 75.
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new s
 Multilateral conventions are open conventions (to those
who are legally competent to become parties to them), and are
normally brought into force by means of a unilateral act.
Ratifications, notifications of accession and declarations are
unilateral acts under different names, or different forms of
unilateral acts, by which a 'Power' undertakes 'to respect and
ensure respect' for the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their
additional Protocol I 'in all circumstances" 1 , that is to say,
in all situations to which the Conventions are applicable.2
The last remark to be made with regard to sub—paragraph
(a) is that it should be read in the light of paragraph 1 of
Article 96, which provides: "When the Parties to the
Convention are also Parties to this Protocol, the Conventions
shall apply as supplemented by this Protocol." Conversely, when
the Parties to the conflict are only Parties to the Geneva
Conventions of 1 y 49, but are ndt Parties to the Protocol, only
the Geneva Conventions (and of cour5e rules of customary
international law as well) would be applicable. This is a rule
of simple legal logic, which, nevertheless, have been expressly
formulated in Article 30, paragraph 4(b) of the Vienna Convention
on the law of treaties, which provides:
"as between a State Party to both treaties and a State
Party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which
both states are Parties govern their mutual rights and
obligations."
The 'Powers' against which wars of national liberation are
fought are already Parties to the Geneva Conventions. This is
1.. Common article 1 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
Article 1, para. 1, of Protocol I.
2. ICRC Commentary on the Geneva Conventions, Pictet (ed.)
Third Conotion, p. 18; Fourth Convention, p. 16.
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probably why the converse of paragraph 1 of Article 96, of
Protocol I (quoted above) ha5 not been stated in the Article
itself. At any rate, sub—paragraph (b) of Article 96 of Protocol
I leads to the same result as it states:
"the said authority (i.e., the liberation movement) assumes
the same rights and obligations as those which have been
assumed by a High Contracting Party to the Conventions
and this Protocol."
In assuming the rights and obligations of' a High Contracting
Party, the liberation movement would be bound by the Geneva
Conventions if the adverse Party was also a Party to these
Conventions. It would also be bound by the Protocol if the
adverse Party was bound by it. But if the adverse Party was
neither a Party to the Conventions nor to the Protocol (as was
the case of Rhodesia - Zimbabwe), then only the rules of
customary international law would be applicable.
Sub—paragraph (c) which provides that the Geneva Conventions
and the Protocol "are equally binding upon all Parties to the
conflict" is a rather	 untraditional provision. CertainLy, it
does not mean that the declaration by a liberation movement to
be bound by the Protocol would ipso facto have the effect of
bringing the Protocol into force for the 'Power' against which
a war of liberation is fought. No notification of' accession by
whosoever could have that effect. Sub—paragraph (c) was probably
intended to assure the critics that the legitimacy of wars of'
national liberation and the justice of the cause for which a
liberation movement is fighting are without prejudice to the
'equally binding' character of the Geneva Conventions and the
Protocol upon all Parties to the conflict.
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In brief, the locus standi of the liberation movement in
international law is the same as that of a state, and the
effects of the declaration addressed by the liberation movement
to the depository are the same as in any notification of'
accession made by a state involvd in an international conflict.
The only difference between the notification of accession made
by a state and the declaration made by the liberation movement
is that the latter is ad hoc, not permanent accession.
But not every insurgent or revolutionary movement styling
itself a national liberation movement is legally competent to
undertake to apply the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I by
means of a declaration addressed to the depositary. \s if such
an undertaking is a 'privilege', certain conditions have to be
fulfilled before it can validly be made. Some of the conditions
to be fulfilled relate to the Parties to the conflict; others
relate to the conflict itself. But as the effect of such
conditions is to disqualify the liberation movement, If they
were not fulfilled, they may legitimately be discussed in
relation to the movement itself. These conditions are the
subject of the following section.
6.2. The Conditions for a ialid Pccession by Liberation
Movements
\rticle 96, paragraph 3, of Protocol I provides a direct
answer: "The authority representing a people engaged against a
High Contracting Party in an armed conflict of the type referred
to in \rticle 1, paragraph 4, may undertake to apply the
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Conventions and this Protocol in relation to that conflict by
means of a unilateral declaration addressed to the depositary."
This text disolves into three conditions: the first
relates to the 'authority' (i.e., the liberation movement) which
should be representing a people; the second relates to the
adversary against which the liberation movement or the people
it represents is engaged in armed conflict, which should be a
High Contracting Party; while the third condition relates to
the conflict itself - which should be of the type referred to
in Article 1., paragraph 4, of Protocol I.
Each of these conditions bears elaboration. Iloreover,
during the discussion, and after the adoption, of Article 1,
paragraph 4, other conditions have been proposed or expressed
in explanation of votes. One such condition related to the
'intensity' of the conflict, while another condition related
to the 'recognition' of the liberation movemnt. It is
necessary, therefore, to examine these 'other' conditions as
well, in order to determine whether they should be included
among the conditions which qualify a liberation movemnt to make
a valid "unilateral declaration addressed to the depositary".
Each of these conditions, be it actual or not, will be examined
in a separate sub—section.
6.2,1. The Condition that the Armed Conflict be of the Type
Referred to in Articl_e 1, Paragraph 4, of Protocol I
One of the conditions which a liberation movement has to
fulfil in order to be competent to make a valid, though
temporary, notification of accession to the Geneva Conventions
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and Protocol I by means of a unilateral declaration addressed
to the depository, is that it should be representing a people
engaged against a High Contracting Party "in an armed conflict
of' the type referred to in Article 1, paragraph 4", of Protocol
I. This paragraph states that armed conflicts of international
character in the meaning of Article 2 common to the Geneva
Conventions:
"... include armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting
against colonial domination and alien occupation and
against raci5t regimes in the exercise of' their right of'
self—determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the
United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of'
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Co—operation among States in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations."
Opinions differ on the material scope of this text. Writers
who directly or indirectly share the view of the Belgian
delegate to the Diplomatic Conference that "wars of liberation
were anachroisms which would soon be ended", tend to interpret
the provisions of Article 1, paragraph 4, restrictively and
bemoan in passing its narrowness,1
For example, Professor Schindler states with reference to
Article 1, paragraph 4, that:
"The term 'wars of liberation' is narrowed down in several
1 •
 E.g. 0. Schindler, Different Types of Armed Conflicts, 163
Recueil des Cours, (1979_TI), p. 137_139; Cassese, A
Tentative Appraisal of the Old and the New Humanitarian Law
of Armed Conflict, in Cassese (ed.), The Neu Humanitarian
Law of Armed Conflict, 1979, pp. 466-470; Charles Lysaght,
The Attitude of Western Countries, in Cassese (edj, ibid.,
p . 354.
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respects by this provision. In the first place, the wars
of liberation are confined to struggles against 'colonial
domination', 'alien occupation' and 'racist regimes'. ll
other kinds of wars of liberation are excluded, such as
wars of secession and struggles against oppressive regimes."1
Oddly enough, Professor Schindler finds support to this
'exclusion' in the reference in \rticle 1, paragraph 4, to
"the right of self—determination as enshrined in the
Charter of the United Nations end the Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Co—operation among States in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations."
This reference, according to Professor Schindler, is a "second
restriction, whose main effect is to confirm the first one"2,
quoted above. His argument runs as follows:
"... this Declaration states that the territorial integrity
and political unity of sovereign and independent States
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of
equal rights and self—determination of peoples may not be
dismembered or impaired. Wars of secession which are
fought beyond decolonisation, such as the wars of Biafra
1967-1970, of Bangladesh 1971, or the struggles in the
border regions of Ethiopia (Western Somalia—Ogaden, 1977_
1978, and Eritra, still going on at present), are
therefore, not considered wars of liberation according to
frticle 1 (4). The same holds true for struggles against
an oppresive regime which is not a racist regime or a
1. D 1 Schindler, op. cit., p. 137.
2. Loc. cit.
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regime of alien occupation•11
The strangeness of this analysis calls Par several remarks.
First, contrary to Professor Schindlers suggestion
colonial wars are not wars of secession, because, in the words
of the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co—operation among States in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations:
"The territory of the colony or other non—self—governing
territory has, under the Charter, a status separate and
distinct from the territory of the State administering it;
and such separate and distinct status under the Charter
shall exist untill the people of the colony or non—self-
governing territory have exercised their right of self—
determination in accordance with the Charter, and
particularly its purpose and principles."
Second, Professor Schindler invokes the so—called
"safeguarding clause" of the principle of self—determination to
justify the exclusion from the concept of' wars of' national
liberation 'wars of 5955jQfl and strugges against an
oppresive regime which is not a racist regime or a regime of
alien occupation'. The 'safeguarding cause , contrary to
Profe e'sor Schindler, does not support such a sweeping exclusion.
The so—called 'safeguarding clause' states as follows:
"Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
1 •
 Ibid., pp . 137-138.
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States conducting themselves in compliance with the
principle of equal rights and self—determination of
peoples as described above and thus posessed of a
government representing the whole people belonging to the
territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour."
This provision may exclude from the concept of wars of
national liberation 'some' but not 'all' wars of secession. In
other words, wars of secession which occur in independent states
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal
rights and self—determination, of peoples and are thus posessed
of a government representing the whole people belonging to the
territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour, may
be excluded from the concept of wars of national liberation for
the simple reason that they are not fought for self—determination.
But even if wars of secession were excluded from the
concept of wars of national liberation altogether, which is not
the case, it would still be impossible to exclude from the
concept of wars of national liberation armed conflicts waged
by peoples against their oppressive rulers. An oppressive regime,
by definition, does not conduct itself in compliance with the
principle of equal rights and self—determination of peoples. It
may be sufficient here to note that by virtue of the principle
of equal rights and self—determination of peoples "peoples have
the right freely to determine •.. their political status and to
pursue their economic, social and cultural advancement."
Iloreover, observance of human rights and fundemental freedoms
is a sine qua non of compliance with the principle of equal
rights and self—determination of peoples. Wars against
oppressive regimes, therefore, cannot be excluded from the
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concept of wars of national liberation.
Third in the light of the foregoing criticism, the dilema
of the restrictive approach to the concept of wars of national
liberation seems obvious: it either leads to a di5tortion of
the principle of self—determination, or leads to discrimination
between different forms of denial of self—determination. In
order to avoid such a distortion and discrimination, all armed
conflicts fought by peoples for their right of self—determination
must be considered wars of national liberation.
Indeed, Article 1, paragraph 4, of Protocol I, is not
averse to such a conclusion which may be arrived at by consider-
ing the enumeration "colonial domination and alien occuoation
and racism", as being examplary, not exhaustive enumeration of
cases of deni]. of self—determination, as did the Australian
delegation at the end of the First Session of the Diplomatic
Conference. The Australian delegation initially abstained when
Article 1 of Protocol I ua5 put to vote in Committee, because,
"it feared that the terms used in paragraph 4 might be too
restrictive and might exclude all other conflicts other than
those enumerated." 1 But at the end of the First Session of the
Diplomatic Conference in Plenary, the Pustralian representative
renewed his delegation's support to Article 1, because,
"After due consideration, his delegation had realised that
if paragraphs 3 and 4 were taken together and if the word
'include' in paragraph 4 was taken literally, the list
could be interpreted as not being exhaustive. On the
1. Cited in , Abi—Saab, 155 Recueil des Cours, (1979—lU), p.398;
and Cassese (ed.), The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict,
1979, p. 468. n. 13.
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basis of that interpretation, his delegation supported
the text of rticle
I\s a matter of fact, the narrow concept of wars of national
liberation is not so much a result of the wording of' rticle 1,
paragraph 4, as of the tendency to confine that wording to the
actual cases of the peoples which were represented at the
Diplomatic Conference by their liberation and of the tendency
to confine the concept of wars of national liberation to the
colonial context. \s Professor bi—Saab explains with regard to
the formula 'colonial and alien domination against racist regimes'
which has been used in United Nations resolutions:
"proceeding from thr hard—core case of classical colonial
rule, the concept of colonialism was refined and extended
within the United Nations to include other varieties of
colonization producing the same result of denialof
self—determination to whole peoples, which have been
designated as alien domination and racist regimes. In fact,
both partake of' the same phenomenon of "colonies of
settlement", which are generally designated as "alien
domination" and of' which "racist regimes" are a species
or a special case"2
Elaborating on the concept of 'alien domination' and
'racist regimes' in the colonial context, Professor Abi—Saab
says:
"It is not the mere act of a group of people emigrating
and settling in another country which constitutes the
'alien domination'; but it becomes so when the colonies
1. Loc. cit.
2. Abi—Saab, 165, Recueil des Cours, ( 1y 79_IJ), p. 394.
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of settlement are established to the detriment of the
local populations, i.e., when the settlers, while severing
their formal ties with their mother countries, exercise a
colonial policy vis—a—vis these populations which denies
them their right to self—determination; and this either by
chasing them out of their territory, or by regrouping them
against their will in certain areas, prohibiting them from
others, appropriating communal and private lands, etc., or
in more general terms, by subjecting the local population
to an alien rule which denies them basic rights and equal
treatment.
/s the systemic discrimination by the settlers against
local populations, which characterizes 'alien domination',
is invariably based on the different 'origins' of the two
human groups, it constitutes by definition a 'racist
regime', whatever the criterion used to identify these
different origins, e.g., race, religion, etc. (Though the
term 'racist regime' is more particularly used to denote
cases where race is the exclusive criterion.)"1
The change in the term of reference from 'colonial and alien
domination and racist regimes' to 'colonial domination and alien
occupation and racist regimes', which was done at the request
of Latin I\merican countries, did not mean a change of substance,
according to Professor i\bi—Saab.
"Their objection was not to the inclusion ol the phenomenon
of 'colonies of settlement' in the category of situations
which can give rise to wars of national liberation, but
1	 Ibid., p. 394.
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to the words as such; and this For reasons which are
particular to the Latin 1merican context. It was to
exclude any possible interpretation (of article 1,
paragraph 4) by dissident movements that certain
governments are under 'foreign domination', hence armed
insurrection against them constituted wars of national
liberation.
But whether or not the change in terminology meant a change
of substance, the fact remains that the above analysis would
still confine the concept of wars of national liberation to
the context of decolonization. Indeed, If the formula 'colonial
and alien domination and racist regimes' which was used in
United Nations resolutions, and the formula 'colonial and alien
domination and racist regimes' which has been used in Prticle
1, paragraph 4, of Protocol I, were identical in substance,
their interpretation in the light of the practice of the United
Nations and of the actual cases of the liberation movements
which participated in the work of the Diplomatic Conference
would hardly take us beyond the colonial context. But such an
interpretation, as noted above, would lead to a distortion of
the right of self—determination as well as to discrimination
between different forms of denial of self—determination.
To be sure, there is no conclusive evidence that either
the United Nations or the Diplomatic Conference had intended
to confine the concept of wars of' national liberation to the
context of decolonization. The fact about article 1, paragraph
1 •
 Ibid., p. 395.
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4, is that it left the concept of wars of' national liberation
'open ended'. The most assured thing about the formulae
'colonial and alien domination and racist regimes', and
'colonial domination and alien occupation and racist regimes',
is that they were intended in the first place to cover the cases
of liberation movements which were fighting against such regimes,
and which were in fact invited to participate in the work of the
Diplomatic Conference as representatives of' their peoples.
Beyond those actual cases the question is one of interpretation.
Thus, the term 'colonial domination' may be interpreted as
covering cases of 'political' as well as 'economic' alien or
foreign domination. But such an interpretation would only
intensify ideological conflict5. Moreover, the fact that the
terms 'colonial and alien domination' had been replaced by the
terms coonja domination and alien occupation' with a view to
exclude any interpretation by dissident movements that certain
governments are under foreign domination' and therefore armed
insurrection against them constituted wars of national libera-
tion, seems to exclude the possibility of extending the concept
of wars of national liberation beyond the 'political'
decolonization.
On the other hand it is wrong to confine the term 'alien
occupations to belligerent occupation. 1 The reference to 'alien
1. Baxter, The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Wars of National
Liberation, in Rivista di Diritto Internazionale, 1974, pp.
194_195; and Cassese, A Tentative Appraisal of' the Old and
the New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, in Cassese (ed.),
The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, 1 979, p. 468,
speaks only of belligerent occupation. Baxter, bc. cit.,
even introduces a distinction between 'lawful' and 'unlawful'
occupation, a distinction which is irrelevant for the appli-
cation of the Geneva Conventions, since in either case the
Conventions are applicable.
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occupations would not have been necessary if only belligerent
occupation was envisaged. 1 It would not have been necessary
because belligerent occupation, whether it was the result of a
'lawful' or 'unlawful' use of force, is expressly covered by
Article 2, paragraph 2, common to the Geneva Conventions, which
provides:
"The Conventions shall also apply to all cases of partial
or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting
Party, even if the said occupation meets with armed
resistance."
The provision on 'alien occupation', says Professor
Schindler, "will mainly cover cases in which it is not clear or
controversial whether they fall under 1rticle 2 (2) of the
Convertions, such as the case of Namibia, the case of Western
Sahara which, after its release from Spanish rule in 1976, was
divided between Florroco and Mauritania, the case of a State
which uses its troops stationed in another State with the
permission of that State, to gain power therein, or the case of
those parts of Palestine which are not under belligerent
occupation of Israel, but form part of the State of Israel."2
The case of a state which uses its troops stationed in
another state with the permission of that state, to gain power
therein, was probably mentioned to illustrate that "the connec-
tiOn" of the concept of wars of national liberation "with
decolonization does not necessarily hold good for the term
"alien occupationI•3 Professor Schindler probably had in mind
l .D.Schindler, 163 Recueil des Cours, ( 1 979_Il), p. 138; Abi-
Saab, 155 Recueil des Cours, (1979_IV), p. 395.
2. Schindler, op. cit., p. 138.
3. Loc. cit.
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the cases of Soviet intervention in Hungary (1956) and
Czechoslovakia (1968). These, however, are special cases of the
so—called'intervention by jvjtatjofl, and a part of' a wider
subject which is the impact of 'foreign state aid' on the
applicable international humanitarian law. In this respect, it
is useful to recall that in 1971 the ICRC submitted the following
proposal to the Conference of Government Experts:
"When, in case of non—international armed conflict, one
or the other Party, or both, benefit from the assistance
of operational armed forces afforded by a third State,
the Parties to the conflict shall apply the whole of the
international humanitarian applicable in international
armed conflict.
The Conference of Government Experts examined this proposal
at length, but it did not endorse it. The subject was not raised
again at the Diplomatic Conference. Therefore, it cannot be
said that foreign aid in troops, whether the troops were
stationed in a state with its permission, or were invited in,
were cases of alien occupation in the sense of Prticle 1,
paragraph 4.
Perhaps, beside the reference to self—determination in
P1rticle 1, paragraph 4, the only term which may extend the
concept of wars of national liberation beyond the colonial
context is the reference to 'racist regimes'. \ racist regime
is by definition a regime which practices racial discrimination.
In the "International Convention on the Elimination of ll
1, ICRC Report on the Work of the Conference of Government
Experts, First Session, 1971, pp. 50-52.
279
Forms of Racial Discrimination" 1 , adopted by the U.N. General
fssembly as annex to resolution 2106 (xx) on 21 Decembeç 1965,
the term "racial dscrimination" means 'any distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour,
descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or
exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundemental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any
other field of Public Life."2
The Convention entered into force on 4 January, 1969, by
31 December, 1977, it was ratified or acceded to by 97 states
and 13 other signatures. 3 The definition of 'racial discrimin-
ation' may therefore be considered as being generally accepted.
Consequently, any government or state practicing such 'racial
discrimination' is by definition a racist regime, and the group
of human beings or the 'people' engaged in armed conflict against
such a regime would be fighting in the exercise of its right of
self—determination, and therefore, would be engaged in a war of
national liberation.
This interpretation of the term 'racist regimes' would
carry the concept of wars of national liberation beyond the
process of decolonization, and would bring us very close to the
spirit of the principle of equal rights and self—determination
of peoples as elaborated in the Declaration on Principles of
1. Text in Brounlie (edj, Basic Documents in International Law,
second edition, 1978, pp. 191 et seq.
2 P,rticle 1, paragraph 1
3. United Nations Iction in the Field of Human Rights, United
Nations Publications, New York, 1980, Sales No. E. 79. XIV6,
p . 49. On lleasures' taken by the United Nations for the
elimination of racial discrimination, see ibid., pp. 45-94.
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International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co—operation
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
6.2.2.	 Intensity of the Armed Conflict
Another question relating to the armed conflict is whether
it sh uld reach a certain level of' intensity before the libera-.
tion movement can make a valid declaration in accordance with
paragraph 3 of Article 96 of Protocol I. The Australian and
British delegations thought that it should. Thus, explaining its
affirmative vote on Article 1 of Protocol I, the Australian
delegation stated that:
"In supporting Article 1 as a whole, Australia understands
that Protocol I will apply in relation to armed conflicts
1
which have a high level of intensity."
The British delegation was even more explicit; at the time
of signature it declared that it signed Protocol I on the basis
of the following understanding:
a) in relation to Article 1, that the term 'armed conflict'
of itself and in its context implies a certain level of
intensity of military operations which must be present
before the Conventions or the Protocol are to apply to
any given situations, and that this level of intensity
cannot be less than that required for the application
of Protocol II,
	
y virtue of' Article 1 of that Protocol,
to internal conflict."2
1	 CODH/SR. 36. (Annex).
2. Roberts and Guelff, Documents on the LaLEof War 1982, p.
461 - 62.
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h) in relation to paragrph 3 of Article 96, that only a
declaration made by an authority which genuinely fulfils
the criteria of paragraph 4 of Article 1 can have the
effects stated in paragraph 3 of Article 96, ..."
Thus, according to the British statement of understanding
the liberation movement should be in control of' a part of its
national territory and should be able to carry out 'sustained
and concerted' military operations, i.e. conventional warfare.
Liberation movements carrying out a guerrilla warfare would not,
according to the British view, be qualified to make a valid
declaration and thus bring the Geneva Conventions and the Protocol
into force.
In commenting on this view it should be noted first that
Britain was in a minority of one in this understanding. It was
not supported even by Britain's closest all>' - the United States
of' America. Indeed, as Mr. Aldrich, head of' the American dele-
gation to the Diplomatic Conference had noted at a panel of the
American Society of International Law:
"the British statement had caused the U.S. Government some
concern because of the implication that a rather quick or
low—level conflict, which was clearly an international
armed conflict, might not be covered. It had in mind
incidents such as the 1968 seizure of the Pueblo (an
American navy vessel) in which it would want to assert
that the protections of Protocol I applied and feared that
wish might be put in question by the British statement."2
1 •
 Ibid., p. 462.
2. Proceedings of the American Society of International Law,
1980, p. 207.
2B2
Among international lawyers, Professor Draper seems to be
the only one to support the British statement, and that was
probably because he was a member of the British delegatiin to
the Diplomatic Conference, but probably more so because of his
strong dislike (to put it mildly) of liberation movements and
to guerrilla warfare in general. 1
 However, Professor Draper
contends that nothing in the Protocols repudiates the British
interpretation. 2 He was wrong; there are many provisions in the
Geneva Conventions and the Protocols which explicitly repudiate
the British interpretation.
First of all, it should be noted that neither the text of
Article 1, paragraph 4, nor the text of Article 96, paragraph
3, nor their legislative history, nor indeed any provision of
the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I, whether implicitly or
explicitly, seem to require any degree of intensity in the armed
conflict for the application of the Geneva Conventions and
Protocol I. The correct analogy, if one is needed, cannot be
on Article 1 of Protocol II which is concerned with armed
conflicts of non—international character, but on similar
situations in the context of armed conflicts of international
character, i.e. governments in exile and resistance movements
in occupied territory. Since the adoption of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, no one has ever suggested that a government
in exile or a resistance movement in occupied territory should
be in control of' a part of its territory before the Geneva
Conventions and Protocol I become applicable to it. Liberation
1. See for example, Draper, Wars of National Liberation and War
Criminality, in Michael Howard (ed.), Restraints on 1Jar,
Oxford University Press, 1979, pp. 135 et seq.
2. Ibid., p. 150.
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movements are in the same situation as governments in exile and
resistance movements.1
Second,since 1968, the General Assembly of the United
Nations in numerous resolutions has been demanding the
application of the Geneva Conventions to armed conflicts in
which peoples are fighting against colonial and alien domination
and racism, without the condition of intensity and regardless of
the intensity of the armed conflict.2
Third,the 'beginning and end' of the application of the
Geneva Conventions and Protocol I are specified in these
Conventions and are not open to misinterpretation. Some of these
provisions may be quoted in evidence.
Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention relative to the
treatment of prisoners of war is entitled "Beginning and End of
Application." It provides in paragraph 1 that:
prBsent Convention shall apply to the persons referred
to in Article 4 from the time they fall into the power
of the enem and until their final release and repatria-
tion" (emphasis added)
Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the
protection of civilians in time of armed conflict is even more
explicit; its first paragraph provides:
"The present Convention shall apply from the outset of' any
conflict or occupation mentioned in Article 2."
(emphasis added).
The ICRC Commentary on this provision is even more
revealing. It says:
1. See Abi—Saab, 165 Recuuil des Cours, (1979_lU), pp. 412-415
2. See D.Schindler, 163 Recueil ds Cours, (1979_Il), pp. 13g_14o.
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"The words 'any con f'lict' may mean declared war or any
other armed conflict covered by Article 2. By using
the words 'from the outset' the authors of the
Convention wished to show that it became applicable as
soon as the first acts of violence were committed, even
if the armed struggle did not continue. Nor is it
necessary for there to have been many victims. (Viere
frontier incidents may make the Convention applicable,
for they may be the begining of a more widespread
1cofct•I
These comments were made long before Protocol I came
into being, but since wars of national liberation are now
covered by Article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions, these
comments apply to such wars.
Finally, Article 3 of Protocol I, which is also entitled
"Beginning and End of Application" provides:
"Without prejudice to the provisions which are
applicable at all times:
a) The Conventions and this Protocol shall apply from
the beginning of any situations referred to in
Article 1 of this Protocol."
In all these provisions it is expressly stated that the
Geneva Conventions and Protocol I apply from the 'beginning' of
an armed conflict of international character. It is also obvious
that no degree of intensity whatsoever has been required. Indeed,
it would be absolutely absurd to suggest, let apart to state,
that a war of liberation begins when a part of the national
territory has already been liberated. The concept of armed
1 •
 Pictet (ed.), Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention of
1949, Geneva, ICRC, 1958, p. 59.
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conflict, as far as armed conflicts of international character,
including wars of national liberation, are concerned, is used
and understood in the literal meaning of armed conflict, j•e•
fighting.
Cynics might argue that in such a case any band of
criminals might style themselves a 'liberation movement' and
claim the benefits of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I. To
such cynicism Irticle 43 of Protocol I provides the answer by
defining the "armed forces of a Party to the conflict." !\rticle
43, paragraph 1 states:
armed forces of a Party to the conflict consist of
all organized armed forces, groups and units which are
under a command responsible to that Party for the
conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is
represented by a government or an authority not
recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall
be subject to an internal disciplinary system which,
inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict."
This provision clearly shows that application of the
Geneva Conventions and Protocol I is a function, not of
recognition or intensity of military operations, but of'
organization and discipline and above all, the political will
to respect and ensure respect of these Conventions.
In conclusion, it may confidently be stated that no
degree of intensity whatsoever is a prerequisite for making a
declaration in accordance with Article 96, paragraph 3, of
Protocol I, nor the validity of the declaration to produce the
effects stated in that paragraph is dependent on any degree of
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the intensity of the military operation. As the provisions
quoted above expressly state, the Geneva Conventions and Prot-
ocol I apply to wars of national liberation as defined in
Article 1, paragraph 4, from the beginning of the armed
conflict, i.e., from the beginning of the fighting or the armed
hostilities, as any interstate armed conflict.
6.2.3. The Claim that a Declaration by a Liberation Movement
can only be made if the Adversary was a Party to
Protocol I.
The first sentence of paragraph 3 of Article 96 of
Prtocoj. I declares that:
"The authority representing a people engaged against a
High Contracting Party in an armed conflict of the type
referred to in Aticle 1, paragraph 4, may undertake to
apply the Conventions and this Protocol by means of a
unilateral declaration addressed to the depository."
In his lectures at the Hague Academy of International
Law, Professor Schindler misconstrued this statement when he
commented by saying:
"A declaration according to Article 96 can only be issued
if a people is involved in a war of liberation against a
High Contracting Party. This provision will greatly
restrict the applicability of Protocol I to wars of
liberation since one cannot expect that such countries
as South Africa or Israel, against which wars of libera-
tion are fought, will become contracting parties to the
Protocol, Probably none of the recognized liberation
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movements of today will ever be able to make a
declaration according to i%rticle 96 of Protocol 1.1,1
This clearly indicates that in Professor Schindler's view
a liberation movement can only make a declaration of accession to
the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I if the Party against which
a war of liberation is fought was a Party to Protocol I.
The implication of this view make it absurd indeed. The
primary purpose, if not indeed the sole purpose, of paragraph
3 of P,rticle 96 of Protocol I was to ensure at least the
protection of the Geneva Conventions to "liberation movements
of today." It was those cases which engaged the United Nations
from 1968. !\nd although textually, the words "against a High
Contracting Party" may be construed as excluding the former
liberation movements in Rhodesia (now independent Zimbabwe),
there is no evidence to suggest that such a case was intended to
be excluded. In fact, the General Issembly of the United Nations
had repeatedly called upon the United Kingdom as the administer-
ing Power responsible for Rhodesia to ensure the application of
the Geneva Conventions to that conflict and to quell the
rebellion of' the racist white minority which unilaterally
2declared the independence of Rhodesia in 1965.
1. D.Schindler, 163 Recueil des Cours, (1979—Il), p . 141.
2. For example, in resolution 2508 (xxiti) of 21 November, 1969,
on the question of Rhodesia, the General P1ssembly of the
United Nations, inter alia, "calls upon the Government of the
United Kingdom, in view of the armed conflict in that
territory and the inhuman treatment of prisoners, to ensure
the application to that situation of the Geneva Convention
relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War and of the
Geneva Convention relative to the protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of Liar, both dated 12 1%ugust 1949." For a
summary of United Nations Pction with respect to Southern
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), see "United Nations Action in the Field
of Human Rights", New York, 1980, United Nations Publications,
sales No. E79.XItJ.6, pp . 34 - 38.
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in view of these facts one is inclined to think of the words
"against a High Contracting Party" as being either a reminder of
the contractual character of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol
I; or as being merely a drafting oversight, which is more likely.
At any rate, the drafting history of paragraph 3 of Article
96 of Protocol I, its declared purpose, and its text, do not
support Professor Schindler's view quoted above.
With regard to its drafting history, it should be noted
that ArtIcle 96, paragraph 3, was drafted after prolonged
negotiations conducted by an informal working group comprising
representatives of various geographical regions and political
persuasions, as well as representatives of liberation movements.1
One therefore cannot realistically expect the supporters of
liberation movements and the liberation movements themselves to
participate in a working group negotiating a text that would
have the effect of making the application of the Conventions
and/or the Protocol dependent on the will of the Party to the
conflict against which a war of liberation is fought.
The declared purpose of paragraph 3 of Article 96, of
Protocol I, "was to establish a procedure whereby national
liberation movements would have the same rights and obligations
as the High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions of
1949 and to Protocol i." 2 This clearly indicates that the
liberation movement can make a declaration in accordance with
Article 96, paragraph 3, if the other Party to the conflict
1. See the speech of' mr. Longva (Norway), introducing the
amendment containing the text of Article 96, paragraph 3, on
behalf of its 35 sponsoring states, CODH/I/SR,67, pare. 56 -
61, para. 61.
2. Ibid., COOH/I/SR.67, para. 57.
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against which a war of' liberation is fought was a Party to the
Geneva Conventions. To suggest, as Professor Schindler has done,
that the liberation movement can only make a declaration if the
adversary was a party to Protocol I amounts to saying that the
Geneva Conventions do not apply to wars of national liberation
independently of Protocol I, which is absurd. It is worth
recalling in this respect that from the moment the depositary to
the Geneva Conventions receives the declaration, the liberation
movment "assumes the same rights and obligations as those which
have been assumed by a High Contracting Party to the Geneva
Conventions and this Protocol." 1 This means that if' the adverse
Party was a Party to the Geneva Conventions the liberation
movement becomes bound by these Conventions; if the adverse Party
was also a Party to the Protocol then the Geneva Conventions and
the Protocol become binding on the liberation movement.
Indeed, a liberation movement may still make a valid
declaration even if the adverse Party was neither a Party to the
Geneva Conventions nor to the Protocol, and consequently assumes
the same rights and obligations as those which have been assumed
by a High Contracting Party to the Geneva Conventions and to
Protocol I. These are open Conventions and the declaration by a
liberation movement is merely an expression of the will to be
bound by them and such a declaration cannot be made subject to
the will of the other party to the conflict against which a war
of liberation is fought. The claim made by Professor Schindler,
that the declaration by a liberation movement can only be made
if the other Party to the conflict was a Party to Protocol I is
1. ArtIcle 95, para. 3(b).
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absolutely unfounded. It is not suprising therefore that
Professor Schindler seems to be in a minority of one in this
respect. The phrase "against a High Contracting Party", on which
he based his argument may indeed be ignored altogether without
loss of either form or substance. It is redundant. Indeed, the
whole of this sub—section would not have been necessary if it
were not for his remarks made at the beginning of this discussion.
6.2.4. Should the Liberation F1ovement be Recognized ?
Should the liberation movement be recognized in order to
make a declaration of accession to the Geneva Conventions and
Protocol I; in the case of an affirmative answer, by who ?
The first case that comes to mind is the recognition of
the liberation movement by the regional intergovernmental
organization. After all, this was the basis of the invitation
of liberation movements to the Diplomatic Conference. Thus, in
resolution 3102 (XXviiI) of 12 December 1973, the General
Assembly of the United Nations:
"Urge(d) that the national liberation movements recognized
by the various regional international organizations con-
cerned be invited to participate in the Diplomatic
Conference as observers In accordance with the practice of
the United Nations."
Acting on this recommendation, but after a long controversy, the
Diplomatic Conference adopted by consensus a resolution by which,
inter alia, it decided "to invite the national liberation
movements, which are reognized by the regional intergovernmental
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organizations concerned, to participate fully in the
deliberations of the Conference and its ham Committees," on the
understanding that only delegations representing States were
entitled to vote,1
However, neither Article 1, paragraph 4, nor Article 96,
paragraph 3, require that the liberation movement be recognized
by the intergovernmental regional oganization concerned. Could
it be assumed nevertheless, that in the light of precedents
of the initiation and participation in the work of the Diplomatic
Conference and in the light of the practice of the United Nations
in matters of invitations and the grant of observer status to
2liberation movements in United Nations Organizations, that
recognition of the liberation movement by the regional inter-
governmental organization was taken for granted as a condition?
The answer is probably negative. According to Professor
Abi—Saab, the attempt to impose the condition of recognition by
the regional intergovernmental organization concerned, did not
succeed in the Conference and cannot be read in the language of
Article 96 as it stands.3
In this respect it is worth recalling that in the course of
the debate on the amendments to draft Article 1 of Protocol I,
Turkey proposed an amendment which explicitly made the
application of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I to wars of'
national liberation conditional to the recognition of' the
liberation movement by the regional intergovernmental organization
1. For the complete text of the resolution, see Abi—Saab, 165
Recueil des Cours (1879—IV), p. 405.
2. See for example resolution 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974,
by which the General Assembly of the United Nations granted
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 'observer status'
in the Assembly, and the resolution cited therein.
3. Abi—Saab, 165 Recueil des Cour5, (1979_ni), p. 408.
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concerned. 1 The amendment, however, was not followed through,
but the condition of recognition found expression in some
interpretations and explanations of votes. Thus upon signing
the Protocol, the United Kingdom stated with regard to Article
96, paragraph 3, that "in light of the negotiating history,
it is to be regarded as necessary also that the authority
concerned be recognized as such by the appropriate regional
intergovernmental organization. ,,2
The delegation of Turkey, as might be expected, reiterated
its position in the explanation of' vote on Article 1 of
Protocol I. It stated that the Article "applied to armed
conflicts recognized by regional intergovernmental organizations
such as the League of Arab States or the Organization of
3
African Unity, which were universally and widely accepted."
The delegation of Indonesia seems to have had no trouble
with the question of recognition. In its view, "the liberation
movements referred to in paragraph 4 of' Article 1 are limited
only to those liberation movements which have already been
recognized by the respective regional intergovernmental
organization concerned, such as the Organization of African
Unity and the League of Arab States. ' This is indeed too
restrictive.
1. See Amendment CDDH/I/42.
2. Reproduced in Adam Roberts and Richard Ouelf (ed.),
Documents on the Laws of War, 1982, p. 462.
3. Toperi (Turkey), CDDH/SR. 36, para. 121.
4. CDDH/SR. 36, (Annex.).
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However, the delegations of the United Kingdom, Turkey
and Indonesia, seem to have been the only delegations to raise
the question of recognition. On the other hand, no delegation
expressly stated that recognition by the regional intergovern-
mental organization concerned, was not a prerequisite. But since
neither the text of Article 1, paragraph 4, nor the text of
Article 96, require any sort of recognition, one may hold with
Professor Abi—Saab and Professor Schindler, that recognition of
the liberation movement by the regional intergovernmental
organization is not necessary and that such a condition cannot
be read in the text of Article 1, paragraph 4, and Article 96,
paragraph 3•1 In other words, it may be assumed that the Confer-
ence had not wished to make the application of the Geneva
Conventions and Protocol I subject to any sort of recognition,
whether collective or individual.
This is in fact more in keeping with the policy adopted
since 1949 to rid the law of armed conflict from the requirement
of recognition, particularly recognition by the adversary. It is
to this problem that
	
we now turn our attention.
Recognition of the liberation movement by the adversary
usually arises in the context of the prisoner of war status. The
Third Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners
of war, as well as Protocol I, make it clear that application of
these Conventions to members of liberation movements is not
subject to recognition of the liberation movement as a state, a
government, a belligerent Power or authority, by the adverse
party to the conflict. Thus, Artiôle 4 of the Third Geneva
1, Abi—Saab, 165 Recueil des Cours, (1979—IV) p. 408; 0.
Schindler, 163 Recueil des Cours, (1979-115, p. 142.
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Convention states that it applies to "('lembers of regular armed
forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority
1
not recognized by the adverse Detaining Power." The same of
course applies to the members of militias and volunteer corps
belonging to the liberation movement provided they fulfil the
four conditions - that of being commanded by a person responsible
for his subordinates; that of having a fixed distinctive sign
recognizable at a distance; that of carrying arms openly; and
that of' conducting their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war.2
Protocol I is even more explicit. Article 43, paragraph 1,
of Protocol I states that:
"The armed forces of a Party to the conflict consist of all
organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a
command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its
subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a
government or an authority not recognized by an adverse
Party.
Paragraph 2 of Article 43, states that members of the armed
forces of a Party to the conflict (other than medical personnel
and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Geneva Conven-
tion) are combatants, that is to say, they have a right to
participate directly in hostilities. And Article 44, paragraph
1, of Protocol I, states that "Any combatant, as defined in
Article 43, who falls into the power of an adverse Party shall
be a prisoner of war."
1. Article 4 (A) (3) of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949.
2. Article 4 (A) (2) of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949.
3. Emphasis added.
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Thus it is made perfectly clear that the Geneva Conventions
and Protocol I are applicable regardless of whether the Parties
to the conflict recognize each other or not. In other words, non-
recognition of the liberation movement by the adversary is no
justification for the denial of the protection afforded by the
Geneva Conventions and Protocol I to the people fighting a war
of national liberation and to its liberation movement.
6.2.5. The Liberation Plovement should Represent.a People.
Since the liberation movement prosecutes the war of national
liberation in the name of the people, it seems logical to require
that it be representative of the people. But how can the
representative character of the liberation movement be ascert—'
ajned ?
Of course it would be unrealistic to require the liberation
movement to produce formal evidence of its representation; a
formal evidence, for example, by democratic methods, requires
the co—operation of the very Party to the conflict against which
the war of liberation is fought. As such co—operation is
impossible even to envisage, one has to be contented by informal
means, such as the mobilization of the people to demonstrate in
support of the struggle waged by the liberation movement, the
response to calls for strikes and material support to the
liberation movement. In general, all forms of active and passive
resistance by the people constitute evidence of support to the
liberation movement and hence testify to the representative
character of the liberation movement.
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Recognition by other states of the liberation movement or
recognition by intergovernmental organizations also provide
evidence on the representative character of the liberation
movement, although, as stated earlier, such recognition is not
a prerequisite for the issue of a declaration in accordance with
Article 96, paragraph 3, of Protocol I.
Iloreover, the very fact of the forcible denial of the right
of self—determination, and in general, the repressive policies
of the Party against which a war of' liberation is fought should
be considered as the best evidence on the representative
character of the liberation movement. After all, the war of
liberation is a means to an end; which is the exercise of the
right to self—determination. Therefore, in this writer's view,
the representative character of the liberation movement should
be presumed. It is a presumption that can only be rebutted by
allowing the people to exercise freely its right to self—
determination. This, it is submitted, is the better solution
from a humanitarian point of view• For what is at stake is the
application of' international humanitarian law and the protection
which it provides to the civilian population and combatants. To
deny such protection on the pretext that the liberation movement
is unrepresentative is to add another injustice to the denial of
the right of self—determination.
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1	 The Principle of Distinction
All humanitarian international law - whether customary
or conventional - is largely based on a basic distinction
between combatants and non—combatants and between civilian
and military objects.
As a rule combatants and military objects constitute
military objectives, that is to say, it is permissable to
attack.
This rule was included in one of the earliest
multilateral conventions on the conduct of hostilities, namely
the Declaration of St. Petersburgh of 1868.1 In uncompromising
terms the Declaration lays down that "the only legitimate
object which States should endevour to accomplish during war
is to weaken the military forces of' the enemy," and that for
this purpose, "it is sufficient to disable the greatest
possible number of (armed) men."
The Declaration goes on to state that the object of war,
which is the weakening of the military forces of the enemy,
"would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly
aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their
death inevitable," and that "the employment of such arms would,
therefore, be contrary to the laws of humanity."
It should be noted that the Declaration of St. Petersburg
was not formulated by sentimentalists but by military
strategists who were quite aware of' the fact that "war is a
mere continuation of policy by other means." The Declaration,
1. See text in: Friedman, The Law of War, A Documentary
History, Vol. 1, 1972, pp 192193; Roberts and Guelf,
Documents on the Laws of' War, 1982, pp. 30-31.
therefore, reflected the political philosophy of 19th Century
military strategists.
Apparently, with an eye on the principles embodied in
the Declaration of St. Petersburg, the British Manual of
Military Law (1958), remarks that:
"Before the First World War the tendency was to regard
hostilities as being restricted to the armed forces of'
the belligerents, and to differentiate between them and
the ordinary citizens of the contending States who did
not take up arms. As the result, however, of' the practice
followed by the belligerents in the two world wars, it
is no longer possible to say that international law
protects the civilian population from injury which is
incidental to attack upon legitimate military objectives."1
Each of these two statements calls for comment • The
first statement in this quotation regarding the tendency to
regard hostilities as being restricted to the armed forces of
the belligerents is only true as far as the military strategy
was concerned, and apparently, only in so far as war between
European states were concerned, and even then, apparently
only in theory; practice was completly different. Of the
reasons which impelled him to write his famous treatise on the
laws of war in 1623 brotius wrote:
"There were many and weighty considerations impelling
me to write a treatise on the subject of law. I observe
everywhere in the Christian world a lawlessness in
1. Great Britain, War Office, The Law of' War on Land, Being
Part III of the Manual of Military Law, 1958, p. 8, para.
13, quoted in Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol.
10, 1968, p. 135•
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war fare, of which even barbarous nations would be
ashamed. And arms once taken up, there would be an end
to all respect for law, whether human or divine, as
though a fury had been let loose with general licence
for all manner of crime."1
jf thj5 were the kind of warfare conducted between the
self—styled	 Western Powers', the type of warfare
which such Powers waged against what they considered as
peoples of inferior civilization should come as no suprise,
especially during the colonial era •
 In 1906, the English
writer F.U. Hirst, drew attention to the "peculiarly
barbarous type of warfare" which civilised Powers waged
against "tribes of inferior civilization." "When I contemplate
such modern heroes as Gordon, and Kitchener, and Roberts, I
find them in alliance with slave dealers or Iandarins, or
cutting down fruit trees, burning farms, concentrating women
and children, protecting military trains with prisoners,
bribing other prisoners to fight against their fellow
countrymen. These are performances which seem to take us to
the bad old times. What a terrible tale will the recording
angel have to note against England and Germany in South Africa,
against the United States in the Philipines, against France in
F1adagascar and Tonquin, against Spain in Cuba, against the
Dutch in the East Indies, against the Belgians in the Congo
State •
1. Liesje van Someren, Umpire to the Nations: Hugo Grotius,
(London - Dennis Dobson), 1955, p. 121 •
 This book is a
biography of Hugo Grotius.
2. F.W. Hirst, The Arbiter in Council, 1906, p. 230, cited in
U. Wright, The Bombardment of Damascus, A.J.I.L., 1926,
p . 266.
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Certainly the record is not any better, whether in
interstate or non—interstate armed conflicts which took place
since the First World War.
With regard to the statement that as a result of' the
pratice in two world wars it is no longer possible to say
that international law protects the civilian population from
injury which is incidental to attack upon legitimate military
objectives, it should be said that it is misleading. Never in
international law were the civilian population and civilian
objects considered to be protected against injury or damage
which is incidental to attacks upon legitimate military
objectives. What actually happened during the two World Wars
and particularly in the Second World War is that the concept
of military objectives was stretched to such an extent that
any talk about distinction between combatants and non—combatants
and between civilian and military objects became meaningless.
The concept of military objectives went so far as to make the
morale of the civilian population a primary object of attack.
This was not done as mere reprisal but wa.s adted &s a
For example, following what had been described as "a
comprehensive review of' the enemy's (present) political,
economic and military situation", 1\ir Uice-11arshal Bottomely,
the British Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, in two directives
to Pir Ilarshal Sir Richard Peirse, stated that "the primary
object of your operations should now be focused on the morale
of the enemy civil population and, in particular, of the
industrial workers." 1
1. British directives of 9 July, 1941 and 14 February, 1942,
as quoted by David Johnson, Rights in 1ir Space, 1955, pp.
48-49. The story of the British 'strategic bombing' iswell
(cont. on the following page)
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Such military strategy was exactly the opposite of that
proclaimed in the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868, which,
in the final analysis proved to be the correct strategy. Thus,
as if to commemorate the centenary anniversary of the
Declaration of St. Petersburg, the General assembly of the
United Nations, in resolution 2444 of 19 December 1968,
affirmed the following principles "for observance by all
govermental and other authorities responsible for action in
armed conrlictstl:
a) That the right of the parties to a conflict to adopt
means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited;
b) That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the
civilian population as such;
c) That distinction must be made at all times between
persons taking part in hostilities and members of'
the civilian population to the effect that the latter
be spared as much as possible.
This resolution was adopted by 111 votes for, none
against, and no abstentions. Its significance lies probably
not so much in affirming these customary principles of
international law, or even in recognizing the necessity of
of applying basic humanitarian principles in armed conflict,
but in the fact that it marked the end of' an era of disenchant-
ment with the law of armed conflict and the beginning of a
new concern by the United Nations in the resect of' human
rights in armed conflicts of all types. Thus, in operative
(cont. from previous page) analysed in pp . 44-57 of Johnson's
book,as well as by Geoffry Best, Humanity in Warfare, 1980,
pp . 262-285.
304
paragraph 2 of Resolution 2444, the General Assembly invited
the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, in consultation
with the International Committee of the Red Cross and other
appropriate international organizations, to study:
a) Steps which could be taken to secure the better
application of existing international conventions
and rules in all armed conflicts;
b) The need for additional humanitarian international
conventions or for other appropriate legal
instruments to ensure the better protection of
civilians, prisorrs and combatants in all armed
conflicts and the prohibition and limitation of the
use of certain methods and means of warfare.
In operative paragraph 3 of Resolution 2444, the
General Assembly requested the Secretary—General "to take all
other necessary steps to give effect to the provisions of
resolution 2444, and to report to the General Assembly at its
next session on the steps he had taken. Further, in operative
paragraph 4, the General Assembly requested member—states to
extend all possible assistance to the Secretary—General in the
preparation of the study requested of him in paragraph 2 of
the resolution. Finally, in operative paragraph 5, the General
Assembly called upon all states which have not yet done so to
become parties to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the
Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
Since then, respect for human rights in armed conflicts
whether in general or with respect to particular cases of
armed conflict or both, has become a constant topic in the
work of the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is
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unnecessary for the purpose of our discussion to review all
the steps which had been taken in this regard; 1 suffice it
here to refer to two resolutions that had a marked effect on
the "reaffirmation and development of humanitarian law
applicable in armed conflicts.?' These are Resolution 2675 (xxv)
of 9 December, 1977, adopted by the General Assembly by '109
votes in favour, none against, and 8 abstentions, which
affirmed "basic principles for the protection of civilian
populations in armed conflicts, without prejudice to their
future elaboration within the framework of' progressive
development of the international law of armed conflict; and
Resolution 3103 (xxviii) of' 12 December, 1973, proclaiming
basic humanitarian principles in all armed conflicts and
principles of the legal status of' combatants struggling
against colonial and alien domination and racist regimes.
The basic principles for the protection of civilian
populations in armed conflicts which were affirmed in
Resolution 2675 were the following:
1, Fundamental human rights, as ac'ceptaO iii Thtez'aa'icjrrg1
law and laid down in international instruments,
continue to apply fully in situations of armed
conflict.
1. For a review of the work of the United Nations including
the reports prepared by the Secretary—General of' the
United Nations on "Respect for Human Rights in Armed
Confljcts", see Keith Suter, An International Lau of'
Guerrilla Warfare, 1984, pp. 37-82. The title of' this book
which is based on Keith Suter's Ph.D. thesis, does not
reflect its content, it is more of a general report on the
different stages of the revision of the laws of war in the
period from 1968 to 1974, than of an international law of'
guerrilla warfare as such. For extracts of the reports
prepared by the Secretary—General of' the United Nations in
1969 and 1970, see Friedman, The Law of War, A Documentary
History, Vol. 1, 1972, pp. 701-755.
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2. In the conduct of military operations during armed
conflicts, a distinction must be made at all times
between persons actively taking part in the
hostilities and civilian populations.
3. In the conduct of military operations, every effort
should be made to spare civilian populations from
the ravages of war, and all necessary precautions
should be taken to avoid injury, loss or damage to
the civilian populations.
4. Civilian populations as such should not be the object
of military operations.
5. Dwellings and other installations that are used only
by civilian populations should not be the object of
military operations.
6. Places or areas designated for the sole protection
of civilians, such as hospital zones or similar
refuges, should not be the object of military
operations.
7. Civilian populations, or individual members thereof
should not be the object of' reprisals, forcible
transfers or other assaults on their integrity.
8. The provision of international relief to civilian
populations is in conformity with the humanitarian
principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other
international instruments in the field of human
rights. The Declaration of principles for internat-
ional humanitarian relief, as laid down in resolution
XXVI, adopted by the twenty—first International
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Conference of the Red Cross, shall apply in situations
of armed conflict, and all parties to a conflict should
make every effort to facilitate this application.
A comparable resolution of weighty evidential value is
the resolution adopted by the Institute of International Law
at its Edinborough Se5SiOn (4_13 September, 1969). This
resolution bears the title: "The distinction between military
objectives and non—military objects in general and particul-
arly the problem associated with weapons of mass destruction."
The resolution states existing principles of' international law
to be observed in armed conflicts "by any de jure or de facto
government, or by any other authority responsible for the
conduct of hostilities", which presumably includes international
as well as non—international armed conflicts. The text of the
resolution of the Institute of International Law is reproduced
here in full and is accompanied by unexhau5tive references to
texts of existing international conventions as well as
comparable texts of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 The purpose (my purpose) is to show that,
notwithstanding the formalities of ratification and accession,
the rules of Protocol I (Articles 48 to 67) affording
protection to the civilian population against effects of'
military operations are, by and large, already binding on
all States and other authorities responsible for the conduct
hostilities. In other words, the rules of Protocol I affording
protection to the civilian population are regarded here as
mere clarification of already binding principles or
specifications of the basic principles of distinction. This
being said, we turn now to the text of the Resolution of'
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the Institute of International. Law which reads as follows:
The Institute of International Law,
Reaffirming the existing rules of international law
whereby the recourse to force is prohibited in
international relations,
Considering that, if an armed conflict occurs in spite
of these rules, the protection of' civilian populations
is one of' the essential obligations of the parties,
Having in mind the general principles of' international
law, the customary rules and the conventions and agree
ments which clearly restrict the extent to which the
parties engaged in a conflict may harm the adversary,
Having also in mind that these rules, which are enforced
by international and national courts, have been formally
confirmed on several occasions by a large number of
international organizations and especially by the United
Nations Organization,
&eirig of' the opinion that these rules have kept their Pull
validity notwithstanding the infringements suffered,
Having in mind that the consequences which the
indiscriminate conduct of hostilities and particularly
the use of' nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons,
may involve for civilian populations and for mankind as
a whole,
Notes that the following rules form part of the
principles to be observed in armed conflict by any de
jure or de facto government, or by any other authority
1. Text in ICRC, Document CE/3b, Geneva, 197t, \nnex, pp . 76-77.
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responsible for the conduct of hostilities:
1 The obligation to respect the distinction between
military objectives and non—military objects as well as
between persons participating in the hostilities and
members of the civilian population remains a fundemental
principle of the international law in force.1
2. There can be considered as military objectives only
those by which their very nature or purpose or use, make
an effective contribution to military action, or exhibit
a generally recognized military significance, such that
their total or partial destruction in the actual
circumstances gives a substantial, specific and immediate
military advantage to those who are in a position to
2destroy them.
3. Neither the civilian population nor any of the
3
objects expressly protected by the conventions or
agreements can be considered as military objectives, nor
yet
a) under whatsoever circumstances the means
indispensable for the survival of the civilian
population,4
b) those objects which, by their nature or use, serve
primarily peaceful purposes such as religious or
1 •
 Cf. Art. 48, 50, 51(3) of Protocol I.
2. Cf. Art. 52 of Protocol I, Art. 23(g) of the Hague
Regulations of 1907, and Art. 53 of the Fourth Geneva
Covention, 1g4g
3. Cf. Art. 51(2) of Protocol I. The terms of such conventions
or agreements usually prescribe the conditions under which
'protected objects' may loose that protection.
4. Cf. Art. 54 of Protocol I, and Art. 23, 55 to 62 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949
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or cultural needs.1
4. Existing international law prohibits all armed
attacks on the civilian population as such, as well as
on non—military objects, notably dwellings or other
buildings sheltering the civilian population, as long
as these are not used for military purposes to an extent
as to justify action against them under the rules
regarding military objectives as set forth in the second
paragraph hereof.2
5. The provisions of the preceding paragraphs do not
affect the application of the existing rules of
international law which prohibit the exposure of
civilian populations and of non—military objects to the
destructive effects of military means.3
6. Existing international law prohibits, irrespective of
the type of weapon used, any action whatsoever designed
to terrorize the civilian population.4
7. Existing international law prohibits the use of all
weapons which, by their nature, affect indiscriminately
both military objectives and non—military objects, or
both armed forces and civilian populations. In particular,
it prohibits the use of weapons the destructive effect
of which is so great that it cannot be limited to
1 •
 Cf • Irt. 53 and 56 of Protocol I, and the Hague Convention
of 14 May, 1954, on the protection of cultural property in
armed conflict.
2. Cf. irt. 51 (2), 52(1) and (3), 59 and 60 of Protocol I,
and in general, Part II of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
3. Cf. 1\rt. 51(7) and 58 of Protocol I, and Art. 28, 83 and
88 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
4. Cf. Art. 51(2) of Protocol I, and Art. 27 to 34 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, especially Article 33
thereof.
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specific military objectives or is otherwise
uncontrollable (self—generating weapons), as well as of
'blind' weapons.1
8. [xisting international law prohibits all attacks for
whatsoever motive or by whatsoever means for the
annihilation of' any group, region or urban centre with
no possible distinction between military objectives and
non—military objects.2
I\lthough affirmed and reaffirmed in a number of
resolutions adopted by governmental and non—governmental
organizations as shown in the above discussion, formulation
of the principle of distinction raised some controversy at the
Geneva Diplomatic Conference of' 1974/1977. The ICRC proposed
to formulate the principle (or the Basic Rule) of distinction
as follows:
"In order to ensure respect for the civilian population,
the Parties to the conflict shall confine their
operations to the destruction or weakening of' the
military resources of the adversary and shall make a
distinction between the civilian population and
combatants, and between civilian objects and military
objectives."3
1s it stood, this draft was acceptable to the major
Western states as well as to the Soviet Union, but it was
1. Cf.	 rt. 35, 36, and 51(4) (5) of Protocol I. See in
particular the Geneva Protocol of 1925, (Protocol for the
prohibition of the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other
gases, and of bacteriological methods of' warfare).
2 Cf. Art. 51 (4), (5), But see also the Convention on the
prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, 1948,
and Art. 32 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1y49
3. ICRC Draft Article 43, (Basic Rule).
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unacceptable to some East European countries as well as to
African, Asian and Latin American countries. 1 Their objection
was mainly to the words 'military resources'. It was pointed
out that the Declaration of St. Petersburg stated that "the
only legitimate object which States should endevour to
accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the
enemy", while the ICRC text referred to the "weakening of the
military resources of the adversary•	 'Military forces' and
'military resources' were not the same thing. Types of
military forces, it was said were set out in Article 4,
paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Geneva
Convention of 1949, while the concept of military resources
seemed to include not only military forces but the entire
logistic support of such forces, including factories and
industries manufacturing war materials, power plants and so
forth. Accordingly, the delegate from Venezuela who made these
remarks asked the representative of the ICRC for what reasons
the Declaration of St. Petersburg had been amended in the
sense of amplifying the concepts contained therein.2
Another recurring criticism of the ICRC draft was that
the expression "the destruction or weakening of the military
resources of the adversary" was more appropriate in a
convention on the law of war than in a convention covering
the protection of the civilian population during hostilities.3
Eventually, a compromise solution was reached by
replacing the words 'military resources' by the expression
1 See Summary Record in Levie (ed.), Protection of War
Victims, Vol. III, 1980, pp. 59-74.
2. CDDH/III/SR. 4, para. 8; Levie, Vol. 3, p. 66.
3. CDDH/III/SR. 10, para. 2; Levie, Vol. 3, p. 70.
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'military objectives' and rewording the Article as to read:
"In order to ensure respect for and protection of the
civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties
to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between
the civilian population and combatants and between
civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly
shall direct their operations only against military
objectives."1
In plenary, this Article was adopted by consensus. In
Protocol I it figures as Article 48, and is entitled "Basic
Rule." During the discussion of this rule the British delegate
Mr. Eaton tended to minimise its importance. "The heads of'
entities responsible for applying the Conventions would
consult Article 52, not Article 48," he said. 2
 This view is
wrong, because Article 52 is concerned with general protection
of civilian objects, and therefore it is not a complete guide.
Although Article 52, like Article 48, states that
"attacks shall be strictly limited to military objectives",
it only gives a partial definition of 'military objectives':
"In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives
are limited to those objects which by their nature,
location, purpose, or use make effective contribution
to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstance5 ruling at the time, offers a definate
military advantage."3
1 •
 Article 48, of Protocol I.
2. CDDH/IIISR. 4, para. 19; Levie, Vol. 3, p. 67.
3. Article 52, para. 2, of Protocol I.
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Thus Article 52 assists in drawing a distinction
between non—military objects and military objectives, but it
does not suffice to distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants. In this respect, one has to consult
Article 43 of Protocol I which offers a definition of
civilians and civilian population.
The rest of this Chapter will focus on these definitions
and their value in assisting to draw the distinction required
in Article 48, between the civilian population and combatants
and between civilian objects and military objectives.
While this distinction, as Article 48 states, is in
order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian
population and civilan objects, the distinction between the
civilian population and members of' the armed forces assists
in drawing a line between persons entitled upon capture to
be treated as prisoners of war and those who are not entitled
to such treatment. We begin with the definition of
combatants and the categories of persons entitled to the
Prisoner—of War status because Article 50 of Protocol I
defines civilians negatively:
tiA civilian is any person who does not belong to one
of' the categories of' persons referred to in Article
4A(1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third (Geneva) Convention
and in Article 43 of' this Protocol."1
1 •
 Article 50, para. 1 of Protocol I.
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2.	 Combatants and Prisoner—of—War Status
2.1. The Armed Forces of a Party to a Conflict
According to Clausewitz, "where a simple conception and
language is sufficient, to resort to the complex becomes
affected and pendantic." 1 The definition of the armed forces
laid down in Article 43 of Protocol I is simple, relatively
clear, and calls only for little explanation. The Report of
Committee III on this Article notes that the term 'members of
the armed forces' is all—inclusive and includes both
combatants and non—combatants (such as medical personnel and
chaplains) and that, as elsewhere in the Protocol the term
'Party to a conflict' includes national liberation movements,
by virtue of Article 1, paragraph 4, of Protocol i.2
Paragraph 1 of Article 43 of Protocol I defines the
armed forces of a Party to a conflict as follows:
"1 The armed forces of' a Party to a conflict consist
of all organized armed forces, groups and units which
are under a command responsible to that Party for the
conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is
represented by a government or authority not recognized
by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject
to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia,
shall enforce compliance with the rules of'
international law applicable in armed conflict."
Obviously, enforcing compliance with the rules of
1 Anatol Rapoport (ed.), Clausewitz On War, Pelican Classics,
1968, p. 205.
2. Report of' Committee III, Third Session, in Levie, Protection
of War Victims, Vol. 2, p . 376.
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international law is an obligation on the armed forces Yet,
of all peoples, the delegation of Israel wished to make a
constitutive element of the concept of armed forces:
"the delegation of Israel wishes to declare that the
enforcement of compliance with the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflicts is a
conditio sine qua non for qualification as armed forces.
Moreover, it is not sufficient that the armed forces be
subject to an internal disciplinary system which can
enforce compliance with the laws of war, but - as the
expression "shall enforce" indictes - there has to be
effective compliance with this system in the field."1
If the history of the Israeli armed forces was not
punctuated with massacres of civilians beginning with the
massacre of the inhabitants of the Palestinian village of
Deir Yassin in April 1948, the very year which the state of
Israel was created, to the massacre of thousands of' Palestinian
civilians in Sabra and Chatila camps in Beirut in September
1982, one would have forgiven the Israeli delegation for
making such a declaration. The Israeli armed forces are indeed
the first to be disqualified according to this declaration, as
well as the Israeli government which since 1967 till the
present time continued to violate the letter and spirit of'
the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of
civilians in time of' war. In 1982 an International Commision
inquiring into reported violations of' international law by
1 •
 Written explanation of vote on \rticle 43 of Protocol 1
(draft Article 41), text in Levie, Protection of War
Victims, 1980, Vol. 2, p. 377.
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by Israel during its invasion of the Lebanon found the Israeli
armed force5 and the government of Israel guilty, not only of
committing aggression in violation of the Charter of the
United Nations but also of violating all rules of civilized
warfare prescribed by international law.1
The delegation of Israel, however was isolated in this
declaration, the real purpose of which seems not to be concern
about the enforcement of compliance with the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflicts, but the
attmpt to maintain the Israeli myth that the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) were merely a 'group of
terrorists' not a liberation movement. Another purpose of the
Israeli declaration is to provide a pretext for denying
prisoner—of—war status to captured Palestinian fighters. The
Israeli declaration may best be understood against this
background.
But let us assume for the sake of argument that the
Israeli declaration was motivated solely by deep concern about
the enforcement of compliance with the rules of international
law applicable in armed conflicts. Its acceptance would still
trigger a chain of negative reciprocity which eventually would
do away with the system of' prisoner—of—war status altogether,
and even with the law of' armed conflict as a whole. Surely
then, the Israeli declaration must be rejected. On the other
hand, it must be emphasized that the enforcement of' compliance
with the rules of international law applicable in
1. See "Israel in Lebanon" - The report of the International
Commission to enquire into reported violations of Interna-
tional Law by Israel during its invasion of the Lebanon,
Ithca Press, 1983. (280 pages),
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armed conflict remains an obligation on the Parties to the
conflict and not only on members of the armed forces It is
significant that Article 1 common to the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949 provides that:
"The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and
ensure respect for the present Convention in all
Paragraph 2 of Article 43 of Protocol I sthtes that:
t emberg of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict
(other than medical personnel and chaplains covered by
Article 33 of the Third (Geneva) Convention) are
combatants, that is to say, they have the right to
participate directly in hostilities."
This provision might see to be stating the axiom: that
members of the armed forces have a right to participate
directly in hostilities. But there is more than meets the eye
to this axiom. It happens sometimes that combatants, i.e.
members of the armed forces, do not qualify for prisoner—of-
war status either by reason of the fact that the conditions
for prisoner—of—war status were actually not fulfilled, or,
by reason of the fact that the required conditions were
interpreted in such a way as to make them appear unfulfilled,
and consequently not only to deny prisoner—of—war status to
the members of the armed forces concerned, but also to deny
their status as members of the armed forces and to treat them
as ordinary criminals, even when their operations were
exclusively directed against the armed forces of the
adiersatj. Sc-\ a possibility still exists under 1\rticle 44
of Protocol I entitled "Combatants and Prisoners of War",
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albeit as an exception to the rule. This will be explained
later; suffice it here to note that by emphasising the
combatant status of members of the armed forces it was
intended to state, (and Article 44(1) of Protocol I does
state), that "any combatant as defined in Article 43 who falls
into the power of an adverse Party shall be a prisoner of war•"
Finally, paragraph 3 of Article 43 of Protocol I
addresses the possibility of a Party to a conflict
incorporating in its armed forces " a paramilitary or armed
law enforcement agencyt
"Whenever a Party to a conflict incorporates a
paramilitary or armed law enforcement agency into its
armed forces it shall so notify the other Parties to
the conflict."
It is not clear from the summary records of the
Diplomatic Conference whether the purpose of the notification
was to guarantee to the members of such a paramilitary or
armed law enforcement agency the privileges of the member5 of
the armed forces or the civilian status in view of the
generality of paragraph 2, and of the word 'incorporate' in
paragraph 3, it seems that the purpose of the notification
was to guarantee to such "paramilitary or armed law enforce-
ment agency" the privileges of members of the armed forces.
With regard to the 'notification' its self, it may be
noted that the Rapporteur of Committee III, Mr. Aldrich of
the United States' delegation referred to it as "a simple
procedural condition." 1 Mr. El Chonemy of Egypt disagreed;
1	 CDDH/III/SR.47, para. 34; in Levie, op. cite, Vol. 2,
p . 374.
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his delegation considered that, in order to be valid, the
notification provided for in paragraph 3 should be subject to
certain conditions: it should be made in an effective manner
and the adverse Party should be given sufficient time to
inform its forces of the notification 1 1 This seems to be a
reasonable view, whatever may be the legal status of such
paramilitary or armed law enforcement agency.
3. Combatants and Prisoners of War under the Geneva Convention
As far as the protection of combatants in wars of
national liberation is concerned, the international character
of wars of national liberation might be meaningless if it did
not result in affording adequate protection to combatants, in
the sense of enjoying the rights and protection attatched to
the status of prisoner—of—war.
In order to be entitled to prisoner—of—war status under
the Third Geneva Convention, the combatant who falls into the
power of the enemy has to belong to one of the categories of
persons enumerated in Article 4A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the
Convention.
These categories of persons are:
1) members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict
as well as members of militias or volunteer corps
forming part of such armed forces.
2) members of other militias and members of other
volunteer corps, including those of organized
1, CDDH/III/SR.,47, para. 47; in Levie, Vol. 2, p. 375
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resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the
conflict and operating in or outside their own
territory, even if this territory is occupied,
provided that such militias or volunteer corps,
including such organized resistance movements, fulfIl
the following conditions:
a) that of being commanded by a person responsible
for his subordinates;
b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign
recognizable at a distance;
c) that of carrying arms openly;
d) that of conducting their operations in accordance
with the laws and customs of' war.
3) rembers of regular armed forces who profess
allegiance to a government or an authority not
recognized by the Detaining Power.
o) Inhabitants of a non—Occupied territory, who on the
approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to
resist the invading forces, without having had time
to form themselves into regular armed units, provided
they carry arms openly and respect the laws and
customs of war.
There is a tendency in legal literature to treat all
members of national liberation movements as guerrillas or
irregulars and to subject them to the test of sub—paragraph
(2) quoted above. Such an approach is erroneous for several
reasons. First, it confuses the structure of the armed forces
of the national liberation movement with its mode of'
conducting hostilities. Guerrilla warfare is a type of warfare
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and may be resorted to by regulars as well as by irregulars.
Second, it ignores the fact that sub—paragraph \(2) of
[irticle 4 of' the Third Geneva Convention refer5, in the main,
to auxiliaries of the regular armed forces referred to in
sub—paragraph A(1). That is why it speaks of' "members of
other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including
those of organized resistance movements." Such 'auxiliaries'
or 'others' may exist in wars of national liberation as in
interstate armed conflicts, but the fact remains that in wars
of' national liberation the Party to the conflict is the people
itself which is fighting for its self—determination. One should
therefore look to sub—paragraph p(1) when speaking of' the
armed forces of liberation movements and not only to sub-
paragraph !(2).
Third, it is significant that sub—paragraph i(3) speaks
of "I'lembers of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to
a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining
liberation movement is invariably such a government
or an authority not recognized by the adversary, and there is
nothing to prevent it from having a regular armed force.
Possession of' regular armed forces is not the monopoly of'
states, and the question of' whether the armed forces were
regular or irregular is a question of' fact.
In brief, the question of the legal status of a member
of the armed forces of a liberation movement should be
examined with reference to sub—paragraphs P(1), (2), (3) and
(6) of Article 4 of' the Third Geneva Convention, and not only
with reference to sub—paragraph p(2). In fact, this was
basically the approach of' an Israeli court in the case of
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"the Military Prosecutor v. Omar Mahmud Kassem and others",1
but unsuprisingly, it could not fit them in any of' the above
mentioned categories.
The facts of the case are simple and clear and any
self—respecting court judging objectively would have found
the defendents "Omar Kassem and others" entitled to prisoner-
of—war status. But no Israeli court could be expected to reh
such a decision without puting itself against the very
ideology of the Zionist movement and the official state—policy
of Israel in the Arab territory occupied by Israel in the
1957 war. The court decision reviewed below should therefore
be first read against its political background. Officially,
Israel does not recognize the West Bank as occupied territory
and has refused to apply to the occupied Arab territories
the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 since 1957 Consequently,
the interpretation of the provisions of' Article 4 of the Third
Geneva Convention of 1949, had to be coloured to suit Israeli
objectives in the occupied territories. This being said, we
proceed to the facts of the cases
Omar Kassem and his group were members of the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine - one of several
Palestinian organizations under the umbrella of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO). Wearing mottled caps and green
miltary dress and armed with rifles, hand grenades and
ammunition and carrying other explosive materials, they
'infiltrated' from the East Bank of Jordan into the West Bank
occupied by Israel. They were captured after a battle or, in
1 •
 1 S.J.M.C., 402, April 13, 1959, summarized in Israel
Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 1, 1971, pp. 455...450.
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the words of the court "an encounter with the Israel Defense
Forces in the course of which an exchange of fire took place."
The Israeli 'military prosecutor' charged them with "armed
infiltration, belonging to an unlawful association, and carry-
ing arms and ammunition." Obviously, these are crimes under
Israeli law, but they do not constitute crimes under
international law. Indeed it is impossible to make such acts
criminal under international law without abolishing the
peo p le's right to resist —a right recognized in Pirticle 4 of
the Third Geneva Convention, and in customary international
law. 1 accordingly, it was only natural that the preliminary
argument of council for the dafense against the charges was
that "the defendants were entitled to the protection provided
under the Third Geneva Convention as prisoners of war."2
The first issue considered by the court was whether it
was competent to decide who is entitled to the status and
treatment of' prisoner of war. In support of' its affirmative
ruling, the Court reasoned that: first, every court of' law has
the basic right immanent in its very existence to determine
the limits of its jurisdiction from the >aterl
Second, the claim to protection as prisoners of war (a
1. But Customary international law did not protect the
participants in a people's resistance in occupied
territories, see generally, I.P.Trainin, 1uestions of'
Guerrilla Warfare in the Law of War, A.J.I.L., Vol. 40,
1946, pp. 534 et seq.; R.R.Baxter, The Duty of Obedience to
the Belligerent Occupant, British Year Book of International
Law, Vol. 27, 1950, pp. 235 et seq.; also, Baxter, So—Called
Unprivileged Belligerency, British Year Book of International
Law, Vol. 28, 1951, pp . 323 et seq., especially, pp. 333 et
seq. For a survey of practice, prior to the Geneva Convention
of' 1949, see Lester Nurick and Roger Li. Barret, Legality of
Guerrilla Forces under the Laws of War, A.J.I.L. Vol. 40,
1946, pp. 563 et Seq.
2. See Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 1, 1971, p. 456.
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protection which, said the court, is not included in the web
of the military enactment concerning rules of responsibility
for offences, but is included in the rules of customary and
conventional law as to the treatment of prisoners of war) is
a claim involving denial of the Court's powers to try offences
attributed to the defendants. Therefore, it was concluded, the
court must even incidentally to the question of its powers,
decide whether to classify the defendants as prisoners of war.
The court fortified this conclusion by invoking Article 5 of
the Third Geneva Convention which stipulates that:
"Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having
committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the
hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories
enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the
protection of the present Convention until such time as
their status has been determined by a competant
tribunal."
The intention of this Article, said the court, is to
withhold from military commandBrs the pwer to determine whether
persons captured in combat operations are prisoners of war,
and to vest that power in a court in which the question can
be decided according to accepted principles of law and
justice. 1
But did the court really decide according to accepted
principles of law and justice ?
We are told that the question of' the legal status of'
Ornar Kassern and his group was discussed with reference to the
1 •
 See Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 1, 1971, p. 457.
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provisions of subsections A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of Article
4 of the Third Geneva Convention which in our view is the
correct approach, but this is only the starting point, and
in a way, may be seen as merely procedural. The crucially
substantive matter is the manner in which the different
provisions are construed. Thus we are told that the Court
ruled that the defendants - Omar Kassem and his group - "were
not to be classified among the categories of persons mentioned
in the provisions of Article 4 A(1), (2), (3) and (5) of the
Third Geneva Convention" in view of the following findings
(quoted below verbatim):
"1. The defendants belong to the organization known as
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
The Organization exists not only in Jordan, but also
has leaders and branches in other countries in the
Middle East. In Jordan it operates independently
according to the insructions of its leaders. The
Organization is not part of the Jordanian army or
of any body of recognized legal status in Jordan,
and is considered an illegal organization in Jordan
itself where it operates in underground manner
without any approval from the Jordanian authorities.
The Jordan government has sometimes taken action to
prevent it from operating in Jordanian territory, in
the West Bank, and in Israel, and even on several
occasions employed its armed forces against the
Organization's bases.
1. Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 1, 1971, p. 458.
2. Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 1, 1971, pp 457-58.
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"2. The aim of the Organization is to strike at the very
foundations of the State of' Israel and to destroy it.
One of its principles is armed struggle, meaning the
use of force, including terrorism, murder, and
sabotage, to solve the problem. The members of the
Organization take the same approach to civilian
objectives as to military objectives.
I3 The Organization has committed various acts of
violence, including grenades thrown and explosives
placed in various locations where civilians
congregate (such as the Mahane Yehuda Market in
Jerusalem and Tel Aviv Central Bus Terminal, and
attacks on El—Al aircraft at Athens and Zurich).
"4. Members of the Organization sometimes wear military
uniform and carry arms openly outside inhabited areas,
although they sometimes refrain Prom doing so in the
course of operations for fear of being caught.
Before assessing the relevance of these findings some
clarifications need to be made. The findings in (1), are on
the whole, correct. But it should be added that the illegality
of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
in Jordan was mainly due to the Marxist ideology of the
Organization, and partly due to the conflict between the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Jordan on the
question of the representation of the Palestinian People s
 It
was not until the Arab summit in Rabat, 1974, that Jordan
recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the
Palestinian people. The Israeli court was therefore fishing
in troubled water when it made much of the illegality of the
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PFLP in Jordan, as will be shown below.
With regard to the findings in (2) and (3) of the Court,
it should be noted that, almost without exception, whenever
the PFLP or any other Palestinian organization carried out an
operation against a civilian or what appeared to be a civilian
target, the operation was invariably classified as 'retaliation'
or 'reprisal'. Unfortunately, subject to Article 33 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949,1 reprisals against civilian
objects were not illegal under international law, prior to the
adoption of Protocol I of 1977.2 But of course, no Israeli
court could be expected to classify as reprisals, any of the
operations carried out by Palestinian organizations. On the
contrary, they have been considered as violations of
international law, and as evidence that Palestinian
organizations do not respect the laws and customs of war and
therefore do not qualify for prisoner—of—war status, or even
qualify as a 'Party to the conflict'. To be sure, from a
formal point of view, neither the Israeli government, nor the
Israeli courts consider the Palestinian people or its present
representative - the Palestine Liberation Organization - a
1 Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 states
(inter alia): "Reprisals against protected persons and
their property are illegal." But Article 4 of the said
Convention defines the persons protected by the Convention
as "those who, at a given moment and in any manner
whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or
occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict of which
they are not nationals." Unfortunately, this has not been
interpreted as prohibiting reprisals altogether; it needed
Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to
complete the ban on reprisals.
2. Article 51, para. 6, of Protocol I provides: "Attacks
against the civilian population or civilians by way of
reprisals are prohibited." And Article 52, para. 1, of'
Protocol I provides: "Civilian objects shall not be the
object of attack or of reprisals."
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Party to the conflict. In their ayes the conflict is between
Arab states and Israel - not a conflict betwee the Palestinian
people and world Zionism with Israel as its striking arm - as
the Palestinians see it, or even a Palestinian/Israeli conflict
The Palestinian People does not exist in formal Israeli
thinking. Consider for example the 'willful blindness ? in the
following statement made by the former Israeli Prime Minister
Levi Eshkol in an interview with the Israeli newspaper Davar,
in 1969. Levi Eshkolwas one of the early zionist immigrants
to Palestine in the early years of this century. He said in
that interview:
"What are the Palestinians? When I came here there were
25U,00[J non—jews, mainly Arabs and Bedouins. It was
desert - more than under developed. Nothing. It was
only after we made the desert bloom and populated it
that they became interested in taking it from us."1
(Not e that he did not say how many Jews there were when
he came to Palestine)
Consider also the willful blindness, contradiction and
arrogance in the words of another Israeli Prime Minister,
Colda Meir:
can we return the occupied territories? There is
2
nobody to return them to."
"There was no such thing as Palestinians... It was not
as thtiugh there was a Palestinian people in Palestine
considering itself as a Palestinian people, and we came
1. Davar, January 24, 1969, cited in Alfred M. Lilienthal,
The Zionist Connection, 1978, p. 146
2. Cited in \lfred Lilienthal, Ibid., p. 146.
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and threw them out and took their country away from
them e They did not exist."1
So the by now estimated four million or more Palestinians
were 'nobody' in the eyes of the former Israeli Prime Ilinister
Golda heir, and Levi Eshkol negatively defined the population
of Palestine which was almost one hundred per cent 1rab when
he went to Palestine, 2
 (including a Jewish—Arab minority).
Given this attitude of the politicians it becomes hardly
suprising that the Israeli judiciary followed suit. Indeed,
as early as 1952, the I5raeli Supreme Court of Israel (sitting
as Court of Criminal Appeals) in the case of Diab v. Attorney
General, said:
"We have never acknowledged that the Arab State5 (1948)
came to assist the Arabs of' Palestine and that their
war aim was to establish an independent Palestinian
State within the former mandatory boundaries (of
Palestine)."
And with reference to Palestinian fighters in that war,
the Supreme Court of Israel said:
They were, intentionally or unintentionally, tools of
1. Ibid., Loc. cit.
2. Consider the following changes in the population and land-
ownership as a result of' Jewish immigration between 1895
and 1945 based on the official British "Survey of
Palestine" (1945):
Population	 j	 No. Jew Sets.
Year	 Arabs	 Jews	 Total	 Arabs Jews
1895 435,000	 47,000 500,000	 99.5	 0 . 5	 14
1919 642,000	 58,000 700,000	 97.5	 2.5	 71
1939 977,500 445,500 1,423,000 	 94.4	 5.5	 231
1944 1,211,000 529,000 1,740,000 	 93 . 5	 6 . 5	 259
1946 1,364,000 608,000 1,973,000 	 934	 6.6	 373
(figs have been rounded • A census was taken in 1922 and
1931).
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the invaders and it was the invader's aims which were
decisive."1
The attitude of the Israeli court in the case of "Omar
Kassem and Others" was thus a continuation of what has all
the way been held by Israeli politicians as well as by Israeli
courts. This will become even more evident when we examine
the manner in which the Israeli court construed the provision
of sub—paragraph A(2) of Article 4 of the Third Geneva
Convention. But let us first continue the consideration of
the Court's findings in the case of "Omar Kassem and
quoted in (1) to (4) above. We have so far commented on the
findings in (1), (2) and (3).
With regard to the Court's finding in (4) that the
members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
"sometimes wear military uniform and carry arms openly outside
inhabited areas, although they sometimes refrain from doing so
in the course of operations for fear of being caught", it
seems that the Court's intention was to say that the members
of the Organization do not always distinguish themselves from
the civilian population. In this respect, it should be noted
that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, like
all other Palestinian Organizations in the PLO, has a
political as well as a military wing. It is therefore in the
nature of things that not all the members of the organization
wear military uniform.
Nevertheless, on the basis of its findings the court
ruled that Omar Kassem and his group were not to be
1. Diab v. Attorney General, cited in Whiteman, Digest of
International Law, Vol. 10, pp 29-30, at 30.
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classified among the categories of persons mentioned in
section A(1), (3) and (6) of Article 4 of the Third Geneva
Convention of 1949 That sub—paragraph A(6) is inapplicable
in this case is uncontested because there was no levee en
masse. But the Court did not tell us why, in view of its
findings, Omar Kassem and his group were not to be classified
among the categories of persons mentioned in Article 4 P(l),
that is to say, they should neither be classified as "member5
of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict" nor as
of militias or volunteer corps forming a part of
such armed forces." Nor did the Court explain why Omar Kassem
and his group were not to be classified as "members of regular
armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an
authority not recognized by the Detaining Power."
Objectively speaking, the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine is such an 'authority' which is not
recognized by the Detaining Power, and the question of
'regularity' of the armed forces is a question of fact.
Some explanation, however, was given when the Court
considered the legal state of the defendants with reference
to sub—paragraph A(2) of Article 4 of the Third Geneva
Convention. The persons entitled upon capture to prisoner—of-
war status according to Article 4 A(2) are:
"Members of' other militias and members of other
volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance
movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and
operating in or outside their own territory, even if
this territory is occupied, provided that such
organized resistance movements fulfil the following
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conditions:
a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for
his subordinates;
b) that of having a distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance;
c) that of carrying arms openly;
d) that of conducting their operations in accordance
with the laws and customs of war."
In the case of the (Israeli) "Military Prosecutor v.
Omar Mahmud Kassern and Others" the Israeli Court relied
heavily on the words "belonging to a Party to the conflict"
and made them "the most basic condition for the classification
of irregular forces as prisoners of war." 1
 Since the words
"belonging to a Party to the conflict", as well as the four
conditions (a, b, c, d) of Article 4 A(2) quoted above, are
open to different interpretations, and since it is on the
interpretation of these conditions that the fate of the
prisoner depends, it seems necessary to consider them in
some detail.
3.1. Belonging to a Party to the conflict. In referring
to the provision of Article 4 A(2) of the Third Geneva
Convention, the Israeli Court in the case mentioned above,
pointed out that:
"the most basic condition for the classification of
combatants of' irregular forces as prisoners of war is
their belonging to a belligerent party. If' they do not
belong to a Government or State for which they fight
1• Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 1, 1971, p . 458.
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the combatants do not have the right to enjoy the
status of war upon capture."1
Thus, the Israeli Court interpreted the words "belonging
to a Party to the confljct" as meaning "belonging to a State."
In explaining this conclusion, the Court said:
"It is natural that, in international conflicts, the
Government which previously possessed an occupied area
should encourage and take under its wing the irregular
forces which continue fighting within the borders of
the country, give them protection and material
assistance, and that therefore a
	 relationship"
should exist between such Government and the fighting
forces, with the result that a continuing responsibility
exists of the Government and the commanders of its army
2for those who fight in its name and on its behalf."
The Court went so far as to state that the Third Geneva
Covention "excludes those forces - even regular armed
units - which do not yield to the authority of the
State and its organs of government. The Convention does
not apply to these at all. They are to be regarded as
combatants not protected by the international law
dealing with prisoners of war, and the occupying Power
may consider them as criminals for all purposes."3
Thus, even if Omar Kassem and his group were regular
members of the armed forces of Jordan, or, even if the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine were part of the regular
1. Ibid., pp. 458—Y.
2	 Ibid., p. 559.
3. Loc. cit.
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armed forces of Jordan, they would still in the Court's
view be considered as criminals for all purposes because they
"do not yield to the authority of the State and its organs of
government."
No one else seems to have construed Article 4 A(2) of
the Third Geneva Convention as the Israeli Court has done. In
particular, no one seems to have eversuggested that regular
and irregular forces which do not yield to the authority of a
state or its organs of government are to be regarded as
combatants not protected by the international law dealing with
prisoners of war and that the occupying Power may consider
them as criminals for all purposes. Professor H. Lauterpacht
summarised the position of irregulars under the Hague
Regulations thus:
"Of such irregular forces two different kinds are to be
distinguished - first, such as authorised by the
belligerents; and, secondly, such as acting on their own
initiative, and on their own account, without special
authorisation. Formerly, it was a recognized rule of
international law that only the members of authorized
irregular forces enjoyed the privileges due to the
members of the armed forces of the belligerents; members
of unauthorized irregular forces were considered to be
war criminals, and could be shot when captured. During
the Franco—German war in 1870, the Germans acted through-
out according to this rule with regard to the so—called
'f'ranc—tireurs', requiring the production of a special
authorisation from the French Government from every
irregular combatant whom they captured, failing which
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he was shot. But according to Prticle 1 of the Hague
Regulations this rule is now obsolete. Its place is
taken by the rule that irregulars enjoy the privilege
due to members of the armed forces of the belligerents,
although they do not act under authorisation provided
(1 ) that they are commanded by a person respnsible for
his subordinates; (2) that they have a fixed distinctive
emblem recognisable at a distance; (3) that they carry
arms openly; and (4) that they conduct their operations
in accordance with the laws and customs of war."1
trticle 1 of' the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907 (as
well as article 9 of the unratified Brussels Declaration of
1874) which prescribed these four conditions for militias and
volunteer corps, expressly state that:
"The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to
armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps
fulfilling the following conditions:..."
"In countries where militia and or volunteer corps
constitute the army, or form part of it, they are
included under the denomination 'army'."
The stipulation that in countries where militia or
1 Dppenheirn - Lauterpacht, International Law, Vol. 2, 1952,
pp . 256-57. In the Trials of Major war criminals at
Nuremberg it was stated that: "Many of the defendants seem
to assume that by merely characterizing a person a partisan,
he may be shot out of' hand. But it is not so simple as that.
If the partisans are organized and are engaged in what
international law regards as legitimate warfare for the
defence of their own country, they are entitled to be
protected as combetants" It was also stated: "/s the Hague
Regulations state expressly, if they (the partisans) fulfill
the four conditions, "the laws, rights, and duties of' war"
apply to them in the same manner as they apply to regular
armies. See "The Einstatzgruppen Case", cited in Uhiteman,
Digest of International Law, Vol. 10, p. 163.
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volunteer corps constitute the army, or part of' it, they are
included under the denomination 'army' would have been
superfluous if, as the Israeli Court contended, a "command
relationship" between such forces as mentioned in Prticle 4
(2) of' the Third Geneva Convention, and a state Party to the
conflict were a legal requirement. For if' "other militias and
other volunteer corps, including organized resistance
movements" were to belong to a Party to the conflict in the
sense of a "command relationship", they would cease to be
irregulars in therreaning of' Trticle 2 Tt(4), and become regular
militias or volunteer corps under article 4
This is not merely a logical conclusion. There is
overwhelming evidence that under both the Hague Regulations
and the Geneva Conventions of' 1949, the intention was to regard
resistance movements as a Party to the conflict for purposes of
the prisoner—of—war status. But there is no evidence to suggest
that a'commanu relationship' between a state Party to the
conflict and a resistance movement was necessary for members
of the resistance movement to be legally entitled to be treated
as prisoners of' war.
In the 1CRC Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention we
read the following:
"The Conference of Government Experts (1947) had
generally agreed that the first condition preliminary
to granting prisoner—of—war status to partisans was their
forming a body having a military organization."2
1. This conclusion was made by ti. Thomas 1'allison and Sally \I.
['lallison, "The .Juridicial Status of' Irregular Combatants
under the International Law of' i\rmed Conflict, Case West-.
em Reserve Journal of' International Law, 1977, p, 37 et
seq., at p. 55.
2. 1CRC Commentary III, Pictet (ed.) 1960, p. 58.
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I\nd this:
"the delegates to the 1949 Conference reverted, at
the suggestion of the Netherlands Delegation, to the
principle stated in Article 1 of the Hague Regulations
of' 1907, which made a distinction between militias and
volunteer corps forming part of the army and those which
are independent.	 (emphasis added)
Clearly, one cannot use the word 'independent' to
describe resistance movements which are under the command of
the government of a state Party to the conflict or its regular
army. According to the ICRC Commentary:
"It is essential that there should be a de facto
relationship between the resistance organization and
the Party to international law which is in a state of
war, but the existance of this (de facto) relationship
is sufficient. It may find expression merely by tacit
agreement, if the operations are such as to indicate
clearly for which side the resistance movement is
2
righting."
Probably the best statement to conclude the above
discussion and refute the allegation made by the Israeli Court
to the effect that a 'command relationship' should exist
between the resistance movement and the government of a state
Party to the conflict, in order to be entitled to be treated
as prisoners of war, is that of the United States Army Field
Manual (1956). Commenting on the condition of' Article 4 A(2)
1	 Ibid., p. 57.
2. Loc. cit.
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of the Third Geneva Convention, which states that the members
of other militias and members of other volunteer corps and
resistance movements, in order to qualify for prisoner—of—war
status, should, inter alia, be commanded by a person respons-
ible for his subordinates, the U.S. Army Field 1anual
categorically states:
"State recognition, however, is not essential, and an
organization may be formed spontaneously and elect its
1
own
The Israeli Court was therefore wrong in interpreting
the phrase "belonging to a Party to the conflict" as meaning,
or requiring, a "command relatjonshjp between resistance
movements and the government of the state whose territory is
occupied. The resistance movement, it is submitted, has been
considered as a Party to the conflict for purposes of prisoner
of war status, that is to say, a subject of international law,
since the Brussels Declaration of 1874, and definitely so,
since the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. Any other
interpretation would make a mockery of the stipulation in
Article 1 of the Hague Regulations, that the laws, rights, and
duties of war appply not only to armies, but also to militias
and volunteer corps fulfilling the four prescribed conditions,
and would smack of bad faith.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the term "Party
to the conflict" refers not only to states and resistance
movements in interstate armed conflicts, but also to peoples
fighting in the exercise of their right of self—determination
1. Cited in Uhiternan, Digest of International Law, Vol. 10,
p. 133.
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against colonial domination and alien occupation and against
racist regimes, as proclaimed in paragraph 4 of' Pirticle 1 of
Protocol I.
Resistance movements, as well as members of militias and
members of volunteer corps w-ich do not constitute part of the
regular army of' a Party to the conflict have to fulfil four
conditions in order to be qualified for prisoner—of—war status
under 4 t\(2) of the Third Geneva Convention. These conditions
may briefly be explained as follows:
3.2.	 Command by a Responsible Person. Pccording to the
United States rmy Field rianual (1956), this condition is
fulfilled "if the commander of the corps is a commisioned
officer of the armed forces or is a person of position and
authority or if the members of' the militia or volunteer corps
are provided with documents, badges, or other means of'
identification to show that they are officers, noncommissioned
officers, or soldiers so that there may be no doubt that they
are not persons acting on their own responsibility. State
recognition, however, is not essential, and an organization
may be formed spontaneously and elect its own officers." 1 The
ICRC Commentary also states that it is not a requirement that
the members of resistance movements be commanded by regular
officers of the armed forces; "the leader may be either
civilian or military." 2 He is responsible for action taken on
his orders as well as action which he was unable to prevent.
His competence must be considered in the same way as that of'
1 •
 Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 10, p. 133.
2. ICRC Commentary 111, Pictet (ed.), 1960, p. 59.
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a military commander.1
Subordination to a resoonsible commander has perhaps
been easy enough to fulfil. It is in fact difficult to see how
guerrillas could function at all as a military force unless
such subordination were first acheived. 2 Yet, in the case of
'Omar Kassem and Others' referred to above, the Israeli Court
contended that the condition of being commanded by a person
resonsible for his subordinate has not been proved to the
Court. 3 This seems to be in flat contradiction with the Court's
finding that "the defendants belong to the organization known
as The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine", and
that "the organization exists not only in Jorcan, but also has
leaders and branches in other countries in the Middle East",
and that the Organization toperates independently according to
the instructions of its leaders." 4 It is difficult to see how
an organization could have all these characteristics without
being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.
This, however, goes to show hw arbitary can be a court bent
on denying prisoner—of—war status to persons entitled to it.
It also shows the necessity for an international tribunal to
determine the legal status of the persons claiming to be
entitled to prisoner—of—war status, instead of leving it to
political leaders or to the judiciary of the adverse Party to
the conflict.
1	 Loc. cit.
2 McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order,
p. 548.
3. Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 1, 1971, p. 459.
4. Ibid., p. 457.
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3.3.	 , Fixed Distinctive Emblem Recognizable at a Distance.
In addition to being organized under a responsible
command, members of resistance movements are required to wear
a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance.
1\ccording to the U.S. 1\rmy Field Flanual, this condition is
satisfied by the wearing of military uniform, but less than
the complete uniform will suffice. I\ helmet or headdress which
would make the silhouette of the individual readily distingui-
shable form that of the ordinary civilian would satisfy this
requirement. 1 This is also the view expressed by the authors
of the ICRC Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention. The
Commentary mentions an arm-band, a cap, (although it says this
may frequently be taken off and does not seem fully adequate),
a coat, a shirt, an emblem or a coloured sign worn on the
2	 .	 .
chest. It hardly needs mentioning that to be distinctive the
sign must be the same for all the members of any one resistance
movement. But it is not essential that the sign be notified to
the adverse Party, although this may be desirable in order to
avoid misunderstanding.
The term 'recognizable at a distance' is open to
interpretation. I\ccording to the ICRC Commentary, "the
distinctive sign should be recognizable by a person at a
distance not too great to permit a uniform to be recognized."4
In the case of "Omar Kassem and Others", the condition
of wearing a fixed emblem recognizable at a distance was the
only condition which the Israeli Court was prepared to admit
1. See Whiteman, Digest, Vol. 10, p. 133
2. ICRC, Commentary III, Pictet (edj, 1950, p . 60.
3. Loc. cit.
4. Loc. cit.
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1
as being fulfilled. Pnd this was apparently due to the Pact
that the evidence was too strong for refutation - the group
was dressed in a complete military uniform. Yet, the Court
made it look like a concession on its part. This is how the
Court put it:
to the second condition, in spite of' the evidence
that the defendants, when seen from a distance did not
look like saboteurs, the Court was ready to hold that
they wore mottled caps and green clothes, which were not
customary with the inhabitants of' the area in which they
were captured, and therefore this condition was
fulfilled."2
Perhaps political leaders the world over would have been
very grateful to the Israeli Court if' it could provide them
with a clue to how saboteurs look, whether from a distance or
at very close range.
3.4.	 Carrying I\rms Openly.
The third condition which members of militias and members
of volunteer corps and resistance movements have to fulfil in
order to qualify for prisoner—of—war status upon capture is the
carrying of arms openly. But what does the term open1y mean
in this respect? The United States i\rmy Field Manual (1956)
seems to interpret 'openly' as meaning 'visibly'. It states
that this requirement is not satisfied by the carrying of'
weapons concealed about the person or if the individuals hide
their weapons on the approach of the enemy. 3 This is all the
1 •
 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 1, 1971, p. 45g
2. Loc. cit.
3. See Uhiteman, Digest, Vol. lo, p . 133.
344
l\merican I1anual had to say about this condition. It amounts
to prescribing a way of carrying arms and even kinds of
weapons which have to be carried. This seems unreasonable. War
has never been a fair game; suprise is a factor in military
operations. There seems to be therefore more realism in the
interpretation made by the ICRC Commentary of this condition.
It says:
"although the difference may seem slight, there must be
no confusion beteen carrying arms S open1y and carrying
them 'visibly' or 'ostensibly'. Suprise is a factor in
any war operation, whether or not involving regular
troops." 1
This provi5ion, according to the ICRC Commentary, is
intended to guarantee the loyalty of' the fighting, "it is not
an attempt to prescribe that a handgrenade or a revolver must
be carried at belt or shoulder rather than in a pocket or under
a coat."2
The ICRC Commentary goes on to say that "the enemy must
be able to recognize partisans as combatants in the same way
as members of regular armed forces, whatever their ueapons•3
If this is the case, then the condition of carrying arms openly
would seem redundant since the enemy would be able to recognize
parti5ans by the wearing of a fixed distinctive emblem
recognizable at a distance. J\nother way of looking at this
condition is to regard it as an alternative means of
distinguishing between combatants and non—combatants, as is
1. ICRC, Commentary III, Pictet (ed.), 1960, p. 61
2. Loc. cit.
3. Loc. cit.
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now the case under Protocol I.
/lt any rate it must be admitted that arms are carried
openly, if they are carried as soldiers normally carry them.
The question which is not easy to answer and which is
common to the three conditions of wearing a fixed distinctive
emblem recognizable at a distance, the carrying of arms openly,
and the conducting of hostilities in accordance with the laws
and customs of war, is whether, with regard to these
conditions, the members of resistance movements are to be
judged individually or collectively, i.e. as an organization.
Opponents of resistance and or liberation movements are
naturally inclined to judge the member5 of resistance movements
individually and collectively, as did the Israeli Court in the
case of	 Kassem and	 With regard to the carrying
of arms openly, the Court ruled that:
"the phrase 'carrying arms openly' is not to be construed
as carrying arms in places where arms and the person
bearing them cannot be seen. 1 f1oreover, it does not refer
to bearing of arms such as Kalatchnikov assault rifles
in the course of their use in an engagement. That the
defendants used their weapons during their encounter with
the Israel defence forces is obvious, but on the other
hand no weapons were identified as being in their
possession until they started firing at the Israel
Defense Forces. Likewise, it has been established that
the Organization to which the defendants belong operates
in underground manner and does not carry arms openly.
1 •
 This amounts to saying that guerrilla warfare is illegal.
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Therefore, it cannot be held that members of the
organization bear arms openly."1
According to such an interpretation no member of a
resistance movement or a liberation movement would qualify for
prisoner—of—war status under the Geneva Conventions, or even
under Protocol I which requires a combatant to carry his arms
openly: a) during each military engagement, and b) during such
time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in
a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in
which he is to participate.
More realistic is the interpretation which requires the
members of resistance movements (or liberation movements) to
wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance and
to carry arms openly, only during military operations, 2 or to
use the more restrictive lanuague of Protocol I, only during
military engagements. 3 Any other interpretation would offend
against not only the very simple logic of guerrilla warfare
which depends on mobility, secrecy and suprise, but also would
put in motion a chain of negative reciprocity (reprisals and
retaliation) which eventually might take away whatever remained
of' the respect for the laws and customs of war e
 Thus, in a way,
denial of the prisoner—of—war status on controversial pretexts
can be counter—productive to the Party to the conflict which
1. Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 1, 1971, p. 460.
2 See Mallison and Ilallison, The Juridicial Status of
Irregular Combatants under the International Humanitarian
Law of Armed Comflict, Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law, Vol. 9:39, 1977, p. 58: "The open arms
requirement, like that of the distinctive sign, is only
applicable during military operations."
3. Article 44(3) of Protocol I.
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denies it to members of the other Party to the conflict.1
This seems to be true regardless of' the legal status of the
Parties to the conflict or of the characterisatiori of the
conflict as international or non—international. In a word, the
question of whether the conditions of' wearing a distinctive
sign, the carrying of arms openly, and compliance with the
rules of civilized warfare were satisfied or not should be
considered with reference to the particular case of the
captured persons, not with referecc to t¼-
	 '
whole. Only in this manner would the fourth condition (i.e.
compliance with the laws and customs of war) make sense in the
case of guerrilla warfare.
35.	 Compliance with the Laws and Customs of' War
The importance of this condition can hardly be
exaggerated. "unless war is to degenerate into a savage contest
of physical forces freed of' all restraints of compassion,
chivalry and respect for human life and dignity, it is
essential that the accepted rules of warfare should continue
2to be observed." The problem, however, is in ascertaining the
scope and content of this condition. The Commentary of' the ICRC
recognizes that "the concept of the laws and customs of war is
1. Consider for instance the many cases of air hijacking and
the taking of hostages by some Palestinian Organizations in
order to secure the release of Palestinian combatants held
prisoners in Israeli jails. Palestinian Organizations would
not have been pushed to take such measures if Israel treated
captured combatants as prisoners of war. One has also to
think of the execution of Imerican prisoners by the Viet-
Cong during the war in Vietnam, and the execution of' French
prisoners by the PJgerian Liberation Front (FLN) during the
!\lgerian war of independence, as measures to stop the
execution by South Vietnam and France, respectively, of'
members of these liberation movements.
2. Oppenheim—Lauterpacht, International Law, Vol. 2, 1952,
p . 218.
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rather vague and subject to variation as the forms of war
evolve." 1 The Stockholm Draft of the Geneva Conventions
attempted to clarify the intention of the Parties on at least
one point by including the express obligation for parti5ans
(i.e. irregulars combatants) to	 nationals of the
Occupying Power who fall into their hands in accordance with
the provisions of the present (Third Geneva) Convention."2
But this provision was deleted by the drafters of the Convention
in 1949, who did not wish to depart from the terms of the Hague
Regulations.
The vagueness of the concept of "the laws and customs of
war" under the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, came to the
fore during the formulation of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters
for the trial of so—called 'major war criminals' following the
Second World War. 4
 However, for purposes of those trials the
following acts, or any of them, were considered as crimes
coming within the jurisdiction of the International Ivlilitary
Tribunals of Nurembery and Tokyo, and for which there shall be
"individual responsibility":
fa) Crimes against peace: namely, planning, perpetration,
initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or war
in violation of international treaties, agreements
or assurances, or participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the
foregoing;
1 •
 ICRC, Commentary III, Pictet (edj,
2. Loc. cit.
3. Loc. cit.
4. On this point, see Schwarzenberger,
Vol. 2, (armed conflict), 1968, pp.
1960, p. 61.
International Law,
479-483.
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"b) \J_ar Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs
of war. Such violations shall include but not be
limited to, murder, ill—treatment or deportation to
slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian
population of or in occupied territory, murder or
ill—treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the
seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or
private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns
or villages, or devastation not justified by military
necessity;
"c) Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian populations, before or
during the war; or persecutions on political, racial
or religious grounds in execution of or in connection
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the
country where perpetrated.
"Lead e rs, organizers, instigators and accomplices
participating in the formulation or execution of a common
plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes
are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in
execution of such plan."1
The principles of international law recognized by the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal were affirmed by the General
1 • article 6 of the Charter of the Military Tribunal of
Nuremberg. For the complete text of the Charter, see
Friedman, The Law of' War, !\ Documentary History, Vol. I,
'Y72, pp. 885-893.
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Assembly of the United Nations in 1945.1 MoreOver, in the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of
1977, there are provisions dealing specifically with "grave
under these Conventions. 2 Accordingl y , whatever may
be the 'vagueness' of the concept of the "Laws and customs of
war" it may be said that a reasonable guide exists regarding
what resistance movements may be expected to comply with. In
our view, it is in the catalogue of "grave breaches" that one
should look when judging whether members of resistance
movements conduct their o eratic,'ns in accordance with the laws
and customs of war.
According to Article 130 of the Third Geneva Convention
of 1949, the following acts are "grave breaches" of the
Convention, if committcd against persons or property protected
by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman
treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to body or health, compelling
a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power,
or wilfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair
and regular trial prescribed in the Convention.
Usually it is not difficult for resistance movements and
liberation movements to comply with the Third Geneva Convention.
The difficulty for resistance and liberation movements is in
the taking of' prisoners, not in looking after them. Asa matter
of fact, nothing in the conduct of military operations pleases
members or resistance and liberation movements than the taking
1 •
 Friedman, ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 1027-29.
2. Articles 50, 51, 130, and 147, respectivelY, of the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Article 85 of Protocol I.
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of prisoners of war, for this is the most assured way of
compelling the adversary to treat the members of resistance
and liberation movements as prisoners of' war, or at least
secure their exchange when they fall in the hands of the
adversary.
Application of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to
the protection of civilian persons raises a technical problem
when the liberation movement and the government or authority
against which the war of liberation is directed are of the
same nationality. Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Fourth
Convention defines the persons protected by the Convention as
being	 who, at the given moment and in any manner
whatsoever, find themselves, in case of ' a conflict or
occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or
Occupying Power of which they are not nationals." This, for
example, is the case of' SouthAfrica. The civilian population
in such a case are at least under the protection of Article 3
common to the Geneva Conventions. But in view of the
international character of war of' wars of national liberation
and of the numerous appeals of the General Assembly to the
colonial Powers and those occupying foreign territories as well
as to the racist regimes.., to ensure the application to the
fighters for freedom and self—determination of' the provisions
of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, of 12 August, 1949, and the Geneva Convention relative
to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War, of 12 August,
1949,1 it seems clear that the intention of the General
1 •
 U.N. General Assembly Resolution No. 3103 (xxviii) of' 12
December, 1973.
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I\ssembly of the United Nations was to regard the Fourth Geneva
Convention applicable notwithstanding I\rticle 4 of the
Convention.
Iccording to Irticle 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention,
any of the following acts, if committed against persons or
property protected by the Convention would constitute a grave
breach of the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman
treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful
deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected
person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of
hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the
rights of a fair and regular trial prescribed in the present
Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
While the'grave breaches' enumerated in the Geneva
Conventions offer a reasonable guidance as to what members of
liberation movements may be expected to respect, the rules
regulating the actual conduct of miltary operations have always
been vague, and the problem was further compounded by the
permissability of reprisals. True, reprisls against persons
and property protected by the four Geneva Conventions are
prohibited, but it was only recently with the adoption of
Protocol I in 1977 that the ban on reprisals was extended to
civilians and civilian objects which did not benefit from the
protection of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Thus, it may be
generally stated that where reprisals are ermissable, it would
be unreasonable to expect liberation movements not to resort to
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them when the adverse Party persists in its violation of' the
Geneva Conventions. In such a case, the Geneva Conventions
become the only applicable standard as to whether the members
of the liberation movement, or the movement as a whole, respect
the laws and customs of war. In this regard, it may be stated
without prejudice that liberation movements have better records
in respecting the Geneva Conventions than their opponents.
Of course, colonial and alien and racist regimes would
never characterize any act of war committdd by members of
liberation movements as reprisals. In their eyes, members of
liberation movements are 'terrorists', and by their laws,
liberation movements are 'terrorist organizations'. The
lregular and fair trial" in such circumstances become an
occasion for the court concerned to vent its political spleen,
regardless of whether the captured members of a liberation
movement have themselves committed any war crime or not. It is
a fact of life that justice has seldom been obtained in
political trials, and has never been obtained for members of
liberation movements in the courts of their enemies.
On the international level, as well as in legal literature
the quetion is of' course different, and although the question
of reprisals has seldom been invoked by international lawyers
in the discussion of' the compliance with the laws and customs of'
war for purposes of' prisoner—of—war status, some writers have
made it the focus of their analysis of' this condition. 1 But,
opinions differ as to when the condition of compliance with the
1 E.g. Mallison and Mallison, The Juridicial Staus of
Irregular Combatants under the International Humanitarian
Law of' Armed Conflict, Case Western Reserve Journal of'
International Law, pp. 58-65.
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laws and customs of war by members of national liberation
movements may be regardard as fulfilled. A minority of the
experts consulted by the ICRC in 1969 and 1970, expressed the
view that:
"while all belligerents are required to observe the laws
and customs of war, this requirement is even greater for
guerrillas, since for them alone it is the constitutive
element to obtain the status of' prisoner of war in case
of capture. The members of the regular armed forces, in
fact, when captured, retain their status as prisoner of
war, this being in virtue of Articles 4, 5 and 85 of'
Geneva Convention III of 1949.t1
This view seems to proceed from the assumption that
members of resistance movements or liberation movements are
"unlawful	 or "criminal civilians" unless their
lawful combatancy is proven by fulfilling the conditions
stipulated in Article 4 A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention.
Such a view was in fact proposed by the Russian delegation to
the Brussels Conference of 1874. The Russian delegation proposed
to add the following qualification to Article 9 of the Brussels
Declaration (which corresponds to Article 1 of the Hague
Regulations of 1899 and 1907):
"... Armed bands not complying with the above—mentioned
conditions (of Article 9 of the Brussels Declaration)
shall not possess the rights of belligerents; they shall
not be considered as regular enemies, and in case of
1. ICRC, Doc. CE/6b entitled, "Rules Applicable to Guerrilla
Warfare", (submitted to the Conference of Government
Expert5), 1971, p. 14.
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capture shall be proceeded against judicially."1
Such a conclusion was unacceptable to the Brussels
Conference and there is no evidence to suggest that it was
accepted or intended by the Geneva Diplomatic Conference of
1949
According to the United States Army Field Manual (1956)
the condition of compliance with the laws and customs of war
is fulfilled "if' most of' the members of the body observe the
laws and customs of war, notwithstanding the fact that the
individual member concerned may have committed a war
This clearly indicates that the individual members of the
organization who have committed war crimes would still retain
their prisoner—of—war status upon capture. This view was expr-
essly upheld in the Report of the Secretary—General of' the
United Nations on "Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts."
The Report of the Secretary—General submitted to the
General Assembly in 1970 commented thus:
"The last condition set forth in the Conventions is that
combatants should "conduct their operations in accordance
with the laws and customs of war." It is enerally agreed
that this condition refers to the respect of the laws and
customs of war by the movement or corps as a whole,
whether or not individual members fulfil this condition.
In case of grave breaches of the Conventions by
individual guerrillas, these guerrillas may, and should,
of course, be punished, but after a trial giving all the
1. Cited in Lester Nurick and Roger U. Barret, Legality of
Guerrilla Forces under the Laws of War, A.J.I.L., 1946,
p . 565.
2. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 10, p . 133.
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guarantees of due process and without losing the status
of prisoner of war that they may have acquired."1
The Report of the Secretary—General also raises the
question of the treatment of guerrillas who themselves have
respected the laws and customs of' war while the movement as a
whole has induldged in practices inconsist8nt with these laws
and customs. This, says the Report, "may be a problem deserving
special consideration." 2 In this respect, it should be noted
that under Protocol I any combatant, as defined in Article 43,
who falls into the power of an adverse Party shall be a
prisoner of' war. 3 Moreover, as a rule, it is expressly stated
that violations of' the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict "shall not deprive a combatant of' his right to
be a combatant or, if he falls into the power of' an adverse
Party, of his right to be a prisoner of war..." 4 1n the absence
of strong evidence to the contrary, the solution adopted in
Protocol I should also be adopted for the Geneva Convention.
Any other solution would create insoluble practical
difficulties and would lead to logical comtradictions, and in
humanitarian terms, it would be counter—productive.
4. Combatants and Prisoners of War under Protocol I of 1977
The four conditions of' priviliged combatancy or
1 Report on Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, Doc. A/B052,
September 18, 197Q partially reproduced in Friedman, The
Law of War, 1972, pp. 723 et seq., at 736.
2 Loc. cit.
3. Article 44 (1) of Protocol I.
4. Article 44 (2) of Protocol I.
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I qu alification 5
 of belligerents" as they are described in
rticle 1 of the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907, were a
19th century compromise between the demands of 'patriotism',
on the one hand, and the demands of what Professor Geoffrey
Best called "the essentials of the occupier's dream: a docile
accepting population, behaving as if conquest and transfer to
the victor 3 s sovereignty had already happened" 1 , on the other
hand. Put rather differently, the four conditions were an attempt
to reconcile the comflicting demands of the democratic
conception of war as an affair of the peoole as a whole, not
simply its regular armed forces, and the 	 'militaristic'
conception of war as an affair of the regular armed forces of'
the state of which the 'civilian population' should stay aloof.
It does not need much ingenuity, however, to discover
that the 'compromise' ha
	 always tilted heavily in favour of
the	 throughout the process known as the
'codification' of the laws and customs of war, or, what has
become customarily known as
	 reaffirmation and development
of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict'. It may be
sufficient to mention that it was only in 1949 that members of
militias and members of volunteer corps, including members of
resistance movements operating in or outside their own
territory, even if their territory was occupied, became
expressly entitled to prisoner—of—war status upon capture
provided that they fulfilled the four conditions discussed in
the preceding section. This was considered by some commentators
important	 to members of resistance movements in
1 •
 Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare, 1980, p . 190.
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occupied territories. 1 The revolutionary character of this
rule is, however, less real than apparent. 2
 This is so, not
only because 1rticle 4 !(2) of the Third Geneva Convention
requires members of organized resistance movements to fulfil
the four conditions (i.e. responsible command;a fixed,
distinctive, recognizable sign; open carrying of arms; and
observance of the laws and customs of war), but also because
there was no agreement on the interpretation of these conditions.
Two of these conditions were particularly singled out for
criticism even before the Geneva Conventions of 1949 came into
being - the condit±on of carrying arms openly, and that of
wearing a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance.
These two conditions, according to Professor Draper, are
directed against the effectiveness of guerrilla fighters and
guerrilla warfare. 3 But Professor Trainin argued that the
unconditional requirement of a uniform for guerrilla troops
"is not supported even by simple military logic." His argument
runs as follows:
"The conditions of guerrilla warf're are unusual.
Guerrilla troops attack suddenly, by suprise. Could a
uniform or distinguishing marks prevent suprise, which
is the principal method of guerrilla warfare? What
importance does a uniform have when guerrilla troops
meet with the enemy at a close range? The intention and
the activity of' the guerrillas would be obvious even
1	 ICRC, Commentary III, Pictet (ed.), Geneva, 1960, p. 59.
2. McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order,
1957, p. 85.
3. Draper, The Relationship Between the Human Rights Regime
and the Law of 1rmed Conflict, Israel Yearbook on Human
Rights, Vol. 1, 1971, p. 201.
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without a uniform."1
Further, he argued that, to link the right of the people
to defend its native land and its honour to a uniform would
be to carry the question of' defense to an absurdity. Patriotism
is not packed only in a uniform, just as it is impossible for
the activities of the spontaneous hurricane to be set forth
in the rules of a meteorological observatory.2
Trainin also criticised the condition of' carrying arms
openly:
"One of the demands of' those opposed to the guerrilla
movement was that weapons be carried openly. This demand
appeared, as a rule, where there were still no weapons
such as those used today, when weapons consisted largely
of rifles, machine guns and artillery. Now not only the
regular army but the guerrillas as well use all
contemporary weapons, even to tanks and aviation. I.\rt
consists partly in camouaaging weapons... iilitary
sagacity was directed to this end. Today a person would
be laughed at who proposes to decamouflage 	 the weapons
of contemporary warfare. But such a laughable demand was
made by the Hitlerites to their enemies."3
Trainin went on emphasizing that the guerrilla troops
set out to acheive the objectives which were given, and these
never conflicted with international law. "From the point of
view of' these objectives, directed towards the liberation of'
their native land, it is entirely immmaterial how the aggressor
1 •
 I.P.Trainin, Questions of Guerrilla Warfare in the Law of
War, P.3.I.L., Vol. 40, 1946, p. 558.
2. Loc. cit.
3. Ibid., pp. 559-60.
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is destroyed - by weapons carried openly or concealed. It was
important that they be destroyed."1
The requirement of wearing a fixed distinctive emblem
recognizable at a distance was also criticised by some Western
writers. 1\s early as 1951, Professor Baxter (at the time Major,
and member of the Judge !ldvocate General's Corps, United
States Prmy) criticised this requirement and made a prophecy
that 25 years later came true. He wrote:
"The soldier in uniform or the member of a volunteer
corps with a distinctive sign have a protected status
upon capture, whilst other belligerents not so identified
do not benefit from any comprehensive scheme of
protection. ... There is considerable justice in the
contention that to make the difference between life and
death hang on the type of clothes worn by the individual
is to create a 'clothes philosophy' of a particularly
dangerous character. Indeed, the emphasis on the properly
uniformed belligerent may only be a survival from the
type of war fought by closely grouped ranks of soldiers,
in which firing upon even individual detached soldiers
was regarded as a violation of international law. 2
 !\s
1s the current tendency of the law of war appears to be
to extend the protection of prisoner—of—war status to an
ever—increasing group, it is possible to envisage a day
1. Ibid., P. 560.
2. Article 69, General Orders No. 100, 24 April, 1863, prepared
by Dr. Francis Lieber for the government of' United States
forces in the field, stated: "Outposts, sentinels, or
pickets are not to be fired upon, except to drive them in,
or when a positive order, special or general, has been
issued to that effect."
361
when the law will be so retailored as to place all
belligerents, however garbed, in a protected status"1
That envisaged day came in 1977 when the Diplomatic
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of' Humanitarian
Law applicable in armed conflicts, at the Plenary meeting of'
26 May, adopted Article 44 of Protocol I Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of' 1949, by 73 votes to one (Israel), with
21 abstentions.2
Before commenting on Article 44 of Protocol I, it may
be useful to have a look at the IERC's prOpDS8 SolutiOn to the
problem of prisoners of war. It is obvious probably, from the
discussion in the preceding section, that the main problem which
remained without a satisfactory solution since the Brussels
Conference of 1874 was the problem relating to members of'
militias or members of' volunteer corps and members of' resistance
movements which operate independently of the freguiar armed
forces of' the state or of the central government. Indeed, the
position of members of militias and members of' volunteer corps
and members of resistance movements operating in occupied
territories and under the authority of the central government
or its armed forces were not in a better position than those
who operated independently since all have to fulfil the four
1 •
 R.R. Baxter, So—Called Unprivileged Belligerency: Spies,
Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, British Yearbook of International
Law, Vol. 28, 1951, p. 343. In Baxter's article, the word
'guerrilla' is applied to armed hostilities by private
persons or groups of persons who do not meet the qualificat-.
ions established in Article 4 of' the Third Geneva Convention
of 1949, or corresponding provisions of the earlier
Conventions. Ibid., p. 333. McDougal and Feliciano, Law and
Minimum World Public Order, 1957, pp. 544 et seq., also use
the term 'guerrilla' in the sense used by Baxter.
2. CDDH/SR.40, para. 15; Levie, Protection of' War Victims, Vol.
2, 1980, p. 516.
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conditions discussed in the preceding section. For such bodies
of irregu1arsf, 'partisans', or 'guerrillas' as they are often
called, the ICRC proposed to loosen the restrictions on their
entitlement to prisoner—of—war status by means of an
interpretative protocol of the four conditions which the
members of such bodies had to fulfil. To this effect, the ICRC
proposed the following text of draft Article 42 of draft
Protocol I entitled 	 Category of Prisoners of War":
"1. In addition to persons mentioned in Article 4 of the
Third (Geneva) Convention, members of organized
resistance movements who have fallen into the hands of
the enemy are prisoners of war provided such movements
belong to a Party to the conflict, even if that Party is
represented by a government or an authority not
recognized by the Detaining Power, and provided that such
movements fulfil the following conditions:
a) that they are under a command resp3rsible to a Party
to the conflict for its subordinates;
b) that they distinguish themselves from the civilian
popuation in military operations;
c) that they conduct their military operations in
accordance with the Conventions and the present
Protocol.
2. Non—fulfilment of the aforementioned conditions by
individual members of the resistance movement shall not
deprive other members of the movement of the status of
prisoner of war. Members of a resistance movement who
violate the Conventions and the present Protocol shall,
if prosecuted, enjoy the judicial guarantees provided by
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the Third Convention and, even if sentenced, retain the
staus of prisoners of war."
In a 'Note' accompanying this text, the ICRC stated that
if, as many governments wished, the Diplomatic Conference should
decide to mention in the present Protocol members of movements
of armed struggle for self—determination, a solution would be
to include in this Article (i.e. draft Article 42) a third
paragraph worded as follows:
"3. In cases of armed struggle for self—determination
85 guaranteed by the United Nations Charter and the
"Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co—operation among
States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations", members of organized liberation movements who
comply with the aforementioned conditions shall be treated
as prisoners of war as long as they are detained."
This draft Article was based on the discussion which
took place at the second session of the Conference of Government
expert5 in 1972.1 It represents a compromise between the
different schools of' thought expressed in that session, but
contrary to its title, it did not introduce a new category of
prisoners of war; it simply 'codified' the widespread and
generally accepted liberal interpretation of 1rticle 4 1(2) of'
the Third Geneva Convention. 2 The reader may therefore take it
as a summary of our discussion of these conditions as shown in
1 •
 See ICRC Report on the Work of' the Conference of Government
Experts, second session, 1972, Vol. 1, pp. 133-135, paras.,
3.53 - 3.69.
2. Abi - Saab, Liars of National Liberation in the Geneva
Conventions and Protocols, Recueil des Cours of the Hague
Academy, Vol. 165, (1979 - iu), p. 423.
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the preceding section, but it should be noted that even such
a liberal discussion is easier to make in theory rather than
to apply in practise. For example, it is not easy to tate with
any certainty 'when' an organization,, taken as a whole, may be
said to have fulfilled the requirement of conducting its milit-
ary operations in accordance with the laws and customs of' war.
Similarly, it is difficult to ascertain whether the resistance
or liberation movement fulfils the requirements of distinction
in military operations. These difficulties may also jeopardise
the chances of the individual member who did not commit any war
crime since the Detaining Power would be inclined to judge him
in the light of the often propagandistic characterization of
the movement as a whole as a 'terrorist organization'. Above
all, in so far as the above mentioned conditions may be regarded
as constitutive elements of' the prisoner—of—war status as far as
members of' resistance and liberation movements are concerned,
they perpetuate the traditional inequality between combatants
belonging to the armed forces of a Party to the conflict and
those which operate independently. loreover, the solution which
the ICRC envisaged for liberation movements was already
overtaken by the adoption of Article 1, paragraph 4, of
Protocol I which treats the people (or the liberation movement)
as a Party to the conflict whose armed forces may, and in fact
invariably do, consist of regulars as well as irregulars, while
the ICRC proposal treats them invariably as irregulars.
For all these reasons, the Diplomatic Conference found
the proposal of' the ICRC unsatisfactory. The main purpose of'
the ICRC proposal, however, was endorsed, but the Diplomatic
Conference devised an alternative method of' acheiving it.
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The work of the Working Group of Committee iii and the
work of the Committee itself on the question of combatants and
prisoner—of—war states was largely facilitated by a list of'
15 questions prepared by the Rapporteur of Committee III, 9r.
Aldrich, head of the United States delegation.1
Among these questions was the following: should there be
separate standards for the PU (prisoner of' war) entitlement of'
combatants who do not satisfy the requirements of Article 4 of'
the Third Geneva Convention, or should there be a single
standard applicable to all members of the armed forces of a
Party to the conflict?
This indeeed was the crux of' the problem of' entitlement
to prisoner—of—war status since the Brussels Conference of'
1874. Under the Brussel Declaration, as well as under the
Hague Regulations of' 1899 and 1907, and under the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, there was one standard for regular members
of' the armed forces and a standard for the so—called
irregulars/partisans/guerrillas. The double—standard approach
was heavily criticised by a number of' delegates whose statements
are too numerous and lengthy to be reviewed here. 2
 The responses
of the representatives in the Working Group of Committee III
revealed overwhelming support for an effort to develop a
single standard for entitlement to prisoner—of—war status which
would be applicable to regulars and irregulars alike. This was
reflected in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 44 of Protocol I,
which provide as follows:
1. For this list of questions, see Levis, Protection of War
Victims, Vol. 2, 1980, pp. 465-466.
2 See, ibid., pp. 378-547.
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"1. Any combatant, as defined in Article 43, who falls
into the power of an adverse Party shall be a prisoner
of war.
2. While all combatants are obliged to comply with the
rules of international law applicable in armed conflict,
violations of these rules shall not deprive a combatant
of his right to be a combatant or, if he falls into the
power of an adverse Party of' his right to be a prisoner
of war except as provided in paragraphs 3 and 4."
As defined in Article 43, paragraph 2, all members of the
armed forces of a Party to the conflict (other than medical
personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third
Geneva Conventions) are combatants, that is to say, they have
the right to participate directly in hostilities. The armed
forces of a Party to the conflict, according to Article 43,
paragraph 1, "consist of all organized armed froces, groups
and units which are under a command responsible to that Party
for the conduct of its subordinates, even if' that Party is
represented by a government or an authority not recognized by
an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an
internal disOiplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce
compliance with the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict."
The one standard concept for entitlement to prisoner—of--
war status for regulars and irregulars alike raised the fear
that the rule might encourage uniformed regular soldiers to
dress like civilians. Ultimately, this concern resulted in th
reference in paragraph 3 of Article 44 to situations where an
armed combatant aannot distinguish himself from the civilian
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population and to a 'saving clause' in paragraph 7 of' Article
44 of Protocol 1.1 The saving clause in paragraph 7 reads as
follows:
7• This Article is not intended to change the generally
accepted practice of States with respect to the wearing
of the uniform by combatants assigned to the regular,
uniformed armed units of a Party to the conflict."
But regulars who are assigned to tasks where they must
wear civilian clothes, as may be the case, for example, with
advisers assigned to certain resistance units, a!e not required
to wear the uniform when on such assignments.2
Reverting now to paragraph 3 and 4 of Article 44 of
Protocol I, it may be noted that paragraph 3 raised the
question of what, if any, distinction from the civilian
population was to be required. The answer was of course in the
positive. Paragraph 3 provides in part, that:
"In order to promote the protection of the civilian
population from the effects of hostilities, combatants
are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian
population while they are engaged in an attack or in a
military operation preparatory to an attack."
This is however, the generally recognized rule of
distinction in normal situations. But the circumstances under
which members of resistance and liberation movements operate
are unusual. They cannot distinguish themselves from the
civilian population and stand any chance of success • Therefore,
1 •
 Report of Committee III, Third Session, (CDDH/236/Rev.1)
reproduced in Levie, op. cit., pp. 483-485, at 483, para.84
2. Loc. cit.
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an exception to the general rule of distinction had to be made
in a sense of realism. 1\ccordingly, after stating (or restating)
the general rule of disinction, paragraph 3 of 1\rticle 44 went
on to state that:
"Recognizing, however, that there are situations in
armed conflict where, owing to the nature of hostilities
an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he
shall retain his status as a combatant s
 provided that
in such situations, he carries his arms openly:
a) during each military engagement, and
b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary
while he is engaged in military deployment preceding
the launching of an attack in which he is to
participate.
1\cts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph
shall not be considered as perfidious within the meaning
of Mrticle 37, paragraph l(c)."
Iccording to the Report of Committee III, the 'situations'
in which an armed combatant cannot distinguish himself from the
civilian population as required by the first sentence of
paragraph 3, occur "particularly in wars of national liberation
and in occupied territories." 1 Indeed, the Rapporteur, Mr.
1\ldrich, said he could not imagine the situation occuring
except in occupied territories or in wars of national liberation,
but he preferred to add the word ' particularly' to the report in
order to avoid limiting the provision of paragraph 3 to
two situations in question, namely, wars of national liberation
1. Ibid., p. 484, para., 88.
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and occupied territories, It was so agreed.1
The practical value of 'relaxing' the requirement of'
distinction, however, depends or, the interpretation of the
words "during such time as he is visible to the adversary
while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the
launching of an attack in which he is to participate", partic-
ularly the words 'visible' and 'deployment'. It should be noted
that the Report of Committee III is silent on the meaning of
paragraph 3(b). Consequently, opinions differed. At the time
of' signature, the delegation of te United
	
cgd\ cc'ade t
following statement of' understanding:
"in relation to Article 44, ... the Government of the
United Kingdom will interpret the word 'deployment' in
paragraph 3(b) of the Article as meaning "any movement
towards a place from which an attack is to be launched."2
In an explanation of vote the delegation of Netherlands
also used the same words: "any movement towards a place from
which an attack is to be launched."3
The delegation of' Australia "would interpret 'deployment'
to include a movement by a combatant to an
	 While to
the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, 'deployment'
meant Pany uninterrupted tactical movement towards a place from
which an attack was to be launched." 5
 To the Canadian
delegation deployrnent would have commenced when the person or
1 •
 Ibid., p. 477-78, pares., 8 and 10 (CDDH/III/SR.53).
2. Roberts and GuelfF, (ed.), Documents on the Laws of War,
1982, p . 462 See also CODH/III/SR,55, para., 13; in Levie,
Protection of War Victims, 1980, p . 487.
3. CDDH/III/SR.56,para., 15; in Levie, ibid., p. 500.
4. CDDH/III/SR.5,para., 55; in Levie, ibid., P. 494.
5. CDDH/III/SR.55, para., 64; in Levie, ibid., p. 495
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persons concerned moved out from the an assembly point or
rendeuous with the intention of advancing on their objective,
and at that point, regardless of risk, arms must be carried
openly." 1 Similarly, the delegation of the United States, like
the delegations of the United Kingdom and Netherlands
understood the phrase "military depoloyment preceding the
launching of an attack" to mean "any movement towards a place
from which an attack is to be launched."2
With regard to the word 'visible' in Article 44, paragraph
3(b), the delegation of the United Kingdom in its explanation
of vote on the said Article maintained that "the existance of
electronic devices, currently in common use, meant that
guerrillas must anticipate being under visual observation even
during darkness and other conditions of poor visibility." 3 Two
other Western delegations - Australia 4 and Canada 5 , also made
statements to the same effect, but the delegations of the
United States of America, the Netherlands, and the Federal
Republic of Germany did not follow suit. This may explain why
the delegation of' the United Kingdom did not maintain this sort
of interpretation of' the word 'visible'.
At any rate, it seems gravely doubtful whether those
interpretations of the words 'deployment' and 'visible' were
made in good faith. Such interpretations are in fact in
contradiction with the recognition that in wars of national
liberation and in occupied territories, a combatant cannot
1 •
 CDDH/III/SR.56, para., 38; in Levie, ibid., p. 503.
2. CDDH/III/SR.56, para., 5; in Levie, ibid., p. 50.
3. CDDH/III/SR.55, para., 13; in Levie, ibid., p. 487.
4. CODH/III/SR.55, para., 55; in Levie, ibid., p. 494.
5. CDDH/III/SR.56, para., 38; in Levie, ibid., p . 503.
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distinguish himself from the civilian population without
jeopardizing his safety and the chances of his success.
Moreover, such interpretations cannot realistically claim to
promote the protection of the civilan population; what they
clearly promote is the interest of the occupying Power, or for
that matter, the interest of the colonial and alien and racist
regimes in the safety of their troops at the expense of the
right of peoples to self—determination.
It has been said in support of the above—mentioned
interpretations that, by failing to reinforce the distinction
between themselves and civilians, members of resistance and
liberation movements would necessarily jeopardize the
protection of the civilian population they were attempting to
serve. 1 This is no more than a pretext to deny the protection
of either the civilian population or combatants or both, and
moreover blame the responsibility on members of resistance and
liberation movements. But fortunately the law does not surrender
to such blackmail; Irticle 50 of Protocol I, for example,
specifically states that the presence within the civilian
population of individuals who do not come within the definition
of civilians does not deprive the population of' its civilian
character, and that, in case of doubt whether a person is a
civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian and
should not be made the object of attack. 2 And the basic rule
of distinction categorically states that the Parties to the
conflict "shall direct their operations only against military
1 •
 E.g. by the delegation of the U.S.I\. CDDH/III/SR.56, para.,
54; in Levie, Vol. 2, op.cit. p. 506.
2. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of Prticle 50 of Protocol I.
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objectives. 1 As long as this rule is respected, it should
practically make no difference whether the attackers carried
their arms openly or not, or whether they wore uniform or not.
Clearly then, not withstanding the ostensible purpose of
paragraph 3 regarding the protection of the civilian
population, its true purpose seems to be the reconciliation of'
the requirement of guerrilla warfare which depends on
concealment and suprise, with the notion of perfidy. This is
clearly demonstrated by t.¼-e last
	
rta o' paTaapn
Article 44 which expressly states: "/cts &thich caçily iitr t?re
requirements of this paragraph shall not be considered as
perfidious within the meaning of Article 37, paragraph 1(c).
Paragraph '1 of' Article 37 of Protocol I states that :
"1	 It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an
adversary by resort to perfidy. Acts inviting the
confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that
he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection
under the rules of' interhational law applicable in armed
conflict, with intent to betray that confidence, shall
constitute perfidy. The following are examples of perfidy:
c) the feigning of civilian, non—combatant status;..."
According to this definition of perfidy, the feigning of
civilian status, in order to constitUte perfidy, has to be
accompanied by an intent to betray the confidence which the
enemy puts into that status. But the feigning of civilian
status alone does not constitute perfidy, and of course, the
feigning of a civilian status by a combatant carrying his arms
1 •
 Article 48 of Protocol I.
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openly is not perfidious since it does not invite the
confidence of the adversary.
Now if' forfeiture of the prisoner-of-war status is linked
with the concept of' perfidy, (and not the contentious
protection of the civilian population), the proper scope of'
paragraphs 3 and 4 of \rticle 44 becomes obvious; only betrayal
of' the confidence of the adversary in civilian appearance, that
is to say, only perfidious acts may entail a loss of prisoner
of war status. But it should be emphasised that the mere
feigning of civilian, non-combatant status, in situations where
it is expressly recognized that a combatant, owing to the nature
of hostilities cannot distinguish himself from the civilian
population, is not perfidious according to Prticles 44(3) and
37(1) (c), of Protocol I, but an act of 'ruses of wart intended
to mislead the enemy without betraying his confidence in the
civilian appearance. Otherwise, the 'recognition' in paragraph
3 that there are situations in which a combatant cannot
ditinguish himself from the civilian opulation would become
meaningless as far as the prisoner-of-war status is concerned.
The importance of the concept of perfidy to the proper
interpretation of paragraph 3 and hence, to the loss of
prisoner-of-war status was emphasized by some delegations. Thus,
Mr. Rosas, of the delegation of Finland, emphasized that:
"His delegation stressed the importance of the basic
distinction between combatants and civilians, so as to
give the civilian population the greatest possible amount
of' protection while taking into acount the realities of'
guerrilla warfare. From that angle, it wished to stress
the link between paragraph 3 of' !\rticle 44 and the
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prohibition of perfidy in Article 37. The loss of'
combatant status for persons who deliberately feigned
civilian status when they were bout to attack and were
visible to the adversary seemed to be a necessary
sanction in order to prevent such activities."1
(emphasis added).
The underlined words indicate the time when combatants
have to show their combatant status by carrying arms openly,
and thus retain their combatant status and their right to be
prisoners of war.
Likewise, the Swedish delegation based its interpretation
on the second sentence of paragraph 3 of Article 44 on the
concept of perfidy. After stating that his delegation
interpreted the passage in paragraph 3 referring to "situations
in armed conflict where, owing to the nature of the hostilities
an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself..." as
applying only to guerrilla fighters during wars of national
liberation and to members of resistance movements in occupied
territory, the Swedish delegate, 1r. Skala went on to say:
"Guerrilla fighters would thus comply with the rules of'
international law even if they were advancing in civilian
clothing and with concealed arms. If they were then
attacked by the adverse Party, they would still be
entitled to protection under Article 44 provided that
they carried their arms openly during the military
engagement. H
The situation was different when the guerrillas had the
1	 CDDH/III/SR.56, para., 10; in Levie, Vol. 2, p. 499.
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initiative. There, the important point was that the guerrillas
could not take advantage of civilian status in order to start
an attack. The time limit within which they were required to
show their combatant status was not stated in exact terms. The
expssion used was "while he is engaged in a military
deployment preceding the launching of an attack." The Swedish
delegation interpreted "military deployment in that context to
mean military preparations immediately before an attack."1
The restrictive interpretation of the condition of
carrying arms openly in paragraph 3(b) was also the
interpretation made by the delegations of countries that were
more directly concerned. Thus, the representative of the Syrian
1\rab Republic emphasized that "the requirement to carry arms in
paragraph 3(b) should be understood in the context of' the
military deployment that 'immediately' preceded the attack."
Further, he pointed out that the rule set fotth in pagraph 3
implied that the combatant "knew or ought to know" that he was
visible to the enemy, otherwise the obligation to carry arms
openly did not apply.2
Similarly, the Egyptian delegate, Professor /U—Ghunaimi,
said that in his delegation t s view,
"the expression 'military deployment' meant the last
step when the combatants were taking their firing
positions just before the commencement of hostilities;
a guerrilla should carry his arms openly only when
within range of the natural vision of his adversary. 1\ny
1 •
 CDDH/III/SR.56, para., 29; in Levie, op. cit., Vol. 2,
p. 502.
2 CDDH/III/SR.55, para., 37; in Levie, op. cit., Vol. 2,
pp. 490-91.
376
other interpretation constituted an attempt to dilute
the prerogatives of the champions of liberty, and
betrayed the very purpose of the Article."1
It is important also to note that resistance and
liberation movements would invariably interpret the requirement
of the second sentence of paragraph 3 restrictively. The
interpretation made by the representative of' the Palestine
Liberation Organization exemplifies the attitude of liberation
movements. In the view of the PLO,
"The requirements in paragraph 3(a) and (b) regarding
the carriage of arms openly could only be interpreted in
the most restrictive manner: the phrase "during such time
as he is visible to the adversary" must be interpreted as
meaning "visible to the naked eye." Any other
interpretation would be abusive and contrary to the
spirit of the discussion on the Article. Similarly, the
phrase "while he is engaged in a military deployment
preceding the launching of an attack" could only mean
immediatly before the attack, often coinciding with the
actual beginning of the attack. Any other interpretation
would expose the combatant to certain capture before
the attack could be launched."2
During the explanation of votes in Committee III, the
PLO representative, Mr. Armali, reminded the Conference that
"his delegation considered the territories occupied by the
enemy to be not only those occupied as a result of the 1967
war but also those occupied by the Zionists since 1948, which
1 •
 CDDH/SR.41, para. 21; in Levie, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 532.
2. CDDH/III/SR.56, para. 75; in Levie, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 510.
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covered the whole territory of Palestine."
It should oe noted, however, that although the restrictive
interpretation is technically the correct interpretation, the
fact remains that paragraph 3 is an attempt to reconcile the
conflicting and apparently irreconcilable interests of the
Parties to the conflict. This being so, the realistic
expectation seems to be that the Parties to the conflict would
continue to hold conflicting views: one invokes the restrictive
interpretation of paragraph 3, the other invokes the widest
possible interpretation.
Be the interpretation of paragraph 3 as it may, it must
be emphasised that the forfeiture of prisoner of war status is
confined to combatants who fall into the power of an adverse
party "while failing to meet the requirements of the second
sentence of paragraph 3•It This is born out by paragraph 4 of
Article 44, which prescribes the protection to which such a
combatant is entitled. The text of paragraph 4 reads:
"4. A combatant who falls into the power of an adverse
Party while failing to meet the requirements set forth
in the second sentence of paragraoh 3 shall forfeit his
right to be a prisoner of' war, but he shall,
nevertheless, be given protection equivalent in all
respects to those accorded to prisoners of war by the
Third Convention and by this Protocol. This protection
includes protections equivalent to those accorded to
prisoners of war by the Third Convention in the case
where such a person is tried and punished for any
CDDH/III/SR.56, para., 75;in Levie, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 510.
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offences he has committed."
According to the report of Committee III, paragraph 4 of
Article 44, in essence, "provides a separate, but equal, status
for combatants who are captured while failing to observe even
the minimum rule of distinction set forth in the second
sentence of paragraph 3. They are not to be prisoners of war,
but they shall benefit from procedural and substantive
protection equivalent to those accorded prisoners of war by the
Third Geneva Convention and Protocol I."'
The Report also states that paragraph 4 "was considered
as the best basis for compromise." 2
 As a compromise it is open
to different interpretations. To some delegations, particularly
the delegations of the United Kingdom, the United States of
America, and Netherlands, a combatant who falls into the power
of an adversary while failing to observe the requirements of
the second sentence of paragraph 3, forfeits his prisoner—of-
war status as well as his combatant status, and therefore,
might be tried for acts which would otherwise be considered
lawful acts of combat. 3 This probably goes too far; for
although Article 37 states that it is prohibited to kill,
injure or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy, the
feigning of a civilian non—combatant statU5 is not among the
grave breaches of Protocol
	 Moreover, the purpose of dist-
inction is to promote the protection of the civilian population,
1 Report of Committee III, third session, CDDH/236/Rev.1;
text in Levie, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 483-85, at 484.
2 Loc. cit.
3. See CDDH/III/SR.55, para. 55 (U.S.A.); in Levie, op. cit.,
Vol. 2, p. 487, 500, 506, respectively.
4. See Article 85, pare, 3(f), of Protocol I.
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not to protect enemy soldiers against suprise attacks.
Therefore, if the combatant who falls into the power of an
adverse Party while failing to observe the requirements of the
second sentence of paragraph 3 were to be tried and punished,
the penalty should at most be disciplinary. This appears to be
the meaning of the "separate, but equal status for combatants
who are captured while failing to observe the minimal rule of
distinction set forth in the second sentence of paragraph 3",
which is the essence of paragraph 4, as the Report of Committee
III states.
1t any rate the apparent contradiction in the text of
paragraph 4 should not be exaggerated. Indeed, if the time
during which a combatant has to carry his arms openly is inter-
preted restrictively as many delegations have done, there would
seldom be an occasion for the forfeiture of prisoner—of—war
status to be invoked. Even according to the wider interpretation
of the term 'military deployment' in paragraph 3(b) the number
of cases in which paragraph 4 might be invoked would still be
very small. Seldom in practice a combatant falls into the power
of the adverse Party 'while' failing to meet the requirements
set forth in the second sentence of paragraph 3. In the vast
majority of cases, members of resistance and liberation
movements who fall into the power of the enemy, fall while not
engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to
an attack, and in such a case, combatants do not forfeit their
right to be combatants and prisoners of war, regardless of
whether in the past they failed to meet the requirements of' the
second sentence of paragraph 3. This is specifically provided
for in paragraph 5 of Prticle 44 of Protocol I which states:
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"5. Any combatant who falls into the power of an adverse
Party while not engaged in an attack or in a military
operation preparatory to an attack shall not forfeit his
right to be a combatant and a prisoner of war by virtue
of his prior activities."
The meaning and purpose of this paragraph are well
explained in the Report of Committee III. The Report states
that:
Iparagraph 5.... iouLd ensure that acv cccvatact
captured while not engaged in an attack or a military
operation preparatory to an attack retains his rights
as a combatant and a prisoner of war whether or not he
may have violated in the past the rule of the second
sentence of paragraph 3. This rule should, in many casas,
cover the great majority of prisoners and will protect
them from any efforts to find or fabricate past
histories to deprive them of their protection."1
To this, it may be added that the phrase "while not
engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to
an attack" seems to be wide enough to include any combatant
captured 'after' an attack in which he had participated, even
if in that attack he failed to meet the requirements of the
second sentence of paragraph 3. For example, if a combatant
throws a hand grenade at an enemy patrol and runs away and
afterwards was captured, he would still be protected by
paragraph 5.
In conclusion, it may be stated that Article 44, on the
1. Report of Committee III, third session, CDDH/236/Rev.1;
text in Levie, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 483-85, at 484.
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whole, remained faithful to the principle stated in paragraph
1 that, any combatant, as defined in Article 43 of Protocol I,
who falls into the power of an adverse Party shall be a
prisoner of war, and to the principle in paragraph 2, that,
violations of the rules of international law applicable in
armed comflict shall not deprive a combatant of his right to be
a combatant or, if he falls into the power of an adverse Party,
of his right to be a prioner of war e The only exception to this
latter rule, is where a combatant falls into the power of the
adverse Party 'while' failing to carry his arms openly during
a military engagement in which he is participating, or, while
failing to carry his arms openly during such a time as he is
visible to enemy personnel, while he is engaged in a military
deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is
to participate. A combatant who falls into the power of an
adverse Party while failing to carry his arms openly during the
military engagement in which he is taking part, or during such
time as he is visible to the enemy personnel while engaged in
a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in
which he is to participate forfeits his right to be a prisoner
of war, but remains entitled to the procedural and substantive
protection provided by the Third Geneva Convention.
On the other hand, any combatant who falls into the power
of an adverse Party while not engaged in an attack or in a
military operation preparatory to an attack does not forfeit
his right to be a combatant and a prisoner of war whether or
not in the past he failed to meet the requirement of carrying
arms openly as defined in paragraph 3 of Article 44.
Finally, it should be noted that Article 44 is without
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prejudice to the right of any person to be a prisoner of war
pursuant to ,crticle 4 of the Third Geneva Convention. This
saving clause is mentioned in paragraph 6 of article 44. It
should also be noted that all members of the armed forces as
defined in Prticle 43 of Protocol I, are also protected by the
First and Second Geneva Conventions of 1949 relative to the
protection of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of the
armed forces. This is specifically stated in paragraph 8 of
Article 44.
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A Theoretical and Operational Analysis of the
Definition of Civilians and Civilian Population
5 • 1 • 1ethods of Definition
As has always been the case in the law of armed
conflict with respect to definitions, the choice of techniques
and the terms of reference pose 'real' problems of theoretical
and practical importance. The ICRC broached these problems in
a comprehensive study made in 1971.1 The study categorized
the opinions of experts consulted by the ICRC in 1970 on
different topics of the law of armed conflict, among which
was the definition of the civilian and the civilian population.
On the need for a definition, the ICRC study reveals
that only a minority of the experts consulted by the ICRC
hesitated, or declined to develop the idea of a definition
- superfluous in their eyes. The majority of the experts
insisted on the need for a balanced definition which would
clearly specify the rights and duties of civilians. Such a
definition, in their view, "would permit the brake to be
applied to the arbitrariness which is all too frequently
manifest in the practice of armed conflicts, and which
2directly affects the civilian population."
In order to acheive this, the experts recommended
various methods which the ICRC study categorized in three
pairs of opposites:
1 • Global or special definition;3
1 See in particular, DoCument CE/3b, Geneva, January, 1971,
pp. 17-28; and Doc. CE/6b, pp. 24-26.
2. ICRC, Doc. CE/3b, p. 17.
3. Ibid., pp. 17-19.
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2. Positive or negative definition;1
3. Definition according to the status of the civilians
or according to their function in military operations.2
Actually, none of these methods excludes the utilisation
of the others; they overlap, combine, and may be multiplied
through any possible combination. Indeed, Article 50 of
Protocol I which defines 'civilians and civilian population'
appears to be, in the final analysis, a combination of elements
of the three categories mentioned above. Accordingly, it may
be useful to examine briefly these various methods of
definition.
1 •	A global definition in this context seems to refer to
a definition that treats the civilian population as a whole,
collectively, and as an entity, while the 'special definition'
breaks up that collectivity into sub—categories of varying
relationships to the military effort.
If this is so, it becomes not difficult to understand
why some experts "felt that the civilian population, taken
as a whole, cannot be defined as such in a 'precise' legaJ
document and that, consequently, one must restrict oneself
to defining certain categories or groups of individuals
which necessarily form part of the civilian population."3
In the same vein, but with more sophistication, one
expert spoke of the "macro—analytical" definition when
referring to the civilian population as a whole and of the
1. Ibid., pp . 19-20.
2. Ibid., pp. 20-24.
3. Ibid., pp. 17_19 Articles 14 and 15 of the Fourth
(civilian) Geneva Convention of 1949, are examples of
'special definition'.
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"microaflalytxcal" definition when refering to a specific
category of the civilian population."1
Perhaps the attitude of the British Manual of Military
Law (195B), and that of the United States Navy Manual (1959),
illustrate this point. In these Manuals the population of a
belligerent is divided into two classes, namely, the armed
forces and the peaceful population, with each class having
distinct rights and duties (macro-analytical definition), but
this division with "distinct rights and duties" has been made
"subject to the fact that the distinction between combatants
and non-combatants has become increasingly blurred", (thus
allowing for micro-analytical definition).2
To this, it may be added that the two Manuals have
adopted a negative definition of the civilian population as
well as a definition according to the status of civilians.
Thus, the British Manual of Military Law (1958), states:
Jt is one of the purposes of the laws of' war to ensure
that the individual who belongs to one class or the
other (i.e. armed forces or peaceful population) shall
not be permitted to enjoy the privileges of both. Thus
he must not be allowed to kill or wound members of the
army of the opposing belligerents and subsequently, 11'
captured to claim he is a peaceful citizen."3
In the United States Navy Manual of 1959, the population
of a belligerent is likewise divided into "two general classes:
the armed forces (combatants) and the civilian population
1 •
 ICRC, Doc. CE/3b, p. 18, n. 5.
2. See Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 10, pp.
135137
3. Ibid., p. 134.
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(non—combatants). Each class has specific duties and rights
in time of war, and no person can belong to both classes at
the same time."1
Reverting to the 'global or special' definition of the
civilian population, but without going into much detail, it
is believed that only a global definition of the civilian
population considered as an entity, and admitting of no
loopholes, may aspire to some protection of the civilian
population.
Qualifications, so general and open—ended such as
"subject to the fact that the distinction between combatants
and non—combatants has become increasingly 	 in the
military manuals cited above, amount to saying that the
protection of the civilian population is a matter of
discretion to the parties to the conflict.
2.	 As to the methods of positive or negative definition,
it appears that the majority of experts consulted by the ICRC
in 1970, were in favour of a negative definition of the
civilian population, 2 The arguments against a positive
definition of the civilian population were two: that it would
tend to ignore or neglect certain categories of the civilian
population and that it would create the grave danger of giving
the impression that the categories not mentioned are considered
- a contrario - as being licit personal objectives.3
Indeed, the same arguments can be advanced against a
negative definition. For unless the categories of persons
1	 Ibid., p. 135,
2. ICRC, Doc. CE/3b, p. 19.
3. Loc. cit.
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considered as permissible objects of attack were clearly
defined, the temptation to expand them might be even more
dangerous to the civilian population than the possible
neglect of a certain category of civilians or the dangers of
an interpretation a contrario.
Moreover, the notion of the civilian and the civilian
population has customarily been defined negatively, and there
is no evidence to suggest that a negative definition is more
favourable to the civilian population as the ICRC study
contends. Indeed, the ICRC itself admits that a negative
definition, "obviously involves the inconvenience of raising
1
the problem of persons considered as being military objectives."
3.	 This leads us to the crucial problem: definition
according to the status of civilians or according to their
functions in military operations.
1%ccording to the ICRC study, "the status of civilians
chosen to distinguish 'civil elements', (illicit objectives),
from'military elements', (licit objectives), is the criterion
which, historically speaking, was the first to be adopted."
To the ICRC, this would seem logical because it conformed to
conceptions generally held around the turn of this century
and according to which only members of the armed force5, and
other categories of persons enumerated in Articles 1 and 2
of the Hague Regulations of 1907 and Article 4 of the Third
Geneva Convention of 1949, had the right to attack or resist
the eneriiy. 2 Such categories of persons have already been
1, ICRC, Doc. CE/3b, p. 20.
2 •
 Loc. cit.
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dealt with. For the purposes of our discussion here, it is
sufficient to note that a definition accordin to the status
of civilians seems to be more of a definition of 'Lawful
Participation' in the armed conflict, than of a definition
of the civilian population as such. Besides, it has the
disadvantage of prejudging as 'criminal' acts of resistance
by persons not formally belonging to the categories of persons
entitled to prisoner of war status. Further, it leaves
unsettled and hence, open to abuse, that category of civilians
which carry out activities considered to be highly useful for
purposes of defence or offense such as the uorkforce in war
or war related industry.
Thu; on the whole, a definition of the civilian popul-
ation according to the status of civilians is more to the
satisfaction of the militarily powerful state which is in
fact or potentially an occupying power.
Definition of the civilian population according to their
function in military operations is a double edged weapon. In
the abstract, it has no intrinsic value. In the concrete, it
depends on which way it goes. On the whole it depends on
'which activities' would functionally assimilate civilians
to combatants. We shall revert to this subject again when
discussing Article 51, paragraph 3, which states that,
civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by Section I
of Part 4 of Protocol I, "unless and for such time as they
take a direct part in hostilities."
As far as wars of national liberation are concerned
the definition of civilians and civilian population is all
the more important. The main type of warfare in these armed
3a
conflicts is guerrilla warfare, as one expert consulted by
the ICRC noted:
"Because guerrilla warfare by its infrastructure calls
upon the whole population, there has often been a
temptation to consider that in such a conflict there
15 no longer any distinction between combatants and
non—combatants and to take this as a justification
for the forces opposing the guerrillas not to apply
the laws and customs of war."1
The ICRC experts, however, did not think that different
criteria should be worked out for guerrilla warfare whatever
the form it might take. Accordingly, the ICRC proposed a
definition taking the following 'objective criteria' as its
basis, to be applied in all types of armed conflict:
- Persons not belonging to the armed forces or any
organization attached to them, and
- Persons not participating directly in military
operations,
are considered to be civilian persons and are the civilian
population.
Perhaps the most articulate definition ever proposed
by the ICRC is the following:
"The civilian persons constitute the civilian
population. Civilians are those persons who do not form
part of the armed forces, nor of organizations attached
to them or who do not directly participate in military
operations, (or: in operations of a military character).
The above mentioned persons whose activities contribute
1, ICRC, Doc. CE/6b, p.25.
2 ICRC, Doc. CE/6b, p.25, 53, see also the ICRC Commentary.
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directly to the military effort do not, for that
reason, loose their status as civilians."1
The definition of civilians and civilian population
finally adopted by the Diplomatic Conference, by and large,
corresponds to this proposal of the ICRC.
5. 2. Definition of Civilians and Civilian Population in
Protocol I: Text and General Remarks
Article 50 of Protocol I, entitled "Definition of
Civilians and Civilian Population" reads as follows:
"1. A civilian is any person who does not belong to one
of the categories of persons referred to in Article
4A 1, 2, 3, and 6 of the Third Convention and in
Article 43 of this Protocol. In case of doubt whether
a person is a civilian, that person shall be consid-
ered to be a civilian.
2. The civilian population comprises all persona who
are civilians.
3. The presence within the civilian population of
individuals who do not come within the definition
of civilians does not deprive the population of its
civilian characters"
The provisions of this Article will be commented on in
the following sub—sections. Here, a-few general remarks may be
made.
First, in the light of the above discussion, it appears
1, ICRC, Doc. CE/3b, P. 26.
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that	 are defined negatively, universally and
collectively, and according to their status. The element of
'function' i.e. the participation or non—participation in
military operations, or more precisely, the loss of civilian
protection against effects of hostilities appears in Article
51, paragraph 3, of Protocol I.
Second, apart from necessary drafting modifications, the
present definition corresponds to ICRC draft Article 45, which
in turn was taken from a proposal submitted by the experts
of Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Federal. Republic of Germany,
the United Kingdom arid the United States of America. 1 However,
it may be useful to note that at the time the definition of
civilians and civilian population was adopted by Committee
III, Article 43, referred to in the first sentence of Article
50, was not 'yet' adopted. This Article has already been
discussed. For purposes of the present discussion, it may be
sufficient to note that Article 43, substantively, bears
little relation to its origin - (i.e. ICRC draft Article 42).
In form, however, ICRC draft Article 42, like Article 4,
paragraph 2 of the Third Geneva Convention which it was
intended to develop, gave the impression that members of an
organized resistance movement and members of national
liberation movements would be liable to be treated as civil -
ians if they failed to fulfil the pirequis1tes for the enjoyment
of prisoner—of—war status, even if they were actually members
of the armed forces of such movements. Article 43 of the
1. See ICRC's Report on the Work of the Conference of
Government Experts, Geneva, 1972, Vol. 2, p.78, Doc.
(CE/CaM Ill/PC 78).
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Protocol dispels such an impression, and, in order to avoid
any such unjustified connotations, the term 'categories of'
persons' was preferred to the usual terms 'armed forces' or
'combatants' as explained in the following sub-section.
The third remark to be made here concerns what might be
called'the problem of doubt'. The second sentence of paragraph
1 of 1rticle 50 states that "in case of doubt whether a person
is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a
civilian." Logically, there are two methods for solving the
problem of doubt. They are: judgement according to appearances,
and judgement according to 'available information'. The
Protocol does not say which method is to be followed. Logi-
cally, the two methods do not necessarily exclude each other,
and while both are open to abuse, especially in non-interstate
armed conflicts characterized by guerrilla warfare, it is
certainly the judgement according to appearances which
provides the better protection. However, opinions had already
differed on how 'the problem of doubt' should be solved, and
therefore, the problem needs to be properly examined and
assessed.
It should be noted that the problem of' doubt is not
confined to the definition of civilians and civilian
population, it is a problem that pervades the whole process
of planning, deciding upon and carrying out a military
operation or an attack. Thus, it is a problem of primary
importance to the whole question of the protection of
civilians and civilian objects against effects of hostiljtje5
The fourth and last remark to be made here before
undertaking the task of clarifying the issues raised in thj
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section is concerned with the last paragraph of Article 50,
namely, that the presence within the civilian population of
individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians
does not deprive the population of its civilian character.
The importance of such a provision need hardly be underlined.
The extent to which the presence of 'combatants' within the
civilian population has been abused in order to disguise
sheer vindictiveness and direct attacks against the civilian
population as such needs no pedant's footnotes to give it a
sense of realism.1
5.3. Terms of Reference
It is important to pay attention to the words 'categories
of persons', in paragraph 1. ICRC draft Article 45 used the
words, "categories of armed
	
but an amendment by
Belgium and Britain (cDDH/III/22) proposed to replace the
term, 'armed forces', in the ICRC text by 'combatants'2
It may be noted in this respect that several of the
experts consulted by the ICRC in 1970 considered that the
term 'combatants' was inappropriate because it tends to
prejudge the legal status of' the participants in the struggle.3
As this has been the case in almost all wars of national
liberation, it was feared that the amendment proposed by the
1. See in particular, Israel in Lebanon - The Report of' the
International Commision to enquire into reported violations
of International Law by Israel during its invasion of' the
Lebanon, (280 pages), published by Ithaca Press, London,
1933•
2. CDOH/III/22, 13 March, 1974, text in Levie, Protection of
War Victims, Vol. 3, p. 108.
3. See ICRC, Doc. CE/Gb, p • 6 et seq.
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United Kingdom and Belgium, if adopted, would be open to
abuse by the powers opposing the liberation movements, with
a view to denying to members of' liberation movements their
right to prisoner of war status. It seems, however, that
neither the representative of' the United Kingdom, nor that
of' Belgium made an effort to dispel this fear. This apparently
prompted the delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic to state categorically that "If the words 'armed
forces' were replaced by 'combatants' as tt
in document CDDH/1II/22, the text would unequivocally apply
to members of national liberation movements, who had been
recognized as combatants in a United Nations General Assembly
Resolution • 1
The Report of' Committee III does not say much, and the
Rapporteur (Mr. Baxter, U.S.A.), would only say that "the
term categories of persons' had been used instead of
'categories of armed forces' to avoid controversy2
The last sentence of paragraph 1 of' Article 50,
according to the Rapporteur of Committee III, had given the
Working Group "the most difficulty" and the text was the
result of "long discussions." 3 This might seem hard to believe
when the ICRC draft is compared with the final texts
The ICRC draft, (Article 45, paragraph 4), stated that:
"In case of doubt as to whether any person is a
civilian, that person shall be presumed to be
1. CDDH/IIISR.6, para. 20. See also the speeches of the
delegates from Tunisia, ibid., para. 14, and the U.S.S.R.,
Ibid., para. 19.
2. CODH/III/SR. 1, para. 16•
3. CDDH/III/SR. 1 0, para. 17.
4. ICRC	 Draft Additional Protocols - Commentary, 1973, p.55.
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The final text reads:
"In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that
person shall be considered to be a civilian,"1
Judging by appearances, the problem seems to be in
substituting the	 for the word 'presumed'.
But this was not the whole story. The fact of the matter is
that Britain and Belgium proposed to amend the ICRC text so
as to read:
"Unless there are grounds for supposing that he is about
to commit a hostile act, a person who appears to be a
civilian shall, for the purposes of' this section, be
treated as such."2
This amendment was criticized by a number of delegations.
To the ICRC representative, this amendment "was too vague".3
To other delegates, the amendment would amount to 'shoot first
and justify later'. They doubted whether the legal rules could
be extended to cover possible mistakes by soldiers. Further,
it was pointed out that the presumption of civilian status
in case of doubt might in practice aggravate the situation
of the persons in question. For example, members of organized
resistance movements formed among the civilian-population
would be liable to severe penalties if they could not prove
that they belonged to such movements. The status of prisoner
of war had in some cases proved far more advantageous than
that of civilian.4
1. Protocol I, Article 50, para. I.
2 •
 CDOH/III/22, 13 larch, 1974, text in Levie, op. cit. p.l9.
3. CODH/III/SR. 5, para. 18.
4. See for example remarks of the representatives of: Syria,
CDOH/III/SR.6, para,12; Venezuela, CDDH/III/SR.6, para 22;
Poland, CDOH/III/SR.5, para.29,30: U.S.S.R., CDDH/III/SR.
5, para. 31
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In the eyes of its sponsors, however, the United Kingdom
and Belgian amendment was intended above all "to avoid any
specification of the contradiction which, (in their view),
existed between Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention of
'1949 and Article 45 of draft Protocol 1," (now Article 50).1
Article 5, paragraph 2 of the Third Geneva Convention
of 1949 states that:
"Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having
committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the
the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories
enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the
protection of the present convention until such time
as their status has been determined by a competent
2
tribunal."
Obviously the presumption of P.O.L1. status in this
paragraph becomes operative 'after' the belligerent acts have
been committed and the person or persons concerned have fallen
in the hands of the enemy, while the presumption of the
'civilian status' operates 'before'. On this account they
cannot possibly contradict each other.
On the other hand, the British delegate, rir. Eaton,
rejected the view that "adoption of the United Kingdom and
Belgian amendment uould have the effect of increasing the
dangers to which the civilian population was exposed." The
intention of the proposal and, in his view, its effects, were
in fact the opposite. In cases of' doubt such as were
1. As stated by the Italian delegation, CDDH/III/SR. 6, para. 2
2 •
 See ICRC Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention, PP.
77-78.
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envisaged by the paragraph, he said, "some element of
subjectivity was unavoidable. The sponsors of the proposal
had triad to make the criteria as strict as possible to put
1
a heavy burden of proof on the soldier."
The Report of Committee III had the following to say
on the presumption that, "in case of doubt whether a person
is a Civilian, that person shall be considered to be a
civilian":
"There were generally two divergent tendencies in the
discussion of this paragraph in the Committee. On the
one hand, it was thought desirable by some delegations
that the presumption should be retained as drafted by
the ICRC in order to preclude unscrupulous belligerents
from denying the protection of the Protocol to
civilians. On the other hand, several delegations were
of the view that the provision should be redrafted in
such a way as to make it more readily understandable
to the soldier. It was also pointed out in the discus—
ions that there was a possibility of co\t'Uct
this presumption and that contained in the second
paragraph of 1%rticle 5 of the Third Geneva Convention
of 1949• It was agreed in the Working Group that the
concept of presumption gave rise to such difficulties
that the word presumed should be replaced by the word
'considered'. The Working Group was also of the view
that the paragraph as thus amended, would not be
inconsistent with Article 5 of the Third Geneva
1 •
 CDDH/III/SR. 6 para. 32.
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Convention of 1949, as the two provisions were intended
to apply to different circumstances. On that basis, it
was possible to arrive at a convergence of views on the
text. U1
5.4. The Problem of Doubt and the Doctrine of' 'vailable
Information'.
In spite of these clarifications, it is believed that
not all ambiguities have been removed. The main problem is
not whether the word'considered' is more understandable to
the soldier than the word 'presumed', but whether the word
'considered' has solved the problem of'	 The rule that,
"in case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person
shall be considered a civilian", still leaves the judgement
to the soldier who, before acting, will have to judge whether
he uas in doubt. So he will have either to judge by appearances,
or he will have to recall his 'available information' and in
a moment make a decision whether to shoot or not. But by his
very instinct of self—preservation, the soldier is more
inclined to give himself, rather than his potential victim,
the benefit of doubt. Thus, although the 'rule of doubt'
appears on the surface to be a compromise between the
protection of the soldier and the protection of the civilian,
with apparent leaning towards the protection of' the civilian,
in practice it is more likely to be just the opposite.
1. Report of Committee III, First Session, 1974, para 39.
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Accordingly, one may wonder whether it was wise to
bring the idea of doubt into the field of the protection of
the civilian population.
However, having been brought in, the rule of doubt
(Article 50, paragraph 1) may be approached from two different
points, which, for convenience, will be referred to here as
the'Uestern view' and the'Chinese vjew'.
In almost identically worded statements, the delegations
of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Italy,
Canada, and the Federal Republic of Germany said that in their
view, 1 "Commanders and others responsible for planning,
initiating or executing attacks, necessarily had to reach
decisions on the basis of their assessment of' the information
from all sources which was available to them at the relevant
time." This interpretation, in their view, applies ta all the
Articles of Section I of Part 4 of Protocol I including
Article 50 (definition of civilians and civilian population)
and Article 52 (general protection of civilian objects).
At first sight, it might seem difficult to object to
such statements without offending 'Common sense', or
discrediting the principle of good faith, or judicial preced-.
ants. But that an element of subjectivity is involved which
may jeopardize the whole protection of civilians and civilian
objects, should also not be underestimated.
It is of course not difficult to theorize on 'actual'
1, For their statements see CDDH/SR. 41, Annex., and CDDH/SR.42,
Annex. The statement of the United Kingdom may be found in
CDDH/SR. 41, para. 121,
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andIpresurned knowledge and 'error' in judgement in order to
fix the limits of responsibility, 1 but it is not at all easy
to put the theory into practice. Governments are still in the
habit of what one writer has described as "the nationalization
of truth.
Propaganda warfare, charismatic attitudes, perceived
or projected images whether of one's own or of the enemy's
are but too ready for the'cover up', and if the worst comes
to the worst and attempts to cover up war crimes did not work,
either because the evidence was too strong for refutation
because the insistence on the 'cover up' was more damaging,
politically or militarily, a scapegoat would not be difficult
to find. Thus, cases which may intrinsically be of 'systemic
responsibility' could easily be watered down to 'personal
responsibility'.
It is not suprising, therefore, that Lieutenant Calley
was reluctantly tried and convicted as if the massacre at
FlyLai of an estimated 400-500 Vietnamese civilians, men,
women and children, was an isalat€d iccic^nt. 1or Is it
suprising that the initial reaction of the Israeli Cabinet
to the disclosure of their involvement in the massacre of
Palestinian civilians in Sabra and Chatila refugee camps in
Beirut between 15 and 18 September, 1982, was that they "had
no direct knowledge other than news reports."3
The massacres of Vietnamese civilians at Ily Lai and of'
Palestinian civilians in Sabra and Chatila camps in West
Beirut, suggest the general pattern in the cover—up; denial
1. See Kaishoven, Reaffirmation and Development of' International
Humanitarian Law...Part II, N.Y.I.L. 1978, pp. 118119.
2. See Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflicts,
pp . 318-323.
3. See The Times, ilonday, Sept. 20, 1982, p. 1
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of knowledge; a pledge to launch an enquiry; and attempts
to conceal naked vindictivness by the appearance and
rectitude of	 battles. For example, in the case of
Ely Lai, the Brigade Commander, under whose leadership
Lieutenant Calley was serving, "reported the killing of 128
'combatants', in order to mask what had really happened.
Soldiers who expressed distress at what had taken place were
warned to keep their feelings to themselves."1
The massacre of Sabra and Chatila was preceeded by
frequent allegations by the Israeli Defense Ilinister, Ariel
Sharon, and his Chief of Staff, General Eitan, that the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO.) had left two thou-
sand of its forces behind, in civilian dress, in Sabra and
Chatila camps - an allegation that has never been substant-
iated - either before or after the perpetration of the
massacre. In fact, on the eve of the massacre the two camps
were, in strict legal terminology, 'an open town' which the
Israeli forces could enter without having to fight, but
legally were not allowed to enter by virtue of the agreement
reached through the mediation of Philip Habib, the American
President's special envoy to the rliddle East and according to
which the PLO evacuated its forces from West Beirut. The
Palestinians faithfully observed their commitments, the
Israelis did not.2
Even while the massacre was being committed at Sabra
and Chatila the Israeli Cabinet issued a statement on 17
1 •
 Karsten, Law Soldiers and Combat, 1978, p. 33.
2. For a full account of the massacres at Sabra and Chatila,
see Israel in Lebanon, Report of the International
Commision, 1983, pp. 162-183.
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September, 1982, in which it alledged that"about 2,000
'terrorists' equipped with modern and heavy weapons, remained
in West BBirut, thus blatantly violating the departure
agreement ,,1
The massacre of the Vietnamese civilians at ('y Lai, and
the massacre of Palestinian civilians in the camps of Sabra
and Chatila suggest the extent to which 'official lies' may
go in the name of 'available information'. They further pose
sharply the question of the dividing line between 'available
j fl frmat j on and 'obsession with the image of' the enemy'. The
two are closely interrelated, and more often than not
'obsession with the image of' the enemy'renders the legal
protection of the civilian population largely illusory and
'the available information' a matter of mere convenience.
For example, the American obsession with the Vietcong
in Vietnam had led many to see in every Vietnamese a member
of the Vietcong. A passage from Lieutenant Calley's testimony
may illustrate the point. He said:
"... if' those people weren't all VC then prove it to
me Show me that someone was for the American Forces
there. Show me that someone helped us and fought the
VC. Show me that someone wanted us: one example only!
I didn't see any... Our task force commander - well,
the Colonel's dead and I'd rather not say. His staff,
though, said it's a VC area and everyone there was a
VC or a VC sympathizer. "And that's because he just
isn't young enough or pid enough to do anything but
1. Ibid., p . 167.
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sympathize." I even heard a brigadier general say, "My
God! There	 a Vietnamese in this Godamn area! They
are all VC" I believed it. And as soon as I understood
1 t,I wasn't frustrated anymore11
Another testimony comes from an American Pilot: he said
in part:
far as the clearance to fire went, my first three
months I never heard of the term 'clearance to fje•
If there was somebody we thought might be VC by his
actions, by running or hiding, he was a dead man.
We had pretty much our own show. We did not have to ask
for clearance... An airforce forward controller, who
co—ordinates air strikes from jets, told me another
time, "If you have trouble obtaining clearance to fire,
just holler out that your'e receiving fire and we'll
send jets in to bomb the hell out of the place, whether
or not you actually receive fire, or whether or not
there are any GIapons in the area at all."2
Among the hundreds of' citations which Karsten collected
for his excellent analysis of' the 'Reasons Whys the laws of'
war are violated, 3 there is a wealth of' evidence to suggest
that one cannot realistically entrust the protection of the
civilian popultation to assessment by "commanders or others
responsible for planning, deciding upon or executing attacks",
on'avajj.able information'. Where the leadership is lax and
the decision making is largely decentralized 'available
1 •
 As quoted by Richard Falk, Methods and Means of' Warfare,
Ch.1, In Torboof (ad), Law and Responsibility in Warfare,
1975, p. 48.
2. Quoted from Karsten, Law, Soldiers and Combat, 1978, p.98.
3. Ibid., Ch. 2, pp. 32-123, esp. pp . 70-111.
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information' becomes everyone's game and thus hardly
distinguishable from mere convenience.
But even the centralized decision making in the case
of the latest Israeli invasion of Lebanon produced a record
of atrocities parallel to that of Vietnam.
As is well known, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, to
destroy the political and military structure of' the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon, was commenced by
two days of intensive air raids covering Beirut and most of
Southern Lebanon, on what Israel alleged to be the PLO's
military positions. A massive land invasion followed, on June
6th, 1982. By June 17th, estimates of invading forces were
put at 9 armoured divi5ions. On the same day, June 17th, the
PLO Chairman, Yasser Arafat, sent a letter to the u.ri.
Secretary General demanding that the United Nations send an
International. Commision to investigate the Israeli crimes.
The letter claimed that more than 600,000 people were made
homeless, 30,000 civilians killed or injured, 10,000 civilians
missing, 14 Palestinian Refugee camps transformed into rubble
and 3 Lebanese cities, Sidon, lyre and Nabateyeh turned into
1
ruins.
For the remainder of the 79 days of fierce fighting
against the PLO forces and the militias of' their Lebanese
allies, besieged West Beirut and its outskirts to the east
and south were under constant bombardment from land, sea and
air by Israeli forces, which used cluster and phosphorus bombs
on a larga scale than ever before in the long Arab—Israeli
1 •
 As reported by Radio Moscow, 17.00 CMI, Radio Kuwait and
the Radio of' Saudi Arabia, on 17 June, 1982.
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conflict. The fiercest attacks came on the 12th August, when
Beirut and the Palestinian camps were subjected to indiscrim-
inate 10 hour non—stop air raids.1
Indeed, indiscriminate bombardment was the normal
pattern of conducting hostilities by Israeli forces. During
the siege of West Beirut, electricity, water, food and medical
supplies were cut off. Israel demanded the withdrawal from
Lebanon of an estimated 6 to 7 thousand Palestinian fighters
besieged in West Beirut as a Condition for lifting the siege.
The Israeli estimate of a maximum 6 to 7 thousand Palestinian
combatants in Beirut was apparently taken by the media the
world over as an uncontestable fact and was repeated with
'certainty and emphasis' in almost every news bulletin through-
out the siege. Yet, when agreement was reached on the
evacuation, the PLO in fact evacuated more than 11 thousand
fighters.
Yet the Israeli Defence rlinister, Ariel Sharon, and his
Chief—of—Staff, General Eitan, in concerted propaganda with
the Israeli Prime minister Begin and Foreign minister Shamir,
and the whole Israeli Cabinet, alledged that the PLO had left
behind, in the Palestinian camps of West Beirut, two thousand
of its forces in civilian dress, 'terrorists' in official
Israeli parlance. The 'two thousand terrorists' turned out
to be the massacred Palestinian civilians of Sabra and Chatila.
It is not necessary to elaborate on the political
purposes of the cover—up or of the massacre itself. Suffice
it to ask: was it a coincidence that the same Zionist
leadership responsible for the massacre of Palestinian civil-
1. See The Times, 13 August, 1982.
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lana at Deir Yassin on April 9th, 1948, was the same leadership
responsible for the massacre of Sabra and Chatila? Was the
conduct of' hostilities by Israel based on any available
information?
The legal qualifications of the crime at its lowest
denomination, is the crime of attacking civilians as such,
with terrorization as the primary purpose, while at its highest
denomination it is the crime of genocide pure and simple.
At this juncture a word of caution seems necessary.
What is mainly under discussion is the principle of 'available
information' stated or restated by the Western delegations
to the Diplomatic Conference, "that military commanders and
others responsible for planning, initiating or executing
attacks necessarily had to reach decisions on the basis of
their assessment of the information from all sources which
was available to them at the relevant time." The principle
is obviously open to abuse. But the reader should not on that
account attribute to those delegations an intention of'
restating the principle of 'available information' for the
purpose of abusing it or allowing others to abuse it.
This being said, the principle of'available information'
should now be clarified because of the very statement of' the
principle, as made by Western delegations is open to different
interpretations.
A classical statement of the principle may be found in
that portion of the "Hostage Case" decided by Military
Tribunal V at Nuremberg, on February 19, 1948. One of the
defendents in this case, the German General Rendulic was
charged with wanton destruction of private and public property
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in the province of Finmark, Norway, during the retreat from
Russian troops of the 20th Mountain Irmy under his command.
General Rulic defended himself on the grounds of military
necessity. In this case the Nurenburg Tribunal found that an
examination of the facts in retrospect can well sustain the
conclusion that there was no military necessity for the
destruction and devastation. But it also found that the
information obtained concerning the intentions of the Russians
was limited. The extreme cold and the short days made air
reconnaissance almost impossible., 1 Moreover in his case, as
in other cases of general devastation committed by the German
armies, "the Germans were in retreat under arduous conditions
wherein their commands were in serious danger of being cut
off." 2 It was with this situation confronting him that he
(General Rendu].ic) carried out the 'scorched earth' policy
which was the basis of the charge against him. The portion
of the judgement which concerns us here reads as follows:
"There is evidence in the record that there was no
military necessity for this destruction and devastation.
1n examination of the facts in retrospect can well
sustain this conclusion. But we are obliged to judge
the situation as it appeared to the defendant at the
time. If the facts were such as would justify the action
by the exercise of judgement, after giving consideration
to all the factors and existing possibilities, even
though the conclusion reached may be faulty, it cannot
1 •
 Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 1 0, p . 387.
2, For a survey of these cases, see McDougal and Feliciano,
Law and Minimum Public Order, pp. 600-604.
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be said to be criminal. ... We are not called upon to
determine whether urgent military necessity for the
devastation and destruction in the province of Finmark
actually existed. We were concerned with the question
whether the defendant at the time of its occurance
acted within the limits of honest judgement on the basis
of the conditions prevailing at the time... It is our
consisdered opinion that the conditions as they
appeared to the defendent at the time were sufficient
upon which he could honestly conclude that urgent
military necessity warranted the decision made. This
being true, the defendent may have erred in the exercise
of his judgement but he was guilty of no criminal act."1
It may be noted in passing that under the Geneva
Conventions and Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions,
General Rendulic would have still been guilty, but this is
beside the point. The point which the Tribunal has emphasised
is that it is not sufficient that the decision be taken
according to available information. The available information
must amount to facts not fantasies, and should be such as
would create an urgent military necessity, and the decision
taken should be within the limits of honest judgement after
giving consideration to all factors and existing possibilities.
If all this was taken into consideration, then, and only then,
the defendant would not be guilty.
Under Protocol I, "those who plan or decide upon an
attack," may be considered to have acted within the limits
1. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 10, pp. 387-88•
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of honest judgement if they took the 'precautions in attack'
enumerated in article 57. Indeed, these precautions make it
difficult for the technologically advanced states to invoke
the 'available information' or the lack of it as an excuse
for the commision of war crimes. Article 57 of Protocol I
requires that in the conduct of military operation "constant
care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians
and civilian objects." Those who plan or decide upon an attack,
are under obligation to do everything feasible to verify that
the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians not
civilian objects and are not subject to special protection
but are military objectives which by their nature, location,
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or
neutralization, in the ruling circumstances, offers a definite
military advantage.
Article 57 of Protocol I, also requires those who plan
or decide upon an attack to take all feasible precautions in
the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to
avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian
objects. Further, they are required to refrain from deciding
to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated to be gained from the attack.
This is not a complete list of the precautions which
those who plan, decide upon or conduct military operations
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are bound to take, but they are among the most important ones,
and all can be regarded as manifestations of the classical
doctrine of available information laid down in the Nuremberg
judgement in the Hostage Case quoted above. For the essence
of that doctrine is that commanders, in reaching their
decisions on the basis of available information, are required
to act within the limits of honest judgement, an indispensable
element of which is the giving of due consideration to all the
factors and existing possibilities at the time of decision.
Nevertheless, the doctrine of available information
remains open to abuse. Ploreover, details of planning and
decision—making are usually treated as guarded secrets, and
therefore, those who plan or decide upon attack remain their
own judges until the facts are made public. One cannot
therefore entrust the protection of the civilian population
against effects of military operation to the doctrine of
available information. In this respect, the Chinese view
seems to offer a better alternative.
The Chinese delegation to the Diplomatic Conference:
"considered that any person who was not a member of
the armed forces or who did not participate directly
in military poerations was a civilian and should receive
full protection against attack, deportation to
concentration camps and every form of persecution...
People's militia and guerrilla fighters in wars of
national liberation should be protected, since they
were basically civilians who had been forced to take
up arms in self—defence against imperialist repression
in order to win independencB and safeguard their right
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to survival. When not participating directly in military
operations, members of people's militia or guerrilla
movements should have civilian status and benefit from
the protection granted to civilians."1
In our view, these remarks do not exclude the principle
of available information altogether, but they guard against
the 'exploitation' of that principle by giving protection
against attacks to members of peoples's militia or guerrilla
movements when not participating directly in military
operations, and by giving them the protection of prisoner-
of—war status if captured, since they are members of the
armed forces of the liberation movement concerned.
It might be thought that the Chinese view was
ideologically motivated and that it favours liberation
movements by giving them the protection of both civilian
status and prisoner—of—war status. This is not the case,
because Article 50 of Protocol I which defines'civilians and
civilian population' specifically states in paragraph 3 that,
"The presence within the civilian population of'
individuals who do not come within the definition of'
civilians does not deprive the population of its
civilian character."
This paragraph applies equally to wars of national
liberation as well as to interstate armed conflicts and even
to civil wars, although there is no corresponding provision
in Protocol u. 2 It is indeed one of the best provisions,
1 CDOH/III/SR. 7, para. 52-54.
2 Actually, Article 25 of draft Protocol II did contain an
identically worded provision and was adopted at Committee
level in 1975, but the whole Article (25) was deleted in
plenary.
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if not also the best provision the Diplomatic Conference had
adopted. The importance of this provision (i.e. Article 50,
paragraph 3) to the protection of the civilian population
against effects of military operations was forcefully
expressed by the ICRC thus:
"Unless the definition of the civilian population were
to lose all substance and the protection to which it
was entitled were to be invalidated, it must be
recognized that the presence of single individuals not
answering to the definition of civilian should not in
any way modify the civilian character of a population."1
Paragraph 3 of Article 50 of. Protocol I must therefore
be regarded as an absolute rule and the attack in violation
of this rule must be recognized as an attack against the
civilian population as such, even if the attack was claimed
to be directed only against the individuals who do not come
within the definition of civilians and even if the attacker
was in no doubt as to the presence of members of the armed
forces of the adversary among the civilian population.
Otherwise, the whole law regarding the conduct of hostilities
would be reduced to a so—called proportionality rule 2 and a
statement of understanding to the effect that "commanders
and others responsible for planning, deciding upon or
executing attacks necessarily have to reach decisions on the
1 •
 ICRC, Commentary on Draft Additional Protocols to the
Geneva Conventions, Geneva, 1973, p. 56.
2. The so—called 'propotionality' rule has been laid down in
para. 5(b) of Aticle 51 of Protocol I, which considers as
indiscriminate Han attack which may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated."
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basis of their assessment of the information from all sources
which is available to them at the relevant time."
Reverting now to the provision in paragraph 1 of Article
50 of Protocol I, that "In case of doubt whether a person is a
civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian", it
may be noted that the joint amendment proposed by Belgium and
the United Kingdom seems to bear out the meaning better. The
joint amendment proposed to formulate as follows:
"Unless there are reasonable grounds for supposing that he
is about to commit a hostile act, a person who appears to
be a civilian shall, for the purposes of this section,
(i.e., Section 1 of Part IV of Protocol I), be treated
as such."1
Subject to the clarification that such a person should, if
arrested, be treated as a prisoner—of—war if he was a member of
the armed forces within the meaning of Article 43 of Protocol I,
it seems clear that the intention was to judge, at first sight,
by appearance. Accordingly, the provision that "in case of doubt
whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered
to be a civilian", should be understood to mean that a person
who appears to be a civilian shall not be made the object of
attack, unless of course, that person himself was carrying out
an attack, or was about to attack.
1 •
 Doc. CDDH/III/22, 13 March, 1974, Text in Levie, Vol. III,
p . 109.
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6.	 The Distinction between Civilian Objects and Military
Objectives: The Concept of Military Objectives.
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the
civilian population and civilian objects against effects of'
hostilities, the parties to the conflict are required at all
times to distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives
and consequently direct their operations only against military
objectives. This requires a definition of civilian objects and
military objectives.
Paragraph 1 of Article 52 of Protocol I defines civilian
objects negatively: "Civilian objects are all objects which are
not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2".
Paragraph 2 states that, in so far as objects are concerned,
"military objectives are limited to those objects which by their
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution
to military action and whose total or partial destruction, cap-
ture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time,
offers a definite military advantage."
The protection of civilian objects, however, is not left
solely to this definition. The Protocol, like the Brussels
Declaration of 1874 and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907
and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, singles out certain civilian
objects for varying degrees of protection, provided they were
not used for military purposes. Thus, for example, Articles 12,
13 and 14 of the Protocol protect medical units and specify the
conditions under which the protection would cease; Article 53
protects cultural objects and places of worship; Article 54
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objects indispensable to the survival, of the civilian population;
crticle 55 protects the natural environment; and FtrtiQle 55
protects works and installations containing dangerous forces.
These, and other relevant rules are examined in the following
chapter in the context of the general protection of the civilian
population.
In this section we examine at length the relationship
between the general protection of the civilian population and
civilian objects, and the concept of military objectives. This
will be done in historical order and will cover attempts at a
definition from the Brussels Declaration of' 1874 to Protocol I
of 1977
In the Brussels Declaration of 1874, in the Hague
Regulations of 1899 and 1907 respecting the laws and customs of
war on land, and in Hague Convention (Ix) of 1907 concerning
bombardment by naval forces, the concept of' military objectives
was circumscribed by a broad distinction between 'defended' and
localities and by a broad reference to the
requirements of imperative military necessity'. But neither
nor 'undefended' localities were defined. We consider
first the concept of 'undefended' localities in these Conventions
and, for convenience, in Protocol I as well.
Rrticle 25 of the Brussels Declaration of 1874 laid down
that:
"Fortified places are alone liable to be seized. Towns
agglomerations of houses or villages, which are open and
undefended, cannot be attacked or bombarded."
Article 25 of' the Hague Regulations of 1899, likewise,
provided that:
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"The attack or bombardment of towns, villages, habitations
or buildings which are not defended, is prohibited,"
In Article 25 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 an important
addition was made:
"The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns,
villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is
prohibited."
Two remarks may be made at this juncture. First, while
Article 25 of' the Brussels Declaration referred to "open and
undefended" localities (i.e., open for occupation and undefended)
Article 25 of the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907 referred
only to "not defended" or "undefended"; the word ?opent has
been discarded. Second, the phrase "by whatever means" was
deliberately added to cover attacks and bombardments from the
.1
air.
In marked contrast was Hague Convention (Ix) of 1907
concerning naval bombardment. While Article 1 of' this Convention
reiterated the prohibition for naval forces to bombard "ports,
villages, habitations, or buildings which are not defended",
Article 2 of the Convention excluded from this prohibition the
following objects:
"Ililitary works, military or naval establishments, depots
of arms or material of war, shops and establishments
suitable to be utilized for the needs of the enemy's army
or navy, and vessels of war then in port."
1 •
 See Jennings, Open—Towns, British Year Book of International
Law, vol. 22, 1945, p. 260; Oppenheim—Lauterpacht, Internat-
ional Law, Vol. 2, seventh edition, 1952, p. 517; Schwarzen-
berger, International Law, vol. 2, 1968, p. 146; Geoffrey Best
Humanity in Warfare, 1980, p. 253.
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According to Article 2, the commander of a naval force may,
a demand and a reasonable delay", destroy these objects
by artillary, if no other measures are possible, and if the local
authorities have not proceeded to such destruction within the
time fixed. The Article states that the commander incurs no
responsibility in this case for the accidental damage which may
be occasioned by the bombardment. Moreover, if military
necessity, requiring immediate action, does not permit a delay
to be accorded, the commander may still destroy these objects
with artillery, but he must take "the necessary measures to
relieve the city as much as possible of distress."
This exception or departure from the strict prohibition
laid down in Article 25 of the Hague Regulations of 1899 and
1907, has been explained on the ground that:
"Article 2 was designed to meet the special circumstances
of naval warfare; for whereas the commander of an army
can take possession of an undefended place and so deny to
the enemy the use of its military resources, the naval
commander usually can only deny such resources to the
"1
enemy by destroying them with shell fire.
This explanation, however, is not as convincing as It might
seem. First, if the alleged special considerations of naval
warfare were the reason behind the exception made in Article 2
of Hague Convention (ix), why were these considerations which
apply with even greater force to the circumstances of aerial
warfare, not taken into consideration when Article 25 of the
Hague Regulations of' 1907 was adopted. Jennings himself, who
1. Jennings, op. cit., p. 260.
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made the above—quoted explanation admits that the phrase "by
uhatever	 was deliberately added to extend the prohibition
of attacking or bombarding undefended localities to aerial
attacks. Second, although as noted above, the Hague Regulations
of 1899 and 1907 referred only to 'undefended' and not to 'open
and undefended' localities, these terms continued to be used by
some writers and some military manuals interchangeably. Thus,
for example, Jennings insisted that "the equation between the
'undefended' town and the 'open' town still stands. It is
impossible", he said, "to conceive of' a truly ônde?ended town
which is not also open in every sense of the word."1
The British military manual of 1958 on land warefare adopted
Jennings' view and, in fact, expressly referred its readers to
Jennings' article on 'open towns'. The British military manual
defined and undefended or open? town as follows:
t29Q• An undefended or 'open' town is a town which is so
completly undefended from within or without ... that the
enemy may enter and take possession of it without fighting
or incurring
If this was also the definition of undefended localities
for purposes of Hague Convention (Ix) concerning bombardment by
naval forces, it would be impossible to imagine the existence
of' a military necessity that would justify the bombardment of an
undefended locality, by naval forces. It would also be
impossible to justify the incidental injury to civilian and
civilian objects which may be occasioned by such a bombardment.
This is probably why Protocol I additional to the Geneva
1 Jennings, op. cit., p. 261.
2. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, vol. 10, p. 415.
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Conventions of 1949 made no exception with regard to undefended
localities. Article 59(1) of the Protocol stated that:
"It is prohibited for the Parties to the conflict to
attack, by whatever means, non—defended localities."
Since the Protocol's provisions with respect to attacks
apply to all attacks from land, sea or air against objectives
on land, Article 59(1) of the Protocol, in due course, will
supersede that of Article 2 of the Hague Convention (Ix)
concerning bombardment by naval forces of military objectives in
undefended localities.
It is also important to note that at the Diplomatic
Conference of' Geneva (1974_1977), there was no opposition to
thB prohibition "to attack, by any means whatsoever, non—
defended localities." But opinions differed on the application
of the principle. On this matter there were five tendencies in
the Conference: those who wished to see non—defended localities
established by unilateral declaration; those who wished to see
them established by agyreement; those who wished to limit them
to an area in or near a contact zone; those who wished to permit
them also in a hinterland; and those who wished to provide a
mechanism for creating non—defended localities even where it
would take some further time to remove all combatants from the
2
locality.
The result - Article 59 of' the Protocol - permitted the
establishment of undefended localities by a unilateral
declaration if certain conditions were fulfilled, but it
1. See Article 49 (3) of' Protocol I.
2. Report to the Third Committee on the Work of' the Working
Group, CommitteB III, 13 tlarch 1975, in Levie, Protection of
War Victims, vol. 3, 1980, p. 363.
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required agreement for the establishment of' such localities in
cases where the prescribed conditions were not fulfilled. The
establishment of undefended localities by means of a unilateral
declaration addressed to the adverse Party is regulated by
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Article 59. The key paragraph 2 of'
this Article provides:
"The appropriate authorities of' a Party to the conflict
may declare as a non—defended locality any inhabited place
near or in a zone where armed forces are in contact which
is open for occupation by an adverse Party. Such a
locality shall fulfil the following conditions:
a) all combatants, as well as mobilB weapons and mobile
military equipment must have been evacuated;
b) no hostile use 8hall be made of fixed military
installations or establishments;
c) no acts of' hostility shall be committed by the
authorities or by the population; and
d) no activities in support of military operations shall
be undertaken H
Paragraph 3 of Article 59 explains that the presence in
this locality, of persons specially protected under the Geneva
Conventions and the Protocol, and of police forces retained for
the sole purpose of' maintaining law and order, is not contrary
to the conditions laid down in paragraph 2. Accordingly, the
presence of military medical personnel, civil defence personnel,
civilian police forces, wounded and sick military personnel, as
well as military chaplains, is not contrary to the conditions
laid down in paragraph 2.1
1 This enumeration was made in draft Article 52 of Protocol I
as proposed by the ICRC.
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According to paragraph 4 of Article 59, the declaration
made under paragraph 2 has to be addressed to the adverse Party
and has to define and describe, as precisely as possible, the
limits of the undefended locality. The Party to the conflict to
which the declaration is addressed has to acknowledge its receipt
and consequently has to treat the locality as a non—defended
locality "unless the conditions laid down in paragraph 2 are
not in fact fulfilled", in which event it has immediately to so
inform the Party making the declaration. In such an eventuality,
the locality continues to enjoy the protection provided by the
other provisions of the Protocol and the other rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict.
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of' ArtiCle 59 of Protocol I deal with
the establishment of non—defended localities by special
agreement even if such localities do not fulfil the conditions
laid down in paragraph 2. But agreement in such a case seems
more hypothetical than real and therefore, like the Article on
the establishment of demilitarized zones by special agreement,
they are more likely to remain idle.
Finally, paragraph 7 states the obvious, that a locality
looses its status as a non—defended locality when it ceases to
fulfil the conditions laid down in paragraph 2 or in the
agreement referred to in paragraph 5 of' the Article. But in
such an eventuality, the locality continues to enjoy the
protection provided by the other provisions of the Protocol and
the other rules of international law applicable in armed conf'
lict.
It should be noted that the declaration referred to in
paragraph 2 is meant to facilitate the observance of the
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prohibition to attack, by any means whatsoever, non—defended
localities. In other words, the declaration is not a condition
for the establishment of' the status of non—defended localities;
it merely declares the fact that a certain locality is
undefended, and therefore attacks on the locality will be
illegal. It should be emphasized that Article 59 of Protocoll
was not intended to depart from customary international law
under which non—defended localities are protected regardless of
any declarations to that effect.
In conclusion, it may be stated that the prohibition to
attack or bombard undefended localities was absolute for land
and air forces by virtue of ArtiCle 25 of' the Hague Regulations
of 1907. Article 2 of Hague Convention (IX) which allowed naval
forces to bombard military objectives in undefended localities
was an unjustified exception for the obvious reason that there
is no military necessity for it. fnalogies have sometimes been
made on Article 2 of Hague Convention (Ix) of 1907 with a view
to extend the allowance to aerial attacks. But analogies, what-
ever may be their strength cannot overrule express provisions
of' law. There is no legalbsis for the extension of Article 2
of Hague Convention (Ix) to aerial attacks. Article 59 of'
Protocol I has rightly withdrawn the licence given to naval
forces to bombard military objectives in undefended locality.
Consequently, the prohibition to attack undefended localities
has become absolute, provided the conditions stipulated in
ArtiCle 59 (2) have been fulfilled.
It may be noted that neither the concept of undefended
localities, nor the concept of defended localities were defined
in the Hague Conventions. Article 25 of the Declaration of'
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of Brussels of 1574 prohibited the attack or bombardment of
'open and undefended' localities. The Hague Regulations of lggg
and 1907 discarded the word 'open' which meant open for occup-
ation. In 1907 it was probably immaterial whether one spoke of
'open and undefended' or spoke of 'undefended' pure and simple.
It was so because available means of warfare at the time were
not yet capable of attacking localities beyond the enemy's front
line. And although the advent of the aircraft was then envisaged,
the air force was apparently conceived as an auxilliary to land
forces, not as an independent force s This may explain the
exclusion of naval bombardment from the prohibition to attack
or bombard undefended localities. Naval forces were apparently
conceived not as auxilliaries to land forces, but as an indep-
endent force capable of creating its own zone of operations
independently of land forces.
Be this as it may, the fact remains that the licence to
naval forces to bombard military objectives in undefended
localities was an exception. This licence was finally withdrawn
by Article 59 of' Protocol I.
It should also be noted that although the purpose of' the
prohibition to attack undefended localities was to extend
absolute protection to such localities against direct and
incidental dangers of military operations, the concept of' undef-
ended localities had its bite against the civilian population
and civilian objects, as will be shown below.
We turn now to the protection of civilian objects in
defended localities, and the first thing to be noted is the
generality and laxity of' legal restraints and the absence of'
a definition of' 'defended' localities. All that one may find
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in this respect is a general principle and a short list of
objects that have to be spared, Vt	 far as possible", provided
they were not at the time used for military purposes. The
general principle was laid down in Article 23(g) of' the
Brussels Declaration of 1874 and the Hague Regulations of' 1899
and 1907. It states that the destruction or seizure of the
enemy's property is especially prohibited "unless such
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the
necessities of war,"
In addition to this general principle, Article 27 of the
Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907, and the corresponding
Article 5 of Hague Convention(IX) of 1907, provide that in
siege and bombardments, "all necessary measures" must be taken
to spare, "as far as possible", buildings dedicated to religion,
art, science, or charitable purposes, historic nonuments,
hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected,
provided that these objects are not being used at the same time
for military purposes. These Articles, however, make it the duty
of the authorities in the attacked locality to indicate the
presence of such buildings or places in the locality by
distinctive and visible signs which have to be notified to the
enemy beforehand.
Note that the obligation to take all necessary measures to
spare, as far as possible, "other civilian objects" and the
civilian population, is not expressly laid down. It seems that
this was to be decided by the requirements of' military necessity,
as laid down in Article 23(j) of the Hague Regulations. All
that Article 26 of the Hague Regulations would add, is that the
commander of the attacking forces, before commencing bombardment
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except in the case of an assault, should do all he Can to warn
the authorities. In case of' naval bombardment Article 5 of
Hague Convention (Ix) made this warning subject to the condition
that the military situation permits.
The key question, however, is when a locality may be said
to be defended?
Objectively speaking the concept of' defended localties is
undefinable; and no definition laid down in advance may
reasonably claim to be objective. In concrete situations the
'defence' of the locality is the measure of 'legitimate military
necessity'. In the loose words of the Nuremberg Tribunal in the
Hostage Case, "there must be some reasonable connection between
the destruction of the property and the overcoming of' the enemy
forces." 1
 I'lcOougal and Feliciano did better; in their view, the
concept of' military necessity authorizes "only such destruction,
as is necessary, relevant and proportionate to the prompt
realization of legitimate military objectives."2
Consequently, it is an abuse of terminology to infer from
the concept of 'undefended localities' a definition of 'defended
localities', since this would lead to a very wide definition
that would practically render the protection of the civilian
population and civilian objects nominal. The British r'lanual of'
Land Warfare (1958) may illustrate this point. Paragraphs 285
and 290 of this manual provide as follows:
1, Cited in Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 10,
p. 3Q1•
2. mcDougal and Feliciano, Law and minimum World Public Order,
p . 72. On the principle of' military necessity in general, see
Whiternan, op. cit., pp. 300 - 316. See also, Gehring,
Protection of Civilian Infrastructure, Law and Contemporary
Problems, Vol. 42, (1978), pp. 96 - 101.
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"258. To be defended a locality need not be fortified. It
may be defended if a military force is in occupation
of or marching through it. (In modern war the
increased depth of battle area often makes it
difficult to distinguish between defended and
undefended localities, but see paragraph 20)
"290. An undefended or 'open' town is a town which is so
completly undefended from within or without (if a
town is covered by artillery fire from the flanks or
rear areas or by air or naval cover (sic), or by
minefields around it, even though there is no
resistance from within, it is not an 'open town' and
is liable to bombardment.) that the enemy may enter
and take possession of it without fighting or
incurring casualties. It follows that no town behind
the immediate front line can be open or undefended
for the attacker must fight his way to it. Any town
behind the enemy front line is thus defended and is
open to ground or other bombardment, subject to the
limitation imposed on all bombardments, namely, that
as far as possible, the latter must be limited to
military objectives."1
This seems to be another way of sayJng that the attack or
bombardment must be limited to military objectives in defended
localities however these localities are defined. The problem,
however, is that apart from the unexhaustive list of military
objectives enumerated in Article 2 of the Hague Convention (IX)
1 •
 Cited in Whiteman, op. cit., p. 414 ...4l5
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the Hague Conventions of' 1899 and 1907 didn'ot contain a
definition of military objectives, moreover, the British
Military Manual (1958) provides in paragraph 289 that:
"! town which is defended by detached posts, though they
are at a distance from it, is liable to bombardment. The
town and defended posts form an Indivisable whole, inas-
much as the town may contain workshops and provide sup—
lies which are invaluable to the defence, and may serve to
shelter the troops holding the defence points when they
are not on duty."
It should be noted first that the British Military Manual
does not cite any rule of' law to support this view. Moreover,
it seems to contradict paragraph 290 of the Military Manual which
makes all bombardments subject to the limitation that they must
be"limited to military objectives." Furthermore, it is not
understood why the town and the detached defence points should
constitute an indivisible whole, (i.e., one miltary objective),
when these posts are detached and at a distance from the town
and can be bombarded seperately. The fact that the town may
serve to shelter the troops holding the defence points when
they are not on duty, and the fact that it contains workshops
and provides supplies which are invaluable to the defence ofthe
town, are not sufficient to make the town a military objective.
For however valuable such services may be, they can be neutral-
ized by overcoming or destroying the defence points.
The inadequacy of the distinction between 'defended' and
'undefended' localities as a basis for the legal regulation of
1. Ibid., p . 415.
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hostilities has been realised as early as the First World War.
Consequently, when in 1922/1923 a commision of jurista
representing the United States of America, the United Kingdom,
France, Italy, Japan and the Netherlands met in the Hague to
draft rules for air warfare, the Commission abandoned the con-
cept of defence on which the Hague Conventions were based and
substituted it by the concept of 'military objectives', in the
strict sense. Articles 22 and 24 of Air Warfare defined clearly
what the Commission considered to be legitimate objects of
attacks. Article 22 applied to aerial bombardment a well
established rule of customary international law. It stated that:
"Aerial bombardment for the purpose of terrorising the
civilian population, of destroying or damaging private
property not of a military character, cr of' injuring non-
combatants is prohibited."
Article 24 laid down the following definition of military
objectives and rules of legitimate aerial bombardment:
"1. Aerial bombardment is legitimate only when directed at
a military objective, that is to say, an object of
which the destruction or injury would constitute a
distinct military advantage to the belligerent.
"2. Such a bombardment is legitimate only when directed
exclusively at the following objects: military forces;
military works; military establishments or depots;
factories constituting important and well—known centres
engaged in the manufacture of' arms, amunition; or
distinctively military supplies; lines of communication
used for military purposes.
"3. The bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings
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or buildings not in the immediate neighbourhood of the
operations of land forces is prohibited. In cases where
the objectives specified in paragraph 2 are so
situated, that they cannot be bombed without the
indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian population,
the aircraft must abstain from bombardment.
"4. In the immediate neighbourhood of the operations of'
land forces, the bombardment of cities, towns,
villages, dwellings, or buildings is legitimate
provided that there exists a reasonable presumption
that the military concentration is sufficiently
important to justify such bombardment, having regard
to the danger thus caused to the civilian population.
"5. A belligerent State is liable to pay compensation for
injuries to person or property caused by the vioation
by any of its officers of forces of the provisions of'
this Article."
Clearly, these provisions discarded the obsolete and
unworkable test of liability to bombardment which rests on the
distinction between 'defended' and 'undefended' places, 1 and
were inspired mainly by the doctrine that bombardment should be
confined to specific military objectives. 2
 But the Hague Rules
of Air Warfare were not adopted by any international conference.
Consequently, opinions differed on their importance and binding
1 Oppenheim—Lauterpacht, International Law, Vol. 2, seventh
edition, 1952, p. 522; Jennings, Open Towns, British Year
Book of' International Law, Vol. 22 (1945), p . 260; Spaight,
Legitimate Objectives in Air Warfare, British Year Book of
International Law, Vol 21, (1944), p. 161.
2. Oppenheim—Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 522 - 23.
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force s
 To Professor Schwarzenberger the Hague Rules of' Air
Warfare meant to attain a true compromise between the necess-
ities of war and the postulates of the standards of civilization
(i.e., the principle of humanity), and that, in case of doubt,
they even gave preference to the considerations of humanity.
This, in his view, "sufficed to condem these draft rules
permanently to the limbo of lex ferenda." He notes that while
states were prepared to pass "pious resolutions" on the topic
of air warfare at sessions of the Assembly of the League of'
Nations and disarmament conferences 1
 between the two World Wars,
"they were unwilling to exchange the state of uncertainty of the
law as it stood for one of more definite commitments, however
realistic.
To Lauterpacht, the Hague Rules of' Air Warfare "are of
importance as an authorative attempt to clarify and formulate
rules of law governing the use of aircraft in war"3
Schindler and Toman, 4 and Roberts and Cuelff', 5 reiterated
Lauterpacht's view regarding the importance of' the Hague Rules
of Air Warfare, but they added the statement that these rules
largely corresponded to the customary rules and general
principles underlying the laws of war on land and at sea.
It is probably more appropriate to say that Articles 22
and 24 of the Hague Rules of' Air Warfare were a reaffirmation
1. For a review of the question of air warfare at disarmament
conferences, see Watt, Restraints on War in the Air Before
1945, in Plicheal Howard (ed.) Restraints on War, 1979,
pp . 57 - 79.
2, Schwarzenberger, International Law, Vol. 2 - The Law of'
Armed Conflict, 1968, p. 154.
3. See Oppenheim—Lauterpacht, International Law Vol. 2, seventh
edition (1952), p. 519•
4. Schindler and Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflict, 1973, p.139.
5. Roberts and Guelff, Documents on the Laws of' War, 1982, p.121.
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and clarification of cuStQrnry rules of international law.
Article 22 which prohibited attacks against the civilian
population as such is a codification of an undoubted rule of
customary international law. 1 Article 24 might be thought to
have laid down new rules since it discarded the distinction
between defended and undefended localities and limited attacks
or bombardments to military objectives. This rule, however, was
implicit in the principle that "the only legitimate object which
States should endevour to accomplish during war is to weaken
2
the military forces of the enemy" , and in Article 23(g) of the
Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907 which "especially prohibited"
the destruction or seizure of the enemy's property, "unless
such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the
necessities of war." Both these rules had implicitly prohibited
indiscriminate attacks, and it is this prohibition which was
made explicit in Article 24 of the Hague Rules of Air Warfare.
Probably the only substantive difference between Article 24 of
the Hague Rules Of Air Warfare and the corresponding rules of
the Hague Regulations is that Article 24 of the Hague Rules of
Air Warfare had proposed an exhaustive list of legitimate
military objectives. Accordingly, the fact that the Hague Rules
of Air Warfare had not been ratified (and it should be noted
that they were never made open for ratification) seems
immaterial.
Iloeover, contrary to Schwarzenberger's view quoted above,
the non—ratification of the Hague Rules of Air Warfare did not
1 •
 Oppenheim—Lauterpacht, op. cit., PP. 523-527, especially,
pp. 523-524.
2. The Declaration of St Petersburg (1868),
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condemnthese rules permanently to the limbo of lax ferenda.
There is much evidence to suggest that these rules, whatever
might have been their legal status in 1923, had by 1939 been
generally accepted, as far as bombardment from the air is
concerned. Thus, in 1937, in the course of hostilities between
Japan and China, Japan declared that it would act in accordance
1
with the Hague Rules of !ir Warfare.
On September 22, 1937, the United States of Pimerica
protested to the Japanese Government against an announcement
made by Japan of its intention to resort to bombing in and around
the Chinese city of Nanking. The United States said in its
protest that it held "the view that any general bombing of an
extensive area wherein there resides a large populace engaged in
peaceful persuit is unwarranted and contrary to principles of
2law and humanity."
The Italian War Regulations of 1938 provided in articles
40 - 42 that bombardment of 'enemy objectives' is permitted
only when their total or partial destruction may benefit
military operations; that bombardment of centres of population
is permitted only when there exists a 'reasonable' presumption
that they conceal military preparations or supplies "such as to
justify bombardment"; and that it no case may bombardment be
resorted to for the sole purpose of penalising civil populations
or of' destroying or damaging property which is not of military
character. 3 The Italian War Regulations thus paraphrased Articles
22, 23 and 24 of' the Hague Rules of Air Warfare.
1 Oppenheim - Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 519, n.2.
2. Ibid., p. 523, n. 3.
3. Loc. cit.
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On 21 June, 1938, the British Prime Ilinister, Neville
Chamberlain, stated that three principles of international law
as governing bombing from the air. In September of the same
year the Assembly of the League of Nations adopted unanimously
the following principles which have already been stated by the
British Prime Flinister:
"1. The intentional bombing of civilians is illegal;
2. Objectives aimed at from the air must be legitimate
military objectives and must be identifiable;
3. Any attack on legitimate military objectives must be
carried out in such a way that civilian populations in
the neighbourhood are not bombed through negligence."1
At its Fortieth Conference held in Amsterdam from 29
August to 2 September 1938, 1939, the International Law
Association adopted a "Draft Convention for the Protection of
Civilian Populations against New Engines of War." This Draft
Convention represents one of the notable instances in the inter-
war period to define and improve the protection of the civilian
population, 2 Article 2 of this Draft Convention reiterated the
prohibition of the bombardment of undefended localities by
whatever means and in all circumstances; Article 3 laid down the
general principle that the bombardment "by whatever means" of
towns, villages or bulidings which are defended is prohibited at
any time (whether night or day) when objects of military char-
acter cannot be clearly recognized; and Articles 4 and 5 dealt
specifically with aerial bombardment in the same manner as
1. Text in Schindler and Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflict,
1973, pp. 153 - 54.
2. Ibid., p. 155.
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Articles 22 and 24 of' the Hague Rules of Air Warfare of 1923.1
The last but not the least to be mentioned in this survey
are the declarations made in 1939 by the Governments of' Great
Britain and France. On September 1, 1939, President Roosevelt of
the United States appealed to France, Great Britain, Germany,
Italy and Poland to retrain from aerial bombardment of "civilian
populations or unfortified cities" so long as their opponents
so refrained. 2
 In response to this appeal the Governments of the
United Kingdom and France jointly declared that:
"They had indeed some time ago sent explicit instructions
to the commanders of their armed forces prohibiting the
bombardment whether from the air, or the sea, or by
artillery on land of any except strictly military
objectives in the narrowest sense of the word."3
Professor Watt commented on this statement by saying that,
in effect, it amounted to the unilateral acceptance of the
Hague Rules of Air Warfare and had paved the way towards the
tacit observance of these rules by all combatants in the West
for the first nine months of the war. 4 It should be noted,
however, that Germany also made a similar declaration, and as
mentioned earlier, Italy had already included the Hague Rules
of Air Warfare in its rlilitary Regulations of 1938.
Thus, in the light of the preceeding evidence, it seems
reasonable to conclude that whatever might have been the legal
status of the Hague Rules of Air Warfare in 1923, the rules
1. Text in ibid., Pp. 155 et seq.
2. Uhiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 10, p. 136.
3. Cited in Witeman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 10, P.137.
4. Watt, op. cit., p. 74.
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pertaining to the protection of the civilian population and
civilian objects, had, by 1939, been generally accepted, and
had thus acquired the status of' rules of customary international
law, not only with regard to attacks from the air, but also with
regard to attacks from sea and land against objects on land.
I1oreover, 1939, the old distinction between 'defended' and
'undefended' localities on which the Hague Regulations of 1899
and 1907 were based, was almost completely replaced by the
criterion of 'military objectives'. But governments seemed
reluctant to accept an exhaustive enumeration of military
objectives. Without an exhaustive enumeration the definition of'
a military objective as "an object of which the destruction or
injury would constitute a distinct military advantage to the
belligerent", would be too subjective, as the Second World War
was soon to prove. As the war progressed, the protection of the
civilian population from aerial bombardment became largely
nominal. "That result was not due merely to the reciprocal
adoption of the practice of reprisals. It was due to the
general acceptance of a notion of military objective capable of
an eblargement so vast as to loose in fact any legally relevant
1
content." The concept of' military objective in that war was
tied with the concept of military effort Any activity and any
object that contributed directly or indirectly to the military
effort of a Party to the conflict was regarded as a military
objective, Even the morale of the civilian population was
regarded as a military objective.
The Geneva Diplomatic Conference of 1949 did nothing to
1, H. Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of
War, British Year Book of International Law, (1952), p. 365.
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clarify the concept of military objective, nor did the Fourth
Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilians
provide for the protection of the civilian population against
the dangers of military operations. Indeed, anything tending to
provide such protection was systematically removed from the
Convention. iloreover, the Diplomatic Conference declared that
a draft Resolution forbidding the use of weapons of mass
destruction was not receivable.1
Occasionally, however, there was some talk about military
objectives in the narrow sense • For example, during the war in
Korea, the Government of the People's Republic of Korea (North
Korea), on August 5, 1950, sent a letter to the President of
the Security Council of the United Nations protesting against
"the inhuman, barbarous bombing of the peaceful population and
of peaceful towns and populated areas" by the United States Air
Force in Korea. 2 During the discussion of this matter in the
Security Council the representative of the United States of
america, In his attempt to refute the charges, quoted the
F%merican Secretary of State (Acheson) as saying:
"The air activity of the Nations forces in Korea has been,
and is, directed solely at military targets of the invader.
These targets are enemy troop concentrations, supply dumps,
war plants and communications lines."3
The representative of the United States then quoted from
one of a series of radio broadcasts to the North Korean
population urging civilians "to leave any areas in North Korea
1 •
 Pictet (ed.), Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention of
1949, published by the ICRC, Geneva, 1958, p. 10.
2. Whiternan, Digest of International Law, Vol. 10, p. 138.
3. Ibib., p. 140.
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where there are military targets." "Ililitary targets are", said
the broadcast, "railroads and railroad facilities, docks and
harbours, bridges, power plants, factories helping the war,
ships and boats, air fields and supply warehouses."1
The representative of the United States then 'unwittingly'
quoted from a warning leaflet which he said was typical of the
millions constantly dropped to warn the civilian population in
the areas controlled by the North Korean forces. On the front
of the leaflet, he said, there was a picture of a bomb burst,
with a large slogan printed in contrasting blue and red in
order to engage attention. The large caption in the Korean
language read as follows: "1ir raid warning. P.ct quickly. hove
away from military targets." On the reverse side of the leaflet
there was a United Nations flag in blue. In red letters, there
was a heading: "act quickly. hove away from military targets.
Ilnd underneath was the following: "The United Nations forces
urge all civilians to leave cities containing military targets.
The United Nations Forces wish to avoid bombing civilians."2
The usefulness of such a leaflet as a warning against air
raids presupposes that the civilians know what military targets
are. In the absence of a definition of military objectives
supplemented by a comprehensive list of actual and potential
military objectives, knowledge by the civilian population of
what military objectives are, cannot be presumed. True, in this
particular case the military objectives were enumerated in a
series of radio broadcasts to the population of North Korea;
but one cannot presume that the people were listening or were
1	 Loc. cit.
2 Ibid., p. 140 - 141
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allowed to listen. And even if they were actually listening, to
urge "all civilians to leave cities containing military targets"
and not simply to move away from military targets, suggests to
the civilian population that such cities as a whole were
military targets and consequently, the ?warning would amount
to an act of terrorization.
However, after the Second World Ijar, attempts at defining
military objectives by means of exhaustive enumerations seemed
to have been abandoned, and the most that could be expected were
definitions of a general nature, with or without exemplary
enumerations. The Hague Convention of 1954 for the protection
of Cultural Property provides an example of a non—exhaustive
enumeration of military objectives without a general definition.
According to Article 8, paragraph 1 (a) of this Convention,
there may be placed under special protection a limited number
of refugees intended to shelter movable cultural property in
the event of armed conflict, and of centres containing monuments
and other immovable property of great importance, provided that
they are situated at an adequate distance from "any large
industrial centre or from any important military objective
constituting a vulnerable point, such as, for example, an
aerodrome,	 broadcasting station, establishment engaged upon
work of' national defence, a port or railway station of relative
importance or a main line of communication."1
The ICRC Draft Rules of 1956 "for the limitation of the
2
dangers incurred by the civilian population in time of war"
1 •
 Text in Schindler and Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflict, 1973,
pp. 529 et seq.; Roberts and Cuelff, Documents on the Laws
of' War, 1982, pp. 339 at seq.
2. Text in Schindler and Toman, op. cit., 179 et seq.
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were the last in a series of abortive attempts to provide a
general definition with a comprehensive list of military
objectives. !rticle 7 of the proposed draft rules provided that:
"In order to limit the dangers incurred by the civilian
population, attacks may only be directed against military
obj ecti. yes.
Only objectives belonging to the categories of
objectives which, in view of their essential character-
istics, are generally acknowledged to be of military
importance, may be considered as military objectives.
Those categories are listed in annex to the present rules.
However, even if' they belong to one of those
categories, they cannot be considered as a military
objective where their total or partial destruction, in
the circumstances ruling at the time, offers no military
advantage."
The annex referred to in the second paragraph of this text
has never been drafted. part from this, the text was an attempt
to objectify the concept of military objectives by prescribing
three cumulative guide lines. Firstly, the object must exhibit
the essential characteristics of a military objective, that is
to say, it must be military by nature, purpose or use. Secondly,
it must be of generally recognized military importance. Thirdly,
its total or partial destruction in the military circumstances
ruling at the time must offer a military advantage. If all
three conditions were fulfilled, the object would be a legit-
imate military objective; If any of these conditions was not
f'ulfilled, the object should not be treated as a military
objective.
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The Draft Rules of 1956 had a cool reception by governments;
they did not even care to comment on them although they were
asked to do so by the ICRC. Those Draft Rules, however, were
resurrected by the ICRC in one form or another in the draft
Protocol I which served as a basis for discussions at the
second session of the Conference of Government Experts (1972)
and the Diplomatic Conference (1974_1977) for the Reaffirmation
and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in
Armed Conflicts.
The ICRC proposed to the Diplomatic Conference the follow-
ing definition of military objectives:
"1. Attacks shall be strictly limited to military
objectives, namely, to those objectives which are, by
their nature, purpose of use, recognized to be of
military interest and whose total or partial
destruction, in the circumstances ruling at the time,
offers a distinct and substantial military advantage."
"2. Consequently, objects designed for civilian use, such
as houses, dwellings, installations and means of
transport, and all objects which are not military
objectives, shall not be made objects of attack,
except if they ar used mainly in support of the
1
military effort."
This seems to be a rather diluted version of the
definition of military objectives contained in the resolution
of the Institute of International Law which was adopted at the
1. Article 47 of Draft Protocol I. See also the Commentary of
the ICRC on this Article; ICRC, Draft Additional Protocols
- Commentary, Geneva, 1973, pp. 60-61.
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session of Edinburgh, 9 September, 1969. This resolution was
intended to state the existing law. 1 It was adopted by 60 votes
to one, with one abstention. It defines military objectives as
follows:
"There can be considered as military objectives only those
which, by their nature or purpose or use, make an
effective contribution to military action, or exhibit a
generally recognized military significance, such that
their total or partial destruction in the actual
circumstances gives a substantial, specific and immediate
military advantage to those who are in a position to
2destroy them."
The main difference between this definition and the one
proposed by the ICRC quoted above, is that the elements of the
ICRC'S definition are cumulative, while those of' the Institute
of International Law are alternatives, as indicated by the word
"or". Such a difference however, seems more apparent than real,
since objects which by their very nature or purpose or use,
make an effective contribution to military action usually
exhibit a generally recognized military significance.
However, during the discussions of the Diplomatic
3Conference several amendments were submitted; two of which may
1 •
 Schindler and Tornan, The Laws of Prmed Conflict, 1973, p.
193-194, at 193 • Indeed, in the seventh preambular paragraph
of this resolution the Institute of International Law notes
that the rules embodied in the resolution "form part of the
principles to be observed in armed conflicts by any de jure
or de facto government, or by any other authority responsible
for the conduct of hostilities."
2. Ibid., p. 193
3. For the texts of these amendments, see Levie Protection of
War Victims, Vol. 3, 1980, pp. 175179
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be mentioned first as illustrations of two diametrically
opposing points of view. On one extreme there was the amendment
of the delegation of Romania which propsed to define civilian
objects rather than military objectives. It reads as follows:
"1ll objects which do not serve to produce weapons, milit-
ary equipment or methods of combat, or which are not
directly and immediatly used by the armed forces shall
be deemed to be civilian objects even if some change in
their use should later cause them to acquire a
predominantly military nature."1
The first part of this definition seems reasonable enough,
but the words "even if some change in their use should later
cause them to acquire a predominantly military 	 seem
unrealistic as a general condition. For the importance of the
"military nature" acquired by a civilian object may vary from
one object to another. For example, a school transformed into
a military barrack5 acquires an undoubted military nature and
thus becomes a legitimate military objective while so used.
But a shoe factory or a textile factory acquiring a predomin-
antly military nature should not be treated as military object-
ives if the armed conflict was expected to last only for a short
time. In other words, the problem of so called 'mixed objectives'
that is to say, objects which serve both civilian as well as
military purposes cannot be solved by a hard and fast rule.
They can only be judged contextually, whether on the level of
military strategy or on the level of military tactics. The ICRC
proposal, as well as the definition of military objectives which
1. Document CDDH/III/1O, dated 12 larch, 1974, ibid., p. 176.
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was finally adopted, as will be shown in due course, allow far
a contextual appreciation of whether a civilian object which
had acquired a predominantly military nature may, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, be considered a military
objective.
If the Romanian proposal reflected an unrealistic
humanitarian zeal, the French proposal reflected an equally
unrealistic military zeal. The French delegation proposed to
introduce into the definition of military objective what it
called "the military potential of the adversary." 1 It proposed
to define military objectives as follows:
"J\n object shall be considered a military objective if by
its nature or use it contributes directly or indirectly
to the maintenance or development of the military
potential of the adverse Party."2
In effect, this derinition seems to stop just short of the
concept of total war 1
 Forir one goes down the scale of' indirect
contribution to the maintenance and development of the military
potential of the adversary, the point might be reached where it
would be difficult to exclude the tiller of' the soil or even
the morale of the civilian population. However, the French
proposal does not seem to have been supported by any other
delegation.
Between the Romarian and French oropJsals which seem to
have represented two ends of a spectrum, there was a variet y of'
1 See the remarks of the French delegate ir. Girard introducing
his delegation's amendment; CDDH/III/SR. 14, para. 21.
2. Doc. CDDH/III/63, dated 19 iarch, 1974, cited in Levie,
ibid., p. 177.
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proposals all of which stated that "attacks shall be strictly
limited to military objectives", but differed in their concep-
tion of these objectives. On that spectrum, and next to the
Romanian proposal, may be placed the proposal of a group of
Arab Statesstating that:
"Attacks shall be strictly limited to military objectives.
Consequently objects designed for civilian use, such as
houses, dwellings, installations and means of' transport,
and all objects which are not military objectives, shall
not be made the object of attack. These objects shall not
be made the object of reprisals."1
The Arab States proposed to delete the definition of
military objectives on the ground that any definition of the
kind given in paragraph 1 of the ICRC proposal constituted a
restriction which could be misused. For the same reason it was
proposed to delete the phrase "except If they are used mainly
in support of the military effort" in paragraph 2 of' the ICRC
proposal "because it could encourage unwarranted attacks." The
inclusion of the prohibition of reprisals against civilian
objects was considered by the group of Arab States as being a
logical addition, in line with the prohibition of reprisals
against the civilian population which, at that time, was already
adopted by Committee iii.2
While the proposals of Romania, the Arab States and the
ICRC tended to restrict the concept of military objectives, the
1. Ooc. CDOH/III/63, dated 19 '1arch, 1974, cited in Levie,
ibid., p. 177.
2. See the remarks made by the Egyptian delegate Professor El-
Chonemy, introducing the Arab amrnendment on behalf of the
sponsors: CDDH/III/SR.14, para. 18.
445
proposals of Australia, Canada and the Netherlands tended to
widen that concept.
The Australian delegation proposed to delete the phrase
"recognized to be of military interest" in the first paragraph
of the ICRC text, and the word 'mainly' in the second paragraph.
Accordingly, the Australian proposal was as follows:
"l •
 Attacks shall be strictly limited to military
objectives, namely, those objectives the total or
partial destruction of which, in the circumstances
ruling at the time, offer a distinct and substantial
military advantage.
2. Consequently, objects designed for civilian use, such
as houses, dwellings, installations and means of
transport, and all objects which are not military
objectives, shall not be made the object of attack,
except if they are used in support of military effort."1
Canada proposed to delete the whole of the ICRC proposal
and to replace it by the following:
"Attacks shall be strictly limited to military objectives,
namely to those objectives which are by their nature,
purpose or use recognized to be of military interest or
whose total or partial destruction, in the circumstances
ruling at the time, offers a distinctive military
	 -
advantage.
This proposal was criticised on the ground that the notion
1 •
 Doc. CDDH/III/49, dated 18 ilarch 1974, cited in Levie, ibid.,
p. 177.
2, Doc. CDDH/III/79, dated 25 1arch 1974, cited in Levie,
ibid., p. 179
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of military interest was too vague, 1 and that the use of the
word 'or' instead of 'and' would result in giving the parties
2to the conflict too much latitude.
Another proposal which also would have given the Parties
to the conf].ict too much latitude was that of the Netherlands.
It proposed to replace the ICRC text by the following:
"Attacks shall be strictly limited to military objectives,
namely those which by their nature or use effectively
contribute to the military effort of an adverse Party or
whose complete or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization in the circumstances ruling at the time
offers a distinct military advantage."3
It appears from these proposals as well as from the
summary records of the Diplomatic Conference that there was a
universal agreement on the rule that attacks must be strictly
limited to military objectives, but the opinions differed
widely as to what those objectives were The main difficulty of
defining military objectives was the solution to be found to
the so—called 'mixed objectives'. In the study prepared by the
ICRC for the Conferences of' Government Experts and the
Diplomatic Conference, the term 'mixed objectives' has been
used to denote two categories of objects. The first category is
called 'mixed objectives in the strict sense', that is, objects
which can be used for both civilian and military requirements,
e.g., a factory producing both civilian and military equipments.
The second category is called 'mixed objects', that is, objects
1 •
 E.G., by Australia, CDDH/III/SR. 1 4, pare. 16.
2. E.G., by Sweden, CDDH/III/SR. 1 5, para. 38.
3. Doc. CDDH/III/SR.56, dated ig March 1974, cited in Levie,
ibid., p. 177.
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which, according to their usual purpose are non—military
objects but which, by means of a simple transformation, may
easily be used directly in the military effort or operations,
e. g., a school turned into a barracks.1
The solutions proposed for'mixed objectives' at the
Diplomatic Conference may be summerized as follows: the
delegation of Romania proposed that objects should be treated
as civilian objects unconditionally, while the delegation of
France proposed that they should be considered military
objectives. The delegations o? Ilustralia, Canada and Netherlands,
mutatis mutandis, proposed that these objects should, in
principle be regarded as military objectives, while the %rab
delegations as well as the ICRC, proposed that 'mixed object
ives' should, in principle, be regarded as civilian objects.
In the end, the present text of %rticle 52 of Protocol I
was adopted as a compromise solution. It is entitled "General
Protection of Civilian Objects", and provides as follows:
"l • Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or
reprisals. Civilian objects are all objects which are
not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2.
"2. ttcks shall be strictly limited to military
objectives. In so far as objects are concerned,
military objectives are limited to those objects which
by their nature, location, purpose or use make an
effective contribution to military action and whose
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization,
in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military advantage.
1 •
	CRC, Doc. CE/3b, Geneva, January, 1971, p. 59
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"3. In case of doubt whether an object which is normally
dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of
worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is
being used to make an effective contribution to
military action, it shall be presumed not to be so
us e U. II
The Article was adopted by consensus in Committee III, and
by 79 votes in favour, none against, and 7 abstentions in
plenary. 1 The explanation of votes which followed the adoption
of the Article and the Reports of the Rapporteur and of
Committee III shed some light on certain aspects of this
Article, 2 but they seem conspicuously silent on the hard core
of the provision, namely the definition of military objectives
in paragraph 2, and its application in practice.
Article 52 of Protocol I is particularly important for two
main reasons: first, it brings into a full circle the
prohibition of reprisals against the civilian population and
civilian objects; secondly, it provides as a basis for other
provisions dealing with the protection of civilian objects by
laying down a definition of military objectives. The question
of reprisals will be discussed in the following chapter with
the prohibition of reprisals against the civilian population.
Here, we deal with the definition of' military objectives and
1. CDDH/III/SR.59, para. 10, and CDOH/SR.41, para. 149. In
Committee III, Article 52 was also adopted paragraph by
paragraph. Paragraph 1 was adopted by 58 votes to 3 with 9
abstentions; paragraph 2 was adopted by consensus; and
paragraph 3 was adopted by 64 votes to none with 6 absten-
tions. See CDDH/III/SR.24, para. 16, 17, 18.
2. The Summary records of the Diplomatic Conference regarding
Article 52 may be found in Levie, Protection of War Victims,
Vol. III, 1980, pp. 176 - 208.
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and the presumption in favour of civilian status laid down in
paragraph 3 of the Article.
The first question to be raised with regard to paragraph
2 is whether the statement that attacks shall be strictly
limited to military objectives is intended to deal with the
question of collateral damage caused by attacks directed
against military objectives. The answer seems to be 'no'.
Indeed, in their explanation of vote, the delegations of the
1	 2	 .	 3United Kingdom ,.Canada , Federal Republic of Germany ,
Netherlands 4 , and the United States of America 5 , stated that
the first sentence of Article 52, paragraph 2, prohibits only
such attacks as may be directed against non—military objectives,
and that it does not deal with the question of colateral damage
caused by attacks directed against military objectives.
To be sure, the question of' colateral damage is regulated
only indirectly by the so—called 'proportionality rule' which
appears in paragraph 5(b) of Article 51 of Protocol I. It
considers as indiscriminate, and therefore prohibited, any
attack "which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects,
or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."
This rule was met with strong opposition from Third World and
Socialist countries, but it was as far as the major Western
countries were prepared to go. Indeed, it was only after the
1 •
 CDDH/SR.41, para. 153.
2. CDDH/SR.41, Annex.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
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precautionary measures had been 'intensified' that it was
possible to adopt the 'proportionality rule'. Nevertheless,
this rule will continue to represent the ichilles heel in the
body of law as far as the protection of the civilian population
and civilian objects is concerned.1
The second question to be raised is whether the definition
of military objectives applies to military objectives in general
or only to civilian objects which may be considered as military
objectives. In other words, does the definition of military
objectives apply also to military objects, such as troops, their
equipment and ground, or is it limited to civilian objects which,
for the reasons specified in paragraph 2, may be treated as
military objectives ? In view of the fact that the civilian
population and civilian objects have often been attacked on the
pretext of attacking military objectives or even military
objects, and of the fact that even the most scrupulous and law—
abiding attacker would still cause immense civilian losses in
populated areas, the question seems to be of' particular
importance.
The Summary records of the Diplomatic Conference do not
seem to give a conclusive answer to the question under
discussion. The Report of' Committee III states the obvious; that
the definition of military objectives takes account of "the
fact that military objectives include objects other than
military objects - such as troops, their equipment, and
ground
1 The 'proportionality rule' is discussed in Chapter 6, Sec,8.
2. Report of Committee III, Second Session, 1975, Doc.
CDDH/215/Rev.1, para. 64. reproduced in Levie, Protection of'
War Victms, Vol. 3, 1980, p. 201.
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Strangely enough, Professor Karlshoven saw in this
statement of fact a "restriction" which, in his view, "implies
that the question of whether, and under what conditionS,
'troops their equipment and ground' constitute military
objectives is not governed by the specific definition of that
concept given in Prticle 52.ttl Nevertheless, he did not go as
far as to say that enemy troops, their equipment and ground
constitute military objectives under all circumstances. He would
only say that "generally speaking, it seems a reasonable
assumption that enemy troops will represent a military
objective no matter when and where they are found." 2 At the
same time, he expresses awareness of the fact that, while this
presumption may at first sight seem a truism, it becomes
somewhat less so if it is realised how often the civilian
population has sustained severe incidental losses.3
Professor Karlahoven was probably unaware that in making
these remarks he was in effect arguing against his conclusion
that whether, and under what conditions, enemy troops, their
equipment and ground constitute military objectives is not
governed by Article 52. The purpose of the definition of
military objectives is not only to protect the civilian popul-
ation and civilian objects against direct attacks, but also
to avoid them incidental losses which may be caused by attacks
directed against 'military objects' which their total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, does not offer in the
1 •
 Kaishoven, Reaffirmation and Development of Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Armed Conflict - Part Two, in Netherlands Year
Book of International Law, 197, pp. 107 at seq., at p. 11o•
2. Loc. cit.
3. Loc. cit.
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circumstances ruling at the time a definite military advantage.
Indeed such attacks would be contrary to sound military strategy
and contrary to the military principle of economy in warfare.
In brief, contrary to Professor Kaishoven's suggestion,
frticle 52, paragraph 2, applies equally to military objects
as well as to non—military objects which fulfil the criteria
laid down in that paragraph.
The third and most important question to be raised is
whether the definition of military objectives does really
contribute to the protection of the civilain population and
civilian objects. This requires a textual and contextual
analysis of the definition given in Irticle 52, paragraph 2.
according to that definition, an object may lawfully be
treated as a military objective only if:
a) it makes an effective contribution to miltary action
and
b) its total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time,
offers a definite military advantage.
It should be emphasized that these conditions or criteria
are cumulative. 1 With regard to the first condition the
indicatives of effective contribution to military action are
the nature, location, purpose or use of the object. This is
indeed a broad list which, without further qualification, would
have left to military commanders a wide measure of discretion
in regarding objects as military objectives. The second
1 •
 Ibid., p. 11Q• Also, ICRC Draft Additional Protocols to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949 - Commentary, Geneva,
1973, p. 61.
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condition purports to provide the needed qualification by
requiring military commanders to determine in the light of the
actual military situation whether military action to be taken
against a given object 'offers a definite military advantage.
But what does 'definite' miltary advantage mean? According
to the Report of Committee III, extensive discussion took place
before agreement was reached on the word 'definite' in the
phrase 'definite military advantage'. Among the words considered
and rejected were 'distinct', 'direct', 'clear', 'immediate',
'obvious', 'specific' and 'substantial'. 1
 The Rapporteur of
Committee III, Mr. Aldrich, commented by saying that he was
"unable to draw any clear significance from this choice."2
Similarly, Professor Kalshoven "is doubtful that another choice
would have made any noticeable difference." moreover, in his
view, the term 'definite' leaves ample room for divergent
interpretations.3
As a matter of fact the Diplomatic Conference was not
consistent in the choice of words used to qualify 'military
advantage'. In Article 52, paragraph 2, it speaks of'definite
military advantage', while in Articles 51 and 57 it speaks of'
'concrete and direct military advantage. ' It may be assumed,
however, that these phrases are not different, and that
'definite' means 'concrete and direct'.
This becomes obvious from the term 'military action',
which has been deliberately used,, instead of' the indefinite term
1 •
 Report of Committee 1111, Seccrnd 5esion, Document CDDH/215/
Rev.1, para. 64, cited in Levie, op. cit., p . 201.
2. Report to the Third Commission on the Work of' the Working
Group, Committee III, 24 February, 1975, (CDDH/III/224).
3. Kalshoven, op. cit., p. 111•
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'military effort', as well as from the requirement that the
'definite military advantage' be present 'in the circumstances
ruling at the time'. The term 'military action' can only mean
'military operations', and the term 'in the circumstances ruling
at the time' refers to the actual military situation at a given
time. The phrase 'in the circumstances ruling at the time', as
Professor Kalshoven commented, effectively precludes military
commanders from relying exclusively on abstract catergorizations
in determining whether specific objects constitute military
objectives (e.g., a bridge is a military objective; an object
located in the zone of combat is a military objective, and so
forth). Instead, they will have to determine whether, say, the
destruction of a particular bridge, which would have been
militarily important yesterday, does, in the circumstances
ruling today, still offer a 'definite military advantage'. If'
not, the bridge has to be treated as a civilian object.1
Even so, or perhaps because of the 'contextual' nature of
the definition of military objectives, doubt may exist in some
concrete cases as to whether a civilan object is being used to
make an effective contribution to military action, and, whether
its destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances
ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. In
such a case, the military are more likely to give themselves
the benefit of the doubt and thus treat the object as a
military objective. Inevitably, such a presumption in favour of
the military is bound to result in an unwarranted denial of
protection to the civilan population and civilian objects.
1	 Loc. cit.
455
rticla 52, paragraph 3, of Protocol I, seeks to preclude such
an unwarranted denial of protection by stating that, in case of
doubt whether an object which is"normally dedicated to civilian
purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling
or a school", is being used to make an effective contribution
to military action, "it shall be presumed not to be so used."
In other words, the object should be treated as a civilan object
and should not be attacked.
In the Working Group of Committee III much discussion was
devoted to the question whether this presumption should apply
without exceptions, or whether an exception should be made with
regard to civilian objects located in 'contact zones'.
Delegations in favour of such an exception proposed to add at
the end of paragraph 3 of rrtjcle 52 the words: "except in
contact zones where the security of the armed forces requires
a derogation from this presumption."1
This proposal was defended on the ground that infantry
soldiers could not be expected to place their lives at great
risk because of such a presumption and that, in fact, civilian
buildings which happen to be in the front lines usually are
used as part of the defensive work. On the other hand, the
proposal was criticised on the ground that it would unduly
endanger civilian objects to permit any exception to the
2presump tion.
In the end, however, the proposed exception was rejected
by Committee III by 36 votes to 12 with 23 abstentions, and
1 Report to the Third Commission on the Work of the Working
Group, Committee III, 24 February, 1975, (CDDH/III/224).
2. Ibid.
456
the present paragraph 3 of /\rticle 52 of Protocol I was adopted
1by the Committee by o4 votes to none with 6 abstentions.
Finally, we consider the important question of whether the
definition of military objectives laid down in Article 52,
paragraph 2, and the presumption in favour of civilian status
laid down in paragraph 3, do really solve the problem of
military objectives, and thus, contribute to the protection of
the civilian population and civilian objects.
For this purpose it might be useful to compare Article
52, paragraph 2, of Protocol I with Article 23(g) of the Hague
Regulations of' 1899 and 19Q7, for the two seem to be indentica].
in substance, although they are different in form.
Reduced to its simplest form, the definition of military
objectives contained in Article 52, paragraph 2, of Protocol I,
seems to be saying that: an object which does not make an
effective contribution to military action and whose total or
partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circum-
stances ruling at the time, does not offer a definite military
advantage must not be made the object of attack.
Article 23 (g) of the Hague Regulations seems to be saying
the same thing. It states that, in addition to the prohibitions
provided by the special conventions, it is especially forbidden
- "To destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necess-
ities of war."
There seems to be no doubt that 'the necessities of w5
were used here in a tactical sense and refer to the imperative
1 •
 CDDH/III/SR.24, para. 18.
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demands of military action. In a tactical sense, the destruction
or seizure of the enemy's property may only be imperatively
demanded by the necessities of military action if it offers a
concrete military advantage directly relevant to the military
situation ruling at the time.
Thus, the phrase 'imperatively demanded by the necessities
of war' seems to contain all the elements of the definition of
military objectives contained in Article 52, paragraph 2 Does
it necessarily follow that the whole fuss about the problem of
the definition of military objectives was ?ado about nothing??
To be sure, Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations was not
even mentioned during the debate on Article 52 of Protocol I.
And although substantively, both Articles are concerned with
the general protection of civilian objects, the law makers have
actually acted on the assumption that the Hague Conventions did
not contain a definition of military objectives and that one
was needed.
eut even if' the definition of military objectives in
Article 52, paragraph 2, was no more than a reaffirmation of'
Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations, it certainly has the
merit of being more elaborate. Sut like any contextual
definition it is bound to give rise to many controversies in
pr&tice, particularly in the context of guerrilla warfare. The
concept of 'effective contribution to military action' and the
concept of 'definite military advantage in the circumstances
ruling at the time' might be easy to apply in the context of
conventional warfare, but it is not clear what they are
supposed to mean in the context of guerrilla warfare.
As for the presumption contained in Article 52, paragraph
4 5
3, one may concede that it is an important addition to the lai
of armed conflict which, if faithfully respected, would
contribute significantly to the protection of the civilian
population and civilian objects. Its main weakness, however, is
that it is unveriflable, and that, in all probability, those
who plan or decide upon an attack in the light of the inform-
ation available to them at the time would act contrary to what
the law requires them to do.
On the whole, it seems fair to conclude that the question
of whether the definition of military objectives would
contribute to the protection of the civilian population and
civilian objects is a matter that rests almost entirely with
the conscience of the Parties to the conflict - a conscience
which past experience shows is untrustworthy. In fact, the
definition of military objectives has nothing new to offer; it
is the same old notion of 'the imperative demands of the
necessities of war' differently formulated. If this were to be
hailed as a victory for humanity in warfare, or what passes for
it in the official parlance oP 'reaffirmation and development
of humanitarian law applicable in armed conc'lict', let it not
be forgotten that under the present definition of military
objectives no object is immune from attack if it 'effectively
contributes to military action' and if its destruction, capture
or neutralization in the circumstances ruling at the time offers
a definate military advantage. Even objects indispensable to
the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs,
crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and
irrigation works may be attacked, destroyed, removed or rendered
useless, If' they were used 'in direct support of military
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operations' such as shielding the enemy from attack or
observation. 1 Similarly, the natural environment may be
attacked provided that the attacks do not cause 'widespread,
longterm and severe damage' to the natural environment as would
'prejudice the health or survival of the population. ,2 Even
objects containing dangerous forces, namely, dams, dykes and
nuclear electrical generating stations may be attacked if they
were used in 'regular and significant and direct support of'
military operations' if such an attack is the only feasible way
to terminate such support.3
On the whole, it seems fair to conclude that the actual
scope of the concept of military objectives has in fact been
widening eversince the advent of aircraft and that war
technology has aggravated the problem of the protection of the
civilian population and civilian objects. In the light of the
definition of military objectives contained in i\rticle 52,
paragraph 2, of Protocol I, the extent of the protection of the
civilian population and civilian objects will ultimately depend
on how in practice the criteria of 'effective contribution to
military action' and the 'definate military advantages in the
circumstances ruling at the time' will be understood and applied.
But it should be noted that the definition of military
objectives and, for that matter, P,rticle 52 of Protocol I as a
whole, are parts of a package which includes, among other things,
the prohibition of' attacking or terrorizing the civilian
population as such, the prohibition of reprisals against the
1 •
 For details, see the following Chapter, section 6.2.
2. For details, see the following Chapter, 5ection 6.3.
3. For details, see the following Chapter, section 6.4.
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civilian population, civilians and civilian objects, the
prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, and the obligation for
those who plan or decide upon attacks to take certain specified
precautionary measures with a view to avoiding, and at any rate,
minimizing incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians
and damage to civilian objects. These matters constitute the
subject of the following chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE
FUND7T'1ENTALS OF THE GENERAL PROTECTION
OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AND
CIVILIAN OBJECTS: SUBSTANTIVE RULES
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I •
 Introduction
So far, the discussion has been focused on the basic
rule of distinction as such. This Chapter follows up by
examining some of' the detailed but fundemental specifications
of the basic principle of distinction. That is to say, rules
which afford basic protection to the civilian population and
civilian objects on land, against attacks from land, sea or
air.
It may be noted here that the provisions of Section I of
Part IV of Protocol I affording protection to civilians and
civilian objects against the dangers of' military operations are
additional to t e rules concerning humanitarian protection
contained in the Fourth teneva Convention of 1949, particularly
in Part II thereof, and in other international agreements bind-
ing upon t e Hig Contracting Parties, as well as to other rules
of international law relating to the protection of civilians
and civilian objects on land, at sea or in the air, against the
1
effects of hostilities.
This indeed covers a vast area which, for reasons of' space
and time cannot be examined here or even summarized. The texts
alone extend into volumes, 2 let apart commentaries. Of
necessity therefore, the discussion is selective. The texts
selected for this chapter are, in the main, Section I of Part
IV of Protocol I, affording protection to civilians and
and civilian objects on land, against the dangers of attacks
1 •
 Irticle 49, paragraph 4, of protocol I.
2. See for example, Roberts and Guelff, Documents on the Laws
of War. Oxford, 1982, (two volumes); Schindler and Toman,
the Laws of Armed Conflict, 1973.
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from land, sea or air. From the Fourth Geneva Convention it
is in the main, Section I of Part III of the Convention which
has been selected. Together, these two sections are believed
to provide civilians and civilian objects with an irreducible
minimum of protection below which the Parties to the conflict
will inevitably relapse into pristine savagery.
By and large the rules in Section I of Part IV of Protocol
I are either customary rules of international law or detailed
elaboration of customary rules and principles. 1 Thus, unless
one approaches them from the point of view of what is not
expressly pro ibited is licit, it would be difficult to deny
that t ey are already binding on the Parties to conflicts of
international character, notwithstanding the fact that the
final provisions of the Protocol require signature and ratifi-
cation or accession,
But even if it is alleged that some of the rules of
Section I of Part IV of Protocol I were new rules, this would
actually matter very little. For according to the principle
laid down in Prticle 18 of the Vienna Convention on the law of
treaties: "1\ state is obliged to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when it has signed
the treaty..., until it shall have made its intention clear not
to become a Party to the treaty." Thus, according to this
principle, even absolutely new rules contained in conventions
which are signed but not yet ratified will not be without legal
1. This is also the view of the International Commision which
enquired into reported violations of International Law by
Israel during its invasion of the Lebanon: Israel in Lebanon
- The Report of the International Commision, Ithaca Press,
London, 1983, p. 23.
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validity. This, at any rate, is not the case with the provis-
ions of Section I of Part IJ of Protocol I which, as just noted
are reaffirmation and development of existing rules of intern-
atjona]. law.
With regard to the provisions of Section I of Part III
of the Fourth g eneva Convention, it is important to note that
they are provisions common to the territories of the Parties
to the conflict and to occupied territories. Moreover, they
are now incorporated, by and large, in Protocol II relating to
the protection of victims of armed conflicts of non—international
character, particularly in i\rticles 4, 5, and S thereof.
Fin lly it should be noted that most of the provisions of
Section 1 of Part flJ of Protocol I, have corresponding
provisions in Protocol II, either in form, or in substance.
However, care will be taken not to confuse Protocol I with
Protocol II. This chapter therefore, has the double purpose of
comparing the provisions of the Protocols when dealin r with
the same subject matter, and of avoiding repetion when the
provisions in the two Protocols are identical.
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2, The Principle of General Protection
Article 51 of Protocol I entitled "protection of the
civilian population" starts by laying clown a general principle
with regard to "dangers arising from military operations." it
states that:
"The civilian population and individual civilians shall
enjoy general protection against dangers arising from
military operations. To give effect to this protection,
the following rules, which are additional to other
applicable rules of international law, shall be
observed in all circumstances."
During the discussion of' this paragraph in the Working
Group of the Third committee of the Diplomatic Conference
several delegates questioned the phrase, "To give effect to
this protection." It was pointed out that there were also
other rules in Protocol I and in other instruments which
helped give effect to the protection and that the phrase
might conceivably import a limitation of the protection from
military operations)
The text itself is sufficiently clear on this point and
Report of Committee III made it even clearer; it explains
that while the provisions of' Article 51 give effect to the
principle of general protection against dangers arising from
military operations, "they are not intended to be limitative
in effect. It is for this reason that express reference is
made to the fact that these paragraphs (of Article 51) are
1. Report to the Third Commission on the Work of' the Working
Group. Committee III, 24 February 1975 (CDDH/III/224),
text in Levis, Vol. 3, pp. 148-151.
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"in addition to other applicable rules of international law",
which may be found both in (draft) Protocol I and in other
treaties and rules of customary international law. The rules
of Article 51, as well as other rules of international law,
apply to all types of operations, by regular and irregular
forces alike, during the course of an armed conflict".1
The statement that "The rules of Article 51, •.. apply to
all types of operationsP, is of particular importance to the
interpretation of Article 51. rhe term "operations" Is wider
than the term "military operations" anó the latter term is
wider than the terrn"attacks."
Failure to take sufficient notice of this statement and
terminology, or probably, the 'exploitation of terminology'
seem to have lead one writer, Bierzanek, to assert that the
prohibition of reprisals in Article 51, paragraph 6, does not
cover 'all' the provisions of Article 51, and further,to argue
that reprisals against civilian5 and civilian objects are
still permissible under Protocol I. Most of Bierzanek's2
findings, however, are wrong, and he might well disclaim them
once he realises that they were based on a serious oversight
of the prohibition of reprisals against civilian objects.
Article 52, paragraph 1, clearly states that: "Civilian
objects shall not be the object of attacks or of reprisals."
On the other hand, Article 51, paragraph 6, states that:
1. Report of Committee III, Second Session, 1975,
(CDOH/215/Rev. 1), para. 50 Emphasis added.
2. See Remigiusz Bierzanek, Reprisals as a means of enforcing
the Lau5 of Warfare, pp. 232-257, in Cas5ese (ed.), The
New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, 1979, pp, 251-254.
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"Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way
of reprisals are prohibited? These two provisions are
complementary to each other, and together with other pro-
hibitions of reprisals incorporated in the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949, as well as other specific prohibition
incorporated in Protocol I itself, the prohibition of
reprisals may be said to have become total.1
The civilian population and individual civilians shall
enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military
operations in all circumstances (Art. 51, para. 1).
"General protection" should be distinguished from "special
protection•t As Ialshoven explains, the term "special
protection" is used to indicate the fullest protection,
verging on immunity, while the term tgneral protection" implies
that only a certain measure of protection is provided without
there being an attempt to remove all the risks to which the
category of persons or objects concerned is exposed. Thus,
general protection of the civilian population and civilian
objects basically implies two things: a prohibition on making
them the object of direct attack, and a requirement to avoid
unacceptable collateral loss or damage as a result of attacks
on military objectives.2
Another fundamental difference between Itgefleralt and
"special" protection is that the latter may only be conferred
on certain "localities and zones" by means of a special
1 •
 See below, this Chapter, Section 7.
2. Frits Kaishoven, Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law mpplicable in Armed Conflict:
The Diplomatic Conference, Geneva, 1974— 1977, NYIL, 1978,
p. 113. (For brevity, this will be referred to as
Humanitarian Law, Part ii),.
469
agreement between the parties to the conflict. Such Local-
ities and zones, as may be put under special protection,
shall fulfil certain conditions specified by law; (in Article
14 of the fourth Geneva Convention with respect to hospital
and safety zones and localities; Article 15 with respect to
neutralized zones; in Article 59 of Protocol I with respect
to non—defended localities; and in Article 60 with respect
to demilitarized zones)
In these cases, the special protection conferred by
special agreement ceases if the locality or the zone ceases
to fulfil the required conditions, but it continues to benefit
from the "general protection" afforded by international Law
to civilians and civilian objects.2
Special protection by means of a special agreement is
rare in practice. Indeed, no such agreements have been made
since the end of the Second World War, 3 except in one case;
that was during the conflict in Palestine in 1948, where two,
and at one time three, neutralized zones, directed and
administered entirely by the International Committee of the
Red Cross, were set up in Jerusalem 4 But there seem to be no
other instances since then despite the great importance of such
"places of refuge" (as the ICRC likes to describe them) to the
protection of the civilian population.
However, special agreement is not the only means of
conferring special protection; some rules of international
1 On Articles 14 and 15 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, see
the ICRC Commentary, 1958, pp. 119-133, Pictet (ed.)
2. Art. 59 (7) and Art. 60 (7), of' Protocol (i).
3. On the practice during the Second World War, see R.Y.
Jennings, "Open Towns", BYIL, 1945, pp. 258-264; and
Whiteman, Digest, Vol. 10, pp. 423-437.4. ICRC Commentary, Ibid, p . 129.
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law conf'er such protection without special agreement. Thus,
Article 25 of the Hague Regulations on land warfare, 1907,
provides a classical example: "The attack or bombardment, by
whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings
which are undefended is prohibited."
If military objectives are situated in these localities,
they may be attacked but subject to the general protection of
the civilian population and civilian objects. As Article 2
of Hague Convention IX concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces,
1907, put It, "the commander shall take all due measures in
order that the town may suffer as little harm as possible."
The clearest example of "special protection" without the
necessity of "special agreement" in Protocol I is Article 56
entitled "Protection of works and installations containing
dangerous forces", namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical
generating stations. Some writers discuss this Article under
1
the rubric: "General protection: special objects", although
the article itself speaks of "special protection." 2 However,
immunity of these objects from attack is not absolute but
conditional, as is generally the case with special protectioc.
It may be useful to note that despite what has been said
above, the classification of the protection of' civilians and
civilian objects. into "general" and "special" protection
seems to be a misnomer. For, to the extent that genera
1 e.g. Kaishoven, Humanitarian Law, Part II, NYIL, l9?8,pp.
131135 • Kalshoven, however is not oblivious or averse to
the special protection in Art. 56.
2. Art. 56 (2).
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protection" may imply that civilians and civilian objects
may be attacked, albeit indirectly, it deviates from the
basic rule (!rt. 48 of Protocol I) which requires the parties
to the conflict to "direct their military operations only
against military objectives." The psychological impact of
the term "general protection" may induce those who plan or
decide upon an attack to take the protection of civilians
and civilian objects less seriously, or to take for granted
that civilians and civilian objects are not legally immune
from attack.
Even more serious is the psychological impact of the
term "special protection" which, although it indicates the
fullest possible protection, nevertheless seems to over-
emphasize the importance of declarations, special agreements
and the fulfilment of certain conditions.
It was probably to guard against such impact and oti-er
inferences as well, that Article 57 of' Protocol I, after
enumerating the precautionary measures that "shall be taken"
by	 who plan or decide upon an attack", went on to
state unequivocally in paragraph 5 that: "No provision of
this Article may be construed as authorizing any attacks
against the civilian population, civilians or civilian
objectt
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3.	 Attacks against the Civilian Poiulation 'as Such'
The first sentence of paragraph 2 of Article 51 of
Protocol I, lays down that: "The civilian population as such,
as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of
This is a firmly established rule of customary
international law notwithstanding its violation in the
Second World War and the wars that followed. Article 25 of
the regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention and
Article 2 of the Hague Convention No. IX, of 1907, have
already been mentioned. In 1938, the Assembly of the League
of Nations, on the initiative of the Spanish Government,
discussed at length the question of the protection of the
civilian population against bombing from the air. Raging at
the time were two armed conflicts; one was interstate (the
Sino—Japenese war), and the other was civil war (the Spanish
Civil war). At the conclusion of the debate the Assembly
adopted a resolution stating that "the intentional bombing
of civilian populations is illegal.." This, however, does not
mean that bombing by negligence is permissible. The same
resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations states
as a recognized principle that: "Any attack on legitimate
military objectives must be carried out in such a way that
civilian populations in the neighbourhood are not bombed
through negligence." Immediatly before this the resolution
states the principle that "flbjectives aimed at from the air
must be legitimate military objectives and must be
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identifiable.
These three principles were regarded as already in
force, although they needed to be developed and specified.2
Indeed even before this famous resolution was adopted on 30
September, 1938, the three principles were already declared
by the British Prime Minister Mr, Chamberlain, in the House
of Commons, as being principles of existing international
3law. Moreover, in the same year, 1938, after an intensified
aerial bombardment of Barcelona by the insurgent forces of
General Franco during the Spanish Civil war, the British and
French Governments sent representations to General Franco's
administration drawing its attention to the fact "that direct
and deliberate attacks on civilian population are contrary to
the principles of international law as based on the established
practises of civilised nations, to the laws of humanity and
to dictates of public opinion."4
The prohibition of attacks against the civilian
population was thus firmly established when the Second World
War broke out and with regard to all types of armed conflict.
Accordingly, when on the first of September, 1939, President
Roosevelt of the United States appealed to the United Kingdom,
France, Italy, Germany and Poland to affirm that their armed
forces shall "in no event and under no circumstances undertake
bombardment from the air of civilian populations or
1. For the complete text of this resolution, adopted on 30th
September, 1938, see Schindler and Toman, The Laws of
Armed Conflict, pp. 153-154.
2. See Antonio Cassese, The Spanish Civil War and Customary
International Law, in Cassese (edj, Current Problems of
International Law, pp. 298-311
3. Ibid, p. 300, n. 1g
4. As quoted by Cassese, ibid, p . 300.
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unfortified cities, upon the understanding that the same rules
of warfare shall be scrupulously observed by all their
opponents" 1 , he was asking these States not to resort to a
practice which they themselves had just condemned as illegal.
The United Kingdom and France, as it is well known,
welcomed the appeal and replied in a joint declaration that:
"They had indeed some time ago sent explicit instructions
to the commanders of their armed forces prohibiting
the bombardment whether from the air, or the sea, or
by artillery on land of any except strictly military
objectives in the narrowest sense of' the word.
Bombardment by artillery on land will exclude
objectives which have no strictly defined military
importance, in particular large urban ares situated
2
outside the battle zone."
This bears out three principles already recognized in
the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations.
Hitler also replied that the German Airforce had received the
command to confine itself to military objectives.
There is evidence to suggest that these pledges were
honoured for some time. Historian Geoffrey Best gives the
winter of 1940-1941 as the time when 'strategic bombing'
began, but he seems to suggest that it began as early as the
25th of August 1940, when Churchill's government ordered "the
bombing of 'military' targets in Berlin on a succession of
nights following 25 August." The avowed pretext for this,
says Best, "was the accidental dropping on the night of 24th
1. Quoted from Blix, Area Bombardment, BYIL, 1978, p.36.
2. For complete text, see the (British) House of Lords Debates,
Vol. 114, fifth series, cols. 1048-49, Sept. 13th 1y39
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(of august) of some bombs on London (which the Luftwaffe had
been under strict and irritating instruction5 to avoid)."1
Geoffrey Best seems to doubt that the bombing of' Berlin
was merely retalitory and expresses 'some puzzle' as to why
Churchill's government triggered the indiscriminate
bombardment of cities at a time when the RAF was not 'yet'
ready for a'bombing match' with the German ir Force and at
a time when Britain had already
	 many months suffered
much worse than Germany." 2
 Geoffrey Best offers some political
explanations which, however, do not concern us here. For the
purposes of thi5 section it is sufficient to note that
indiscriminate attacks, when judged by the principle of
di5tinction between non—combatants and civilian objects on
the one hand, and combatants and military objectives on the
other hand, appear in their true nature as attacks against
the civilian population 'as such' but in disguise.
This, in particular, may be the case when the expression
'as such' is taken to mean exc1usive1y?, or taken to mean an
attack 'unrelated to a military objective'. Such qualifications
have in the past rendered the protection of' the civilian
population largely illusory. For illustration, the United
States Navy manual of July, 1959, may be quoted. Under Section
221 of this Manual we read the following:
"It should be emphasized that despite recent developments
in the conduct of' warfare, the prohibitions against
subjecting non—combatants to direct attack unrelated to
a military objective or of attacking them for the
1 •
 Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare, 1 980, p. 276.
2. Loc. cit.
476
purpose of terrorization remains valjd•'1
At the Second Session of the Conference of Government
Experts, 1972, the ICRC presented the Conference with a draft
rule stating that: "Attacks which, by their nature, are
launched against civilians and military objectives
indiscriminately, shall be prohibited."2
With respect to this proposal the experts from the USA
expressed the following understanding which they requested
should be included in the report of Commission III: "In-
discriminate attacks are those attacks which have no specific
military objectives."3
The inference seems to be that in the view of' the
experts from the USA the slightest presence of a 'specific'
military objective would suffice to lift from an attack the
qualification of being an attack against the civilian
population as such, as well as the qualification of being
an indiscriminate attack. But then the attack would become
without any legal identity, and the distinction between
attacks against the civilian population as such and
indiscriminate attacks would becoce turrad. 	 kAc
it is extremely unlikely that a party to the conflict would
admit that he attacked any but military objectives.
However, the fact that the rule protecting the civilian
population as such, although recognized as a customary rule
of international law, has been formulated in some military
manuals restrictively, and has been interpreted by some
1. Cited in Whiteman, Digest, Vol. 10, p. 136.
2. ICRC, Report on the work of' Government Experts, Geneva,
1972, Vol.2, p 7, (draft Art. 45, para. 3)
3. Ibid, P. 83, Doc. CE/COIl 111/PC 11Q•
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writers in such a way as to make the illegality of
indiscriminate attacks look like a rather naive proposition.
Thus, for instance, the U.S Pirmy Field Manual on land
warfare (FM 27_iD), 1956, and the British Manual of' Military
Law, 1958, provide in identical words that "it is a generally
recognized rule of' international law that civilians must not
be made the object of attack directed exclusively against
them.
Some writers, e.g., Robert E. Jordan III, Hamilton
DeSaussure, and H. Lauterpacht, individually, seem to have
over—emphasized and over—stretched a controversial
'interpretation a contrario' of this rule in order to endow
with legality any attack not directed exclusively against
the civilian population or individual civilians.
Robert E. Jordan III advocated the 'legality' of the
widely condemned 'free—fire zones' practices in Vietnam
(renamed 'Specified Strike Zones' to avoid adverse publicity),
on the ground that:
I5 long as a reasonable belief in the enemys
presence was the basis for making a specified
strike zone the target of military operations, and
so long as undefended towns were not attacked,
the doctrine of military necessity clearly justified
the use of' firepower."2
Expressions like 'a reasonable belief in the enemy's
presence',	 towns', and 'specified strike zones'
1. Cited in Whiteman, Digest, Vol. 10, p. 135 Emphasis added
2. Robert E. Jordan III, Methods and Means of Warfare, Ch. 2,
p . 61, in Trooboff (ed.), Law and responsibility in
Warfare, 1975
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had a chameleon character in Vietnam, and so had the term
military necessity. Iccording to Petrowski, in some fmerican
officers' eyes "it would be considered a matter of 'military
necessity' to burn down an entire village to kill one sniper."1
!\nd according to Fleyrowitz, the concept of defended localities
was taken to mean any real or assumed presence of Vietcong or
of arms hidden in homes by the National Liberation Front.2
Evan Jordan himself admits that the term "free—fire zones"
was "loosely understood to mean 'anything goes' so far as the
use of firepower was concerned." Yet he was not prepared to
admit the illegality of the 'free—fire zones' practice. 	 ll
that he seems to admit as illegal appears from the following
sentence: "Certainly there is some evidence that such zones
were used for target practice without regard to the limitations
of the Hague Regulations." Only such 'target practice' where
individual noncombatants "may indeed have been shot without
justification" 3 seemed to him illegal.
Thus, it seems clear that Jordan reduced the protection
of the civilian population to the prohibition of attacks
directed exclusively against the civilian population or
individual civilians. Conversely, when the attacks were not
directed exclusively against the civilian population or
individual civilians, military necessity, in his view, would
justify the attacks.
Hamilton DeSaussure expressed similar views to those
of Robert Jordan, but he claimed that the civilians in the
1. Lawrence C. Petrouski, Law and the Conduct of the Vietnam
War, in Falk (edj, The Vietnam War and International Law,
Vol. 2, p. 496.
2. Henri Pleyrowitz, The Law of War in Vietnam, in Falk's,
• ibjd p 555.
3. Robet	 . Jordan III, op Cit,
	 . 60-61.
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preplanned free—fire Zones were given the opportunity to
evacuate except in cases where prior warning would jeopardize
the success of the mission. Moreover, in his view, the free—
fire zones and area bombing, "all can be considered as
counterbalancing the enemys policies of concealment, surprise,
and treachery."1
Capitalizing on guerrilla tactics of concealment,
surprise, the use of civilians as a shield, and urban guerrilla
operations was fashionable in the past three decades as if the
legal requirement of distinction meant segregation. Like
economic warfare in the Second World War, 'counterbalancing'
guerrilla tactics has been taken as a pretext for the destruct-
ion of the civilian population and the social fabric of the
people struggling for its liberation and its invaluable right
of self—determination.
ConcBalment and surprise are classical elements of
military strategy and are recognized as such the world over.
They are not the invention of guerrilla movements. Further,
there is no rule of law that prohibits the siting of military
objectives among the civiLian çoçu1ation -o'ier
such a prohibition may be, political and military spokesmen,
of whom we hear and see much on radio and television screens,
who blame excessive civilian losses on guerrilla movements
failing to 'segregate' themselves from the civilian population,
either display their ignorance of international law or tend
to play on the feelings of soft—hearted but largely ignorant
public opinion.
1. See Hamilton DeSaussure, Methods and Means of' Warfare,
"Comments", Ch. 4, in Trooboff (ed.), Op. Cit. pp. 66-74.
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In brief, indiscriminate attacks have always had the
dual character of being attacks against the civilian
population as such, and of being attacks against military
objectives. It is unconvincing to argue that such attacks
were not intended to strike at civilians or that they were
not directed exclusively against them. There is no magic
power in the words 'intended' and 'exclusively' that would
make a crime 'no crime'. The express prohibition of
indiscriminate attacks in two detailed paragraphs of Article
51 of Protocol I bear out this fact.
Perhaps the most repugnant form of attacking the civilian
population as such is by way of reprisals. The bitter fact
about reprisals is that under customary international law
they are described as sanctions, and as such they will continue
to be until the conventional illegality of reprisals enshrined
in Article 51(6) of Protocol I supersedes their customary
legality.
The rule that the civilian population as such, as well
as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack
must be read in conjunction with a definition of who is a
1	 ...
'civilian'. Under the definition adopted in Article 50 of
Protocol I only persons belonging to the armed forces of the
Parties to the conflict are excluded from falling under the
concept of 'civilians'. This point has already been discussed
at some length. Suffice it here to state or re5tate that
under the definition of civilians in Protocol I there is no
longer a place for the discussion often heard after the Second
World War, as a result of the practices in that war, that the
1. See Blix, Area Bombardment, BYIL, 1978, pp. 42-43.
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distinction between civilians and combatants has been
blurred, 1 or that there is a category of civilians, notably
those who work in munition or armament factories, that ought
to be regarded as 'quasi—combatants' 2 and hence constitute a
legitimate object of attacks. Under Protocol I, attacks
against the so—called 'quasi—combatants' must be regarded
as attacks against the civilian population and individual
civilians 'as such' and therefore prohibited.
However, the presence of these workers in legitimate
military objectives does not, by itself, render these
objectives immune from attack, but the workers, even in this
case, would still remain under the so—called protection of' the
'proportionality rule', as in any other attack on military
objectives, as will be shown in due course.
Finally it seems worth recalling that the presence
within the civilian population of individuals who do not come
within the definition of civilians does not deprive the
3population of its civilian character. In other words, the
attack in such a case would still be regarded as an attack
against the civilian population 'as such'. Indeed, the attack
in this case may easily qualify as being indiscriminate, a
violation of the rule of proportionality, as well as a
violation of the rules about precautions in attacks. Yet,
the importance of expressly reserving civilian character to
1. Such a claim found expression in Military Manuals of the
USA and Britain, see Whiteman, Digest, Vol. 10, 134-136.
See also, Lauterpacht, The Revision of the Law of War,
BYIL, 1952, p. 364.
2. J.M. Spaight, Legitimate Objects in Air Warfare, BYIL,
1944, pp. 162-3; and Stone, Legal Controls of International
Conflict, 1959, p. 629.
3. Protocol I, Art. 50, para. 3.
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the whole collectivity in question can hardly be exaggerated,
especially in armed conflicts characterized by the guerrilla
type of warfare, which is generally the case in non—interstate
armed conflicts.
In summary, the following points may be stated:
1.	 %lthough the rule that "the civilian population as such,
as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of
attack", is a recognized rule of customary international law,
its content has not always been clear. Some writers have
interpreted the rule so narrowly and thus confined the
prohibition to attacks directed exclusively against the
civilian population or individual civilians, that is, attacks
not related to a recognized military objective. Beyond this,
one writer argued, " it is controversial, at least practice
has made it controversial, whether the civilian population
as such is entitled to protection." 1 It seems doubtful whether
such arguments were made in good faith.
2	 The rule under discussion should now be read in conjunction
with other rules such as the definition of civilians and
civilian objects, the definition of the civilian population,
the prohibition of idiscriminate attacks, the prohibition of
reprisals, and the precautionary measures to be taken in
attacks.
3. The prohibition of making civilians the object of attack
is not confined to 'direct attacks'; nowhere in the Protocol
has the term 'attack' or 'attacks' been qualified by the word
'direct'. Thus, indiscriminate attacks may also be attacks
against the civilian population as such although in fact
1 •
 Lauterpacht, Up. cit., p 365.
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military objectives may have been hit. The question there-
fore is not one of semantics but one of facts. In non—
interstate armed conflicts characterized by the guerrilla
type of warfare, attacks against guerrillas in centres of
civilian population have usually and predominantly been
attacks against the civilian populations as such, despite
allegations to the contrary.
4.	 Civilian Iviorale as a Target
An air of paradox surrounds the attitude of governments
towards the morale of the civilian population of the enemy.
In practice, they regard the morale of the civilian population
a strategic objective. In law it is quite the contrary; the
morale of the civilian population is regarded as legally
inviolable. For example, at the Allies' Casablanca Conference
of January, 1943, the primary purpose of air war against
Germany was defined as:
"the progressive destruction and dislocation of the
German military, industrial, and economic system, and
the undermining of the morale of the German peole to
a point where their capacity for armed resistance is
fatally weakened."1
In marked contrast, on February 15, 1 940, British Prime
Minister Chamberlain stated in the House of Commons:
"... Whatever be the length to which others may go, His
1 Cited in McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World
Public Order, 1967, p. 654.
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Majesty's Government will never resort to the deliberate
attack on women, children, and other civilians for
purposes of mere terrorism"
This statement should not be read deviously as implying
that deliberate attacks on the civilian population for
puposes other than "mere terrorism" were excluded. It should
be read in the light of the declaration made in response to
President Roosevelt's appeal to France, Germany, Great Britain,
Italy, and Poland to refrain from aerial bombardment of
"civilian populations or unfortified cities" so long as their
opponents so refrained. 2 In response to this appeal, the
Governments of the United Kingdom and France, in a joint
declaration made on September 3, 1939, 'solemnly and publicly'
affirmed their intention "to conduct hostilities with a firm
desire to spare the civilian population." Further, they said
that they had indeed some time ago sent explicit instructions
to the commanders of their armed forces "prohibiting the
bombardment whether from the air, or the sea, or by artillery
on land of any except strictly military objectives in the
narrowest sense of the word." 3
 Moreover, there is historical
evidence that this policy was maintained by Chamberlain's
Government until Churchill took over as Prime Minister.4
However, the situation after the Second World War seems
not only paradoxical, but also hypocritical. Belligerents
1 •
 Cited in Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 10,
p.l37. But see also, 357 House of Commons Debates, (5th
ser.), col. 954, (Feb. 15, 1940).
2. See Witeman, Digest of' International Law, Vol. 10, p.l36.
3. Ibid., pp. 136-137.
4. The British story regarding aerial bombardment is well
discussed by D.H.N.Johnson, Rights in Air Space, Manchester,
1965, pp.42 et seq. as well as by Geoffrey Best, Humanity in
Warfare, 1980, pp. 262 et seq.
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during the Second World War, although they were proved
strategically to be wrong, they at least
	 were honest to
declare that one of their primary objectives was to break the
morale of the enemy's civilian population. 8ut since the Second
World War, the emphasis in law has been on the prohibition of
making the morale of' the civilian population the object of
attack whether for strategic or for tactical purposes.
Thus, Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Gonvention prohibited
"all measures of intimidation or of terrorism", and paragraph
2 of Article 51 provides: "The civilian population as such, as
well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.
Acts of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread
terror among t e civilian population are prohibited."
Yet, with reference to post World War armed conflicts
one may speak without exaggeration, of incidental military
losses incidental to attacks against the civilian population
rather than of civilian losses incidental to attacks against
legitimate military objectives. Why this hypocrisy? If' the
morale of the civilian population in every armed conflict
does really constitute a strategic military or political
objective, does it not make sense to continue to assert that
all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited
and that acts of violence the purpose of which is to spread
terror among the civilian population is prohibited. If on
the other hand there is no military case for the terrorisation
of the civilian population sound reason requires that those
who commit such acts to desist from committing them. The rest
of this section will consider these two points, namely, why
governments will continue to insist that the morale of the
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civilian population is legally inviolate, and secondly,
whether there is a military case for terror attacks.
The fjrst point has been abley explained by H.
Lauterpacht and his argument merits quotation at length. He
wrote:
"... it is in that prohibition, which is a clear rule
of law, of international terrorization - or destruction
- of the civilian population as an avowed or obvious
object of attack that lies the last vestige of the
claim that war can legally be regulated at all. Without
that irreciucible principle of restraint there is no
limit to the licence and depravity of force. If stark
terror and panic dissolving all bonds of organized
life are an object at which the belligerent can
legitimately aim, there is no reason why he should
stop short of murdering the inhabitants of occupied
territory - for such action is certain to create terror
both in the occupied territory and in the territory
which he threatens to occupy. Nor is there any reason
why an i5Olated hamlet or peaceful township should not
be harassed, attacked, and obliterated - for that is
cl e arly calculated to put the entire population of the
adversary in a state of disorganizing fear. It iS clear
that admission of' a right to resort to the creation
of terror among the civilian population as being a
legitimate object per se' would inevitably mean the
actual and formal end of' the law of warfare For that
reason, so long as the assumption is allowed to subsist
that there is a law of war, the prohibition of the
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weapon of terror not incidental to lawful operations
must be regarded as an absolute rule of law."1
Governments are of course in no mood to bring the law
of armed conflict to a 'formal' end although in practice they
do bring it to an actual end. However, the general legal
conviction remains that terrorization of the civilian popul-
ation as a method of warfare is prohibited. Stone summed up
that legal conviction in the following words:
"Governments as well as publicists generally deny the
legality of bombardment aimed at civilian morale, using
'civilian' in an indiscriminate sense wide enough to
include the quasi—combatant workforce."2
Professor Stone himself did discriminate. In his view,
the human impulse to declare civilian morale inviolate from
direct attack rises from refusal to accept consistently the
distinction between the quasi—combatant and genuine civilians.
Once this is accepted, he argued;
"the hard fact that belligerents do regard the morale
of the enemy's quasi—combatant workforce as a military
objective can be faced, while yet guarding the physical
and psychological immunity of other civilians."3
Professor Stone has been frequently criticized for
making this distinction. 11cDougal and Feliciano regarded the
distinction as being "most difficult of application" and
perhaps apt to be enumerated among the "escapes into verbal
illusion" which the learned writer himself so forcefully
1 •
 Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 369.
2. Stone, Legal Controls in International Conflict, p. 629.
3. Ibid., p. 631.
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deplored
Another point of criticism was that, contrary to Stone's
auggestion, belligerents in the Second World War did not act
upon such a distinction between the 'quasi—combatant workforce'
and 'genuine civilians'; belligerents in practice considered
the morale, not of the 'quasi—combatant workforce' merely or
as such, but of the population generally, as a military
objective. The extent to which the Allied Powers regarded
enemy civilian morale as an appropriate target of aerial
attack is indicated by the fact that of the total bomb tonnage
dropped in the European theatre of operations (2.697.473 tons),
23.7 percent (or 639.301 tons) was devoted to urban "area
raids." 2 According to U.S Strategic Bombing Survey 1945,
the term 'area rajd	 denoted attacks having certain
distinctive characteristics:
"They were made generally at night; they were directed
against large cities; they were designed to spread
destruction over a large area rather than to knock
out any specific plant or installation; and they were
intended primarily to destroy morale, particularly that
of the industrial worker."
The U.S. Survey also states that the urban area incendiary
attacks carried out by 'superfortresses' had for their
'preponderant purpose' "to secure the heaviest oossible moral
and shock effect by widespread attack upon the Japanese civilian
population.
The area bombing of World War II was used to attack the
1. McDougal and Feliciano, Op. Cit. 657,
2. Ibid, p. 658 and p. 654.
3. Ibid, p. 654.
4. Ibid, p. 654, n. 405
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collective will to fight, perhaps even more so than it was
1
used to hit military and industrial complexes. 	 This may
explain why the problem of the morale of the civilian
population as an object of attack has been habitually
discussed in the context of 'indiscriminate attacks' and air
warfare in particular.	 The morale of the civilian population
seems to have loomed large in strategic thinking before and
during World War II, and the advent of the warplane made it
loom even larger and more attractive, as an object of attack.
The basic assumptions of that strategic thought seemed
attractively simple. The element5 of military power, it was
assumed, were twofold - the material fighting resources both
potential and in esse, and the psychological—ideological
factors comprising the collective predisposition or will to
fight and loosely summed up as 'morale'. The enemy might be
disarmed, the assumption continued, by destroying one or
the other element, for one avails little or nothing without
the other. Pir power made it technologically possible swiftly
and decisively to shatter the enemy's will to Fight.2
'('lorale' is thus a catchy phrase; it is not simoly a
state of mind - fear or terrorization, as it is generally
assumed, but it is the equivalent of 'the cause' for which
the war is fought, that is to say, the political object. This
seems to be what Clausewitz understood bysubduing "the will
of the enemy"; that is, hIj5 Government and its allies must
1 Gerald J. !\dler, Targets in War: Legal Considerations, pp.
281-326, at p. 320, in Falk (ed), The Vietnam War and
International Law, Vol. 3, 1972.
2 McDougal and Feliciano, Op. Cit. p. 652-53
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be forced into signing a peace, or the people into submission."
Yet, it seems doubtful whether Clauewitz had ever
considered the civilian population as such, or its morale,
or even the exertion of pressure on the civilian population
whether physical or moral, as a means of pressurising the
military or political leadership to yield to the attacker's
military or political demands.1
It should not be forgotten that Clausewitz found in the
nation—in—arms theory the essence of' war and on that account
he glorified it, and yet he detested the devastation of towns
and countries and described such acts as "rude acts or mere
ifl5tiflCt." He wrote:
"If we find civilized nations do not put their prisoners
to death, do not devastate towns and countries, this is
because their intelligence exercised greater influence
on their mode of' carrying on war, and has taught them
more effectual means of applying force than these rude
acts of mere
It seems gravely doubtful whether 20th century war
cabinets have ever learnt the lesson, or whether if they
learned it, they ever practised it. i\s noted on the previous
page, the civilian population and their morale became an
attractive military target, apparently more attractive than
military targets in the proper sense. Douhet, the Italian
Ceneral, assumed the effectiveness of airpower in breaking the
morale of the enemy. He wrote:
1. See Clausewitz' chapter on "Ends and Means in War", pp.
122-138, in Rapoport (ed.), Clausewitz On War, 1968,
Pelican Classics.
2. Ibid., p. 103.
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"Tragic, too, to think that the decision in this kind
of war must depend upon smashing the material and moral
resources of a people caught in a frightful cataclysm
which haunts them everywhere without cease until the
final collapse of all social organization. I1ercifully,
the decision will be quick in this kind of war, since
the decisive blow will be directed at civilians, that
element of the countries at war least able to sustain."1
The First World War, commentators observed, heO ep
some partial and tentative anticipation of Douhet's thesis.
It was in the Second World War, however, that the above
conception of strategic air warfare was put to deliberate
and sustained application.2
According to Mcdougal and Feliciano, Douhet's thesis
was prevalent in current doctrine on strategic air power
before and during World War IT. 3 If so, that doctrine must
have been at variance with the legal conviction expressed in
the resolution adopted by the Assembly of the League of
Nations on 30 September, 1938, that the bombing of civilian
populations is a practice "for which there is no military
necessity and which, as experience shows, only causes needless
suffering", and therefore, is condemned under the recognized
principles of international law"4
1. As quoted by McDougan and Feliciano, Op. Cit. p. 653.
2. Ibid, p. 653. See also, Geoffrey Best, Humanity In Warfare,
1 980, pp. 269-70.
3. Op. Cit. p.652. On the development of the doctrine 'within'
the British RAF, see Geoffrey Best, Op. Cit. pp. 271-285;
and David .Johnson, Rights In Air Space, 1965, pp. 44-57.
4. Text in Schindler and Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts,
pp 153-154
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Evidence on the correctness of this legal conviction is
probably best when it comes from all quarters concerned -
operational analysts, politicians, historians and internat-
ional lawyers.
Since indiscriminate attacks are all—embracing
activities, whether in terms of form or in terms of objectives,
and since one of the main purposes of such attacks (area
bombardment, carpet bombing, blanket bombing, etc.) was the
undermining of the'morale' of the civilian population (which
simultaneously, although not necessarily invariably, includes
attacks against the 'physical' being of the civilian
population), it is no wonder that most of the evidence comes
up in the context of indiscriminate attacks. On the other
hand, emphasis on the impotence or ineffectiveness in military
terms of any but precision attacks on objects of generally
recognized military value, is, in itself, evidence of the lack
of military necessity for (or at least the needlessness of')
attacks against the civilian population as such or against
their morale.
This being said, it remains to quote some of the most
persuasive evidence.
Authorities, aided by operational analysts, seem to
agree that 'terror attacks' are at best of uncertain military
value. 1
 Professor Adler, himself an ex—air officer, wrote:
... if the will could be broken by terror attacks on
non—military elements of the nation, if rapid capitul-
ation by the decision makers would follow, one could
argue that such strategy is more merciful than a longer
T. IlcDougal and Feliciano, op. cit., pp . 655-656.
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war •
 However, not only is this not provable, it is
probable that wars are lengthened and made more inhumane
by brutalizing tactics."1
With reference to the Second World War, Professor Adler
wrote:
"the impermissable line is reached in terror bombing
of the civilian community with the aim of pressuring
the political elite to accept the attacker's political
demands. It is impermissable because it is inhumane and
ineffective •
Historian Peter Karsten concludes a long historical
survey that begins with ancient Rome and ends with American
terrorism in Vietnam,by saying:
"Terrorism and brutality served more often to weaken
than to provide an advantage for the military force
that used them. And this appears to hae been true
despite the politics, ideology, and relative strengths
of the contending forces."3
Historian Geoffrey Best, a staunch critic of area
bombardment in general, and of the British RAF Bomber Command
in particular, wrote with reference to the Second World War:
"By the second half of 1944, the opportunity was there
for those with eyes to see and minds to understand. \rea
bombing, always morlly repugnant and legally dubious,
had not even worked. Costly and painful to the (British)
bomber force, it had been seen to be of no exceptional
1. •
 Gerald J.Mdler, Targets in War, pp.321-22, in Falk (ed.),
The Vietnam War and International Law, \Jol.3,(1972).
2	 Ibid., p. 322.
3. Peter Karsten, Law, Soldiers,and Combat, pp. 1 6l-64, at 164.
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value towards winning the war •
 The money, said some,
might have been better spent, the men and machines
1better employed."
Professor Gordon Wright, an 1merican historian, wrote:
"[lass bombing, then undoubtedly hampered the German War
effort in much more than a marginal way. What it failed
to do was to destroy civilian morale - to break the
German people's will to work and endure."2
On this, Professor Geoffrey Best commented:
"Even so fine and discriminating historian as Professor
Wright here puts a foot in the undiscrirninating mud
which is the normal medium of so many writers on this
matter. When he says 'mass bombing', he means all
strategic bombing, both 'precision' and 'area' s
 He has
no doubt which sort in fact did the more good."3
Professor Best himself is in no doubt that, of the two
kinds of bombing, 'precision'bombing did the more vital damage,
as was discovered soon after the war by the United States
Strategic Bombing Survey.4
Winston Churchill, the former Prime (Vilnister of ritain
who ordered the onslaught on the German cities, has been
quoted as saying:
"The destruction of' Dresden remains a serious query
against the conduct of allied bombing. I am of the
opinion that military objectives must henceforth be more
1 Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare, 1980, p. 280
2. Gordon Wright, Ordeal of' Total War, New York, 1968, p. 181.
3. Geoffrey Best, op. cit., p.366, n. 113.
4. Ibid., p. 283.
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strictly studied in our own interest rather than that
of' the enemy... I feel the need for more precise
concentration upon military objectives, such as oil and
communications behind the immediate battle—zone, rather
than on mere acts of terror and wanton destruction,
however impressive."1
The importance of careful selection of targets for air
attacks is emphasized by the German experience, according to
the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (1945). The Germans, says
the Survey, were far more concerned over attacks on one or more
of their basic industrie5 and services - their oil, chemical,
or steel industries, or their power, or transportation
networks - than they were over attacks on their armament
industry and city areas.2
1s noted above, some writers tended to make a big issue
of the 'morale' of the workforce in armament and war—related
industries (generally described as'quasi—combatants', 'war
or 'civilian warriorst), and accordingly, contended
that the distinction between combatants and non—combatants
has become increasingly blurred as a result of the practice
(a term which they use to gloss over the issue of' 'opinio
juris t ) which made the workforce and or their morale a
legitimate object of attack.
On this issue, the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Over-
all Report, European War, 1945, had the following to say:
"War production is the critical measuring rod of the
1. I\s quoted by Blix, Area Bombardment, BYIL, 1973, p. 60.
2. Loc. cit.
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effects of lowered morale in the German war effort.,.
As has been seen, armament production continued to mount
till mid-1944, in spite of declining civilian morale,
but from that point on, arms production began to decline
and dropped every month thereafter at an increasing
rate. A minor, but not negligible, portion of this drop
was the result of the cumulative effects of lowered
morale • ,, 1
In commenting on this citation, it should be noted first
that it is not our intention to deny the effect of' morale on
the productivity of the workforce. On the other hand, it does
not need an expert in production management to tell us that
the morale of the workf'orce (assuming that it can be measured),
remains, under all circumstances, just one single factor among
the many factors that constitute the process of production,
all of which are variables.
Accordingly, it seems absolutely unrealistic to consider
war production 'the critical measuring rod' of the effects of
lowered morale in the German war effort, For to assume that
this was the case, is to assume that morale uas the
element in war production and that it was the only variable
in the process of production, which is absurd.
Liar production may be the critical measuring rod of' 'war
effort' itself, but it is not, and cannot be, the critical
measuring rod of the effects of morale except in a purely
hypothetical situation in which all other elements of'
1 •
 Loc. cit.
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production are treated as constant, actually and potentially,
while the effects of morale are treated as the only variable.
I1oreover, to assume that the war production 'was' or
'is' the critical measuring rod of the effects of 'lowered
morale' is to assume that the workforce in the war industry
is motivated only by patriotic reasons, which is untrue. Were
this the case, it would have followed that the war effort
should increase in direct proportion to an increased sense of
national danger - assuming of course that it is possible
materially to do so.
In view of' these remarks, the statement made by the U.S.
Survey that "a minor but not negligible portion" of the drop in
German war production "was the result of the cumulative effects
of' lowered morale", seems to be general, and so vague, and
therefore carries no more evidential value than it might in
time of peace. In other words, it is no more than a general
statement of principle, valid at all times, that the morale
of the workforce is an element in the process of' production.
Many things can lower the morale of the workforce, in war or
in peace. But that tends to confirm (rather than disprove)
the argument that bombing is an effective way of' lowering the
morale of enemy workers. At any rate , it is probably obvious
that no more than a "minor but not negligible" portion of the
drop in war production has been attributed to 'lowered morale'.
Given the fact that the United States itself had joined in
bombing the civilian population (including the workforce) in
order to produce a moral effect, even that 'minor' portion may
be seen as an exaggeration, more in the nature of a face—
saving formula than a statement of fact. If this view is
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correct, it follows that the whole subject of the morale of
the uorkforce should be dropped altogether from legal
discussions, except perhaps as a historical reminder to those
ready to learn from past experience.
It is probably worth noting in this context that those
who suffered most from tha alleged legitimacy of attacks on
the so—called 'quasi—combatants' are the industrialized
societies. Yet, paradoxically, the advocates of such
legitimacy, and hence of the claim that the distinction
between combatants and non—combatants has become increasingly
blurred, come mainly from countries that were and still are
the main centres of the war industry. With due respect, those
who may continue to hold such a thesis may well be advised to
consider what impact their thesis may have if civil war erupted
at home. However, as noted above, the definition of civilians
and civilian population, as laid down in article 50 of Protocol
I, should terminate the discussion of' this miserable and
illogical theory about the so—called 'quasi—combatants', which
brought the protection of' the civilian population to a vanish-
ing point.
The views quoted above to the effect that attacks against
the civilian population with a view to undermining their
morale are in military terms ineffective and counter—productive
are in the majority. In her report, "The Law of \rmed Conflicts",
1971, Madame Binshedler—Robert, an ICRC expert, states:
"Military experts today admit that the results of 1\llied
bombing in Germany fell very much short of expectations,
that they did not become effective until they concentrated
on sources of' energy and transport, and that the brutality
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of' that form of warfare, far from shattering the enemy's
morale, may even have encouraged a spirit of resistance
which prolonged the war."1
To this, it may be added that the oppressive and savage
policies applied by Germany and Japan in territories under
their occupation during the Second World War did not succeed
in suppressing the fighting will of the peoples of occupied
territories; on the contrary, the fighting will of the peoples
stiffened, their determination to emancipate themselves
increased and gathered momentum day after day, and soon the
occupying puers found themselves engaged in a war more
dangerous to them than the war at the battle fronts.
At this juncture, it should be noted that the evidence
adduced so far came up in the context of interstate armed
conflicts, but it is equally (or even more) relevant in the
context of wars of national liberation and of civil war. A
study based on the Pentagon papers, and prepared for the
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, entitled
"Bombing as Policy Tool in Vietnam: Effectiveness",
"calls into 5erious question the efficacy of strategic
and interdiction bombing against a highly motivated
guerrilla enemy in an underdeveloped countryt2
This was the critical assessment of the results achieved
through the di5charge of bomb quantities in Vietnam that were
several times those dropped during the whole of the Second
World War.3
There is thus a wealth of evidence to justify the
1. As quoted by Blix, op. cit., p. 61.
2. Study No. 5 (Washington, 1972), quoted by Blix, op. clt.,p.6l
3. Loc. cit.
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conclusion that terrorism and brutality served more often to
weaken than to provide an advantage for the military force
that used them, and that this appears to have been true
despite the politics, ideology, and relative strengths of the
contending forces.1
Further the evidence is overwhelming that terrorization
of the civilian population as a method of warfare is illegal
and that this illegality is based not only on the inhumanity
of such practices, but also on the rationale that there is
no military necessity for them and that they might even be
counter—productive for the purpose of subduing an enemy.2
Nevertheless, it seems advisable not to confuse the
rule with its rationale. The fact that a Party to the conflict
may find an advantage in violating the law does not justify
that violation; otherwise the rules of law would deteriorate
into rules of convenience, which would practically mean the
abrogation of the law of armed conflict.
1 •
 Karsten, Law, Soldiers and Combat, 1g78, p 164.
2. See Blix, op. cit., pp. 44-46.
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5.	 Forfeiture of Protection
The conditions under which civilians forfeit the
protection afforded them by Section 1 of Protocol I entitled
"General Protection Against Effects of Hostilities (Articles
4a-67), are stated in Article 51, paragraph 3:
"Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this
Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct
part in hostilities."
Stated rather differently, civilians loose the protec-.
tion of the Section only during such time as they take a
direct part in hostilities. 1 But what are these underlined
words supposed to mean ?
It should be noted, first, that the provisions of
Article 51, paragraph 1,2, and 3 of Protocol I are the same
as paragraphs 1,2, and 3 of Article 13 of Protocol II
relating to the protection of victims of non—international
armed conflicts. Therefore, forfeiture of' civilian protection
is the same under both Protocols, notwithstanding the
'threshold' problem of Protocol II.
Secondly, it should be noted that the term 'hostilities'
was not defined in any of the Protocols, nor in Article 3
common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 where the words
Itaking no active part in the hostilities" were used. However,
there is no evidence to suggest that the hostile acts wherby
civilians forfeit their protection under Protocol II were
1. See Report of Committee III, Second Session, Doc. CDDH/215/
Rev. 1, in Levie, Protection of War Victims, Vol. 3, pp.
158-160, at 159.
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intended to be wider than those same acts whereby civilians
forfeit their protection under Protocol I. Therefore, it
seems fair to conclude that the 'parallelism' achieved in the
two Protocols with regard to the 'forfeiture' of civilian
protection should also be extended to rticle 3 common to the
four Geneva Conventions of 1949.
Thirdly, it should be noted that a broad definition of
taking	 or 'direct' part in 'hostilities' could
obviously draw in a great number of civilians as direct
participants, and thus might render any talk about the
protection of the civilians against effects of hostilities
rather nonsensical as the experience of the Second World War
had shown beyond doubt.
So, what does "take a direct part in hostilities" mean?
There is strong evidence that the intention of' the Diplomatic
Conference was that civilians forfeit their protection under
Section I of Protocol I only during such time as they actually
take a direct part in 'attacks' or in 'military operations'.
Evidence in support of 	 interpretation may
be drawn from several sources
First, the content of Prticles 48 to 67 of Protocol I
indicates that 'hostilities' in the titles of' those frticles
(i.e. the title of Section I of Part IV of' Protocol I) is
synonymous with the conduct of attacks or military operations.1
The basic rule of protection, 1\rticle 48, enacts that:
"the parties to the conflict shall at all times
distinguish between the civilian population and
1. See Gehring, Protection of Civilian Infrastructures, Law
and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 42, 1978, pp. 130-31.
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combatants and between civilian objects and military
objectives and accordingly shall direct their
operations only against military objectives."
This indicates that unless civilians become'combatants'
they remain protected. Prticle 51, paragraph 1, prescribes
that the civilian population and individual civilians shall
enjoy general protection Iagainst dangers arising from
military operations." Indeed, throughout the Section one finds
hostilities' tied to military operations and the more
restrictive term 'attack'. 'Pttacks' are defined in \rticle
49 as "acts of violence against the adversary, whether in
offence or defence." flu this indicates that the hostilities
in which direct participation by civilians results in the
forfeiture of' civilian protection are either attacks or
military operations.
It should be noted that international law does not
recognize a half—way house between combatants and non—combat-
ants; it does not recognize the so—called 'quasi—combatant'
status which found its way into legal literature after the
Second World War, or more specifically, during the war itself.
It may be interesting to note in this respect that a proposal
by the ICRC to the effect that "civilians who are within a
military objective run the risks consequent upon any attack
launched against this objective", seems to have been rejected
as a statement of law although it was no more than a statement
2
of fact.
1 •
 E.g. Spaight, Legitimate Objectives in fir Warfare, BYIL,
Vol. 21, 1944, pp. 158-164.
2. ICRC, Report on the Work of the Conference of Government
Experts, 1972, Vol. 1, p.l48, and p. 149, para. 3. 162.
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This indicates that the 'workforce' of' a Party to the conflict,
also described as quasi—combatants, do not forfeit their
protection (in law). In other words, their activities do not
constitute a direct participation in hostilities.
Another example is the activities of civilian civil
defence organizations regulated by Articles 61 to 67 of
Protocol I.
According to Article 61 of Protocol I, 'civil defence'
means the performance of some or all of the following tasks
intended to protect the civilian population against the
dangers, and to help it recover from the immediate effects,
of hostilities or disasters and also to provide the
conditions necessary for its survival. These tasks are:
warning; evacuation; management of' shelters; management of
blackout measures; rescue; medical services, including first
aid, and religious assistance; fire—fighting; detection and
marking of danger areas; decontamination and similar protect-
ive measures; provision of emergency accommodation and
supplies; emergency assistance in the restoration and
maintenance of order in distressed areas; emergency repair of'
indispensable public utilities; emergency disposal of the
dead; assistance in the preservation of objects essential for
survival; and complementary activities necessary to carry out
any of the tasks mentioned above, including, but not limited
to, planning and organization.1
Writing in 1944, Spaight argued that "the huge army of
passive defence, mainly civilian, must also be regarded as
1. Article 61, para. (a).
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quasi—combatant." In his view, "it is obviously illogical to
drop incendiary bombs on your enemy's military objectives,
(which in Spaight's view may comprise a whole city) and then
to spare the firebrigade which tries to extinguish the
conflagration or the demolition squad which tries to prevent
it from spreading."1
It is not necessary to comment on this logic. For by
the same token it would also be illogical to wound a soldier
and then spare the medical personnel and the ambulances which
would take him to hospital. Since hospitals are the places
where wounded soldiers are treated, it would be also illogical
to spare hospitals. If the fire - brigades and demolition
squads may be regarded asfquasi_combatants, why not also
consider the farmers as 'quasi—combatants'? Killing or maiming
them is the most assured way of starving the armed forces!
Surely such a logic is the logic of total war, and
total war does not need laws of war. To talk of military
objectives in total war is mere nonsense
Fortunately, there is no evidence to suggest that the
idea of a quasi—combatant status has ever been sanctioned in
international law, whether by custom or by convention. It
seems only natural therefore that 'civilian civil defence'
organizations and their personnel, as well as their buildings,
shelters and 'materiel' are entitled to be respected and
protected, subject to the provisions of the Protocol,
particularly the provisions of Section I of Part IV, thereof.2
This protection shall also apply to civilians who,
1	 Spaight, op. cit., p. 162.
2. See rticle 62.
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although not members of civil defence organizations, respond
to an appeal from the competent authorities and perform civil
defence tasks under their control.1
According to Article 65 of Protocol I, the protection
to which civilian civil defence organizations, their personnel,
buildings, shelters and materiel are entitled shall not cease
"unless they commit or are used to commit, outside their
proper tasks, acts harmful to the enemy." Protection may,
however, cease only after a warning has been given setting,
whenever appropriate, a reasonable time limit, and after such
warning has remained unheeded.2
Article 65, paragraph 2, provides that, "The following
shall not be considered as acts harmful to the enemy:
(a) that civil defence tasks are carried out under the
direction or control of military authorities;
(b) that civilian civil defence personnel co—operate
with military personnel in the performance of civil
defence tasks, or that some military personnel are
attached to civilian civil defence organization;
(c) that the performance of civil defence tasks may
incidentally benefit military victims, particularly
those who are hors de combat."
Paragraph 3 and 4 of Article 65 mention other acts and
state as follows:
"3, It shall also not be considered as an act harmful to the
enemy that civilian civil defence personnel bear light
individual weapons for the purpose of maintaining order
1 •
 Article 62 (2).
2. Article 65 (1).
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or for self—defence. However, in areas where land fighting
is taking place or is likely to take place, the Parties
to the conflict shall undertake the appropriate measures
to limit these weapons to handguns, such as pistols or
revolvers, in order to assist in distinguishing between
civil defence personnel and combatants. Pdthough civil
defence personnel bear other light individual weapons in
such areas, they shall nevertheless be protected and
respected as soon as they have been recognized as such."
'4.The formation of civilian civil defence organizations
along military lines, and compulsory service in them,
shall also not deprive them of the protection conferred by
this chapter."
1\s to identification, paragraph 3 of \rticle 66 requires
that, in occupied territories and in areas where fighting is
taking place or is likely to take place, civilian civil
defence should be recognizable by the international distinc-
tive sign of civil defence and by an identity card certifying
their status. Paragraph 4 of the same frticle describes the
international distinctive sign of civil defence as an
equilateral blue triangle on an orange ground when used for
the protection of civil defence organizations, their personnel,
buildings and materiel and for civilian shelter.
Now, if, as maintained above, civilians linked to the
military effort must not be considered to have forfeited
their protection, there remains only the problem of civilianst
participation in attacks or in military operations. If,
nevertheless a shadow of doubt remains it may be safe to
conclude at this stage that, at least, performance of civil
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defence tasks is not a direct participation in hostilities,
even when such tasks are carried out on the civilians' own
initiative. This is so, because it would be utterly ridiculous
to proclaim that members of the armed forces and military
units assigned to civil defence organizations shall be
protected and respected as provided by Prticle 67 of the
Protocol on the one hand, and deny the same protection to
civilians against effects of hostilities, on the other hand.
Further, the fact that members of the armed forces and
military units assigned to civil defence are expressly
prohibited from taking a direct part in hostilities and from
committing acts harmful to the adversary, which otherwise
would have been their right under Prticle 41, paragraph 2,
of Protocol I, again ties the taking of "a direct part in
hostilities" within the meaning of 1\rticle 51, paragraph 3,
to military operations or attacks.
If the above evidence still leaves some doubt as to the
meaninQ of the phrase "take a direct part in hostilities",
the ordinary meaning of the words 'direct' and 'hostilities',
and further evidence from the preparatory work,
	 uLO
it.
The word 'direct' is probably too clear to need an
explanation. Nevertheless, it serves the purpose here to have
it explained. The Concise Oxford Dictionary explains that as
an adjective and an adverb, 'direct' means straight not
crooked(ly) or oblique(ly) or round about, lineal(ly), not
collateral(ly), following uninterrupted chain of cause and
effect etc. without intermediaries. Other meanings are:
straightforward, frank(ly), going straight to the point, not
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ambiguous(ly); immediate(ly), personal(ly), not by proxy.
En its dictionary meaning the word 'hostilities' means
'acts of warfare'.
There is no evidence to suggest that the general
intention of the Diplomatic Conference was to give a special
meaning either to the word 'direct' or to the word 'hostil-
ities'. On the contrary, the ICRC commentary and the Report
of the Rapporteur of Committee III support the 'ordinary
meaning •
The ICRC Commentary is straightforward; it explains
that the immunity of civilians is subject to a very strict
condition:
"they must not take a direct part in hostilities, which
means they must not become
The Commentary then goes on to ask and answer:
"What should be understood by direct part in hostilities?
The expression covers acts of war intended by their
nature or purpose to strike at the personnel and
materiel of enemy armed forces. Thus a civilian taking
part in fighting, whether singly or in a group, become
ipso facto a lawful target for such time as he takes
a direct part in hostilities."2
Thus, by'direct part in hostilities' the ICRC unders-
tands "taking part in fighting", or in other words, the
commision of "acts of' war intended by their nature or purpose
to strike (directly) at the personnel or materiel of armed
1 •
 ICRC, Commentary on Draft Additional Protocols to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, Geneva, 1973, p. 58.
2. Loc. cit.
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forces." This is ac±ually what the ICRC has already described
as the relationship of 'adequate causality' between the act
of participation and its immediate result in military
operations. 1
The Report of the Working Group of Committee III seems
to support this interpretation although "several delegations
expressed a wish to have it noted in the record that they
understand the word 'hostilities' in paragraph 3 as including
preparations for combat and return from combat" 2
 As Major
Gehring (United States Marine Corps) observed:
"Such an expression for the record would be totally
unnecessary unless a very narrow definition of
'hostilities' were assumed."3
In military usuage, combat is the real warlike activity,
it means fighting, 4 and in this the destruction or conquest
of the enemy is the object, and the enemy, in the particular
combat, is the armed force. So wrote Clausewitz.5
The equivalent of 'combat' or 'fighting' in the
terminology of Protocol I is 'attacks'. It seems reasonable
therefore to conclude that, in the interest of' consistency
ir usuage and clarity in meaning, Prticle 51, paragraph 3,
ought to have stated : Civilians shall enjoy the protection
afforded by this Section unless and for such time as they
1 •
 ICRC, Doc. CE/3b, Geneva, 1971, p. 28.
2 Report to the Third Commision on the Work of the Working
Group, Committee III, 24 Feb., 1975, (cDDH/III/224.
3. Robert Wayne Gehring, Protection of Civilian Infrastruc-
tures, - Law and Contemporary Problems, tIol. XLII, 1978,
No. 2, p. 131.
4. Rapoport (ed.,), Clausewitz On War, Pelican Classics, 1968,
p . 303.
5. Loc. cit.
511
take a direct part in attacks.
The extension of the idea of direct participation so as
to include "preparation for combat and return from combat" is
logical, but it is also open to abuse s However, even according
to this'extended' view, the direct participation in hostil-
ities may not go beyond the direct "preparation for attack,
participation in attack, and return from attack." The kind of
participation and its duration are thus synonymous with
'military engagement' and 'military deployment' - terms
already used in Article 44 of Protocol I entitled "Combatants
and Prisoners of Uar." This Article may be called in aid to
explain what "preparation for combat and return from combat"
in the sense of 'military deployment' is supposed to mean.
'Military engagement' needs no explanation since by definition
it involves the use of weapons. It goes without saying that
civilians forfeit their protection against effects of host-
ilities during each military engagement in which they
participate. But the matter is far from clear in the case of
'military deployment which usually does not involve the use
of weapons.
As a general rule, it may be said that 'military
deployment', as far as civilian participation is concerned,
should not be different from that of members of the armed
forces, who do not have to distinguish themselves at all times
from the civilian population, but nevertheless will have to
distinguish themselves during a certain time or else forfeit
their right to be prisoners of war.
The idea and duration of taking a direct part in
hostilities for such members of the armed forces seem to be
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embodied in the conditions laid down for them in prtjcle 44
(3), in order to retain their right to be prisoners of war.
!\rticle 44, paragraph 3, lays down as a general rule
that "combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from
the civilian population while they are engaged in attack or
in a military operation preparatory to an attack."
Recognizing, however, that there are situations in
armed conflict where, owing to the nature of the hostilities
an armed combatant cannot distinguish himself, he shall
retain his status as combatant, according to Prticle 44,
paragraph 3, of Protocol I, provided that in such situations,
"he carries his arms openly:
(a) during each military engagement, and
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary
while he is engaged in a military deployment pre-
ceding the launching of an attack in which he is
to participate."
If this is the idea and duration of 'military engagement'
and 'military deployment' for a member of the armed forces
who, otherwise, would appear to be a civilian and thus
entitled to civilian protection, no wider idea of particip-
ation should be applied to civilians and, hence, no longer
duration for the forfeiture of' civilian protection.
6. General Protection: Special Object
In addition to Article 52 of Protocol I which affords
general protection to civilian objects, the Protocol contains
a number of Articles dealing with the protection of' specific
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categories of objects. Thus Article 53 deals with the
protection of cultural objects and places of worship "which
constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples";
Article 54 deals with the protection of objects indispensable
to the survival of the civilian population; Article 55 deals
with the protection of the natural environment; and Article 56
deals with the protection of works and installations containing
dangerous forces. The relationship between the protection of
these objects and the protection of the civilian population
can hardly be exaggerated. This is particularly true of Articles
54, 55 and 56. Yet, those Articles have been the most difficult
to negotiate and draft. Each Article will be discussed here
in a seperate sub—section.
6.1. Protection of Cultural Ob4ects and Places of Worship
Article 53 of Protocol I provides that, without prejudice
to the provisions of the Hague Convention for the protection
of Cultural Property in the Event of frmed Conflict of 14
1ay, 1954, and of other relevant international instruments,1
it is prohibited:
"a) to commit any acts or hostility directed against the
historic monuments, works of art or places of worship
l.Those "other relevant international instruments" may include:
Article 27 of the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907; Article
S of the Hague Convention (IX) concerning Bombardment by
Naval Forces in Time of War 1907; and the Treaty on the
Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and
Historic 1onuments, (Roerich Pact) of 1935, concluded between
American States. Text in Schindler and Toman, The Laws of'
Armed Conflict, 1973, pp. 521 - 523.
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which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of
peoples;
b) to use such objects in support of the military effort;
c) to make such objects the object of reprisals."
Since Article 53 is without prejudice to rules of existing
international law on the subject, it may be useful to compare
it with those other rules in order to see whether it has any-
thing more to offer.
First of all mention should be made of the rules of
customary international law on the subject, particularly
Article 27 of the Hague Regulations of 19Q7 This Article
provides that in siege and bombardments all necessary steps
must be taken to spare, "as far as possible", inter alia,
"buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or ... historic
monuments."
Article 53 of Protocol I seems to differ from Article 27
of the Hague Regulations of 1907 in two ways: in the first
place it lays down a more stringent obligation in the sense
that it prohibits "any actsof hostilities" against the enumer-
ated objects, while Article 27 lays down only an "as far as
possible" obligation. On the other hand, Article 53 is more
limited in scope since it protects only historic monuments,
works of art or places of worship "which constitute the cultural
or spiritual heritage of the peoples", while Article 27 protects
all such objects whether or not they constituted the cultural
or spiritual heritage of' the peoples. This explains why it was
necessary to make Article 53 "without prejudice (to) other
relevant international instruments •"
tiore importantly, however, is the fact that 1\rticle 53 is
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without prejudice to the provisions of the Hague Convention
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of rmed
Conflict, of 14 I1ay, 1954.1 According to Article 1 of this
Convention, the term 'cultural property' covers, irrespective
of' origin or ownership:
"a) movable or immovable property of' great importance to
the cultural heritage of every people, such as
monuments of architecture, art or history, whether
religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups
of buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or
artistic intere5t; works of art; manuscripts, books
and other objects of artistic, historical or
archaeological interest; as well as scientific
collections and important collections of' books or
archives or of reproductions of' the property defined
above;
b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to
preserve or exhibit the movable cultural property
defined in sub—paragraph (a) such as museums, large
libraries and depositaries of' archives, and refuges
intended to shelter, in the event of armed conflict,
the movable cultural property defined in sub—paragraph
(a);
c) centres containing a large amount of' cultural property
as defined in sub—paragraphs (a) and (b), to be known
as "centres containing monuments."
1. Text in Schindler and Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflict,
1973, pp. 529 et seq.; and in Roberts and Guelff, Documents
on the Laws of War, 1982, pp. 339 et seq.
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Cultural property thus defined enjoys 'general protection'
under the Convention. But the Convention also provides for a
regime of 'special protection'. It would be necessary therefore
to examine these two levels of protection in order to determine
whether Article 53 has anything new to offer.
Without pretending to exhaust the provisions of the Hague
Convention of 14 May, 1954, it may be noted first that, for the
purposes of the Convention, the protection of cultural property
comprises "the safeguarding of and respect for such property."1
The obligation to safeguardI cultural property means
that the High Contracting Parties "undertake to prepare in time
of peace for the safeguarding of cultural property situated
within their own territory against the foreseeable effects of
an armed conflict, by taking 5uch measures as they consider
2approprate•I	 But the failure to take such measures does not
absolve the other Party to the conflict from the obligations
incumbent upon it under Article 4 of the Convention regarding
the "respect for cultural property."3
The obligation to respect cultural property entails, for
the Party in posession of such property, an undertaking to
refrain from "any use of the property and its immediate
surroundings or of appliances in use for its protection for
purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage
4in the event of an armed	 For the other Party to the
conflict, the obligation is to refrain from "any act of hostility
5directed against such property." These obligations, however,
1. Article 2	 5. Article 4(1).
2. Article 3.
3. Article 5(5).
4. Article 4(1).
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"may be waived only in cases where military necessity imperat-.
ively requires such a waiver."1
Further, the High Contracting Parties "undertake to
prohibit, prevent and, if necessary, put a stop to any form of
theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of
vandalism directed against, cultural property." They also
undertake to refrain from requisitioning movable cultural
property situated in the territory of another High Contracting
2Party.
Furthermore, the High Contracting Parties undertake to
"refrain from any act directed by way of reprisals against
cultural property.3
These are the main components of the principle of 'general
protection' of cultural property.
8eside this system of 'general protection', the Hague
Convention of 1954 establishes a system of 'special protection'.4
Thus, according to Article a, paragraph 1, there may be placed
under special protection a limited number of refuges intended
to shelter movable cultural property in the event of armed
conflict, of centres containing monuments and other immovable
cultural property of very great importance, provided that they:
"a) are situated at an adequate distance from any large
industrial centre or from any important military
objective constituting a vulnerable point, such as,
for example, an aerodrome, broadcasting station,
establishment engaged upon work of national defence,
1. Article 4(2
2. Article 4(3
3. Article 4(4
4. Article 8 to 11.
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a port or railway station of relative importance or
a main line of communication;
b) are not used for military purposes."
Article 8 of the Convention goes on to state that a refuge
for movable cultural property, "whatever its location", may also
be placBd under special protection, "if it is so constructed
that, in all probability, it will not be damaged by bombs."1
It also states that a cultural property situated near an
important military objective as defined in paragraph 8(1) may
nevertheless be placed under special protection "if the High
Contracting Party asking for that protection undertakes, in the
event of armed conflict, to make no use of the objective and
particularly, in the case of a port, railway station or
aerodrome, to divert all traffic therefrom. In that event, such
diversion shall be prepared in time of peace."
At any rate, special protection is gra r ted to cultural
property by its entry in the "International Register of
Cultural Property under Special Protection." This entry has to
be made in accordance with the provisions of the Convention
and under the conditions provided for in the Regulations for
the execution of the Convention - which is not necessary for the
purposes of our discussion to dwell on. The important point for
our discussion is whether Article 53 of Protocol I has anything
new to offer.
As noted above, Article 53 establishes protection for a
special class of cultural objects, namely, historic monuments,
works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural
1	 Article 8(2).
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or spiritual heritage of peoples." But it does not specify
whether the protection is 'general' or 'special' protection.
The difference, however, despite the formalities involved in
the establishing of' special protection, seem to be singularly
thin. In either case, the Parties to the conflict are under
obligation to refrain from committing any acts of hostility
directed against cultural property; from using such objects or
their surroundings for military purposes; and from making them
the object of reprisals.
But their seems to be a slight difference in the
conditions under which protection may be withdrawn. !\ general
condition for withdrawing the protection is the use of the
cultural property "for military purposes", according to the
Hague Convention, or "in support of the military effort",
according to Article 53(b) of Protocol I. According to Article
8, paragraph 3, of the Hague Convention:
"A centre containing monuments shall be deemed to be used
for military purposes whenever it is used for the
movement of military personnel or material, even in
transit. The same shall apply whenever activities
directly connected with military operations, the
stationing of military personnel, or the production of'
war material are carried on within the centre."
Such a use is a violation of the Hague Convention, as well
as of Article 53(b) of Protocol I. Consequently, in the words
of Article 11 of the Hague Conventions, "the opposing Party
shall, so long as this violation persists, be released from the
obligation to ensure the immunity of the property concerned.
Nevertheless, whenever possible, the latter Party shall first
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request the cessation of such violation within a reasonable
time." This is of course if the property was placed under
special protection, but there seem to be no reason why it should
not also apply to the withdrawal of protection from cultural
property in general.
The use for military purposes, however, is not the only
case where the protection of cultural property may be withdrawn.
Prticle 4, paragraph 2, of the Hague Convention indicates that,
apart from the use of cultural property for military purposes,
the obligation to refrain from any act of hostility directed
against cultural property "may be waived", albeit "only in
cases where military necessity imperatively requires such a
waiver."
The disturbing fact about such a waiver is that it is not
confined to cultural property under general protection. Even
the immunity of' cultural property under special protection may
be withdrawn, albeit ton1y in exceptional cases of unavoidable
military necessity, and only for such time as the necessity
continues." In such a case, however, the "necessity can be
established only by the officer commanding a force the
equivalent of a division in size or larger. Moreover, "whenever
circumstances permit, the opposing Party shall be notified, a
reasonable time in advance, of the decision to withdraw
immunity", and the Party withdrawing the immunity, has, as soon
as possible, to so inform the Commissioner—General for cultural
property provided for in the Regulations for the execution of
the Convention, in writing, stating the reasons.1
1. See 1\rticle 11 of the Hague Conventions of 1y54
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These formalities of decision—making and notification
seem to bear all the distinguishing marks of 'special
pro tection.
In conclusion, it may be stated that Article 53 of
Protocol I is actually redundant. It is no more than a
restatement of a principle already established in the Hague
Convention of 1954 on the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict, and that, in no way does it
improve the already unsatisfactory protection provided by the
Convention.
62. Protection of Objects Indispensable to the Survival of
the Civilian Population
"Starvation of the civilian population as a method of
warfare is prohibited," proclaims the first paragraph of
Protocol I. This paragraph, according to the Report of
Committee III was accepted after considerable discussion as a
useful statement of the basic principle from which the rest of
the Article flows and "as an important addition to the law
protecting civilians." 1 The scope of this principle is defined
by the remainder of Article 54 and by other relevant Articles
in the Protocol, particularly those dealing with relief actions.2
But the prohibition of starvation of civilians as a method of
warfare was not intended to change the law of naval blockade.
This fact is made clear by Article 49, paragraph 3, which states
1. Report of' Committee III, Second Session, 1975, (CDDH/215/
Rev.1), para. 73.
2 See Articles 68 to 71 of Protocol I.
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that the provisions of Section I of Part IV of Protocol I
(i.e. Articles 48 to 67) "apply to any land, air or sea warfare
which may affect the civilian population, individual civilians
or civilian objects on land. They further apply to all attacks
from the sea or from the air against objectives on land but do
not otherwise affect the rules of international law applicable
in armed conflict at sea or in the air."1
Paragraph 2 of Article 54 provides as follows:
"It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render
useless objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural
areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock,
drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation
works for the specific purpose of denying them for their
sustenance value to the civilian population or to the
adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to
starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for
any other motjve."
In commenting on this paragraph, it may be noted first
that the list of objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population is illustrative, not exhaustive, as the
words 'such as' clearly indicate. This was done as a matter of
caution because it is doubtful that all contingencies could be
foreseen. The list, however, includes every item that could
always be identified as being indispensable to the survival of'
the civilian population.2
1. See further, Section 	 of Chapter 7 of this thesis.
2. See Aldrich, New Life for the Laws of War, American Journal
of International Law, Vol. 75, 1981, p. 779.
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Apart from this, the paragraph makes a mockery of the
protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population. For the attack, destruction, removing or
rendering useless, of objects indispensable to the survival of
the civilian population which is prohibited, is that which is
done "for the specific purpose of denying them for their
sustenance value to the civilian population of the enemy."1
This phrase, according to the Report of Committee III:
"was designed to cover both the denial of food and drink
as sustenance and the denial of food—producing areas and
irrigation works for their contribution to the production
of sustenance. On the other hand, it was not intended to
cover their denial to the enemy for other purposes,
including the general purpose of preventing the enemy
from advancing. Thus, bombarding an area to prevent the
advance through it of an enemy is permissable, whether or
not the area produces food, but the deliberate
destruction of food—producing areas in order to prevent
the enemy from growing food on them is forbidden. Simil-
arly, destroying a field of crops in order to clear a
field for fire or to prevent the enemy from using it for
cover is permissable, but destroying it to prevent the
enemy from consuming the crops is
Interpretation a contrario has always been a precarious
method of' interpretation, and it is suprising indeed that the
1. This was considered a clearer form of words than the phrase
"for the purpose of denying them as such to the civilian
population or to the adverse Party", which was initially
proposed by the Llorking Group of Committee III, but the
meaning is the same
2. Reort of Committee III, op. cit., para. 74.
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Report of' Committee III had chosen this method of interpretation
for such a sensitive topic as is the protection of objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. As a
matter of fact, the Report of Committee III was initially no
more than the personal comments of the Rapporteur on the work
of the Working Group of Committee III, and it is not clear how
these comments came to be part of' the Report of' Committee III.
However, one thing seems to be clear - the strong inclination
of the Rapporteur, Mr Aldrich of the U.S.A. delegation, to read
too much 'a contrario' in the text of Article 54. Thus, in an
article published in the American Journal of International Law,
Mr. Aldrich concluded his discussion of Article 54 of' Protocol
I by saying:
"In sum, the prohibition of' starvation is really a
prohibition of certain acts intended to result in
starvation, not a prohibition of acts that may produce
starvation but are done and are justifiable on other
grounds, ...
Such a conclusion, to say the least, is incompatible with
the express proviso in paragraph 3(b), of Article 54. This
paragraph states that:
"The prohibitions in paragraph 2 shall not apply to such
of the objects covered by it as are used by an adverse
Party:
(a) as sustenance solelyfor the members of its armed
forces; or
(b) if' not as sustenance, then in direct support of
1. Aldrich, op. cit., p. 779.
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military action, provided, houever,that in no event shall
actions against these objects be taken which may be
expected to leave the civilian population with such
inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or
force its movement."
Paragraph 3(a) should raise no problem; for as the Report of
Committee III explains, "it was intended to apply only to those
objects which clearly are assigned solely for the sustenance of
the armed
Paragraph 3(b) bears some elaboration. First, the term
'civilian population' in this paragraph "was not intended to
mean the civilian population of a country as a whole, but
rather of an immediate area, although the size of' the area was
not	 Second, it is not clear under what circumstances
the objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population may be considered to be used in direct support Of
military action. In the proposals of the United States of
.2	 .	 .	 .	 3America , Belgium and the United Kingdom , the use of the
1. Report of Committee III, op, cit., para. 74.
2. The proposal of the U.S.A. was as follows: "In order to
avoid the deliberate starvation of civilians and without
prejudice to the rights of the High Contracting Parties in
own territory, it is forbidden to attack, destroy, remove
or rendar useless, crops, drinking water supplies, irrigation
works, livestock, foodstuff or food producing areas for the
purpose of denying them to the enemy or to the civilian
population unless they serve a direct military purpose, such
as shielding the enemy observation or attack." Doc. CDDH/
111/50, dated rlarch 1974.
3. The joint proposal of Belgium and the United Kingdom was
identical to that of the U.S.A except that, before the words
"without prejudice •.. etc., it stated; 1 • Starvation of
civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited. 2.
Consequently, without prejudice •.. etc."Doc. CODH/11I/67,
dated 19 f1arch 1974. The various proposals and the summary
records of the discussion on the protection of objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population may
PP. 2272	
Levie, Protection of War Victims, Vol. 3, 1980,
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objects as a cover was given as an example of use in direct
support of military action, but this was criticised by a
number of delegates. The representative of Vietnam drew atten-.
tion to the seriousness of such an example by recalling the
experience of his country. 1 And the representative of Sweden
objected by saying that "his delegation would understand an
amendment which would permit the destruction of vegetation in
areas around military bases, but it could not accept that case
as merely an example of permitted destruction"2
However, one thing seems to be clear; that the destruction
or objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population is prohibited, even when such objects are used in
direct support of military action, if the actions taken against
these objects " may be expected to leave the civilian
population with such inadequate food or water as to cause its
starvation or force its movements"
Accordingly, one may conclude, contary to Mr. Aldrich,
that the prohibition of starvation is not only a prohibition
of certain acts 'intended' to produce starvation, but also a
prohibition of acts that in the ruling circumstances may
'cause' starvation, or force the movement of the civilian
population as a result of the inadequacy of food or water. Put
rather differently, the fact that the objects indispensable to
the survival of the civilian population are used in direct
support of military action does not legally justify the actions
to be taken against these objects, if actions may be expected
in the ruling circumstances to 'cause' the starvation of the
1. See CDDH/III/SR. 17, para. 9-10.
2. CDDH/III/SR.17, pars. 19.
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local civilian population or force its movement as a result of
genuine fear of starvation. To this extent, but only to this
extent, it may be said that the objects indispensable to the
survival of the civilian population are legally protected. In
a world where many countries are plagued with famine, and many
millions die every year as a result of' starvation, the protect-
ion afforded by Article 54 is hardly adequate.
Finally, 'the straw which broke the camel's back' -
paragraph 5 of Prticle 54 which states:
"In recognition of the vital requirements of any Party to
the conflict in the defence of its national territory
against invasion, derogation from the prohibitions
contained in paragraph 2 may be made by a Party to the
conflict within such territory under its own control
where required by imperative military necessity."
If by 'invasion' in this provision it was meant the
classical across the boundary invasion by the army of' one
state to another state this provision would at best be a
harmless jingoism. Only twice in the history of war, 'scorched
earth' policy was resorted to in defence of the national
territory against invasion. The first was when France invaded
Russia during the Napoleonic wars, and the other when Germany
invaded Russia (USSR) during the Second World War. In both
cases it was the fierce resistance in the form of guerrilla
warfare, not the scorched earth policy, which proved to be
vital for the defence of national territory against invasion.
Ironically, the Germans applied a scorched earth policy to
Russian territory in order to secure their withdrawal from
that territory.
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Houever, in both cases, the right of Russia to do so,
and the right of any state to do so, has never been questioned
as a matter of law. 1nd as a matter of military strategy, one
does not need to be a military expert to challenge safely all
military experts to prove the viability of scorched earth
policy as a vital requirement of defence against invasion in
any concrete situation of the present day world. Indeed, ifthe
past history of war from the French Revolution in the 18th
century to the present day teaches any lesson in the defence
of national territory against invasion, it is the absolute
requirement that objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population in invaded territories should be left
intact in the interest of national defence against invasion.
For only then the local population would be able to provide
food and shelter to members of resistance movements.
Granted, however, that all governments are prone to
jingoism, the fact remains that the express reservation of the
right to derogate from the protection of objects indispensable
to the survival of the civilian population "in recognition of
the vital requirements of any Party to the conflict in the
defence of its national territory against invasion" had been
pressed and demanded, not by states which might be invaded or
even by states which are actually invaded and have parts of
their territory under foreign occupation, but by states which
are the least likely to be invaded, namely, the major Western
Powers. 1
1. Witness the express reservation "without prejudice to the
rights of High Contracting Parties in their own territory"
in the proposals of the U.S.A., Belgium and the United
Kingdom quoted in the preceding footnotes.
529
In view of these facts, it is surmised that behind the
facade of the apparently harmless jingoistic patriotism lies
the stench of the 'free—fire zone tactics' and 'drying up the
sea to catch the fish' policies practiced on a large scale by
the United States during its involvement in the Vietnam ware
Indeed, all the derogations in Article 54 of Protocol I seem
to have been made with a view to countering insurgency in
general and guerrilla warfare in particular. In fact, as the
Swedish representative, Ir. Blix, pointed out:
"It had been argued in connexion with guerrilla warfare
that food should be denied to the civilian population,
thereby denying it indirectly to the guerrillas."1
The fact that Protocol I is formally inapplicable to armed
conflicts of non—international character seems immaterial in
this respect. What matters is whether the derogations from the
protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population are also operative in the context of armed
conflicts of non—international character. In this respect, it
should be noted first that Article 14 of Protocol II does not
contain any provisions like those of Article 54, paragraphs
2, 3, and 5. Accordingly, it is arguab1 that objects indispen-
sable to the survival of the civilian population enjoy full
protection under Article 14 of Protocol II. Such an argument,
however, will carry very little weight in view of' the fact
that a rule prohibiting indiscriminate attacks in armed con-
flicts of non—international character had failed to muster the
necessary majority for its adoption in the plenary meeting of
1 • CDDH/III/SR. 17, para. 18.
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the Diplomatic Conference. Thus, in effect, governments have
actually retained their freedom of action in case of armed
conflicts of non—international character, as far as the conduct
of military operations is concerned.
If, on the other hand, the armed conflict was of interna-
tional character, that would actually make little difference.
For the express derogations in Prticle 54 will then become
applicable.
In conclusion, it cannot be said that international law
provides adequate protection to objects indispensable to the
survival of the civilian population. The poor protection
afforded to such objects makes a mockery of the prohibition of
starvation as a method of warfare.
6.3. Protection of the Environment
Until fairly recently, protection of the natural environ-
ment has not attracted the attention of the lawmakers in the
field of international humanitarian law applicable in armed
conflict. Undoubtedly the war in \Jietnam 'nas contributed
significantly to arousing an interest in this matter, as well
as in the protection of objects indispensable to the survival
of the civilian population and the protection of' dams and dykes.,1
I\t the Conference of Government Experts which preceded
the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development
1. See Kaishoven, Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law 1pplicable in Armed Conflict: The Geneva
Diplomatic Conference, in Netherlands Year Book of
International Law, 1978, pp. 128-130, at p. 128.
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of Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, interest
in the protection of the natural environment was dis1Ie
by only a few East European delegations during the discussion
of methods and means of combat. 1 The Polish experts, for
instance, proposed the forbidding of' methods and means which
destroy "natural human environment." 2 The experts of
Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Hungary
proposed the forbidding of weapons, projectiles or other means
and methods which "upset the balance of the natural living
and environmental	 Later, the experts of Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and
Poland submitted a joint proposal forbidding the use of means
and methods which destroy "the natural human environmental
conditions.
By contrast, Western experts remained completly silent on
the subject. This was probably why the ICRC Draft Protocols
did not contain any proposals on the protection of the natural
environment, according to Professor Kalshoven. 5 But that was
not the end of the matter.
At the first session (1974) oI the Diplomatic Conference,
in the course of the general debate in Plenary, the matter was
taken up by several speakers, among them the Head of the
Australian delegation, Mr. Mahoney, whose country was the first
among the group of 'Western and other countries' to take the
matter of the environment seriously. Mr. Mahoney even announced
1, See ICRC, Report on the Conference of Government Experts,
Second Session, Geneva, 1972, tiol. 1, para. 3.19, p. 128.
2,, Doc. CE/COIITII/C2, para. 3, Text in jbid, Vol. 2, p. 51.
3. Doc. CE/COM 111/C 6, para. 4. Text in ibid., Vol. 2, p. 52.
4. Doc. CE/COn Ill/C 68-69, par
5. See Kaishoven, op. cit.,	
Text in ibid., p. 63.
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his delegation's plan to "suggest the insertion in the Prot-
ocols of a new article seeking to prohibit ecological damage
as a technique of war•"1
However, by the second session (1975) of the Diplomatic
Conference, "there was no disagreement in principle that efforts
should be made to protect the natural environment and there was
wide support for a provision setting out specific requirements
or prohibitions to be included in Protocol i,,2 But as this was
the first occasion on which an attempt had been made to provide
in express terms for the protection of the natural environment
in time of armed conflict, and as important theoretical
questions about the relation of man and nature lay below the
surface of the attempt to draft suitable language for what was
generally regarded to be a highly desirable objective, it was
not surprising that the question had given a great deal of
difficulty to the Working Group of Committee III.3
Some delegations had in fact proposed to postpone the
action on proposals to adopt provisions on protection of the
natural environment until the Third Session of the Conference
so that the proposals could be studied more fully, but for no
obvious reason it was decided to complete Committee action at
the second session.
However the Working Group of Committee III was assj5ted
in its work by the report of the 'Group Biotope' - an
unofficial working group formed in response to the request of
1 •
 Kaishoven, op. cit., p. 129.
2 Report of Committee III, Second Session, Doc CDDH/215/Rev.
1, para. 79.
3. See Report to the Third Committee on the work of the Working
Group, Committee III, 3 Ipril, 1975, (CD DH/III/ 2 75), in
Levie, Protection of War Victims, Vol. 3, 1 980, pp. 268-270.
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the Rapporteur of Committee 111.1 Delegates from ten countries
([lustralia, Finland, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic
Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Spain, Sweden, Netherlands, Yugo-
slavia) and representatives from the ICRC and the United
Nations Environment Programme participated in the work of the
Group Biotope. This Group recommended the following text to
Committee III:
"1. The natural environment shall be protected in all
circumstances. Consequently, damage to the natural
environment as a technique of warfare is prohibited.
2. In particular, it is prohibited to perform any act
which may be expected to harm the natural environment
by disturbing the stability of the ecosystem so as to
prejudice (to the prejudice of) the health and (of)
the survival of the civilian population.
3. 1\ttacks against the natural environment by way of
reprisals are prohibited."2
The Report of' the 'Group Biotope' explains that this
provision was directed to the protection of the natural
environment as distinct from the human environment. The natural
environment relates to external conditions and influences which
affect the life, development and survival of the civilian
population. The human environment may be understood to relate
only to the immediate surroundings in which the civilian
population lives. The natural environment is wider in scope
than the human environment and is essential to the existance
of' the civilian population. It is for this reason that the
1. For the text of the Report of the Chairman of the 'Group
Biotope', see Levie, ibid., pp. 265-268.
2. Ibid., p. 258. This was proposed as a new draft Article
48 bis
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provision seeks to protect the natural environment and to
prohibit disturbance of it to the prejudice of' the health and
survival of the civilian population.1
The Report of the Group Biotope went on to explain that
acts of warfare which cause short—term damage to the natural
environment, such as artillery bombardment, were not intended
to be prohibited by the proposed provision. "Disturbance of the
stability of the ecosystem as contemplated by the provision
will have an effect for a significant period of time, perhaps
for ten years or more •
 However, it was impossible to say with
certainty what period of time might be involved and for this
reason, no time was specified in the proposed text."2
Having left the question of time open, the Group left no
doubt that what it intended to prohibit is "the disturbance
of' the stability of' the ecosystem", because "living organisms
and their non—living environment are inseparably interrelated"
and that "damage or even alteration to any part of the
ecosystem may have severe repercussions for the civilian
population.
Finally, the Report of the Group Siotope concludes by
saying:
"The view was taken that the consequence of disturbing
the stability of the ecosystem may be so disastrous that
the very survival of the civilian population may be
threatened. Accordingly, the standard of protection
provided by Article 48 bis relates not only to the
1. Ibid., p. 267, para. 5.
2. Ibid., p. 267, para. 6.
3. Ibid., p. 267, para. 8.
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health but also to the survival of the civilian
population."
In view of the close relationship between the protection
of the environment and the protection of objects indispensable
to the survival of the civilian population, such a standard
seems reasonable.
However, neither the proposal of the Group Biotope, nor
a proposal by the Rapporteur essentially reflecting the same
idea were adopted. Rather, the present provisions of Pirticle
35, paragraph 3, and Article 55 oF Protocol I were adopted.
Article 35, paragraph 3, provides as follows:
"It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare
which are intended, or may be expected, to cause
widespread, long—term and severe damage to the natural
environment."
This paragraph was again incorporated in Article 55 which
provides:
"Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural
environment against widespread, long—term and severe
damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the
use of' methods or means of warfare which are intended or
may be expected to cause such damage to the natural
environment and thereby to prejudice the health or
survival of the population."
These provisions call for several remarks. First, it
might be thought that the provision of Article 35, paragraph
3, is redundant since it i5 incorporated in paragraph 1 of
Article 55. Indeed, the delegations of the United Kingdom and
1. Ibid., p. 267, pare. 8.
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the Federal Republic of Germany thought so, and consequently
1
voted against paragraph 3 of Article 35. Actually, the
existance of paragraph 3 is explicable by the fact that, in
the Working Group, there were two views about the basic reason
for the protection of the environment. Some delegates were of
the view that the protection of the environment in time of
armed conflict is an end in itself, while others considered
that the protection of the environment has as its purpose the
continued survival or health of the civilian population. The
provision of paragraph 3 of Article 35 was in response to the
first view, while that of Article 55 responded to the second
2
view. Another reason was the conclusion reached by the Group
Biotope that "the two Articles should remain seperate for the
reason that whereas Article 55 relates to the protection of
the civilian population, Article 35 relates to the prohibition
of unnecessary injury3
Second, as the Report of' Committee III explains:
"Because Article 55 was inserted in the context of
protection of the civilian population, the particular
prohibition is linked to the survival of that population
The word 'population'was used without the usual adjective
'civilian' because it was thought that the future
survival is that of the population in general, without
regard to combatant status. The term 'health' was used
in a broad sense in connection with survival to indicate
1. See CDDH/III/SR.38, para. 46 with regard to the United King-
dom, and para. 61 with regard to the Federal Reuplic of
Germany.
2 See Report to the Third Committee on the work of the Working
Group, Doc. CDDH/III/275; in Levie, op. cit. p. 269.
3. Levie, op. cit., p. 268.
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actions which could be expected to cause such severe
effects that, even if the population survived, it would
have serious health problems, such as congenital defects
which produced deformed or degenerate persons. Temporary
or short—term effects were not contemplated within the
prohibitions of this
	 1
But the Report does not say whether the term 'population'
referred to the population of a country as a whole or only to
the population of the affected area s In this writer's view both
are protected by Article 55 although the terms 'widespread,
long—term and severe damage to the environment' were not
defined in the Protocol.
It should also be noted that Article 55 prohibits methods
or means of warfare which "are intended or may be expected" to
cause widespread long—term and severe damage to the environment
and therebye prejudice the health or surviial of the population.
As the Rapporteur of Committee III notes:
"Both the expressions 'may be expected and 'are
intended' are included out of an abundance of caution.
The term 'are intended' refers to deliberate harm
directed at the natural environment as a method or means
of warfare, such as the destruction of natural resources.
'May be expected' imports an objective standard of what
the state or the individual does realize or ought to
realize would have the effect described - (i.e.,
widespread, long—term and severe damage)."2
1. Report of Committee III, Second Session, Doc. CDDH/215/Rev.
1, para. 82; Levie, op. cit., p. 273.
2 Report to the Third Committee on the Work of the Working
Group, 3.4 . 75, CDDH/III/ 275 , p 4; See Levie, op.cit., p.270.
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On the other hand, it should be noted that the obligation
of 'care' to protect the environment against widespread, long-
term and severe damage is operative even if the health or
survival of the civilian population is not prejudiced. In
instance would be environmental damage which is widespread,
long—term and severe but in an unpopulated area1
Third, what is to be understood by 'widespread, long—term,
and severe damage to the natural environment' is difficult to
say with any certainty. Some interpretation of these terms has
been made in an tunderstanding' relating to P1rticle 1 of the
United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of Military or
fny Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques,
signed on 18 May, 1977.2 But that interpretation, which will
be quoted below, has been made exclusively for the purposes of
the said Convention. For brevity this Convention will be
referred to here as the Convention on Environmental Modifica-
tion Techniques. 1\rticle 1, paragraph 1, of this Convention
uses virtually the same terms as those of I\rticles 35 and 55
of Protocol I, and provides as follows:
"Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to
engage in military or any other use of environmental
modification techniques having widespread, long—lasting
or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or
injury to any other State."
i\s used in this 1\rticle, the term 'environmental
1. Loc. cit.
2. Text in Roberts and Guelff, Documents on the Laws of' War,
1982, pp. 379 et seq. For a brief history and general
remarks on this Convention, see ibid., pp. 377-78. The
Convention entered into force on 5 October, 1978, and as of
28 October, 1980, it was ratified or acceded to by 31 States.
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modification techniques' refers to "any technique for changing
- through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes -
the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including
its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of
outer space." 1 A non—exhaustive list of phenomena which could
be caused by environmental modification techniques and there-
fore are prohibited includes the following:
"earthquakes; tsunamis; an upset of' the ecological balance
of a region; changes in weather patterns (clouds,
precipitation, cyclones of various types, and tornadic
storms); changes in climate patterns; changes in ocean
currents; changes in the state of the ozone layer; and
changes in the state of the ionosphere."2
The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament which
drafted the Convention on Environmental Flodification Techniques
made the following understanding in relation to Article 1 of
the Convention:
"It is the understanding of the Committee that, for the
purposes of this Convention, the terms, 'widespread',
'long—lasting' and 5ee' shall be interpreted as
follows:
(a) 'widespread	 encompassing an area on the scale of
several hundred square kilometres;
(b) 'long—lasting': lasting For a period of months, or
approximately a season;
1. Ptrticle 2 of the Convention.
2 The 'understanding' of the Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament relating to Article 2 of the Convention on
Environmental 11odification Techniques, cited in Roberts and
Guelff, ibid., p. 378.
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(c) 'severe': involving serious or significant disruption
or harm to human life, natural and economic resources
or other assets.
It is further understood that the interpretation set
forth above is intended exclusively for this Convention
and is not intended to prejudice the interpretation oP
the same or similar terms if used in connexion with any
other international agreement."1
Clearly, this reservation excludes a similar interpret-
ation of the terms 'widespread', 'long—term' and 'severe'
damage of the natural environment as used in rticles 35,
paragraph 3, and 55 of Protocol I. 1ore importantly, it suggests
that a similar interpretation would be prejudicial, as indeed
it would be. For instance, a similar interpretation of these
terms in Pirticle 35, paragraph 3, and the first sentence of
!\rticle 55 of Protocol I would make possible the arguement
that the destruction oP vegetation in an area of two hundred
square kilometres would not violate these Irticles, if such
an area was unpopulated, because such destruction would not
qualify as being 'idesprsad'.
It is certainly Par good reasons that the above quoted
interpretation was reserved exclusively for the purposes of
the Convention on on Environmental Modification Techniques
although the prohibited use of such techniques as methods or
means of warfare is certainly covered by the Protocol's
provisions, for these provisions prohibit any method or means
1 •
 Ibid., pp. 377-78.
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of warfare, whether conventional or unconventional 1 , which
may be intended or may be expected to cause widespread, long-
term or severe damage to the natural environment.
In brief, the provisions of Protocol I on the protection
of the environment should not be interpreted in isolation; they
should be interpreted in the context of other provisions
relating to the protection of the civilian population and
civilian objects. Indeed, one may venture to suggest that under
no circumstances would the military advantage anticipated from
an attack justify the widespread, long—term and severe damage
to the natural environment or the consequential threat to the
health or survival of the civilian population, however the
terms 'widespread, long—term and severe damage' were
interpreted. If so, it would be unnecessary to speculate on
the meaning of these terms.
On the other hand, as the Report of Committee III notes,
"it appeared to be a widely shared assumption that battlefield
damage incidental to conventional warfare would not normally
be proscribed by Article 55112 The significance of this remark
is that, as long as tn parties \o t're conf'lIct confine
themselves to the use of ?convetjona	 methods and means of
warfare, they are not likely to violate the rules on the
protection of the environment, provided of' course, that they
do not violate other rules of international law.
1. But care for the statements of understanding made by the
United States of' merica and the United Kingdom at the time
of signing Protocol I to the effect that "the rules
established by the Protocol were not intended to have any
effect on and do not regulate or prohibit the use of
nuclear weapons."
2 Report of Committee III, Second Session, Doc. (CDDH/215/
Rev. 1), para. 27.
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The fourth and last remark to be made here is that
Protocol II relating to armed conflicts of non—international
character does not contain provisions on the protection of the
environment. Does it follow that the rules of Protcol I in this
regard are inapplicable to civil wars ? The answer must be in
the negative. It is significant in this respect that the
Australian delegation had initially proposed to make the
protection of the environment "without prejudice to the rights
of a High Contracting Party in its own territory." 1 Such a
reservation was widely criticized and even the Austa'alian
delegation itself had to abandon it. In Fact, not a single
delegate came out in favour of such a reservation.
6.4. Protection of' Objects Containing Dangerous Forces
Article 56 of Protocol I regulates the protection of
objects containing dangerous forces, "namely, dams dykes and
nuclear elecrical generating stations." Attempts to include
other objects by making a list of exemplary rather than
exhaustive were not successful at the Diplomatic Conference.
Indeed, as the Report of Committee III notes, it was only when
a decision was taken to limit the special protection to dams,
dykes, nuclear power stations, and other military objectives
in the vicinity of these objects that it was possible to
produce a generally acceptable text. That limitation made it
possible to be more specific in describing circumstances under
which the special protection ceases, which had been the most
1 •
 Doc. CDDH/III/60, 19 1arch, 1974. -
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difficult part of the drafting task.1
The special protection of dams, dykes, nuclear electrical
generating stations, and other military objectives in the
vicinity of these objects is laid down in paragraph 1 of
Article 56, and provides as follows:
"Works or installations containing dangerous forces,
namely dams, dykes and nuclear elecrical generating
stations, shall not be made the object of' attack, even
where these objects are military objectives, if' such
attack may cause the release of' dangerous forces and
consequent severe losses among the civilian population.
Other military objectives located at or in the vicinity
of' these works or installations shall not be made the
object of' attack if such attack may cause the release
of' dangerous Forces from the works or installations and
consequent severe losses among the civilian population."
According to the Report of Committee III, the Committee
decided to retain the qualifying phrase "If such attack may
cause the release of' dangerous forces and consequent severe
losses among the civilian population" in order to avoid
granting immunity from attacks of a kind not likely to release
the dangerous forces.2
According to paragraph 2 of' Article 56, the special
protection provided by paragraph 1 shall cease:
"(a) for a dam or dyke only if it is used for other than
its normal function and in regular, significant and
1 •
 Report of Committee III, Second Session, 1975, Doc.
(CEJDH/215/Rev.1), para. 85.
2. Ibid., para. 8?.
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direct support of military operations and if such
attack is the only feasible way to terminate such
support;
(b) for a nuclear elecrical generating station only if it
provides electric power in regular, significant and
direct support of military operations and if such
attack is the only feasible way to terminate such
support;
(c) for other military objectives located at or in the
vicinity of these works or installations only if they
are used in regular, significant and direct support
of military operations and if such attack is the only
feasible way to terminate such support•I
An obvious remark common to all three types of objects is
that the special protection may be lost only if the object is
used "in regular, significant and direct support of military
operations and if' attack is the only feasible way to terminate
such support." Another obvious remark which nevertheless should
be emphasized is that these conditions are cvmulatiie.
iloreover, it should be noted that the standard used in paragraph
2, that is, "regular, significant, and direct support of
military operations," is a higher standard than that of' Article
52 of Protocol I which only requires "effective contribution
1
to military action." As the Report of Committee III notes:
"Without trying to define the phrase ("in regular,
significant and direct support of military operations")
in Article 56, it seems clear that production of arms,
1. Ibid., para. 91.
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amunition and military equipment would qualify as direct
support of military action, but the production of civilian
goods which may also be used by the armed forces would
not qualify in the absence of most unusual circumstances."1
But even such use in "direct support of military
operations does not seem sufficient to render the objects
under discussion military objectives; it is necessary also
that such use be 'regular' and 'significant'. Accordingly, if
the use in direct support of military operations, i.e•,
production of arms, amunition and military equipment, was only
occasional, or that the production was 'insignificant' in
comparison to other centres of production or to the needs of
the armed forces, the dam, dyke, or nuclear electrical
generating station would not qualify as a military objective.
It should be noted that the Report of Committee III says
nothing about the terms 'regular' and 'significant', and that
the interpretation made here reflects this writer'spersonal
view.
However, if in the particular case of a dam, dyke, nuclear
elecrical generating station, or other military objectives
located at or in the vicinity of' any of these works or
installations, the condition of use "in regular, significant
and direct support of military operations" were fulfilled, the
particular object becomes a military objective. But the special
protection does not cease ipso facto; It is another prerequisite
for the loss of protection that attack be "the only feasible
way to terminate such support." This latter prerequisite
1. Ibid., para. 91.
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virtually makes the loss of' special protection very difficult,
because there will always be methods and means for terminating
the direct military support other than by direct attacks.
If, nevertheless, these conditions were fulfilled in any
particular case, the protection which would be lost is only the
special protection. And the moment that special protection
ceases the objects mentioned in paragraph 1 become subject to
the 'general protection' accorded by international law to the
civilian population and civilian objects against affects of
military operations, as provided by paragraph 3 of Article 56
which states:
"In all cases, the civilian population and individual
civilians shall remain entitled to all the protection
accorded them by international law, including the
protection of the precautionary measures provived for in
Article 57. If' the (special) protection ceases and any
of the works, installations or military objectives
mentioned in paragraph 1 is attacked, all practical
precautions shall be taken to avoid the release of the
dangerous forces."
Thus the Report of Committee III commented, even when
attack on one of these objects is justified under all the
applicable rules, the second sentence of paragraph 3 requires
the combatants to take	 practical precautions" to avoid
releasing the dangerous forces. Given the array of arms
available to modern armies, this requirement should provide
real protection against the catastrophic release of these forces.1
1. Ibid., para. 92.
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So far we have examined the conditions under which the
special protection ceases, and which are common to all three
types of' objects as specified in paragraph 2. But in addition,
a dam or a dyke may loose the special protection against
attacks provided by paragraph 1 "if it is used for other than
its normal function ... ." Is this really a special case for the
loss of' special protection? The answer is probably in the
negative, and one may venture to suggest that the text of' the
Prticle could do without it. But the phrase 'normal function'
seems to have provided an occasion for clarifying the protection
of' dams and dykes, and therefore, to some extent, it was not
idle.
according to the Report of Committee III, the phrase
flQ ma j fucio	 as used in the text means
	 Function of
holding back, or being ready to hold back, water" 1
 Thus the
Report went on, "if' a dam or dyke is used for no purpose other
than holding back water or being ready to hold back water,
e.g., it is not made part of a fortified line or used as a road,
the immunity from attack provided in paragraph 1 cannot be lost.
Even if' it js used for a function in addition to its normal
function, the immunity is not lost unless it is used in
regular, significant, and direct support of' military operation
and if the only feasible way to terminate the support is by
attack on the dam or dyke." 2
 But this is not all •
 The Report
of' Committee III goes on to state that "in addition, it must
always be recognized that an attack is not justified unless the
military reasons for destruction 	 in a p articular case of' such
1. Ibid., para.. BB.
2. Ibid., para. 88.
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extraordinary and vital interest as to outweigh the severe
losses which may be anticipated." 1
 Nevertheless, the Report
notes that some representatives remained concerned about the
problems that may arise from the use of dykes for roadways.2
The notion of 'normal function' also provided an occasion
for discussing the notion of 'additional function' in the case
of' the usage of the water stored by a dam for hydro—electric
generating facilities. In such a case, the Report of Committee
III states in uncompromising language that the use of water
stored by a dam for hydro—electric generating facilities cannot
justify making the dam itself an object of attack, but the
generating facilities could become "other military objectives
located at or in the vicinity of these installations." If such
a generating facility does become a military objective, it may
not be attacked unless it is "used in regular, significant,
and direct support of' military operations" and, even then, only
if "such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such
support." Certainly, the greater the distance between hydro-
electric generating facilities and the dam, the less risk there
would be of collateral damage to t!rva dam, in t'rie event the
hydro—electric generating facilities were used for military
purposes, in such a way as to become a legitimate military
objective.
Thus, although the notion of the 'normal function' of a
dam or a dyke does not really add to what is said by the other
conditions for the loss of special protection, it has provided
1	 Ibid., pare. 89.
2. Loc. cit.
3. ibid., pera. 90.
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a useful occasion for clarifying the protection accorded to
dams and dykes. With regard to the notion of 'other military
objectives' located at or in the vicinity of dams, dykes and
nuclear elecrical generating stations, it seems that it
includes civilian objects which may become military objectives
in the narrow sense of the term, if attacks on them may cause
the release of dangerous forces from the works or installations
and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.
But it should be noted that paragraph 5 of Article 56 enjoins
the Parties to the conflict to 'endeavour' to avoid locating
any military objectives in the vicinity of these objects.
Nevertheless, "installations erected for the sole purpose of
defending the protected works or installations from attack"
are permissible according to paragraph 5, "and shall not
themselves be made the object of attack, provided they are not
used in hostilities except for defensive actions necessary to
respond to attacks against the protected works or installations
and that their armament is limited to weapons capable only of
repelling hostile action against the protected works or
installations."
According to the Report of Committee III, there was
considerable discussion about the question of the types of
armament to be permitted to the defensive installations.
Ultimately, it was thought impractical to include any limit-
ation other than that implied by the phrase "weapons capable
only of repelling hostile action against the protected works
or installations." This phrase implies, according to the
Report, that "the use of weapons capable of attacking enemy
forces passing at some distance from the protected work or
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installation is prohibited."1
The rest of Article 56 may now be mentioned briefly.
Paragraph 4 of the Art.tcle prohibits reprisals against any of
the objects protected by the Article. Paragraph 6 urges the
Parties to the conflict to conclude further agreements among
themselves to provide additional protection for objects
containing dangerous forces. And paragraph 7 provides that in
order to facilitate the identification of the objects
protected by Article 56, the Parties to the conflict may mark
them with a special sign consisting of' a group of three bright
orange circles placed on the same axis, as specified in Article
16 of Annex I to Protocol I. But the absence of' such marking
in no way relieves any Party to the conflict of its obligations
under Article 56.
7	 The Prohibition of Reprisals
It should be noted from the outset that this section is
basically concerned with the prohibition of reprisals in
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict, and that neither
claims, nor is it intended to be a discussion of the institu-
tion of reprisals in international law and international
relations. 2
1 •
 Ibid., para. 93.
2 See generally, Uhiteman, Digest, Vol. 10, pp. 317-348;
Oppenheim - Lauterpacht, International Law, Vol. 2, 7th
edition, 1952, pp. 135-144, 561-565. For more recent studies,
see Kaishoven, Belligerent Reprisals, Lyden, 1971; Remigiusz
Bierzanek, Reprisals as a Means of Enforcing the Laws of War-
fare: The Old and the New Law, in Cassese (ed.), The New
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, 1979, pp . 232-257.
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Generally speaking, reprisals have often been referred to
as sanctions of international law or a means of law enforcement.
Thus, for instance, Kelsen states that "there is nothing to
prevent us from calling reprisals sanctions of international
law; for reprisals are reactions against violations of
international law." 1 "Reprisals", says Dr. Akehurst, "are one
of the means of	 forcing states to obey the laws of' war - and
indeed of forcing them to obey international law in generaT2
Kalshoven points out that the purpose of reprisals "is to coerce
the addressee to change its policy and bring it in line with the
requirements of international law, be it in respect of the
past, the present or the
	 and that "this function of law
enforcement qualifies the act as a sanction in international
31 a w •"
At the same time, however, modern international lawyers,
particularly since the end of the 19th century, have been more
and more critical in their evaluation of the function of
reprisals as a means of enforcing international law in general
and the rules of the laws of war in particular. It has been
observed that the instjtuttQc- of'	 "t
to ensure the observance of the laws of war, has systematically
been used as a convenient cloak for disregarding the laws of
war." 4 Draper says that it is the "primitive and fatal lex
tallionis - one illegality justifies another ... that lies
1 •
 Kelsen, Principles of International Law, New York, 1952,
p. 23.
2. Akehurst, 1\ 1odern Introduction to International Law, 4th
edition, 1982, p. 236.
3. Kalshoven, op. cit., p. 33.
4. History of the UN Uar Crimes Commission and the Development
of the Laws of War, 1948, p. 29, cited in Bierzanek, OP. cit.
p . 237.
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behind the rules governing reprisals." He notes that
"experience has shown that, hitherto, reprisal action frequently
taken in circumstances that provided no justification has done
much to undermine the effective operation of recognized rules
of the law of war" and that "in fact reprisals which were
designed as a method of enforcing the law of war have become a
wholesale and cynical disregard of the law." 1 The right to
exercise reprisals has been criticized on the ground that it
"carries with it great danger of arbitrariness, for often the
alleged facts which make belligerents resort to them are not
sufficiently verified; sometimes the rules of war which they
consider the enemy to have violated are not generally
recognized; often the act of reprisal performed is excessive
compared with the precedent act of illegitimate warfare." 2 The
advisability of resorting to reprisals has also been questioned;
in view of the chain reaction of negative reciprocity which
reprisals are likely to initiate, to take reprisals, it has
been said, "can rarely, if' ever, be	 On top of all
this, the moral argument against reprisals was particularly
strong; they almost invariably strike at the innocent.
In the 19th century, formal as well as informal attempts
were made to regulate reprisals. Thus, at the Brussels
Conference of 1874, the Russian delegation proposed three rules
to govern the exercise of reprisals: first, that reprisals
should be admitted only in extreme cases of absolutely certain
1.Draper, The Red Cross Conventions, 1 958, p. 98.
2. Oppenheim - Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 563.
3. Schuarzenberger, International Law, Vol. 2 - Armed
Conflict - 1968, p. 106.
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violation5 of the rules of legitimate warfare; second, the acts
performed by way of reprisals should not be excessive, but in
proportion to the violation; third, that reprisals should be
ordered by commanders—in—chief only. 1 The Brussels Conference
apparently did not discuss these rules, but Bierzanek notes,
without giving any evidence, that the Conference could not
reach agreement on the question of reprisals, and that failure
discouraged the reopening of the subject at the Hague
Conferences of 1899 and 1907.2
Had these rules been accepted and faithfully respected in
practice they would have lent some credibility to the claim
that reprisals constitute a means of law enforcement or a
sanction of international law. They would also contribute to
the clarification of existing rules of international law, and
possibly to the formation of' 'new' rules. But instead of'
performing these functions, reprisals have become, as noted
above, "a convenient cloak for violations of international law"
and "an excuse for the wholesale and cynical disregard of the
It should be noted, that international lawyers, generally
speaking, have accepted reprisals only as a last resort and have
made their use subject to certain restrictions. Lieber's Code,
promulgated by President Lincoln on 24 April, 1863, probably
reflected the general view of the time when it stated in
Article 27 that "civilized nations acknowledge retaliation as
the sternest feature of war", and elaborated in Article 28 by
saying:
1 Oppenheim - Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 564.
2. Bierzanek, op. cit., p. 242.
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"Retaliation will, therefore, never be resorted to as a
measure of mere revenge, but only as a means of protect-
ive retribution, and moreover, cautiously and unavoidably;
that is to say, retaliation shall only be resorted to
after careful inquiry into the real occurence, and the
character of the misdeeds that may demand retribution.
Unjust or inconsiderate retaliation removes the
belligerents farther and farther from the mitigating
rules of regular war, and by rapid steps leads them
nearer to the internecine wars of savages•I1
The 'Oxford Manual', adopted in 1 880 by the Institute of
International Law and recommended for use by governments, was
even more explicit. It noted first that reprisals are an
exception to the general rule of equity which requires that an
innocent person ought not to suffer for the guilty, and that
they are also at variance with the rule that each belligerent
should conform to the rules of war, without reciprocity on the
part of the enemy. The Institute however, considered reprisals
as being "necessary rigour" which, however, is modified to some
extent by the following rules laid down in the Oxford Manual:
"article 85. Reprisals are formally prohibited in case
the injury complained of has been repaired."
"i\rtjcle 86. In grave cases in which reprisals appear to
be absolutely necessary, their nature and scope shall
never exceed the measure of the infraction of the laws
of war committed by the enemy.
They can only be resorted to with the authorization of
1. Text in Schindler and Toman, The Laws of Prmed Conflict,
1973, pp. 3 et seq.
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the commander—in—chief.
They must conform in all cases to the laws of humanity and
morality.
The Military Manuals of the United States of America, from
Lieber's code to the present day, have always contained a
comprehensive regulation of reprisals. For example, the United
States Army Pamphlet no. 27 - 161 - 2, October 23, 1962, states:
"An act to be considered a lawful reprisal must have the
following characteristics:
"1	 It Must Be an Unlawful Act
"2. It Must Be Done for the Purpose of Compelling the
Other Belligerent To Observe the Laws of War.
"3. It Must Not Be Done Before Other Means Have Been
E xhaus ted.
"4. It Must Be Done Only Under the Orders of a Commander
and After Consultation With the Highest Available
Military Authority Which Time Permits
"5. It Must Be Committed Against Enemy Personnel or
Property.
"6. It M st Ba Proportional to the Original Wrong.
"This rule of proportionality iS not one of strict
proportionality because the reprisal will usually be
somewhat greater than the initial violation that gave
rise to it. However, care must be taken that the extent
of' the reprisal be measured by some degree of proportion-
ality and not by effectiveness. Disproportionality cannot
be justified on the ground that only disproportionality
1. Text in ibid., pp. 25 et seq.
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could stop the violations of the other belligerent.
"7. Not 1\ll Enemy Personnel and Property 1\re Legitimate
Objects of' Reprisal.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibit reprisal action
against the person or property of prisoners of war, sick
wounded and shipwrecked members of the enemy armed forces,
and enemy civilians either in occupied territory or in
the domestic territory of' the enemy belligerent. These
conventions have restricted t-e açç11.icatir\ 3f
actions to the conduct of military operations and
exempted as victims, helpless enemy military and civilian
personnel who happen to be in the hands of the opposing
1
side."
It is probably on this understanding that international
lawyers continued to regard reprisals as a sanction for
violations of the laws of war or a means of' law enforcement.
But even such a fj for tat' law cannot realistically be
expected to work as a sanction because every 'tit' calls for a
bigger 'tat' and sooner or later the chain of negative
reciprocity will run its full course. It was therefore a wise
decision to impose a complete ban on reprisals, which is the
case under Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions of
1949 But let us see first what was the situation with regard
to reprisals under the Hague and Geneva Conventions.
/s noted above, the Brussels Declaration of 1874 and the
Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907 had actually failed to
regulate reprisals. ll that one can find in these Conventions
1. See Uhiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 10, pp. 319-21•
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is Article 50 of' the Hague Regulations which provides that:
"No general penalty, pecuniary or other wise, shall be
inflicted upon the population on account of' the acts of
individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly
and severally responsible."
Inasmuch as reprisals constitute collective penalties,
it is arguable that they were prohibited by this Article, at
least with regard to th8 population of' occupied territory. Y8t,
Professor Lauterpacht went so far as to suggest that this
Article "does not prevent the burning by way of' reprisals, of
villages or even towns, for a treacherous attack committed
there on enemy soldiers by unknown individuals, and, this
being so, a brutal belligerent has his opportunity." 1 This
illustrates the need for express and clear prohibitions of
reprisals.
In any event, Article 50 of the Hague Regulations of' 1899
and 1907 has been superseded by Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention of 1949, which expressly states that:
"No protected person may be punished for an offence he or
she has not personally committed. Collective penalties
and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism
are prohibited.
Pillage is prohibited.
Reprisals against protected persons and their property
are prohibited."
It is worth recalling here that according to Article 4,
paragraph 1 of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the
1	 1. Oppenheim - Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 565.
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protection of civilians, "persons protected by the Convention
are those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever,
find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the
hands of' a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which
they are not nationals." The words "in case of a conflict or
occupation" must be taken as referring to a conflict or
occupation as defined in Article 2 common to the Geneva
Conventions 1
 which, according to article 1 of Protocol I,
includes armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against
colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist
regimes in the exercise of their right of' self—determination.
It should also be noted that the words "in the hands of" need
not necessarily be understood in the physical sense; it simply
means that the person is in territory which is under the control
of the Power in question.2
In addition to Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
mention should be made of Article 53 which provides that:
"Any destruction by the occupying Power of real or personal
property belonging individually or collectiveiy to
private persons, or to the State, or to other public
authorites, or to social or co—operative organizations,
is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered
absolutely necessary by military operations."
This being the only exception to the prohibition, it
necessarily follows that the demolition of houses of' persons
accused ofacts of resistance to the occupant whether convicted
1. ICRC - Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention of' 1949,
Pictet (ed.) 1958, p. 47.
2. Loc. cit.
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or not has no justification under international law. The
municipal laws of the Occupying Power which allow such a
destruction do not absolve that Power from the responsibility
for such destruction under international law. Indeed, inso far
as such destruction is conducted with a view to prevent further
acts of resistance it easily qualifies as an act of intimidation,
and terrorism and a collective penalty, all of' which, in
addition to reprisals, are prohibited by 1\rticle 33 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention.
It should be noted also that 1rticle 13, paragraph 3, of
the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 prohibits measures of
reprisal against prisoners of war, and 1\rticles 46 and 47 of
the First and Second Geneva Conventions, respectively, prohibit
reprisals against the wounded, the sick and shipwrecked.
Nevertheless, the prohibition of reprisals under the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 does not cover all situations which may
arise in praLtice. For instance, the civilian population and
civilian objects in territories which are not under the control
of an Occupying Power in case of interstate armed conflicts,
and liberated territories in wars of national liberation are
not protected by Irticle 33 of the Fourth Geneva Conventions.
It was left to Protocol 1 which is additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 to bring the prohibition of reprisals to
a full circle, not of course without some opposition from some
Western States. It is therefore still to be seen whether any
reservations to the prohibitions of' reprisals will be made
under Protocol I and what will be the attitudes of other states
towards such reservations, if and when made. In the meantime,
in view of the dark history of' reprisals, one can only hope
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that no reservations will be made in this respect, and that
more effective sanctions and means of law enforcement will be
found other than the reservation of the right to reprisals
however restricted. Much of course will continue to be said
for and against the prohibition of reprisals. But it is
significant that as early as 1929 states have accepted a
prohibition of reprisals against prisoners of war, and, this
being so, it is absolutely illogical and inhumane to retain a
right to exercise reprisals against the civilian population,
civilians and civilian objects. The provisions of Protocol I
which prohibit reprisals must therefore be welcomed as being
steps in the right direction.
In addition to the prohibition of reprisals under the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, Protocol I contains seven
provisions prohibiting reprisals which may be summarized as
follows:
I\rticle 20 prohibits reprisals against persons and objects
protected by Part II of the Protocol, that is to say, wounded,
sick and shipwrecked, medical personnel and medical units, as
defined in Prticla B of t
	 Prooto1. rtc1 2 pToits:
"Reprisals against the persons and objects protected by this
Part are prohibited.'t
I\rticle 51, paragraph 6 provides that: "/ttacks against
the civilian population or civilians by way of' reprisals are
prohibited."
Irticle 52, paragraph 1, provides that : "Civilian objects
shall not be made the object of' attack or of reprisals."
In addition to these general prohibitions of reprisals
against the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects,
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Articles 53, 54, 55 and 56 provide for the prohibition of
reprisals against certain categories of objects. Thus,
according to paragraph (c) of Article 53, it is prohibited to
make historic monuments, works of art or places of' worship which
constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples the
object of reprisals.
According to Article 54, paragraph 4, objects indispensible
to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs,
agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops,
livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and
irrigation works "shall not be made the object of reprisals."
Article 55, paragraph 2, provides that "attacks against
the natural environment by way of' reprisals are prohibited."
And according to Article 56, paragraph 4, "it is prohibited to
make any of the works, installations or military objectives
mentioned in paragraph 1 the object of reprisals." These objects
are: dams, dykes, nuclear electrical generating stations, and
"other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of
these works or installations."
In view of these prohibitions, Mr. Aldrich, in a recent
article published in the American Journal of International
Law concluded by saying:
"In general, it seems fair to say that the Protocol,
coupled with all the other specific prohibited acts of
reprisals set forth in other conventions (such as the
1949 Geneva Conventions' prohibitions of reprisals
against prisoners of war, the wounded, sick and ship-
wrecked, medical and religious personnel, and civilians
in occupied territory), leaves only acts against enemy
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armed forces, including the use of prohibited weapons,
as permissible measures of reprisals."1
One would have liked hr. Aldrich to have stated this vieu
at the Diplomatic Conference in his capacity as head of the
American delegation as this would have given the Conference an
opportunity to look into the alleged permissibility of the use
of prohibited weapons as measures of reprisals against enemy
armed forces. In this writer's view, the alleged permissibility
of the use of prohibited weapons as measures of reprisals opens
a pandora's box, and it is unlikely that the Diplomatic
Conference had intended such a result. Apart from this point,
Aldrich's conclusion seems well justified and probably reflects
the intention of the Diplomatic Conference.
Finally, it should be noted that neither Protocol II
relative to the protection of victims of armed conflicts of
non—international character nor Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 contain any provisions regarding the
prohibition of reprisals against the civilian population,
civilians and civilian objects. Does this mean that reprisals
are not prohibited in such armed conflicts? The answer must be
in the negative, that is to say, reprisals are prohibited under
Article 3 although they were not expressly mentioned This
becomes clear from the text of paragraph 1 of Article 3 which
lays down absolute prohibitions:
"Persons taking no active part in the hostilities,
including members of the armed forces who have laid down
their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness,
1 •
 Aldrich, New Life for the Laws of' War, American iournal of
International Law, Vol. 75, 1981, p. 782, n. 51.
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wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall be treated
humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race,
colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any
other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with
respect to the above mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of
all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and carrying out of executions
without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly
constituted court, affording all the judicial guaran-
tees which are recognized as indispensible by civil-
ized peoples."
Obviously, the acts referred to in items (a) to (d) are
prohibited absolutely and permanently "at any time and in any
place whatsoever." The prohibition allows of no exceptions or
excuses. Consequently, any reprisal which entails any of these
acts is prohibited, and so, generally speaking, is any reprisal
incompatible with the "humane treatment" demanded uncondition-
ally in the first sentence of paragraph 1 of article 31
With regard to Protocol II, which is more comprehensive
than crticle 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, it
should be noted that the Diplomatic Conference, at Committee
1. See ICRC, Commentary of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 1958,
pp. 39-40.
564
level, adopted draft Article 10 bis which provided that "The
provisions of Parts II, III, and V of the Protocol shall riot,
in any circumstances or for any reason whatsoever, be violated,
even in response to a violation of the provisions of the
Protocol." In brief, this provision constituted an express all
out prohibition of reprisals, but alas, it was deleted in
Plenary by 41 votes to 20, with 22 abstentions 2 , apparently
because, as the representative of the United States, Mr.
Aldrich, put it, "the whole concept of' reprisals had no place
'3in Protocol II.'
One hopes that this actually was the reason, for this
would still mean that all reprisals are prohibited under
Protocol II. But better still would have been an express
provision to this effect it-i order to remove all doubts
regarding the prohibition of reprisals.
8.	 The Prohibition of' Indiscriminate Attcks
Fluch has been said in the preceding sections of this
Thapter about indiscriminate attacks 4 , and it is probably
obvious from what has been said that, while there seems to be
a general agreement, in principle, on the prohibition of
indiscriminate attacks, there was no agreement on what is
actually prohibited.
In principle, any attack by whatsoever means which strikes
1 •
 ICRC, Draft Protocol II Following the Third Session of the
Diplomatic Conference, Doc 1 (0 1388/1 b*), p. 5, n. 1.
2. CDDH/SR.51, para. 16.
3. CDDH/SR.51, para. 7, (USA), and para. 8 (India).
4 See in particular, Sections 3 and 4 of this Chapter.
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military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without
distinction may be said to be indiscriminate. On the other hand,
unfortunately, international law still alous the Parties to the
conflict, 'free of charge', an unquantified and probably
unquantifiable measure of' incidental loss of' civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combin-
ation thereof, said to be "unavoidable". So where is the
dividing line between the avoidable and hence impermissible,
and the unavoidable and hence permissible, incidental civiliian
losses? To claim that something is unavoidable naturally
presupposes that all feasible precautionary measures have been
taken in planning and deciding upon attack on a legitimate
military objective to avoid, and in any case, to minimize,
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage
to civilian objects. Such precautionary measures are now laid
down expressly in /rticle 57 of Protocol I and are part and
parcel of the regulation of' indiscriminate attacks and, indeed,
of the concept of respect for and protection of' the civilian
population, civilians and civilian objects. These precautionary
measures are the subject of' the following section, but some
reference to them may be unavoidable in this section, which is
mainly concerned with the definition of' indiscriminate attacks
as laid down in paragraph 4 and 5 of Protocol I. These
paragraphs provide as follows:
"4. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate
attacks are:
(b) Those which employ a method or means of combat
which cannot be directed at a specific military
objective;
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(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the
effects of which cannot be limited as required by
this Protocol;
and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature
to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian
objects without distinction.
5. 1mong others, the following types of attacks are to be
considered as indiscriminate:
(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means
which treat as a single military objective a number
of clearly seperated and distinct military object-
ives located in a city, town, village or other area
containing a similar concentration of civilians or
civilian objects;
and,
(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated."
The multitude of methods and means of combat which form
indiscriminate attack and therefore are prohibited should
hardly be suprising; it is simply an illustration of various
ways of causing losses among the civilian population and damage
to civilian objects even when attacks are directed 'exclusively'
at legitimate military objectives. i\ll of these forms of attack
were in the past controversial. It is hardly surprising
therefore that the formulation of paragraphs 4 and 5 quoted
above was one of the most difficult issues at the Diplomatic
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conference. 1
 Yet, these paragraphs are far from being self—
evident and therefore bear some elaboration, which will be
done in the rest of this section. For the sake of clarity and
convenience reference is made below to the paragraph and sub-
paragraph concerned.
4.(a). 1\ttacks which are not directed at a specific
military objective are indiscriminate attacks. In such attacks,
2
the attacker does not take aim, but fires wildly. Writers
have already condemned such attacks as being unlawful.
"Bombardment at randon is, however, unlawful", wrote Professor
Castren. 3
 Indeed, such attacks may qualify as attacks against
civilian population as such, or even as acts of violence the
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian
population, which are equally prohibited. 4 It should also be
noted in this respect that the distinction between "inaccurate
bombardment" and "bombardment at random" may at times be
difficult to make. Inaccurate attacks are, by definition,
attacks which miss their target, but the more the inaccuracy,
the more the attack is likely to be classified as not being
directed at a specific military objective. But while as a rule,
inaccurate attacks may not be prohibited under sub—paragraph
4(a), they would still be regarded as indiscriminate attacks
under sub—paragraph 5(b), if the attack was expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage
1. For the summary records of the discussions on 1\rticle 51 of'
Protocol I, see Levie, Protection of' War \./ictims, Vol. 3,
1 g 8u, pp. 123-176•
2. 11drich, New Life for the Laws of War, 1\merican Journal of'
International Law, Vol. 75, 1981, p . 780.
3. Castren, The Present Law of' War and Neutrality, Helsinki,
1954, p. 20U.
4. See Prticle 51(2) of Protocol I.
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to civilian objects or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated from the attack. ht any rate, as Castren
had noted, "battering of' small and insignificant military
targets lying in inhabited areas would (like random attacks)
be an obvious abuse of the right of bombardment, and the
freedom of action for the party carrying out the bombardment
is not extended by the fact that the enemy begins to interfere
with operations aimed at the destruction of military targets.
Nor may bad weather be pleaded as an excuse s
 The further a
target is situated from the fighting zone, the greater must be
the care which is observed in carrying out bombardment of that
1target."
4(b). Attacks which employ a method or means of' combat
which cannot be directed at
	 specific military objectives,
and consequently, are of a nature to strike military objectives
and civilians or civilian objects without distinction are
indiscriminate attacks. It seems difficult to see what exactly
this was supposed to mean. Aldrich acidly remarked that this
sub-paragraph refers to "an unguidable or controllable weapon,
a weapon that may not exist." 2 It is a fact that all weapons
can be directed at a specific military objective; the real
issue is whether the effects can be limited to military
objectives as required by the Protocol. If so, the provision
of sub-paragraph 4(b) would be redundant Since sub-paragraph
4(c) deals with this matter.
4(c) Attacks which employ methods or means of' combat the
1. Castren, op. cit., p. 200.
2. Aldrich, op. cit., p . 780.
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effects of which cannot be limited as required by Protocol I
and consequently are of' a nature to strike at military object-
ives and civilian objects without distinction are indiscriminate
attacks par excellence. But the question which is not easy to
answer is what is meant by "limited as required by this
Protocol"? The first such limitation that comes to mind is the
requirement laid down in 1\rticle 52, that attacks be limited
strictly to military objectives. But as we have seen, this
Prticle was not intended to regulate collateral damage to
civilian objects, loss of' civilian life or injury to civilians.
!\ less rigid limitation is the obligation to take "all feasible
precautions in the choice of' means and methods of attack with
a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to
civilian objects." 1 Even more lax is the limitation imposed by
the so—called 'propotionality rule' laid down in paragraph 5(b)
quoted above, which treats as indiscriminate and therefore
prohibited, any attack "which may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated." This rule obviously favours the attacker,
while the rule that "attacks shall be strictly limited to
military objectives" clearly favours the attacked. Thus, it is
more likely that the parties to the conflict will invoke
different 'limitations' and judge each other accordingly.
Finally, it should be noted with regard to paragraph 4 (b)
1. P,rticle 57, (2)(a)(ii).
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and (c) that, in the view of some delegations, "the definition
of indiscriminate attacks (in that paragraph) was not intended
to mean that there are means or methods of combat whose use
would involve an indiscriminate attack in all circumstances.
Rather, it was intended to take account of the fact that means
or methods of combat which can be used perfectly legitimately
in some situations could, in other circumstances, have effects
that would be contrary to some limitations contained in the
Protocol, in which event their use in those circumstances would
involve an indiscriminate
5(a). According to this sub—paragraph, "an attack by
bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single
military objective a number of clearly seperated and distinct
military objectives located in a city, town village or other
area containing a similar concentration of civilians or
civilian objects" is to be considered as indiscriminate and
therefore prohibited. This is actually the prototype of
indiscriminate attacks which is sometimes referred to in legal
literature as 'massive' bombardment, 'target area' bombardment,
or 'carpet bombing'. After much deliberation, the Working
Group of Committee III considered it unnecessary to use such
terms since all are covered by the prohibition, and since the
use of such expressions might be construed to restrict the
2protection of civilians from other types of bombardments
According to the Report of Committee III, "bombardment by
1. Report of Committee III, Second Session, Doc. CDDH/215/Rev.1,
para. 55. See also the explanation of votes by the delega_
tions of the United Kingdom CDDH/SR. 41, para. 119; Italy,
CDDH/SR. 41, para. 122; Canada, CDDH/SR.41 (Annex); Federal
Republic of Germany, CDDH/SR41 (Annex).
2. Report of Committee III, op. cit., para. 56.
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any methods or means" refers to all attacks by fire, and the
use of' any type of projectiles except for direct fire by small
arms. 1
 But while "direct fire by small arms" does not qualify
as bombardment, it does not follow that indiscriminate attacks
by small arms are not prohibited.
Sub—paragraph 5(a) prohibits all types of bombardment
"which treat as a single military objective a number of clearly
s e pEir a t e d and distinct military objectives located in a city,
town, village or other area containing a similar concentration
of' civilians or civilian objects."
The term 'clearly separated and distinct military
objectives' does not seem to be sufFiciently clear. The
representative of the United States of America said that "his
delegation took the words 'clearly separated' to refer not only
to a separation of' two or more military objectives, which could
be observed or' were usually separated, but to include the
element of a significant distance. Moreover, the distance should
be at least sufficiently large to permit the individual
military objective to be attacked separately." 2 The represent-
atives of Egypt and Canada said that their delegations
supported the comments made by the representative of the
United States, 3 and there seems to be no evidence to suggest
that other delegations had dissented from this view, or had
given different interpretations.
As to the phrase "similar concentration of civilians or
or civilian objects" it should be noted that the adjective
'similar' has been deliberately added so that the term will
1. Loc. cit.
2. CDDH/III/5R.31, para. 50.
3. CDBH/III/SR.31, pare. 56 Egypt; and CDOH/SR.31, pare. 58 Canada,
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not be misunderstood, for example, as imp l ying ordinary rural
areas •
 Thus, a refugee camp or column of refugees moving along
a road would be examples of such similar concentration.1
On the whole it may be stated that sub—paragraph 5(a) is
satisfactory. In prohibiting any attack which treats as a
single military objective a number of clearly separated and
distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village,
or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians
or civilian objects, it lays a general rule to the effect that
military objectives should be attacked individually, and that,
only in exceptional cases where the military objectives are so
close to each other as to make it impossible for them to be
attacked individually, it would be allowed to treat them as a
single military objective. It should be noted that the criterion
in sub—paragraph 5(a) is an objective one; the fact that the
military objectives are "clearly separated" is a conclusive
evidence that they can be attacked separately. In other words,
the question is not whether the attacker could see that the
military objectives were clearly separated, but whether the
military objectives were clearly separated in fact. If they
were clearly separated in fact, then treating them as a single
miltary objective would be illegal.
Nor does it seem to be an excuse that the city, town,
village, or the similar concentration of civilians and civilian
objects was situated in a combat zone, or that the military
objectives were heavily defended against air attacks As noted
above, the only legal excuse which may be inferred from the
1. See Report of the Third Committee on the Uork of the
Working Group, Doc. CDDH/III/319, 9 1ay, 1977.
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provision of' sub—paragraph 5(a) is that military objectives in
question are not sufficiently separated to be attacked separately.
Finally it should be noted that an attack would still be
illegal If' It violates the prohibition of sub—paragraph 5(a)
although, arguably, it might be said that it did not violate
the so—called 'proportionality rule' laid down in sub—paragraph
5(b). Indeed, it has been observed that "It may be easier for
a commander to determine whether he can feasibly attack several
objectives separately than to determine whether an attack would
violate the proportionality rule." 1 This indeed implies an
admission that the so—called proportionality rule is too vague,
impractical, and ought not to have been introduced into Protocol
I.
5(b). This is the by now famous or infamous 'proportion-
ality rule' according to which "an attack which may be expected
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated" from the attack is to be
considered indiscriminate and is prohibited.
It should be noted from the outset that this rule was the
subject of much discussion and criticism at the Diplomatic
Conference, and was adopted only after I\rticle 57 of the
Protocol dealing with "precautions in attack" had been settled.
It goes without saying that in the case of this rule, as indeed
in the case of any other attack which may be expected to affect
the civilian population and civilian objects, all the
1. 1ldrich, New Life for the Laws of War, Pmerican Journal of'
International Law, Vol. 75, 1981, p. 780.
574
precautionary measures in attack listed in Article 57 should
be taken before any claim to incidental civilian losses can
legitimately be made. Even then, one may wonder whether it was
necessary at all to introduce such a vague and subjective rule
into the field of the protection of the civilan population and
civilian objects against the effects of military operations.
It may be useful therefore to quote some of the statements made
in favour and against this rule.
In the Draft Protocol prepared by the ICRC the so—called
proportionality rule was formed as follows:
"In particular it is forbidden •.. to launch attacks which
may be expected to entail incidental losses among the
civilian population and cause the destruction of
civilian objects to an extent disproportionate to the
direct and substantial military advantage anticipated."1
Introducing this rule at the Diplomatic Conference the
ICRC representative said that "the Red Cross was concious of
the fact that the rule of pronortionality contained a subject-
ive element, and was thus liable to abuse. The aim was,
however, to avoid or in any case restrict the incidental
effects of attacks directed against military objectives." 2 But
he did not explain how the proposed rule would help to achieve
this aims
However, it appears from the summary records of the
Diplomatic Conference that the so—called proportionality rule
had a mixed reception. Some delegations rejected the very idea
of proportionality between civilian losses and the military
1. ICRC Draft Article 46, para. 3(b).
2. CDDH/III/SR.5, para. 12
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advantage anticipated from an attack, and consequently
proposed to delete the paragraph of the ICRC proposal embodying
the idea 1 , or at least delete the words "to an extent
disproportionate to the direct and substantial military
advantage anticipated" 2 ; while other delegations considered it
a necessary means of regulating the conduct of warfare and of
protecting the civilian population.3
The delegations which rejected the very idea of a
proportionality between civilian losses and military advantage
anticipated argued that the rule of proportionality called for
a comparison between things not comparable, and thus precluded
objective judgement; civilian suffering and military advantage
were two values that could not conceivably be compared. 4 It was
also argued that the proportionality rule as expressed in the
ICRC text would give military commanders the practically
unlimited right to decide to launch an attack if they
considered that there would be military advantage 5 , and that
it would be impossible to prove that the military advantage
anticipated was in fact disproportionate.6
In this writer's view, these criticisms are still valid
and in fact have remained unanswered by the proponents of the
proportionality rule.
1. This was proposed by Czechoslovakia, German Democratic
Republic, Hungary and Poland, Doc. CDDH/III/8, March, 1974.
2 This was proposed by Egypt, Algeria, Democratic Yemen, Iraq,
Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Morroco, Sudan, Syria and United
Arab Emirates, Dcc. CDDH/III/48, dated 18 March, 1974.
3. See Report of Committee III, First Session, Doc. CDDH/50/
Rev. 1, para. 48.
4. See CDDH/III/SR.6, para. 38, (Syria); CDDH/III/SR.6, para.
42 (Hungary); CDDH/III/SR.8, para. 13 (Poland).
5. Poland, CDDH/III/SR.8, para. 13; Syria, CDDH/III/SR.6,
para. 38.
6. Iraq, CDDI-1/III/SR.7, para. 25
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On the other hand, proponents of' the proportionality rule
adduced one valid argument: if one considered examples like
attacks against isolated soldiers or guerrilla fighters among
a crowd of' civilians, it was said, the deletion of the propor-
tionality rule would create a lacuna, since no other provision
in the Protocol would provide a sufficient basis for the
prohibition of' such attacks.1
Other arguments, however, were either unconvincing or
controversial. For instance, the representative of the United
States of Ilmerica, Mr. \ldrich, contended that:
"The rule of proportionality ... was based on existing
international law and it was important to record and
interpret that rule in 1rticle 51. Collateral damage to
civilians and civilian objects was often unavoidable and
it was unrealistic to attempt to make all such damage
unlawful: the rule of' proportionality was as far as the
law could reasonably
The claim that the proportionality rule was based on
existing international law was contested by the representative
of the Democratic Republic of Uietnam who said that he would
like to know what documents in positive international law had
provided any foundation for such an assertion. 3 The represent-
ative of Hungary made the following analysis in reply to the
claim made by the representative of the United States. He said
that in his own view, "a rule well established in international
law should be reflected in practice and should produce the
intended effects. Yet the number of' civilian victims had
1. Federal Republic of' Germany, CDDH/III/SR.7, para. 4.
2. CDDH/IiII/SR.8, pare. 69.
3. CDDH/III/SR.21, para. 81.
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increased alarmingly over the past few years: accordingly,
either the rule was not well established and hence not binding;
or it existed and could not be applied in armed conflicts; or
it existed and was applied, but the results of its application
provided the best argument against it."1
As a matter of fact no delegation other than that of the
United States had claimed that the proportionality rule was
based on existing international law; all delegations who spoke
in favour of the rule seem to have spoken of' the desirability
of having the rule. The delegation of the United Kingdom, for
instance, would only say that the principle of proportionality
proposed by the ICRC "ought to form part of international law"2
But whatever might have been the legal status of the
proportionality rule prior to Protocol I, the fact remains that
it does now constitute a part of positive international law.
It is still to be seen whether it would be a valuable protec-
tion to the civilian population, as some delegations had
contended, or whether it would be a rule of convenience, as
some delegations had feared. The rule is certainly vague, and
there is no indication as to what may be considered 'excessive'
incidental losses in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated from an attack. It has rightly
been pointed out that civilian losses and military advantage
are two values that could not conceivably be compared. Moreover,
incidental losses are by definition 'excessive' in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from a
attack. Thus, if the rule is to be taken literally, all
1	 CDDH/III/SR.B, para. 79
2. LDDH/III/SR.8, para. 48.
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incidental civilian losses would be unlawful. But certainly
this is not what the law makers had in mind, and only God knows
what 'excessive' in this context is supposed to mean.
But assuming for the sake of argument that civilian losses
and military advantage are comparable, the laxity of the rule
remains evident from the fact that it requires a comparison
between incidental losses and the concrete and direct military
advantage 'anticipated', not the concrete and direct military
advantage 'obtained'.
It seems reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the so—
called proportionality rule laid down in sub—paragraph 5(b) of'
Article 51 of Protocol I is simultaneously illogical and
impracticable, eien as a precautionary measure•
As for the regulation of 'prohibition' of' indiscriminate
attacks, it must be admitted that, by and large, it is unlikely
to improve the protection of the civilian copulation and
civilian objects in any significant way.
In order to improve the protection of the civilian
population and civilian objects in any meaningful way, it is
necessary to abolish the 'right' of the Parties to the conflict
to 'gratuitous' incidental civilian losses and regulate the
responsibility for all incidental civilian losses; whether
intended or not, avoidable or unavoidable, excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from
an attack or	 not, all
	
should be treated as torts. How the
responsibility should be divided between the parties to the
conflict should be discussed and regulated by an international
conference. But unless and until this is done, it would be
unrealistic to speak of improving the protection of the
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Civilian population against effects of' hostilities.
9. Precautionary Fleasures
The obligation to ensure respect for and protection of the
civilian population and civilian objects necessarily implies
that the Parties to the conflict should do everything they can
to avoid, and in any case to minimize, loss of civilian lire,
injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. It seems
only natural, therefore, that Section I of Part IV of Protcol
I afrording general protection to the civilian population
against efrects or hostilities contained a chapter on
precautionary measures consisting of two articles. One lays
down a set or precautions to be taken in attacks (1rticle 57);
the other lays down a set of precautions to be taken against
attacks by each Party in the territory under its control -
(1\rticle 58). These sets of precautionary measures may be said
to be as clear (or as vague) as the rules on which they depend.
1\s these rules have already been discussed in this and the
preceeding Chapters, it may be sufficient to quote the
provisions of Prticles 57 and 58 of Protocol I and make some
necessary remarks.
9.1. Precautions in ttack
The general principle with regard to precautions in
attacks is laid down in the first paragraph of \rticle 57 which
provides:
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"In the conduct of military operations, constant care
shall be taken to spare the civilian population,
civilians and civilian objects."
It may be useful to note that this principle was one of
the"basic principles for the protection of civilian populations
in armed conflicts" which were affirmed by the General Assembly
of the United Nations in its resolution 2675(XXtJ) of 9
December, 1970. This resolution was adopted unanimously, and
therefore it may be said that paragraph 1 of Article 57 codifies
a generally accepted principle of positive international law.
It should be noted that, unlike paragraph 2 of Article 57
which is addressed to "those who plan or decide upon attack",
paragraph 1 is addressed to all members of the armed forces,
as well as to those who plan or decide upon an attack.
"2. With respect to attacks, the following precautions
shall be taken:
(a) those who plan or decide upon an attack shall:
(i) do everything feasible to verify that the
objectives to be attacked are neither civilians
nor civilian objects a?ld are nci suä€c
special protection but are military objectives
within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 52
and that it is not prohibited by the provisions
of this Protocol to attack them;
(ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of
means and methods of attack with a view to
avoiding and in any event to minimizing,
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians and damage to civilian objects;
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(iii) refr8jn from deciding to launch any attack which
may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated;
(b) an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it
becomes apparent that the objective is not a
military one or is subject to special protection
or that the attack may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated;
(c) effective advance warning shall be given of attacks
which may affect the civilian population, unless
circumstances do not permit."
At the Diplomatic Conference, a major group of Western
delegations made three almost identically worded statements of
understanding, (or interpretations), of certain terms used in
this and other paragraphs of Protocol I. One of these under-
standings related to Articles 51 to 58 (inclusive) and states
that "military commanders and others responsible for planning,
deciding upon or executing attacks necessarily have to reach
decisions on the basis f their assessment of the information
from all sources which is available to them at the relevant
1time."
1 •
 Please see footnote 1 on following page.
582
The statement of understanding related to the word
'feasible' used in Articles 41, paragraph 3, 57, paragraph 2,
and 58, states that the word 'feasible' means that which is
practicable or practically possible, taking into account all
circumstances at the time including those relevant to the
success of military operations!
The third statement of understanding related to the term
"military advantage anticipated" used in paragraph 5(b) of'
Article 51 (the so—called proportionality rule) and paragraph
2 of' Article 57; it states that "the military advantage
anticipated from an attack is intended to refer to the advantage
anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only
from isolated or particular parts of the attack."3
Each of these statements in its own way inject into the
law subjective elements which make it even more difficult to
standardize what is legal and what is illegal.
Paragraph 3 of Article 57 provides that:
"When a choice is possible between several military
objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage,
1. For this and other statements of understanding made by the
delegation of the United Kingdom at the time of signature,
see Roberts and Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War, 1982,
pp. 461-62. But also see the explanation of vote made by the
delegations of' the United Kingdom, CDDH/RS.41, para. 121;
Italy, CDDH/SR.41, para. 122; Netherlands, CDDH/SR.42, para.
1; United StatSoP America, CDDH/SR.42, (Annex); Federal
Republic of' Germany, CDDH/SR.42, (Annex).
2. To the same effect were the explanations of votes by the
delegations of the United Kingdom, CDDH/SR.42, para. 59;
Italy, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, United States
of America, CDDH/SR.42 (Annex); India, CDDH/SR.42 (Annex);
and Turkey, CDDH/SR.42, pare. 41.
3. To the same effect, the United Kingdom, CDDH/SR.41, para.
120; Canada, Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of
Germany, CDDH/SR.41, (Annex); Italy and the United States
of America, CDDH/SR.42, (Annex).
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the objective to be selected shall be that the attack on
which may be expected to cause the least danger to avoid
losses of civilian lives and damage to civilian objects."
This is indeed a rule of reason as well as of conscience,
but it is unlikely to be raised in practice because it raises
sensitive matters of military strategy and military tactics.
Paragraph 4 of Ilrticle 57 may seem out of context because
it is concerned with the conduct of military operations at sea
or in the air. It provides that:
"In the conduct of military operations at sea or in the
air each Party to the conflict shall, in conformity with
its rights and duties under the rules of international
law applicable in armed conflict, take all reasonable
precautions to avoid losses of civilian lives and damage
to civilian objects•P
This rule was a compromise solution to the controversy at
the Diplomatic Conference regarding the field of application
of the Protocol's provisions with respect to attacks, which is
now regulated by P1rticle 49 of' Protocol I and examined at
length in Chapter 5 of' this thesis. For the purposes of' this
section it may be sufficient to note that, at the Diplomatic
Conference, there were two trends: some delegations argued
that the field of application of the Protocol's provisions
with respect to attacks should govern military operations
at sea and in the air; other delegations argued that the field
of application should be confined to attacks from land, sea or
air, which may affect the civilian population, individual
civilians or civilian objects on land. In the end, however,
the latter view was adopted, but subject to the provision of
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paragraph 4 of 1\rticle 57 1
Lastly paragraph 5 of I\rticle 57 which does not lay down
a precautionary measure but a safeguard clause. It provides:
"No provision of this rticle may be construed as
authorizing any attacks against the civilian population,
civilians or civilian objects."
This provision would have made sense if' all direct and
indirect attacks against the civilian population, civilians
and civilian objects were unlawful. But inasmuch as incidental
losses are lawful there will always be some way round this
provision, for it can always be argued that the civilian
population, civilians or civilian objects were not intended to
be the objects of attack, even though only civilians and
civilian objects were hit. Nor is it clear how a provision
would not be construed as authorizing any attacks against the
civilian population, civilians or civilian objects, if, for
instance, in spite of the available information and of doing
everything feasible to verify that the objective to be attacked
was a military objective the attacked object was in fact
civilian in character. ind what about attacks which as a result
of inaccurate information, misidentification or inaccurate
targeting hit only civilians and civilian objects. I\re such
attacks lawful or unlawful ? If they were lawful, it would be
difficult to escape the conclusion that some paragraphs of
Rrticle 57 may be lawfully construed as authorizing attacks
against the civilian population, civilians or civilian objects.
Conversely, if' they were unlawful the law should clearly say
1. See further, Section 6 of Chapter 6 of this thesis.
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so and regulate the responsibility for such civilian losses.
9.2. Precautions c\gainst ttacks
!\rticle 58 of Protocol I which spells out this set of
precautions provides as follows:
"The Parties to the conflict shall, to the maximum extent
feasible:
(a) without prejudice to 1\rticle 49 of the Fourth
Convention, endevour to remove the civilian population,
individual civilians and civilian objects under their
control from the vicinity of military objectives;
(b) avoid locating military objectives within or near
densely populated areas;
(c) take the other necessary precautions to protect the
civilian population, individual civilians and
civilian objects under their control against the
dangers resulting from military operations."
1\ccording to the Report of' Committee III agreement was
reached fairly quickly on this text when the phrase "to the
maximum extent Feasible" was made to modify all paragraphs of
the /\rticle. This phrase reflected the concern of a number of
delegations that small and crowded countries would find It
difficult to separate civilians and civilian objects from
military objectives. Out the Report also notes that other
representatives pointed out that even large countries would
find such separation difficult or impossible to arrange. 1
 The
1. Report of Committee III, Second Session, Doc. CDDH/215/Re.
1, para. 102.
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humanitarian purpose of the Article had therefore to be weighed
against the requirements of national defence and the success
of military operations, and the phrase 'to the maximum extent
feasible' provided the best compromise.
Yet, some delegations said they would have preferred to
see the Article deleted because, in their view, it might prove
prejudicial to a country's national defence.	 But no delegation
had voted again5t the Article, which was adopted by 80 votes
to none, with 8 abstentions.2
The phrase 'to the maximum extent feasible' has been
interpreted by many delegations as referring to that which is
practicable or practically possible, taking into account all
circumstances at the time, including those relevant to the
success of military operations. 3 In this sense, Article 58
does not hamper any Party to the conflict in organizing its
defences as it sees fit. Not does the failure to act in
accordance with Article 58 release the attacker from its
obligations with respect to the civilian population, civilians
and civilian objects, including the obligation to take the
precautionary measures provided for in Article 57 of Protocol
The purpose of the Article is to increase, not to decrease
the protection of the civilian population, individual
1. See for examples the remarks made by the delegations of
France, Switzerland and Austria, CDDH/SR.42, para. 54, 57
and 60 respectively.
2. CDDH/SR.42, para. 56.
3. See the explanations of votes by the following delegations:
United Kingdom, CDDH/SR.42, para. 59; Italy, Canada, Federal
Republic of Germany, the United States of' America, India,
CODH/SR.42, (Annex); and Turkey, CODH/SR.42, para. 41.
4. See Article 51, para. 8 of' Protocol I.
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civilians and civilian objects.
As to the territorial scope of application, it was clearly
understood that Article 58 applies to all territory under the
effective de facto control of a Party to the conflict, that is
including both its own national territory which is under its
control and any foreign territory which it occupies. 1 But it
should be emphasized that Article 58 of the Protocol is without
prejudice to Article 49 of' the Fourth Geneva Convention of' 1949.
The phrase in paragraph 1 of Article 58, "without prejudice
to Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva	 "was chosen to
make it clear that the provisions of the paragraph are not
intended to amend in any way that Article. This paragraph, on
the contrary is intended to stand on its own in all cases except
where action proposed to be taken under it would be contrary to
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of' 1949; in which
case, Article 49 would govern."2
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides as
follows:
tJdjvjda or mass forcible transfers, as well as
deportations of protected persons from occupied territory
to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any
other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless
of their motive.
Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total
or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of
the population or imperative military reasons so demand.
1. Report of the Third Committee, Second Session, Doc. CDDH/215
/Rev. 1, para. 103•
2. Ibid., para. 104.
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Such evacuations may not involve the displacement of
protected persons outside the bounds of the occupied
territory except when for material reasons it is imposs-
ible to avoid such displacement. Persons thus evacuated
shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as
hostilites in the area in question have ceased•
The Occupying Power undertaking such transfers or
evacuations shall ehsure, to the greatest practicable
extent, that proper accomadation is provided to receive
the protected persons, that the removals are effected in
satisfactory conditions of' hygiene, health, safety and
nutrition, and that members of the same family are not
separated.
The Protecting Power shall be informed of' any transfers
and evacuations as soon as they have taken place.
The Occupying Power shall not detain protected persons
in an area particularly exposed to the dangers of war
unless the security of the population or imperative
military reasons so demand.
The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts
of its own civilian population into the territory it
occupies."
It should be noted in this respect that article 17 of
Protocol II applicable to armed conflicts of' non—international
character also prohibits the forcible movement of' the civilian
population for reasons related to the conflict unless the
security of the civilians involved or imperative military
reasons so demand. Should displacement have to be carried out,
all possible measures have to be taken in order that the
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civilian population be received under satisfactory conditions
of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition. Moreover,
the Article expressly states that civilians shall not have to
leave their own territory for reasons connected with the
conflict. Thus, as far as forcible movement of civilians is
concerned, it may be said that the same rules apply whether
the armed conflict was of an international or non—international
characters
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CHAPTER SIX
CENERL PROTECTION OF THE C1'tJILIP1N POPULATION
AGAINST EFFECTS OF HOSTILITIES:
THE BASIC RULE AND FIELD OF APPLICATION
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1	 Delimitation of the Field of Application in General
As the very title of this chapter suggests, it is about
the field of application of a basic rule underlying the whole
structure of the protection of' the civilian population against
effects of hostilities. This basic rule laid down in Article
48 of Protocol I, states that:
"In order to ensure respect for and protection of the
civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the
conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants and between civilian objects and
military objectives and accordingly shall direct their opera-
tions only against military objectives."
8ut the title also suggests that there are situations
where this basic rule does not apply, or, put rather differ-
ently, there are situations where the civilian population and
civilian objects do not seem entitled to any legal protection
against effects of military operations.
Of course it is not civilians of an enemy State that I
am talking about; they are entitled to the fullest protection
envisaged in Part Four of Protocol I. What I am talking about
is a Party's own civilians; their protection against effects
of hostilities, not those committed by the adversary, but
those committed by their own Party to the conflict. For the
first time in the history of' law—making conferences the
question has been raised: to what extent, if' any, should a
Party to a conflict of' an international character apply the
rules of warfare to its 'own' civilian population?
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The question is doubly strange and alarming especially
when it is raised at a Diplomatic Conference the purpose of
which is the reaffirmation and development of humanitarian law
applicable to armed conflicts. The reader, by now, is perhaps
familiar with rhetorical defences of the sovereignty of the
state in the context of armed conflicts of a non—international
character, but probably, not yet familiar with such rhetoric
in the context of armed conflicts of an international character.
Be that as it may, the Diplomatic Conference seems to have
given a qualified answer to the question whether a Party to
the conflict should apply to its own civilians the Protocol's
provisions with respect to attacks. The relevant provisions
which answer the question are paragraphs I and 2 of Article
49, and paragraph 5 of Article 54 of Protocol I.
Paragraphs I and 2 of Article 49 read as follows:
I.	 "Attacks" means acts of violence against the adversary,
whether in offence or in defence.
2.	 The provisions of this Protocol with respect to attacks
apply to all attacks in whatever territory conducted, includ-
ing the national territory belonging to a Party to the
conflict but under the control of an adverse Party."
It seems worthwhile recalling that during the debate on
the general protection of the civilian population, Mr. Blix
of the delegation of Sweden drew attention to the 'possible
effects' of using the term 'attack'. The word 'attack', he
said, considerably limited the scope of the articles in
Section I of' Part 4 of Protocol I and a careful study should
be made of' the possible effects of using that term.1
1. Blix, (Sweden), CDDH/III/SR. 4 para., 37.
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Indeed, the very title of Article 49 - Definition of
attacks and scope of application - suggests that the definition
of attacks was intended to limit the field of application of
the basic rule of distinction quoted above. Further evidence
may be found in the debate on whether to delete or retain the
words 'against the adversary' in the definition of attacks.
It may be remarked that when Mr. Blix made his above
mentioned statement, paragraph 2 of Article 49 and paragraph
5 of Article 54 were not yet in existence. To put paragraph 5
of Article 54 in perspective, it may be useful to reproduce
the text of Article 54. It reads as follows:
1	 "Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is
prohibited.
2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render
useless objects indispensible to the survival of the
civilian population, such as foodstu'fs, agricultural
areas for the production of' foodstuffs, crops, livestock,
drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation
works, for the specific purpose of' denying them for their
sustenance value to the civilian population or to the
adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to
starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for
any other motive.
3. The prohibitions in paragraph 2 shall not apply to such
of the objects covered by it as used by an adverse
Party:
(a) as sustenance solely for the members of' its armed
forces; or
(b) if not as sustenance, then in direct support of
military action, provided, however, that in no event
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shall actions against these objects be taken which may
be expected to leave the civilian population with such
inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or
force its movement.
4. These objects shall not be made the object of reprisals.
5. In recognition of the vital requirements of any Party
to the conflict in the defence of' its national territory
against invasion, derogation from the prohibitions
contained in paragraph 2 may be made by a Party to the
conflict within such territory under its own control
where required by imperative military necessity."
In plain English, paragraph 5 of flrticle 54 has a
'scorched earth' policy in view. This may explain why the
words "but under the control of an adverse Party" were
inserted at the end of paragraph 2 of' Prticle 49. Without
these words it would have been possible to argue that the
civilians of all Parties to the conflict benefit from the
general protection against effects of hostilities or
military operations of' all Parties to the conflict, as the
law stands at present, this seems to be doubtful, notwith-
standing 'the imperative military necessity' which, however,
is open to different interpretations and, therefore is open
to abuse.
Thus reduced to its simplest form, the field of
application of' the Protocol's provisions with respect to
attacks is the territory under the de facto contol of the
adversary. In other words, the Conference has adopted a
terrjtoria1 rather than a 'national' criterion.
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The main difficulty in applying this criterion is that the
words 'under the control of the adverse Party' are open to
different interpretations.
On another level of delimitation, the Protocol's
provisions with respect to attacks do not apply to military
operations at sea or in the air, but they do apply to attacks
from the sea or from the air which may affect the civilian
population, individual civilians or civilian objects on land.
They further apply to all attacks from the sea or from the air
against objectives on land but do not otherwise affect the
rules of international law applicable in armed conflict at
sea or in the air.
Thus, although the Protocol as such does not affect the
rules of international law applicable in armed conflicts at
sea or in the air, it has the merit of reaffirming the
validity of these rules, particularly the customary and
conventional rules relating to the protection of civilians
and civilian objects at sea or in the air, notwithstanding
their violation during the Second World War. Suffice it here
to emphasize that civilians and civilian objects, at sea or in
the air, are not without protection.
The last remark to be made in this introductory section
is that the Provisions of Section I of Part IV of Protocol I
affording the civilian population general protection against
effects of' hostilities "are additional to the rules concerning
humanitarian protection contained in the Fourth (Geneva)
Convention, particularly in Part II thereof, and in other
international agreements binding upon the High Contracting
Parties, as well as to other rules of international law
596
relating to the protection of civilians and civilian objects
on land, at sea or in the air against the effects of hostilit-
lee." (Article 49, para., 4)
It appears even from this cursory exposition that not
only the protection of civilians at sea was affected by the
definition of attacks but also the protection of civilians
and civilian objects on land has been affected. Sea blockade,
for instance, which is a military operation par excellence,
may not qualify as an attack in the technical military sense
although its impact on civilians on land can be greater than
the killing of civilians and damage to civilian objects
incidental to lawful attacks on military objectives on land.
Similarly, the sinking of neutral merchant ships, in the
circumstances that make it permissable, may not qualify as
"attacks" because it is not committed "against the adversary".
The 'scorched earth policy', the permissibility of which
seems controversial to the invader/occupant under the Geneva
Conventions 1 , but made permissible by the Protocol only to
the Party to the conflict within its national territory still
under its own control where required by imperative military
necessity, may not, in the latter case, be an attack in the
technical military sense because one does not attack what was
in ones possession.
This may shed some light on the role of "contol"
whether in paragraph 2 of Article 49 or in paragraph 5 of
1. See Schwarzenberger, International Law, Vol. 2, 1968, pp
254 - 257, See also Pictet (ed.) I.C.R.C. Commentary, on
Geneva Convention IV, 1958, pp . 302.
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Article 54 of Protocol I. The problem of legal implications
of using the term 'attacks, 'against the adversary' and
contro	 to the protection of civilians and civilian objects
is not a problem of semantics but of substance. No wonder
therefore that Article 49 of Protocol I was one of the Articles
that proved to be very difficult to draft.1
2.	 Relevancy of the Definition of Attacks
The history of armed conflict does not seem to suggest
that a controversy had ever arisen concerning the protection
of civilians the solution of which required a definition of
'attacks'. This is probably why in the past no attempt was
ever made to define attacks in the multilateral treaty on
the law of armed conflict.
Nevertheless a definition of 'attacks' has been inserted
in Protocol I, the necessity for, and the utility of, are
questionable. It is also questionable whether in humanitarian
terms it may not be counterproductive.
The argument for having a definition of attacks as put
by the ICRC representative was that "the number of provisions
where the word 'attack' was used in the Protocol was so great
that the ICRC thought it necessary for that idea to be
2defined."
But is this sufficient reason? If so - that is if
1. For the Summary Records of the debate on this Article,
see Levie, Protection of War Victims, Vol. 3, 1980, pp.
75-1 08.
2. CDOH/III/SR. 2, para. 12.
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frequent use signifies necessity for a definition - why were
other frequently used terms not defined? There would have been
a necessity for a definition if it had contributed to the
protection of the civilian population. But unfortunately, this
does not seem to be the case of the Protocol's definition of
attacks. There is ample evidence to suggest that that defini-
tion, far from strengthening the protection of' civilians
against effects of hostilities, has weakened it. The defini-
tion, despite the ostensibly innocent intention of the ICRC,
seems to have opened a 'pandora's box'.
\nother reason for defining attacks, but rather implicitly
stated, was to specify the purely technical military nature
of that notion - 'attack'. Such expressions may seem rather
impressive. But reverting to the dictionary meaning of the
word 'attack', and to some encyclopedic military literature,
and even to ordinary people, I could not pinpoint any
significant difference in usuage, whenever the matter related
to military action.
The Concise Oxford Dictionary, for example, explains
that 'attack' means "act against with (esp. armed) force;
seek to hurt or defeat;.., act of attacking; offensive oper-
ation.
The Encyclopedia flmericana explains that 'attack' in
military terminology means "offensive action against an
enemy, usually involves an advance combined with firing and
fighting at close range."1
Pnd in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 'attack' means
1	 Encyclopedia J\mericana, Vol. 19, 1973, p.86, see under
"f'lilitary Strategy - Military terms." The encyclopedia defines
military operations as "military action, combination of all
the details of planning and executing a phase of combat",
Ibid, p. 89.
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"a combination of fire and swift movement of units and
sub—units in order to strike and rout the enemy."1
But if all these definitions are not substantially
different, was it then the intention of' the Diplomatic
Conference to give a special meaning to the term 'attack'?
P%ccording to the law of treaties, "a special meaning
shall be given to a term if it is established that the
parties so intended." 2 The question therefore is a matter
of evidence. It should be noted, however, that we are
concerned with the impact of the definition on the protection
of' the civilian population, rather than with technical
meaning as such.
The implications for the protection of' the civilian
population of' a definition of attacks seem to have been
realised as early as the second session of the Conference
of Government Experts in 1972.
The ICRC Draft Protocol stated that:
"1cts of' violence, whether offensive or defensive,
committed against the adversary by means of weapons,
in the course of hostilities, are considered as attacks."
1. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, under'attack',
This encyclopedia, Vol. 18, p. 472, defines military opera-
tions as, "the totality of strikes, encounters, and battles,
co—ordinated and interrelated by objective, time and place,
and conducted by operational commands of one or more armed
services according to a single concept and plan for
fulfilling operational or strategic mission."
2. Irticle 31 (4) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. Text in Brownlie, Basic Documents in International
Law, second edition (1978).
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During the discussion of this text, several amendments
were submitted, some of them substantive. Thus, the expert from
australia proposed to delete the definition; 1 The Canadian
expert proposed to extend the notion of attack by substituting
the words, "any means", for the words, "means of weapons, in
the ICRC text; 2 the French expert proposed to reword the ICRC
text so as to read, "any acts of violence committed against the
adversary in the course of hostilities shall be considered
attacks." 3 One expert (unidentified in the ICRC Report) put
forward a compromise solution, namely; that the words
of weapons in the ICRC text, be replaced by the words "means
', 4
of' combat
In brief, opinions differed on whether to define 'attacks'
or not; whether 'any' act of violence committed against the
adversary constitutes an attack or not; and whether the means
of attack should be specified as 'weapons', 'means of combat',
or 'any means'.
These differences should have indicated to the ICRC the
seriousness of the implications of the definition of' attacks
for the protection of' the civilian population and should have
moved the ICRC to abandon the idea of a definition altogether.5
But instead, the ICRC seems to have
1 •
 ICRC, Report on the Work of the Conference of Covernment
Experts, second session, 1972, Vol. 2, p. 81.
2	 Ibid., p. 68.
3. Ibid., p. 74.
4. ICRC, Report on the Work of the Conference of Covernment
Experts, Second Session, 1972, Vol. 1, p. 148.
5. In presenting the subject of the 'definition of attacks'
to the second session of the Conference of Government
Experts, the ICRC expert specified that "the concept of
attack should be understood in a military and technical
sense and not in a politico—legal 5fl5•P Ibid., p. 148,
Thus the ICRC was aware of the 'politico—legal' implications
of' the definition of attacks.
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taken an 'ostrich attitude'; it proposed to the Diplomatic
Conference a draft definition from which all the phrases which
proved controversial at the Conference of Government Experts
were deleted.
It should be noted here that the definition of attacks
which was submitted to the Government Experts stood on its
own as draft rrticle 44, while in the draft rules submitted
to the Diplomatic Conference it was associated with the
'field of application' of Section I of Part 4 of' Protocol I,
affording general protection to the civilian population
against effects of hostilities. This connection suggests
that the ICRC was aware of the role of' the definition of'
attacks in delimiting the field of application of the
provisions with respect to attacks. Yet, it
insisted in its Commentary on the Draft Protocols that;
"The definition of 'attacks' specifies the purely
technical nature of' this notion. Every time the term
'attack' is employed, it is related to only one
specific military operation, limited in space and
time. 1
However, this explanation does not seem to add any
thing to what ordinary soldiers already know. Besides, it
is not the purpose of the Protocol to lecture in military
terminology; the main purpose of the part of the Protocol
1	 ICRC, Commentary on the Draft Protocols, Geneva, 1973,
p . 54. See also, ICRC, Report on the Work of the
Conference of Government Experts, Second Session, 1972,
p	 148.
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in which the definition of attacks has been inserted is tcj
protect the civilian population against effects of
hostilities. It is not clear how the definition of attacks
would promote or clarify that protection. It is not clear,
for instance, how the definition of attacks would be help-
ful in clarifying "the concrete and direct military advan-.
tage anticipated" from an attack, on which depends the
legality or illegality of an attack.
Thus without multiplying examples, it is not clear
how the definition of attacks might be relevant to the
proper application of the Protocol. Besides if there is any
relevancy (which, admittedly I am unable to see), it must
have been weakened by the definition of attacks (in plural)
rather than attack (in the singular).
One thing, however, seems to be clear; that some
relation exists between the definition of attacks and the
field of application of' the basic rule of distinction. In
other words there is a relation between the definition of
attacks and the protection of the civilian population
against effects of hostilities. It is not in vain that the
definition of attacks was linked with the protection of
civilians and civilian objects.
iccordingly, it is believ e d to be the duty of the
international lawyer to try to discover that relation and
its impact on the legal protection of civilians and civilian
objects.
Unfortunatly, no writer (to my knowledge) has so far
tried to explore this area of Protocol I, which is one of
the purposes of this chapter.
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3.	 The Delimitation Process: Policy Considerations
If' it were the policy of the Diplomatic Conference to
protect the civilians as such, against effects of hostilities,
and to treat them as though they were neutral vis—a—vis
members of the armed forces of' all Parties to the conflict,
deletion of the definition of' attacks would have been a step
in the right direction.
The same may be said about paragraph 2 of Article 49 and
paragraph 5 of Article 54 of Protocol I. The provisions of
these paragraphs are seen here as by—products of the
definition of attacks and altogether as having produced a
philosophy, that for want of a name, might be called 'Attacks
Protectionism'; that is to say, a protection that depends
on whether an act of violence may qualify as an attack or not.
This philosophy provides a convient cloak for pursuing
a policy of vindictiveness in the guise of legal rectitude.
The founding father of this philosophy, it appears, was the
United States of' America; it's testing ground was Vietnam. The
notoriou5 historical example is the so—called 'Free—fire zones',
(renamed 'specified strike zones' to neutralize adverse
publicity). Its legal rectitude may now be found, unfortunately,
in Protocol I, which has been described as one of the rare
treaties that improve in a meaningful way the protections
given by law to individual human beings.1
1. George Aldrich, Remarks, on the Protocols Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, proceeding, of the P.S.I.
L. 1980, p. 1g1
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But while it is hoped that this would be the case, one should
not be oblivious to the fact that, on so many occasions, the
fruits of reaffirmation and development of the law of armed
conflict were withheld from otherwise protected persons, by
disagreements about the scope of application of a certain
treaty. Article 49 of Protocol I, and related provisions, are
good grounds for such differences.
To provide evidence on this thesis, and more importantly,
to warn against its implications for th protection of'
civilians, is the purpose of this discussion.
For a start it is well to appreciate the unusual
frankness of the remarks which George Aldrich made at a panel
of the \merican Society of International Law.
He said that,
"the Protocol on international armed conflicts can only
be understood in the light of the sad experience of the
world in the last 20 years in dealing with international
armed conflicts. Virtually every issue discussed in that
negotiation had its origins in the conflicts in the
Middle East, Korea, South East Asia or elsewhere in the
world. For each of the proposals that were pressed,
there were experiences that were relevant. Certainly
the U.S. Government was very reluctant, since the
Geneva Conventions were concluded in 1949, to consider
even geting into negotiations again that would expand
those protections - in particular through negotiations
that would deal with the Law of the Hague including
aerial bombardment,
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the protection of the civilian population, and the
conduct of military operations."1
Aldrich thought that it was only the experience in Vietnam
that brought the U.S.A. around to the view that not only
was it timely to get into these negotiations, but that it
was in fact necessary. He referred specifically to two
'conditioning' factors that had a lot to do with U.S.
interest in seeing Protocol I produced. The first was, as
he put it, "the experience of the mistreatment of U.S.
prisoners, its inability to get accountings of' them, and
its inability to get any protecting power to look after
their interests". The second 'conditioner' was
participants" in the conflict, as he described them, who
had the opportunity to watch every evening on their
television news what war was like and what happened to the
civilian population and to the military persons involved.2
Obviously, these conditioning factors were not of
equal weight. If one recalls Aldrich's remarks elswhere,3
that in any multilateral negotiations each participating
state arrives with its own positions, which are based upon
its understanding of its own national interests, it would
seem difficult to escape the conclusion that what was
foremost in the mind of the U.S. delegation was prisoner of
war status, the protecting power and the principle of
1 •
 Ibid.,p. 191-192.
2. Ibid.,p. 192.
3. 6. Aldrich, Establishing Legal Norms through 1ulti-
lateral Negotiations - The Laws of War, in Case Western
Reserved Journal of International Law, 1977, Vol. 9,
pp. 9-16, at p. 13.
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proportionality. 1
The protection of the civilian population against
effects of hostilities was probablythe least demanded item
on the agenda of the United States delegation. This belief
is neither dogmatic, nor is it simply inferred from Aldrich's
statement quoted above. The military superiority of the
United States as against any other state but the Soviet
Union; the almost de facto immunity of its civilians against
attacks in any convential warfare in which the United
States might be involved especially outside the American
continent; the interventionary policy of the United States
in support of right wing military juntas in South America
and other 'clients' the world over, assumed to be threatened
by 'Soviet danger'; reliance of U.S. military strategy on
fire power and attrition rather than on manpower, are but
some of the reasons which make the United States reluctant
to get involved in a serious discussion of the protection
of the civilian population against effects of hostilities.
This is neither a comprehensive list, nor is it an
assessment of U.S. military strategy. 2 The purpose is simply
to suggest, contrary to Fir. Aldrich, that the United States,
far from being moved by public opinion or what he called
'the nonparticipants' in the conflict in Vietnam who had
1. See for example the article by General Walter Reed, Laws
of War: The Developing Law of Armed Conflict - Some
Current Problems, in Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law, 1977, Vol. 9, pp . 17 - 37 General
Reed was a member of the U.S. delegation to the
Diplomatic Conference 1974 - 1977
2. For an assessment of U.S. military strategy, see Osgood,
Limited War Revisited, 1979, especially chapters 1 and 2.
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the opportunity to watch every evening on their television
news what war Was like and what happened to civilians, appears
to have approached the question of' delimitation against the
'free—fire zone' background. 1 No wonder therefore that the
theoretical context of the delimitation process was the
definition of 'attacks' and the ICRC draft Articles 48 and
66 of Protocol I, the purpose of which was to secure an
absolute legal protection of objects indispensible to the
survival of the civilian population.
Underlying the delimitation process was the question:
to what extent, if any, should a Party to the conflict apply
the Protocol's provisions with respect to attacks to its
civilian population?
It strikes the observer, that, historically, the
discusion at law—making conferences usually concentrated
on how far enemy civilians should be protected against
effects of hostilities committed by the adverse Party to
the conflict. Suddenly, by a reversal movement of history,
the central question has become, how far should a Party to a
conflict of' an international or 'internationalized'
character be bound to apply to its own civilian population
the rules which it should apply to enemy civilians.
This reversal of the movement of' history, or rather,
1. General Reed's remarks, (op. cit., p.20 are suggestive):
"The preliminary work of the Conference took place
primarily in the 1969— 1973 period.Coiisequently the
Vietnam War had a particularly disproportionate effect
on the first session of the Diplomatic Conference.
Representatives from countries who sought to criticize
the practices in Vietnam introduced provisions on the
use of Napalm ani defoliants, and restrictions on bomb-
bardment, especially in the free—fire zones or jungle
(continued overleaf)
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this parallel development, is partly explicable by the
development of the international character of wars of
national liberation, and partly by the bias of the ir,terna-
tional system against revolutionary challenge.
It is no new thought that violent encounter of major
rivals in world affairs has always been primarily a matter
of warfare 'between states'; now, it is a matter of warfare
1
'within ' states.
Preservation and aggrandisement of ideological and
political spheres of influence, coupled with the interest
of governments in their security of tenure, have always been
behind the bias of the international system against revolu-
tionary challenge. Article 3 common to the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and Protocol II additional to these
Conventions are faithful reflections of that bias.
However, practice suggests, as for example in Korea
and Vietnam, that the interest of the intervening state or
states, or even the interest of the target government, may
in the prevailing circumstances, require that the conflict
be treated as one of an international character. The main
interest of the intervening state in such circumstances is
to secure prisoner of war status for its captured military
personnel although the other parties to the conflict may
continue to regard the war as civil war•
(cont. from previous page) areas. The Vietnam Syndrome seems
to be diminishing and the Conference seems more inclined
to develop humanitarian principles rather than provide
for what they perceived to be the illegal or immoral
practices of the last war."
1 See Falk, Legal Order in a Violent World, 1968, pp.
19 - 115.
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Indeed, states and international lawyers have never
discarded the possibility of applying inter—state hurnanit-
arian law as a whale to non—interstate armed conflicts since
at least the American War of Independence in the 18th
century. This possibility has found expression in Article 3
common to the four Geneva Conventions which stipulates that
the Parties to the conflict, "should further endvour to
bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or
part of the other provisions of the present Convention."
This'obligation of Bndeatour' to coin a phrase,
materiaj,ised during the wars in Korea and Vietnam, despite
disagreement on the legal character of the conflict as
international or non—international, and despite disagree-
ment on the legality of third party intervention and the
impact of intervention on the applicable humanitarian law.1
The Geneva Convention of 1949 and the additional
Protocols refrained from settling the legal problems of
'internationalised' civil wars, that is, civil wars in which
foreign states or international organisations intervene
with armed troops. The ICRO submitted to the Conference of
Government Experts in 1971 and 1972 specific proposals to
the effect that when, in case of armed conflict of
non—international character, the armed forces of other states
take a direct part in the hostilities, the Geneva Conventions
and Protocol I shall apply to the relations of all parties
to the conflict. The proposals, however, were rejected on
the ground that they might encourage the insurgents to call
for foreign aid in troops in order to bring the Conventions
1. See Whiteman, Digest, Vol. 10, pp. 213-222
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in their entirety into effect. The argument is unconvincing;
more realistically, the governments in such cases preferred
to remain their own judges and deal with the situation on an
ad hoc basis rather than on the basis of already prescribed
rul 85.
At any rate, if and when, for whatever reasons,
humanitarian law was made applicable in its entirety, the
legal bias of the international system against revolutionary
challenge would be rectified, at least as far as humanitarian
law is concerned. This seems to have been too much for
governments to digest.
Thus, in order to divest the armed conflict in such
eventuality of its true international character, and in order
to confine the legal effects of such internationalisation, as
far as possible, to prisoner of war status, governments had
to guarantee for themselves a certain measure of freedom from
legal restraints pertaining to the conduct of military
operations. This is a matter which governments, or at least
the vast majority of them, seem to have weleomed wholeheartedly.
This seems precisely what the definition of attacks and
Articles 49 (2) and 54 (5) purport to do.
Attempts to conceal naked interests from public
conciousness by garments of' legal texture are no novelty, as
Julius Stone noted.1
Paragraph 2 of Article 49, as will be explained below,
was advocated on humanitarian grounds as well as on the basis
of reciprocity, while the scorched earth policy envisaged in
paragraph 5 of Article 54, as its text says,
1. Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict, 1959,
p . 57.
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was "in recognition of the vital requirements of any Party
to the conflict in defence of its territory against invasion."
The language might seem impressive, persuasive and
responsive to the fervour of nationalism. But all this is
artificial; all that it attempts to conceal is a scorched
earth policy, free—fire—zone tactics in the name of the
defence of national territory against invasion.
One might not have had any reservations against
paragraph 2 of Article 49 and paragraph 5 of Article 54 if
the condition of controlling a part of national territory by
the insurgents was not inserted in Article I of Protocol II,
and if by invasion was meant the invasion of one state by
another. But the term invasion in the parlance of the cold
war has been trivialised, prostituted, and impregnated with
almost every sort of insurgency or revolutionary challenge to
'established governments'. Indirect aggression, subversion,
war by proxy, terrorism, etc. are but some of the labels
affixed to revolutionary movements and hence called for
'collective self defence' against 'aggression'. 1
 It is the
prostitution of legal terminology by politicians of different
ideological persuasions which makes one sensitive to apparently
innocent, indeed, 5acred concepts such as th defence of
national territory against invasion.'
Having outlined the policy considerations underlying
the process of delimitation, the theoretical context in which
the delimitation process was worked out should now be examined
1. See in this respect, Thomas M. Frank, Who Killed Article
2 (4) ? or Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by
States, A.J.I.L. 1970, pp. 809837.
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as it sheds more light on the 'objectives' of the delimitation
process.
4.	 The Theoretical Context of the Delimitation Process
The context of the delimitation process, as pointed
out, was the definition of attacks and the ICRC Draft Rules
on the protection of objects indispensible to the survival
of the civilian population. Connotations of the words 'attack'
and against the adversary' seem to have set the process in
motion, but it was brought to an 'unhappy' end through an
amendment submitted jointly by delegates of the U.S.A.,
Britain, and the Netherlands, which proposed that;
"1. The provisions of this Protocol with respect to
attacks, as defined in paragraph 2 of Article 44,
apply to attacks wheresoever conducted, including
the national territory belonging to a Party to the
conflict but under the control of an adversary.
2. The prohibition contained in paragraph 2 of
Article 48 apply in the national territory of a
Party to the conflict, except where a derogation
therefrom is required by imperative military
necessity. 1,1
1. Duc CDDH/III/261, 24th Ilarch, 1975, as reproduced in
Levie, Protection of War Victims, Vol. 3, p. 98.
613
The text which this amendment ostensibly intended to
replace was that of ICRC Draft Article 66 which intended to
provide for 'absolute protection' of objects indispensible
to the survival of the civilian population. It reads as
follows:
"It is prohibited to destroy, render useless or remove
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population, namely, foodstuff, food—producing areas,
crops, livestock, drinking water supplies and
irrigation works, whether to starve out civilians,
cause them to move away or for any other reason.
They shall not be the object of reprisals."1
This provision, as the ICRC commented, was intended
to apply to the party to the conflict in whose power these
indispensable objects happen to be..2
The ICRC had also draft Article 48 for the protection
of these indispensable objects, but this time, it was
"addressed to the Party to the conflict not in
possession of the indispensable objects, which are
therefore not in its control."3
In order to suit the addressee, the ICRO used in
draft Article 48 the words, "it is forbidden to attaj or
destroy", while in draft Article 66, it used the words, "it
is prohibited to destroy, render useless or remove". The
uord'attack was not used in Article 66.
1. •
 ICRC - Draft Additional Protocols - Commentary, 1g73,
p . 84.
2. Loc. cit.
3. Ibid., p.62.
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This variation in phraseology, (i.e. attack, destroy,
render useless or remove), had two purposes in view; the
first was to neutralize and hence guarantee absolute legal
protection to objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population; the second was to guard against conn-
otations of the word 'attack'. 1
 As the ICRC representative
had explained with reference to draft Article 66:
"The words used to describe prohibited actions took
account of the fact that the objects to be protected
were in the hands of the Party against which it was
necessary to protect them, the Party which was,
accordingly, in a position"to destroy, render useless
or remove" them. The words "to attack" were not
included in draft Article 66 because one did not
attack what was in ones 3ossesSiOft If the words
"to... destroy" were also included in ICRC's proposed
Article 48, it was for the purpose of citing acts
which might have been regarded as not constituting
"attacks, even though perpetuated by the adversary."2
The ICRC's exercise in drafting articles for the
protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population, suggests simultaneously, the perplexity
which may result from using the word 'attacks', and the
implications for the protection of the civilian population.
Underlying that exercise and the discussion that
1. See the speech of the ICRC representative. CDDH/3/SR 37,
para. 35 to 41, in Levie, Vol. 3 pp. 98 —99.
2 CDDH/3/SR 37, p.9, para. 36, in Levie, Vol. 3 p. 98,
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followed was the serious issue of whether 'a scorched earth
policy' should be allowed to any Party to a conflict. No
wonder therefore, that the protection of objects indispens-
able to the survival of' the civilian population was the
context in which paragraph 2 of Article 49 and paragraph 5
of Article 54 were developed. 1 Throughout that law—making
process, whether with regard to the protection of objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population,
or the wider issue of the scope of application of the
Protocol's provisions with respect to attacks, the law-
makers seemed entangled in the connotation of 'attacks':
does not attack what was in one's possession", as the
ICRC representative had explained. This is the first
connotation of the term 'attack'.
This connotation of the term'attack', namely, that
one does not attack what is in one's possession, is
consistent with the philosophy of 'Respect and Protection'
on which the whole system of humanitarian law is based.
According to this two—word philosophy, 'respect' means 'to
spare, not to attack', while 'rrotection' means 'to come to
someone's defence, to give help and support'.2
It is according to this philosophy that the ICRC
devoted two draft Articles to the protection of objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population;
one draft Article 48 was placed among the rules relating to
attacks, that is, Section I of Part 4 of Protocol I; while
the other, draft Article 66 was placed among the rules
1. See the Summary Records, Levie, Vol.3, pp.96 - 105.
2. ICRC Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949,
ppl33...l34 and the speech of the ICRC representative,
CDDH/3/SR.37, para. 37.
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relating to protection', that is, the rules relating to the
treatment of persons in the power of' a Party to the conflict,
namely, Section 3 of Part 4 of Protocol I.
This philosophy of 'Respect and Protection', while clear
to the ICRC and its representatives, does not seem to have been
clear to as many delegates as the ICRC seem to have assumed. Had
it been clear to the minds of all the delegates, the debate on
whether to retain the words 'against the adversary' in the
definition of attacks, and the debate on the scope of Article
48 as adopted by the Third Committee on 14 cvlarch, 1975, might
not have taken place. As adopted by the Third Committee at that
time, Article 48, (finally Article 54 of Protocol I), consisted
of the first four paragraphs of what is now Article 54.
On the ot er hand, the philosophy might have been clear
but the but the different delegates wanted to be clear about one
lu demental issue, namely to what extent, if' any, should a Party
to the conflict apply the Protocol's provisions prohibiting or
restricting attacks, to its own civilian population9
The answer to this question came up at two stages; the
first was in the context of the definition of attacks; and the
second was in the context of the protection of objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.
In the context of' the definition of' attacks, the Third
Committee of the Diplomatic Conference was faced with the
question whether the words 'against the adversary' should be
retained or deleted.1
1. Doc. CDDH/3/52, Proposed by the Working g roup, Committee 3,
19 [larch, 1974, reproduced in Levie, Vol. 3, pp. 84 - 85.
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The matter was regarded as one of' substance, bearing
on the scope of application of the Protocol's provisions
with respect to attacks. 1 Thus, delegates in favour of
deleting the wordsagainst the adversary', considered that
the provisions of the Protocol with respect to attacks
should apply to the civilian population of all Parties to
the conflict, including one's own civilians. But on the
other hand, delegates in favour of retaining the words
'against the adversary', pointed out that attacks are acts
2
of' violence committed against the adversary. This summary
of views was made by the Rapporteur of the Working Group of
the Third Committee, but he did not elaborate. It seems
clear, however, that at least from the point of view of
those who wanted the words 'against the adversary' to be
deleted, the effect of retaining these words was that a
Party's own civilian population would not he protected by
the Protocol's provisions against the effects of attacks
committed by their own Party to the conflict.
The report of Committee III had the following to say
about this aspect of the matter:
"In view of the variety of views expressed in the
Working Group about the extent, if any, of the
application of' Protocol I to a Party's own population,
the Group decided to submit to the Committee in
Document CDDH/3/54 the question whether the words
1. See the remarks of' the Rapporteur of Committee III,
(Baxter), CDDH/3/SR.
2. Para. 2,3, in Levie, Vol. 3 p.86.
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'against the adversary' in the ICRC text should be
deleted. The Committee decided not to delete the words
'against the adversary' by 38 votes to 18, with 10
abstentions." 1
In the light of the preceding remarks, it appears that
the vote on whether to delete or retain the words 'against
the adversary' was simultaneously a vote on whether a Party
to the conflict should apply the Protocol's provisions with
respect to attacks to its own civilian population. As the
result of the vote indicates, the answer at that stage was
probably negative. But apparently, there was still some
disagreement on what the term adversary'was supposed to
mean. For instance, Sir David Hughes—Morgan of the British
Delegation thought that the words 'against the adversary'
should be retained, because, in his view, "the adversary
was in aiy case a military adversary, and protection of
the civilian population covered the population of' all
Parties to the conflict."2
Sir David Hughes—Morgan did not explain how, in his
view, "protection of' the civilian population covered the
population of all Parties to the conflict." The Fourth Geneva
Convention of 1949 to which the Protocol's provisions with
respect to attacks are additional or complementary, provides
in paragraph 1 of Article 4, that:
"Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at
a given moment and in any matter whatsoever, find
1 •
 Loc. cit. pare. 4.
2. Report of the Committee 3, First session, Document
CDDH/50/Rev.1.
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themselves, in case of' conflict or occupation, in the
hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power
of which they are not nationals .
The authors of the ICRC Commentary on the Fourth Gen-
eva Convention would only make three exceptions to this
definition of protected persons. They are: Article 3
relative to armed conflicts not of an international character;
Part II of the Convention entitled "General Protection of
Populations Against Certain Consequences of War", (Articles
13 - 26 inclusive, which are actually concerned with the
protection of Hospitals and the establishment of safety
zones and localities by means of special agreements); and
finally the exception made in Article 70 (2) regarding
nationals of the Occupying Power who, before the outbreak
of hostilities have sought refuge in the territory of the
occupied state.
Accordingly, by and large, the civilians of a Party
to the conflict would not be protected against hostilities
committed by the Party to the conflict of which they are
nationals. So, how can one say that protection of the civil-
ian population covered the population of' all parties to the
conflict?
Not even Section 1 of Part III which is expressly
entitled "Provisions Common to the Territories of the Parties
to the Conflict and to Occupied Territories" has been
considered applicable to the relation between a Party to
the conflict and its nationals.1
1. See ICRC, Commentary IV, 1958, p. 222, and the Summary
Records of' the Geneva Diplomatic Conference of 1949, Vol.
28, pp . 407 —410.
620
This Section is indeed the core of the Geneva Convention
(Fourth) and the disregard of' its provisions amounts, in
fact and in law, to the commision of not only 'cultural
genocide' but also to genocide in the proper technical
1
sense.
If this is really the proper field of application of'
the Fourth Geneva Convention, it cannot be understood how
the protection of the civilian population covered the
population of all parties to the conflict.
As noted above, Sir David Hughes—Morgan did not say
how, in his view, protection of the civilian population
covered the population of all parties to the conflict.
Indeed, the sponsQrs of' the amendment CDOH/III/261, (The
United States of America, Britain and Netherlands), thought
that Section III of Part IV of Protocol I might be the
appropriate place to insert a provision of the kind
contained in their amendment, since that section is
complementary to Parts I and III of the Fourth Geneva
Convention. 2 In such a case, the language of' their amendment
would be as deceptive as the description of Section I of
Part III of the Geneva Convention as "Provisions Common to
the Territories of the Parties to the Conflict and Occupied
Territories", since these provisions, as interpreted by the
authors of' the ICRC Commentary, protect civilian persons
l.On the definition of Genocide, see Articles 2 and 3 of the
Convention on the Prohibition and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide. Text in Roberts and Cuelff', Documents on the
Laws of' War, Oxford, 1982, pp. 158 et seq.
2. See the speech of Mr. Schutte (Netherlands), CDDH/III/SR.37
para. 61.
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who are in the hands of' a Party to the conflict of which
they are not nationals. If this was also the understanding
of other delegates (which apparently it was, for governments
are not in the habit of agreeing 'fairly quickly' on
restricting their military operations in their national
territory), then all our fears regarding the implications
of paragraph 2 of Article 49, and paragraph 5 of Artitla
54 of Protocol I must have been well founded.
But whatever might have been in the minds of the
delegates to the Diplomatic Conference, an attempt will be
made later in this chapter for a more favourable
interpretation - one that affords more protection to the
civilian population, but letu now revert to the theoretical
context of the delimitation process.
As noted above, the joint (U.S.A., Britain and
Netherlands) amendment was proposed to replace ICRC draft
Article 66. It was submitted on 24th Plarch, 1975 • Paradox-.
ically, by that time, ICRC draft Article 66 had already been
overtaken by the adoption of Rrticle 48, (finally Article
54), by the Third Committee on 14th Plarch, 1975. This point
was made clear by the ICRC representative during the
deliberations in the Third Committee, 4th April, 1975, on
what to do with ICRC draft Article 66. She said:
"She had spoken in the past tense in connection with
Article 48 because it was no longer possible to speak
of Article 66 without taking into consideration
Article 48 as adopted by the Committee at the thirty—
first meeting (CDDH/III/SR.3 1 ). Thus, although in
ICRC's draft Article 48 it was forbidden 'to attack
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or destroy' indispensable objects in the possession of
the adversary, the text produced as a result of the
Committee's deliberations forbade not only to 'attack
and destroy', but also to
	 and 'render useless'
- words borrowed from 1\rticle 66. Consequently, the
present text of Prticle 48 covered the cases referred to
in /rtic1e 66 also. p1rtjcle 48 accordingly forbade attacks
on objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population which were in possession of the enemy whether
on national territory or on territory occupied by the
enemy. It also forbade a Party to deny the use of or to
exhaust objects in its possession, whether occupied or on
national territory.
Immediatly after this explanation, she added:
"in view of' that situation, the Committee would have to
make a choice between giving up 1\rticle 66 as submitted
in the ICRC draft, or revising 1\rticle 48, as accepted
by the Co mittee, by deleting the words 'remove', or
'render useless'."2
But if such was the situation, the logical step ought to
have been the deletion of the ICRC draft 1\rticle 66.
Indeed, hr. Schutte of the Netherlands noted that
"certain delegates had already suggested its ultimate
deletion", 3 but instead, under the cover of' alleged ambiguity
1	 CDDH/III/SR.37, para. 36, in Levie, vol. 3, p. 98.
2. Ibid., para. 38.
3. CDDH/III/SR.37, para. 45.
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in Article 48, his delegation, together with the delegations
of Britain and the United States, introduced their amendment
to replace ICRC draft Article 66. As Fir. Schutte's speech
introducing the joint amendment (in my view) sheds more
light on what has been said so far about 'Policy consider-
ations underlying the delimitation process' as well as on
the following sections, it is thought convenient to pay it
the attention it deserves. He said: "During the debate in
the Working group, distinctions were made between four legal
situations:1
(a) the destruction of objects consequent on attack
within the territory of the adversary not subject
to occupation;
(b) the destruction of objects within the territory
of the enemy under occupation;
(c) the destruction of objects by way of attack witlin
a Power's own territory subject, however, to enemy
occupation;
(d) the destruction of objects within a Party's own
territory being not, or not yet, subject to
enemy occupation•I
Article 48, as adopted by the Committee, he said,
"covered at least the first three legal situations just
mentioned. For Article 66 only the fourth legal situation
seemed to remain, namely the prohibition for a Party to the
conflict to destroy the objects in question within its non-
CDDH/III/SR.37, para. 51.
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occupied territory."1
Such'vacillation' as may be inferred from the words
"at least" and "seemed to e5jflI, 5uggests that the ques-
tion was not one of ambiguity in Article 48 as adopted by
the Third Committee. Nor did Mr. Schutte explain how the
fourth (d) legal situation was not covered by Article 48
as adopted by the Third Committee. The ICRC representative
in her interpretation quoted above said it was covered.
So what actually was the problem? Mr. Schutte did
not leave it for speculation; "the whole problem of the
rights of a Party to a conflict within its own territory
called for a different approach", he said. 2
 This may explain
why the language of the amendment to the ICRC draft Article
66 went far beyond the clarification of the 'alleged
ambiguity' in draft Article 48. As the report to the Third
Committee on the Work of the Working Group, dated 28th April,
1977, explained in retrospect;
"Once Committee III adopted Article 48 in 1975, the
ICRC text proposed for Article 66 became out of
date.The Working Group decided, however, that this
Article provided a useful occasion to clarify the
scope of application, not only of Article 48, but
also of all articles restricting or prohibiting
3
No wonder, therefore, that soon after the adoption
1 •
 CODH/III/SR.37, para. 55, 56.
2. CODH/III/SR.37, para. 57.
3. Doc. CDDH/II.I/369, in Levis, Vol. 3, pp. 103-104.
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of a more attractive formula of the amendment submitted by
the delegations of the U.S.A., Britain and Netherlands as
a 'new' Article 66, it was simply divided between Articles
44, (finally 49) and 48, (finally 54), which were already
adopted. In plain English, ICRC draft Article 66 was simply
a cover for the revision of the scope of application of the
Protocol's provisions to a Party's own civilians. What little,
but precious, protection the civilian population might have
had under Articles 44 and 48 (i.e. Articles 49 and 54)
before the joint amendment came to bear on them seems to
have diminished as a result of that amendment. Here again
we leave it to Fir. Schutte to draw the general picture.
He said:
"Finally, the proposed amendment did not enter into
the question uhether, notwithstanding imperative
military necessities, there were still any limits
to the powers of a Party to the conflict with respect
to its own population within its own territory.
Everyone knew that the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights allowed States that
were Parties to a conflict to derogate from their
obligations in time of public emergency which
threatened the life of the nation, even if' only to
the extent strictly required by the exigencies of
the situation, and provided that the measures
taken were not inconsistent with other obligations
under international law. In other words, the Covenant
explicitly assumed the existance of such limits."1
1. CDDH/III/SR. 37, para. 63.
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To this it should be added that 'imperative military
necessity' and the International Covenants on Human Rights
amount to no more than a token protection, and therefore,
are not a real alternative to at least the moderate ICRC
proposals to protect objects indispensable to the survival
of the civilian population against hostilities by all Parties
to a conflict.
Be that as it may, the fact remains that Articles 49
(2) and 54(5) have introduced into international law a new
criterion for the protection of the civilian population
against effects of hostilities. In the following sections,
the de facto control criterion, its practicability and its
ramifications are examined.
In order to obtain a clear picture of all this, four
legal situations are considered here to be essential for a
useful legal analysis.
1 •
 An interstate armed conflict where the issue of
territorial sovereignty is not involved;
2. An interstate armed conflict where the issue of
territorial sovereignty is involved;
3. Non—interstate armed conflicts (i.e. wars of
national liberation) of the types mentioned in
Article 1(4) of Protocol I;
4. International or internationalised civil war.
Before proceeding any further, it seems useful to
note that rir. Schutte (Netherlands) throughout his speech
introducing the joint amendment referred to 'occupied terr-
itory'while the words of the amendment he was introducing
spoke of' "national territory belonging to a Party but under
the control of an adversary!• 'occupation' is a term of art
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while 'control' is a versatile term. The latter covers the
former, but it also covers situations which are not
'occupation' in the technical sense. Thus the language of
'occupation' seems to have been deliberately chosen to give
the false impression that what was at stake is the freedom of
a state to defend itself against invasion. Apparently, this
'negotiation tactic' was successful in rallying support to the
proposed amendment as well as in deflecting attention from its
side effects. floreover, it left in doubt the demarcation line
between the national territory remaining under the control of
the national government, and the national territory belonging
to a Party to the conflict but under the control of the
adverse Party.
5.	 The Concept of Control
The Working Group of Committee III noted in its report
that the term 'control' in paragraph 2 of Article 49 and
paragraph 5 of Article 54 of Protocol I refers to areas of de
facto control. In paragraph 2 it is the area under control of
the occupying power, and in paragraph 5 it is the area of
national territory remaining under the de facto control of the
lawful sovereign.1
But what does de facto control mean? As Professor Stone
noted, actual control of enemy territory may range in numerous
degrees from the mere ephemeral passage of military forces
1 •
 Report to the Third Committee on the Work of the Working
Group, Comm. III, 28 April, 1977, (CDOH/III/369), in Levie,
Vol. 3, p. 104.
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over a sullen but intimdated land and its people, through
stable control, barely distinguishable pro tempore from that
of a sovereign government, to permanent sovereign control
1
thereof,
Such graduation has traditionally been made in order to
fix the point at which the law of belligerent occupation applies
de pleiri droit. The traditional view in this respect is that
control is either stable enough to constitute belligerent
occupation, or it is not, leaving the occupant subject to the
2
ordinary rules of warfare. Thus, the traditional view
distinguishes between invasion and occupation and subjects them
to different sets of rules mutually excluding each other.
Accordingly, until invasion has reached the stage of' proper
occupation, that is to say, until the invader has secured
actual control of invaded territory, he is not subject to the
law of occupation, but he is subject only to the less severe
restraints of the law governing the active conduct of military
operations or hostilities as called for in the Hague
Regulation3 and in Protocol I additional to the Geneva
Conventions of' 1949, In land warfare, the rules governing
hostilities consist mainly, but not exclusively, of; Section
III of the Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention
of' 1907, Part II of the Fourth GenevaConvention of' 1949, and
Parts 3 and 4 of Protocol I additional to the Geneva Convent-
ions of 1949,
It may be noted here that despite the importance which
1 •
 See Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict,
1959, p . 694, note 4.
2 •
 See Stone, icc. cit., Schwarzenberger, International Law,
as applied by the International Courts and Tribunals,
Vol. 2, 1969, P. 176, and pp. 321-324.
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traditionalists usually attach to the rule of 'effective
control of the invaded territory', 1
 strict adherence to the
rigid concept of effective control as understood or expressed
by traditionalists leaves the civilian population at the mercy
of the invader who, although he is in effective control, may
choose not to place the controlled territory under his
authority pending the outcome of' the conflict.
If in such a case only the harsher law of' hostilities
is held applicable but not the comparatively less severe law
of occupation, as the traditional view seems to imply, the
very purpose of the law of occupation would be easily
thwarted. /s Schwarzenberger observed,
"Far from offering adequate protection, application of
the laws of war stricto sensu to the occupied territory
at large might become a convenient cloak for pursuing
a policy of vindictiveness in the guise of' legal
2
r e c tit u d e •"
To deprive the invader of such a convenient cloak, and
in any case to mitigate the plight of the population of
invaded territories, different concepts of de facto control
emerged in addition to some policy recommendations. Three
concepts of do facto control and one policy recommendation
at least may be singled out.
It may be uorthwhile mentioning that we are not -
concerned here with 'kinds of military occupation' or with a
1 Schwarzenberger, ibid., pp. 325-348.
2. Ibid., pp. 177-178.
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typology thereof, 1 but rather with the different manifesta-
tions of de facto control for the purposes of Articles 49
and 54 of Protocol I. The continuum of' these manifestations
ranges factually,and one may even say, legally, "from initial
attack to a fully functioning occupation government."2
Within this range, however, it is customary to
distinguish invasion from belligerent occupation. Articles
42 and 43 of the Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague
Convention of 1907 have been usually taken as the basis of
such a distinction. Article 42 states:
"Territory is considered occupied when it is actually
placed under the authority of the hostile army.
The occupation extends only to the territory where
such authority has been established and can be
a xe r cis ed."
Article 43 states:
"The authority of the legitimate power having in fact
passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter
shall take all the measures in his power to restore,
and ensure, as far as possible, public order and
safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented,
the laws in force in the country."
The first sentence of Article 42 bears some
1 •
 William C. Downy, jr., "Revision of' the Rules of Warfare,
1949, Proceedings of A.S.I.L., p.l03, beside belligerent
occupation, mention. 'hostile occupation', 'pacific occu-
pation' and 'peaceful occupation'.
Schuarzenberger, International Law, Vol. 2, pp. 317 - 321.
2. rlcDougal and Feliciano, Law and Ilinimum World Public
Order, 1957, p. 734.
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elaboration as it deals with the crucial question, 'jhen is
a territory considered occupied?" To answer the question,
it has been customary to distinguish between invasion on the
one hand, and belligerent or hostile occupation on the other
hand. Thus, according to Oppenheim and Lauterpact,
"it is certain that mere invasion is not occupation.
Invasion is the marching or riding of troops - or
the flying of military aircraft - into enemy country.
Occupation is invasion plus taking possession of
enemy country for the purpose of holding it, at any
rate temporarily. The difference between mere inva-
sion and occupation becomes apparent from the fact
that an occupant sets up some kind of administration,
whereas the mere invader does not."1
Oppenheim and Lauterpacht seem to require a degree of'
control and an administration which, comparatively, appears
to be less than what other authorities had demanded as the
following passage illustrates.
"The troops march into a district, and the moment
they get into a village or town - unless they are
actually fighting their way - they take possession
of the municipal offices, the police station, the
post office, and the like, and assert their
authority there. From the military point of view,
such villages and towns are then'occupied'."2
1 Oppenheim - Lauterpacht, International Law, Vol. 2, 7th
ed., 7th impression, 1969, p. 434.
2, Ibid., p. 434.
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From a military point of' view, this is undoubtedly a
correct view. in military practice, such facts are usually
sufficient upon which to declare the 'capture' of' a certain
locality, but this does not necessarily mean that the
locality has become ipso facto under the government of the
law of occupation with all its attendant rights and duties.
What in military usuage may factually be described as
'occupation' may, in the ruling circumstances, amount to no
more than a successful phase of a military operation. In
such a case, the alleged occupant is merely an invader,
notwithstanding his physical control, his proclamation of
occupation (if any has been made), or hi administration
(if any has been set up).
It is true, as it has always been maintained, that
occupation is a question of fact and as such leaves ample
room for varied appreciation, but it is clear at least
that a mere proclamation that occupation has taken place
does not suffice. 1 As Professor Stone states:
"Whether belligerent occupation has been established
depends not on the will of the belligerent, but on
whether his actual control satisfies the standards
of range and stability laid down by international
law.If it does not, ha is a mere invader enjoying
comparatively narrow legal authority. If it does,
international law attributes to him legal powers
which'merely'as a 'belligerent' he does not have,
1. Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict,
p. 696. McDougal and Feliciano, p. 752.
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touching almost all aspects of' the government of the
territory and the lives of' 1t5 inhabitants,"1
The standards of range and stability, or effective-
ness of' occupation, or, for that matter, the distinction
between'invasion in progress' and an 'occupation accomplished'
has probably nowhere been more ably laid down than in the
'Hostages Case' decided by the United States Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg on February 19th, 1948.
The judgement read in part:
"The question of' criminality in many cases may well
hinge on whether an invasion as in progress or an
occupation accomplished. Whether an invasion has
developed into an occupation is a question of fact.
The term invasion implies a military operation while
an occupation indicates the exercise of governmental
authority to the exclusion of the established
government. This presupposes the destruction of
organized resistance and the establishment of an
administration to preserve law and order."2
"These findings", said the Tribunal, "are consistent
with Article 42 of the Hague Regulations of 19Q7•"
Opinions of uriters, 4 'mutatis mutandis', as well as
the United States Army Field Manual (1956), seem to have
1. Stone, jbid, p . 694.
2. From the 'Hostages Case', as quoted in Whiteman, Digest,
Vol. 10, p. 543.
3. Ibid, p.544.
4. See Stone, jbid, pp. 695-97, Schwarzenberger, ibjd, p.
176, pp. 321-24, IlcDougal and Feliciano, pp. 732-35.
5. See U.S. Army Field Manual, para. 352, 355-357, cited in
Whiteman, Digest, Vol. 10, p . 540-41.
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adopted the view of the Nuremberg Tribunal. Thus, according
to the United States Military Manual (1956), an invader may
attack with naval or air forces or its troops may push
rapidly through a large portion of enemy territory without
establishing that effective control which is essential to
the status of' occupation. Small raiding parties or flying
columns, reconnaisance detatchments or patrols moving thro-
ugh an area connot be said to occupy it. Occupation on the
other hand, is invasion plus taking firm possession of' enemy
territory for the purpose of holding it. ' It presupposes a
hostile invasion, resisted or unresisted, 2 as a result of'
which the invader has rendered the invaded government
incapable of publicly exercising its authority, and has
successfully substituted its own authority for that of' the
legitimate government in the territory invaded.3
Accordingly, it seems only logical to state, as did
the second paragraph of Article 42 of the Hague Regulations
of 1907, that the occupation extends only to the territory
where such authority has been established and can be
exercised.
In	 summary of the above exposition of the
tiaditional law on the question of 'control', or effective-.
ness of occupation, it appears that two conditions have
generally been required first: that the organized local
1. Ibid, para. 352, in Whiternan, Digest, Vol. 10, p. 540-41.
2. See pare. 2 of Article 2, Common to the four Geneva
Conventions.
3. See Uhiteman, Digest, Vol. 10, p . 540-41.
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resistance must have been overcome, and, second, that the
invader in possession (i.e. in de facto control) of enemy
territory must have established an administration in the
territory under his control to preserve law and order in
accordance with Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of
1907 on land warfare. A third but rather implicitly stated
condition, is that hostilities must have been brought to
an end, either generally and formally (as in the Capitula-
tion Treaties during the two World Wars and the general but
'unlimited' ceasefire in the Arab - Israeli conflict in 1967
and 1973), or locally and informally as, for instance, when
actual fighting dies out in a region or district.
It should be noted that as long as the active
hostilities continue, it would be difficult, and to some
writers, it is 'rarely practicable', to point to any
particular degree of control as marking a precise dividing
line between invasion and occupation.1
Thus according to McDougal and Feliciano, however
effective the occupant's control may be within the occupied
territory, such control may nonetheless remain precarious
and tentative when viewed in relation to the over—all
conduct of the uar •
 Outside the captured territory, they
argue, hostilities may continue to be waged by the forces
of the Party to the conflict whose territory was occupied
or by those of its allies who may yet succeed, in the pro-
tracted course of hostilities, in liberating the territory
held by the occupant. In this sense, belligerent occupation
represents a phase or incident of a continuing sequence of
1. McOougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public
Order, p. 734.
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hostilities of combat.1
Pccordingly, McDougal and Feliciano state that it is
commonly more accurate to speak of a gradual acquisition
and solidification of control by one belligerent and of the
gradual settling of' the corresponding expectations on the
part of the inhabitants; the continuum ranges from initial
attack to a fully functioning occupation government. In their
view, "this condition of' precariousness is resolved, and
expectations about final and permanent authority become
fixed, one way or the other, upon the general termination of
hostilities." 2
On a factual level of analysis, Ilcoougal and Feliciano's
emphasis upon the character of belligerent occupation as a
stage that follows successful combat operations in a
continuing process of coercion may be justified in the light
of experience of the two World Wars.
On the legal level, however, it neither finds support
in the jurisprudence of the Nuremberg Tribunals nor in the
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, relative to the protection
of civilians in time of war. Besides, the gradual acquisition
and solidification of control by a belligerent does not
necessarily correspond to, or result in, a gradual settling
of the expectations on the part of the inhabitants of occupied
territories. Thus, in all the countries occupied by Germany
during the Second World War, the inhabitants set up
1. Ibid., p. 734-35.
2. Ibid., p. 735.
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their 'resistance movements' despite firm control on the
part of the occupant and even the formal capitulation or
surrender on the part of some governments of the occupied
countries. Similarly, the firm'cantrol' by Israel of the
territories it occupied as a result of the 1967 Arab -
Israeli War, and the formal acceptance of a general
cessation of hostilities (by Egypt, Syria, and Jordan on
one side, and by Israel on the other side), and even the
failure of the Arabs in the 1973 war to re5tore their
occupied territories, have not yet resulted in settling the
expectations of the inhabitants.
Thus,to include in the effectiveness of occupation
the element of expectations on the part of the inhabitants
is tantamount to a suspension of the application of the
Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of
civilians in armed conflicts of international character
until the precariousness of the military accupation is
solved.
Indeed, NcDougal and Feliciano did not insist on
this logical conclusion. Their view which, however, does
not seem to have been expressed in their main discussion
of belligerent occupation, is as follows:
"In this time period, after successful invasion but
before final victory, the expectations of all parties
about future permanent authority in the area are
obscure; but some temporary authority must be conceded,
and the inhabitants, for whom life must go on, present
against the occupant counter—demands for continuity
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and minimum dislocation of their value processes."1
Thus, McDougal and Feliciano remained, in the main,
within the ambit of the traditional theory.
So far, we have examined two theories about 'de facto
control'; one was that of Oppenheim and Lauterpacht, the
other was the traditional theory. It seems, however, that
both these theories do not take sufficient account of the
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, relative to the protection
of civilians. Even Oppenheim and Lauterpacht, whose view as
cited above comes very close to the requirements of the
Fourth Geneva Convention and who therefore criticise the
definition of occupation as enshrined in Article 42 of the
Hague Regulations of 1907 on land warfare, as being "not at
all precise", seem to have moved backwards as they added,
that Article 42 "is as precise as a legal definition of a
fact such as occupation can be,"2
On the 'beginning' of the application of the Fourth
(civilian) Geneva Convention, the first paragraph of Article
6 states that:
"The present Convention shall apply from the outset
of any conflict or occupation mentioned in Article 2"
It is pathaps obvious from what has been said above,
that modern writers continued to interpret the word
'occupation' in this paragraph of Article 6 in terms of
Article 42 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, But the ICRC
1. Ibid., p.82.
2. Oppenheim - Lauterpacht, Vol. 2, 7th ed., 7th impression
1969, p. 435.
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Commentary makes it absolutely clear that:
"By using the words 'from the b eg jfl njng the authors
of the Convention wished to show that it became
applicable as soon as the first acts of' violence were
committed, even if the armed struggle did not continue.
Nor is it necessary for there to have been many
victims. 1ere frontier incidents may make the
Convention applicable, for they may be the beginning
of a more widespread conflict. The Convention should
be applied as soon as troops are in foreign territory
and in contact with the civilian population there."1
Even more articulate is the follouing comparison
between Article 42 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, and
Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. As the
ICRC Commentary on Article 6 puts it;
"The word 'occupation', as used in the Article, has a
wider meaning than it has in Article 42 of the Reg-
ulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Ccnvention of
1907. So far as individuals are concerned, the
application of the Fourth Geneva Convention does
not depend upon the existance of a state of occupation
within the meaning of Article 42 referred to above.
The relations between the civilian population of' a
territory and troops advancing in that territory,
whether fighting or not, are governed by the present
Convention. There is no intermediate period between
what might be termed the invasion phase and the in-
auguration of a stable regime of occupation."2
1, TCRC Commentary 4, p.59.
2. Ibid., p. 60.
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Article 3 of Protocol I additional, to the Geneva
Convention of 1949 reaffirms the ICRC interpretation.
It states in part:
"Without prejudice to the provisions which are
applicable at all times:
(a) The Conventions and this Protocol shall apply
from the beginning of any situation referred to
in Article I of this Protocol;"
.. .. S • •••• .55. •••••••.S• ............. .. ......•
To complete the spectrum, it seems worth mentioning
that the United States Army Field Ivianual (1956) appears to
have adopted a reconciliatory attitude between Article 6 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention as interpreted by the authors
of the ICRC Commentary, on one hand, and the traditional
theory on the other hand. It provides that the rules of the
law of occupation "apply of their own force only to bellig-
erently occupied areas, but they should, as a matter of
policy, be observed as far as possible in areas through which
troops are passing and even on the battle field."1
Having reviewed the different conceptions and the
varying degrees of 'control', we revert now to the original
question: what does the term 'control' mean in paragraph 2
of Article 49 and paragraph 5 of Article 54 of Protocol I?
Obviously it is not helpful at all to say as did the
Report to the Third Committee on the work of the Working
1 •
 U.S. Army Field Flanual 1956, Section 352, (b), cited in
Whiteman, Digest, Vol. 1, p. 541.
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Group that the term 'control' in these paragraphs means
de facto contol. 1 On the other hand, it seems certain that
the best from the point of view of' the protection of the
civilian population to consider the mere presence of' enemy
military objectives on the national territory of' a Party to
the conflict as sufficient for the application of the
provisions of Protocol I with respect to attacks. But it is
unlikely that the government or the authority of' the invaded
territory would consider this as sufficient, given the
obsession of governments with the defense of national
territory against invasion. 1oreover the Report to the Third
Committee on the work of the Working Group speaks of'
"territory under the control of the Occupying Power", and
of "territory remaining under the control of' the lawful
sovereign" - which suggests a certain degree of' control or
occupation in a legal, or at least in a military sense.
The difficulty with the concept of 'control' or
occupation in the sense of' llrticle 42 of the Hague
Regulations of 1907, and control or occupation in a military
sense is the former requires a stable degree of' control which
can be ascertained only when the fighting has abated and
the hopes of recovering the 'lost' territory have waned - at
least temporarily, while the latter (i.e. control in the
military sense) is open to abuse in propaganda warfare. Both
Parties to the conflict are usually too quick to declare
military victories and too slow to admit defeats as long
1. See the first paragraph of this section.
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as military operations continue. Control is thus a subjective
criterion incapable of objective appreciation. This is probably
why, agreement on paragraph 2 of Article 49, and paragraph 5
of' /rtic1e 54 of Protocol I has been reached fairly quickly.
One point, however, seems to be certain; that each Party
to the conflict would be bound by the provisions of the
Protocol with respect to attacks carried out in the territory
under the control of the adverse Party. The Party to the
conflict whose national territory is in part or in whole under
the control of the adversary is required by paragraph 2 of
Article 49 to treat its own civilian population in occupied
territory in accordance with the Protocol's provisions with
respect to attacks, notwithstanding the fact that they are
nationals of the attacking party.
On the other hand, in the national territory of a Party
to the conflict which has not, or not yet, come under the
control of the adversary, it seems difficult to say with any
certainity, whether the civilian population is protected by
the Protocol's provisions with respect to attacks carried out
by the Party to the cocifllct oc	 they are
nationals.
In view of the experience of the 'free-fire-zone'
pratices in Vietnam and of the obsession of' governments with
the defense of national territory against invasion, the risk
to which the civilian population is exposed can hardly be
exaggerated. In the rest of this section an attempt will be
made to interpret paragraph 2 of Article 49, and paragraph 5
of Article 54, of Protocol I, in suchamanner that brings the
civilian population under the protection of the Protocol's
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provisions with respect to attacks, regardless of' control or
nationality.
In this respect, it should be noted first that
traditional international law did not impose any restrictions
on attacks carried out by a Party to the conflict within its
national territory whether or not it was under the control of
an adverse Party. Accordingly, in so far as paragraph 2 of
Article 49 extends the field of application of the Protocol's
provisions with respect to attacks, to a Party's own attacks
within its national territory it must be considered a
progressive development, however that paragraph is interpreted.
This progressive development was made possible thanks to the
international character of wars of national liberation. For
without paragraph 2 of Article 49 it would be possible to argue
that liberation movements would not be bound by the Protocol's
provisions with respect to attacks carried out by the national
liberation movement in its national territory which is 'under
the control of the adverse Party', while the enemies of
national liberation movement would be bound by these provisions
in their military operation. Thus, theoretically at least,
there would have been situations in which only one Party to
the conflict would be bound by the Protocol's provisions with
respect to attacks. In order to redress this seeming imbalanced
situation, paragraph 2 of Article 49 was devised. This may
explain the statement in the Report of the Working Group of
Committee III that:
"The overwhelming view in the Working Group, however, was
that a regime of reciprocity must prevail and that it
could not be expected that restrains on attacks would
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be effective if they did not bind both sides•"1
This argument carries even more weight in cases of civil
wars notwithstanding whether the armed conflict was
characterized as one of international or non—international
character.
Another argument may be found in the speech of Mr. Schutte
of the Netherlands who introduced the joint amendment sponsored
by the delegations of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and
the United States of America, which ultimately became paragraph
2 of Article 49 and paragraph 5 of Article 54 of' Protocol I,
although this argument seems to contradict other statements in
the same speech. Mr. Schute said that:
"the sponsors thought it useful to codify what had emerged
from the discussions held in the Working Group, namely
that any Party to a conflict that attacked military
objectives situated in parts of' its own territory which
were subject to enemy occupation, or in part of a combat
zone, should be bound to respect the provisions and
prohibitions contained in Articles 46 to 51 of Draft
Protocol I (Articles 51 to 58 of' Protocol I).
Draft Protocol I spoke of "the civilian population"
without drawing a distinction between "enemy civilian
population" and the "own civilian population of the
party concerned. The civilian population as such was
entitled to protection, and in that respect might be
considered as
1. Report to the Third Committee on the Work of the Working
Group, Committee III, 28 April, 1977, Doc. CDDH/III/369.
2. CDDH/III/SR.37, para. 59, 60.
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If this was truely the intention of the Working Group of
Committee III, then on the strength of the phrase "or in part
of a combat zone" one may put the emphasis on the first part
of paragraph 2, namely on the statement that "The provisions
of this Protocol with respect to attacks apply to all attacks
in whatever territory conducted." And since attacks are by
definition "acts of' violence against the adversary, whether in
offence or defence", it may be argued that the mere presence
of the adversary proclaims its 'de facto control', and therefore,
the rest of' paragraph 2 of Article 49 does not imply an exclu-
sion of the national territory which is not, or not yet, under
the control of the adverse Party.
This may be fortified by another argument inferred from
the text of Article 49, paragraph 3, which states that the
provisions of the Protocol with respect to attacks "are
additional to the rules concerning humanitarian protection
contained in the Fourth Geneva Convention, particularly in Part
II thereof." This suggests that the field of' application of the
Protocol's provisions with respect to attacks should not be
less than that of Part II of the Fourth Geneva Convention of
1949. Article 13 of the Fourth Geneva Convention defined the
field of' application of Part II in the following term5:
"The provisions of' Part II cover the whole of the
populations of the countries in conflict, without any
adverse distinction based, in particular, on race,
nationality, religion or political opinion, and are
intended to alleviate the sufferings caused by war•"
The ICRC Commentary on this provision, inter alia, reads
as follows:
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"Ililitary operations nowadays - particularly bombing Prom
the air - threatens the whole population. Consequently
the provisions in Part II are as general and extensive
in scope as possible: Article 13, independently of the
rest of the Convention, defines the field of application
of Part II, by specifying that it covers the whole of the
populations of the countries in conflict. The provisions
in Part II therefore apply not only to protected persons,
i.e, to enemy or other aliens and to neutrals, as
defined in Article 4 but also to the belligerents own
nationals; it is that which makes these provisions
exceptional in character: the mere fact of a person
residing in a territory belonging to or occupied by a
Party to the conflict, is sufficient to make Part II of
the Convention applicable to him."1
Since the provisions of the Protocol with respect to
attacks are additional to the provisions of Part II of the
Fourth Geneva Convention, it necessarily follows that the field
of application of the Protocol's provisions with respect to
attacks is equally as general and extensive as that of Part II
of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
But while the above mentioned arguments may remove the
danger posed by the analysis of paragraph 2 of Prticle 49 of
Protocol I in terms of inclusion and exclusion depending on the
meaning one attaches to the term 'control', they do not remove
the dangers posed by paragraph 5 of Article 54 of Protocol I.
As noted above, this paragraph allows a Party to the conflict
1.Pictet (ed.), Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention of
1949, (1958), p. 118.
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to derogate from the prohibitions to "attack, destroy, remove
or render useless objects indispensible to the survival of the
civilian population." In other words, it permits a Party to
the conflict to conduct a scorched earth policy in the part of
its national territory which is still under its control. This
'right' as the paragraph says, is permitted in recognition of
the vital requirements of a Party to the conflict in the
defence of its national territory against invasion.
In order to remove the dangers of paragraph 5 of lrticle
54 in cases of non—interstate armed conflicts of internional
character, it may be that the best way is to insist on a
restrictive interpretation of the term 'invasion' and thus
confine it to the case where armed forces of a state invade
another state. 1\ny other use of the term, e.g. as referring to
the so—called indirect aggression or intervention by proxy
should be dismissed as an abuse of terminology.
Nevertheless, it seems difficult to escape the conclusion
that the term 'control' in paragraph 2 of \rtic1e 49 and para-
graph 5 of i\rticle 54 of Protocol I may have disastrous
consequences to the legal protection of civilians and civilian
objects in the context of non—interstate armed conflicts of
international character. In the case of interstate armed
conflicts, their effects are merely theoretical since it has
never been proved that the conduct of' a scorched earth policy
in defence of national territory against invasion is a viable
policy, and it is unlikely that any state would resort to it.
On the other hand, it may be that paragraph 2 of \rticle
49, although formulated in general terms, was actually intended
to make it clear that the provisions of the Protocol with
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respect to attacks are binding on all Parties to the conflict
and are intended to protect the civilian population and civil -
ian objects against all attacks, wherever conducted, and
without distinction between "one's own civilian popu1atfon
and the Ienemyts civilian population". If this proved to be
the case, the purpose of' the discussion in this chapter would
still be fulfilled, for as noted at the beginning of this
discussion, the purpose was merely to warn against, not to
condone, certain possible consequences of the use of the term
'attacks' and 'control' in Article 49, paragraphs 1 and 2,
and Article 54, paragraph 5, of Protcol I.
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6	 Exclusion of Civilians and Civilian Objects at Sea
and in the Air
One of the burning questions at the Diplomatic Confer-
ence was whether Protocol I additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 should protect civilians and civilian
objects on land, at ea and in the air, or whether it
should be less extensive.
The text proposed by the ICRC in this respect was
paragraph 1 of draft Article 44 which read as follows:
"The provisions contained in the present Section
apply to any land, air or sea warfare which may
affect the civilian population, individual civilians
and civilian objects on land."1
The section refered to here is Section I of Part 4
of Protocol I entitled "General Protection Against Effects
of Hostilities".
In its Commentary on the text of paragraph I of draft
Article 44, the ICRC explained that the obligations contained
in this Section are binding on members of armed forces on
land, at sea or in the air. The Commentary recalled that
Section I of Part III of' Protocol I, entitled "Methods and
Means of Combat", which refers mainly to the behaviour of
combatants towards each other, extends its scope to military
operations as a whole carried out within the general frame
work of land, air or sea warfare. In the view point of the
ICRC, the same cannot be said of the present Section, the
scope of which has been circumscribed. The phrase, "which
1 •
 ICRC - Draft Additional Protocols - Commentary, 1973,
p . 54.
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may affect the civilian population.., on land", meant that
only military operations liable to cause effects on land are
the objects of this section; as these operations could
obviously be directed from the air or the sea as well as
from points on land, it was necessary to qualify them
accordingly. 1
This restrictive approach did not seem satisfactory
to many delegates. For example, Mr. Rezek (Brazil) said
that the members of his delegation had devoted special
attention in their preparatory studies to the words "on land"
in draft Article 44, paragraph 1 They had felt that such
restrictive terms should be based on specific reasons,
possibly linked to the consideration of the rules of the law
of the sea •
 He thought that it would be useful to have some
enlightenment on that subject from the experts of theICRC.2
The ICRC representative seems to have been embarrassed
by that request. He explained that neither the text of 1971
nor that of 1972 had contained the words 'on land' which, he
said , had been added at the explicit request of some
delegations at the first and second sessions of the
Conference of Government Experts, so as not to interfere
with any of the provisions of the law of the sea • 3 Thus,
the ICRC representative evaded a direct answer, leaving it
to the proponents of' retaining the words 'on land' to defend
their case.
1. Loc. cit.
2. CODH/III/SR,2, para. 24.
3. CDDH/III/SR.2, para. 25.
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With all fairness, it may be said that most of the
arguments adduced to justify the exclusion of civilians and
civilian objects at sea and in the air from the field of
application of Protocol I, do not seem convincing. The
delegation of the U.S.A., for instance, argued that the ICRC
had been correct in inserting the limitation 'on land' since
the vast majority of civilians were in fact on land. They
added that, although the Article applied to attacks on land
from the sea or the air, the law of sea warfare was too
complex to be dealt with at the Conference. Deletion of the
words 'on land' , they argued, might inadvertently modify
the law of the sea.
Sir David Hughes—Morgan (United Kingdom) agreed with
the views put forward by the United States representative
against deleting the words 'on land', "since to do so would
be likely to cause confusion." Draft Protocol I, he said,
was to amplify the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Law and
not to modify international law with regard to warfare at
sea. 2
 On another occasion he pointed out the obvious; that
the deletion of the words 'or? land' Prcnr ,Qrt j cle 44
paragraph 1, would have the same effect as the insertion of'
the words "..., sea or air", namely, the application of
Section 1 of Part 4 of Protocol I to all warfare, on land,
at sea or in the air 1 3
 Substantive arguments of varying
relevancy, however, were adduced. Customary law for the
1. CDDH/III/5R.2, para. 26.
2. CDDH/III/SR.2, para. 28.
3. CDDH/III/SR.3, para. 14
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protection of' civilians and civilian ships in the case of'
warfare at sea, it was argued, differed greatly from that
proposed in the draft Protocol. Under both bodies of law,
civilians included crews and passengers in merchant ships
and non—combatant passengers in warships, although the
protection granted to them must obviously differ from one
category to another,1
The case of armed merchant ships and the circumstances
under which a submarine or other warship may sink a merchant
vessel, with or without warning, and with or without
removing the crew and passengers, were also cited as points
of difference between the protection afforded civilians and
civilian objects at sea under customary law, "and the more
comprehensive protection which was proposed to grant to
civilian objects under Protocol
The rules of sea warfare, the British delegate admitted,
"perhaps needed to be codified or possibly changed, but a
great deal of preparatory work would first be required to
resolve the contradictions he had mentioned,"3
"Air warfare", said the British delegate, "was an even
more difficult subject, because the rules relating to it
were in many respects uncertain. It might be desirable for
those rules also to be codified and expanded, but that again
was a matter for extensive 3tudyI, he said.4
Lastly, the British delegate pointed out that the
1 •
 CDDH/III/SR.3, para. 15.
2. CDDH/III/SR.3, para. 16-18.
3. CDDH/III/SR.3, para, 18,.
4. CDDH/III/SR.3, pare. lg•
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qualified experts who had lengthy discussions with a view
to establishing a clear set of rules for the guidance of
those who had to engage in warfare had not taken the existing
laws of sea or air warfare into account. Pccordingly, he
concluded that any attempt to make draft Protocol I apply to
such warfare would weaken the efforts which had been made to
give a clear lead in the field of humanitarian law.1
Obviously this is not the case, for if deletion of the
words 'rjn land' would not have resulted in affording more
favourable protection to civilians and civilian objects at
sea and in the air, it certainly would not have resulted
in deteriorating it. Moreover, there is every reason to
suggest that by deleting the words 'on land', and hence by
implication extending the protection of Protocol I to
civilians and civilian objects at sea and in the air, that
protection would have been considerably strengthened.
It is not understood for instance, how t e prohibition
to destroy an enemy merchant vessel or render her incapable
of navigation without first having provided for the safety
of passengers and crew as required by Article 22 of the
London Naval Treaty of 1930 could be weakened by a prohibition
to make civilians and civilian objects at sea and in the air
the object of attack or reprisals.
Similarly, if, as the United States Law of Naval
Warfare of 1959 states, "it is difficult to estimate the
1	 CDDH/III/SR.3, para. 20.
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the extent to which the obligations embodied in the London
Protocol of 1935 have been considered by belligerents as
applicable, by analogy, to the treatment of non-military
enemy aircraft", and if "in the absence of any clearly
established practice to the contrary, it may be assumed that
the obligations laid down in the London Protocol of 1935
have not beer considered mandatory in the case of (non-
military) enemy aircraft", 1
 it is not understood how this
legal vacuum saves better the interests of' humanity.
It is no new thought, indeed it is well documented,
that "during World Wars I and II the belligerent practice of'
attacking and sinking enemy merchant vessels without warning
(or only with the most peremptory warning), and without
having first provided for the safety of passengers and crew,
was widespread." 2
 t best, enemy non-military aircraft
eived no better treatment than enemy merchant vessels.3
In view of such practice, and of the fact that the
validity of customary and conventional law of warfare at sea
and in the air (to my knowledge) has not explicitly been
reaffirmed since the close of Trials of riajor War Criminals
following the Second World War, deletion of the words 'on
land' would have been a step in the right direction pending
a revision of that body of law governing warfare at sea and
1. See Whiteman, Digest, Vol. 10, pp . 644-645.
2. Ibid., p.645.
3. Loc. cit. On Naval Measures against Enemy Merchant Vessels,
Aircraft and Personnel, see Uhiteman, Vol. 10 pp. 644-649.
On submarine Warfare on Merchant Ships, ibid, p.650 at
seq.
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inthe air • Aresolution by the Conference to that effect
without deleting the words 'on land' from draft Article 44
(I) could be a significant contribution.
However, it may be inferred from the discussion of
draft \rticle 44 (I) in Committee III, that the customary
and conventional law of' armed conflict at sea and in the air
is still valid notwithstanding its violation in the Second
World War. The Report of Committee III, First Session, with
regard to paragraph 1 of draft Article 44, states in part:
"Several delegations spoke in favour of deleting the
words 'on land' so that the protection under section
I of part 4 of draft Protocol I would be as broad as
possible, embracing the protection of the civilian
population, individual civilians, and civilian objects
at sea and in the air. Other delegations supported
the retention of the words 'on land' in order to
exclude the application of the Protocol to attacks on
merchant ships and on civil aircraft, which they
asserted to be covered by other bodies of lau, such
as the law of blockade and of visit and search."1
The Report of the Working Group of Committee III is
even more explicit about the attitude of delegates who wished
the term 'on land' to be deleted.
"These delegates would prefer to have this section of'
the Protocol affect the law applicable to the conduct
of warfare at sea or in the air to the extent that
1. Report of Committee 3, First Session, due s
 COOH/50/Rev,1
in Levie, Vol. 3,	 gi,
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the provisions of this Section would be more
favourable to civilians than the existing law."1
It may be useful to note that the existing law
regarding warfare at sea and in the air allows a great
measure of discretion, - a privilege which the super—powers
appear extremely reluctant to compromise in favour of a
better protection of civilians and civilian objects at
sea and in the air. The belief in some western circles,
particularly among United States and armchair strategists,
in the possibility of conventional and limited nuclear
warfare in a confrontation with the Soviet Union (a belief,
mistaken as it is, but maintained thanks to being untested
and which hopefully will never be tested) may not pass
without leaving its marks on the structure of the law.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the main
opposition to the deletion of the words 'on land' came from
delegates of the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium,
West Germany, Finland and Sweden, to mention but some
The Soviet delegation, in the first three meetings of
Committee Ill, would only "reserve its position on pr000sec
amendments until they had been presented in writing." In the
fourth meeting, the Soviet delegation stated that ICRC draft
Prticle 44, paragraph 1, was satisfactory. But if the major-
ity of the Committee wished the term 'attacks on land' to
be defined, some explanations might be added at the end of
1 Report to the Third Commision on the Work of the Working
Group, Committee 3, 27th February, 1975.
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the paragraph.1
Thus, the general discussions in Committee III showed
that it was almost impossible to go beyond the ICHC text
which was finally adopted with further clarifications. The
final text, that is, 1rticle 49, paragraph 3, reads as
follows:
The provisions of this Section apply to any land, air
or sea warfare which may affect the civilian
population, individual civilians or civilian objects
on land. They further apply to all attacks from the
sea or from the air against objectives on land but do
not otherwise affect the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflicts at sea or in the air.
It is important to note that, although this paragraoh
was adopted by a vast majority in Committee III, it repres-
ents the lowest common denominator. 1s the Report of' the
Working Group to Committee III explains, the Working Group
was unanimously of the view that Protocol I should at least
cover military operations on land and military operations
from the sea and air against persons and objects on land
(notably in the form of bombardment) which affect civilians
on land.2
Beyond that there was disagreement.
Delegations were of differing views whether Section I
1. See CODH/JII/SR,2, para. 19 and CDDH/IIISR.4, para. 43.
2. Doc. CDOH/III/78/Add.1, reproduced in Levie, Vol. 3,
pp . 88-91,
658
of Part 4 of Protocol I should be applicable to operations
at sea (e.g. blockade, sinking of merchant ships ?tc.) which
affect civilians at sea (such as crews and passengers of
ships) or on land.1
Delegates were also of differing views on whether the
Section should be applicable to military operations Prom
land, sea, or air against civilian objects and individual
civilians in the air - that is civil aircraft. Operations
within planes, such as hijacking, were similarly in issue.2
The report of the Working Group did not raise the
issue of military operations against merchant ships from
land.
Thus, Article 49, paragraph 3, left much to be desired
and many problems to be solved. Accordingly, the remarks
made by Mr. Cristescu (Romania) after the adoption of the
text of Article 49, paragraph 3, by Committee III, but
prior to its adoption in Plenary, seem to be correct as a
matter of principle. He said that "the words 'on land' like
the last phrase of the second sentence of Article 44,
paragraph I, (now Article 49, paragraph 3) limited the scope
of civilian protection. Accordingly, the titles of the
Section and of draft Protoo1 I should be amended to show
that they pertained only to the protection of the civilian
population on land. The most important principle laid down
by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its
1 •
 Ibid., p. 89.
2	 Ibid., p. 89.
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Resolution 2675 (XXi) on "Basic principles for the protection
of civilian populations in armed conflicts", was that human
rights must always be respected on the basis of equality.
Icceptance of the existing wording of Article 44, paragraph
1, would introduce unfair discrimination in the protection
of the civilian population, for the deciding factor would
be its location at a given moment. The aim was to provide
increased protection for the civilian population, not to
facilitate military operations or to uphold the rights of
belligerents in their actions against civilian populations."
Finally, it should be noted that during the search for
agreement on paragraph 3 of Article 49, the Rapporteur of
the Working Group of Committee III made an interesting
proposal, the final form of which appears in Article 57,
paragraph 4. It states that:
"In the conduct of military operations at sea or in
the air, each Party to the conflict shall, in conform-
ity with 1t5 rights and duties under the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflicts, take
all reasonable precautions to avoid losses of
civilian lives and damage to civilian objects."
This seems to be the only concession made to those
who wished to have Section 1 of Part 4 of Protocol I affect
the law applicable to the conduct of warfare at sea or in
the air to the extent that the provisions of this Section
would be more favourable to civilians than the existing law.
How far this concession goes is not clear. One thing however
seems to be clear; that the law of blockade has not been
affected. If' so, then the prohibition of starvation of
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civilians, as a method of' warfare, must be considered a
hollow gesture. It is this aspect of sea warfare which ought
to have been made the focus of concern, not the tentative
extension of the protection afforded by the Protocol to
civilians and civilian objects at sea or in the air, or the
obsessions with'sink at sight' practices of' the Second
World War.
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In an article published in 1952, Professor H. Lauterpacht
made a long list of topics in the law of war which needed
revision and concluded by saying:
"In all these matters the lawyer mistdo his duty rteardless of
dialectical doubts - though with a feeling of humility
springingfrom the knowledge that if international law is,
in some ways at the vanishing point of law, the law of war
is, perhaps even more conspicuously, at the vanishing point
of international law. He must continue to expound and to
elucidate the various aspects of the law of war for the
use of armed forces, of governments, and of others. He
must do so with determination though without complacency
and perhaps not always very hopefully - the only firm hope
being that a world may arise in which no such calls will
claim his zeal."1
Pdthough this is hardly a consolation to the international
lawyer or to the combatants and non—combatants which the law
of armed conflict is intended to protect against unnecessary
suffering, the message, nevertheless, seems clear. The
international lawyer must continue to do his duty to expound
and to elucidate the various aspects of the law of armed
conflict however ineffective that law might be. Moreover as
Professor Schwarzenberger observed, to limit a presentation of
international law in an unorganized international society to
the law of peace would amount to a serious distortion. The
effect of such an approach to international law would be to
1 •
 H. Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of
War, British Year Book of International Law, Vol. 29, 1952,
pp . 381 - 82.
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give a curiously inflated view of the Rule of Law in internat-.
lonal relations. Furthermore, such a mutilation of international
law would deprive students of valuable insights that may be
gained from pondering over the apparent paradox of the very
existence of a law of armed conflicts. Reflections on such lines
may lead to a more profound understanding of international law:
its functions, the operative factors in moulding and develop
its rules, and the forms of growth of individual rules of
customary international law.1
Indeed, it is through a serious study of the law of armed
conflicts in general, and of non—interstate armed conflicts in
particular, that the inconclusiveness of the processes of' law-
making, law—determination and law—enforcement and their defects
become more apparent. For instance, with regard to law—
enforcement, Protocol I contains a long part (Part V: Articles
80 to 91) on the "Execution of the (Geneva) Conventions and of
this Protocol." Article 90 oP the Protocol envisages the
establishing of an "International Fact Finding Commission"
consisting of fifteen members of "high moral standing and
acknowledged impartiality" to enquire into any facts alleged to
be grave breaches, and to facilitate, through its good offices
the restoration of an attitude of respect for the Geneva
Conventions and Protocol 1. But it seems gravely doubtful
whether such a Commission stands any chance of coming into
existence, and, if ever came itno existence, whether it would
stand a chance of becoming operative. First of all, the
International Fact—Finding Commission may only be set up when
1 •
 See Schwarzenberger, International Law, Vol. 2 - \rmed
Conflicts - 1968, pp . 1 - 6, esp. p. 2.
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no less than twenty High Contracting Parties have accepted the
competence of the Commission without prior 'special agreement'
in relation to any other High Contracting Party accepting the
same obligation. Henceforth, the Commission would only be
competent to enquire into alleged grave breaches or serious
violations of the Geneva Conventions if both Parties to the
conflict had already recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Commission. Failing that, the Commission would only
institute an enquiry if all Parties to the conflict agreed to
do so. Secondly, even if all these problems were overcome, the
findings of the Commission may not be reported publicly, unless
all the Parties to the conflict have requested the Commission
to do so,, All this indicates that governments, not only prefer
to keep their dirty linen to themselves, but also prefer to
remain their own judges regarding all matters relating to the
applicability or non—applicability of the law, its content, and
its enforcement. The disastrous consequences of this decentral-
ized 'management' of the law of armed conflict to the protection
of combatants and non—combatants can hardly be exaggerated.
The consequences of this decetraization? are particularly
disastrous in the case of non—interstate armed conflicts, since
it is only with regard to these conflicts that the problem of
threshold exists, whether the armed conflict was of international
or non—international character.
With regard to non—interstate armed conflicts of
international character or wars of national liberation in the
narrow sense, i.e., armed conflicts in which peoples are
fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self'-
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determination, as proclaimed in Article 1, paragraph 4, of
Protocol I, there is some truth in the statement that the
language of this paragraph amounts to a 'built—in inapplicabil-
ity	 For its application would amount to an
acknowledgement by the government against which the armed
conflict is being waged by the people concerned, that it is
'colonial', 'alien', or	 something which probably no
government would admit. But the omission of such 'pejurative'
terms would not have facilitated the application of Article 1,
paragraph 4, of Protocol I, for the same 'built—in
inapplicability clause' would still persist. No government would
admit that it is not conducting itself in accordance with the
right of peoples to self—determination, or that it does not
represent the whole people belonging to the territory of the
state, without distinction as to race, creed or colour.
Moreover, if not all armed conflicts in which peoples fight for
self—determination qualify as armed conflicts of international
character, and that the international character is reserved to
those armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against
colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist
regimes, that would be an unjustifiable discrimination between
various forms of forcible denial of self—determination.
But even if all these difficulties were overcome there would
still remain a major problem emanating from the inconclusiveness
of the process of law—making, law—determination, and law—
enforcement. Thus if Article 1, paragraph 4, of '
 Protocol I,
was a rule of customary international law it would raise the
problem of whether a state which objects to a rule from its
very inception would be bound by a 'new' rule. On the other
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hand, jf Article 1, paragraph 4, of' Protocol I, was merely an
interpretation of the present Article 2 common the the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949, it would still raise the problem
of who is competent to give an authorative interpretation and
whether such an interpretation would be binding on a dissenting
state.
In an organized international society capable of enforcing
its decisions, all such problems would have been solved in due
legal processes. But in an unorganized international society,
international law deteriorates into a sort of partisan politics,
and nothimg short of the voluntary acceptance of' majority
decisions by the individual states concerned would bring the
law into fruition. accordingly, without prejudice to the
discussion of wars of national liberation in Chapter Three of
this thesis, it may be concluded that the Diplomatic Conference
of Geneva (1974_1977), and the United Nations itself, have
failed to provide definite solutions to all questions which may
be raised in theory or in pratice, regarding the application of
international humanitarian law to non-interstate armed conflicts
of international character. This, however, does not suggest
that the 'colonial' or 'alien' or 'racist' government would in
any way be justified in denying the applicability of internat-
ional humanitarian law in its entirety to wars of national
liberation.
The same analysis also leads to the conclusion that the
Diplomatic Conferences of 1949 and 1974-77 have failed to
provide satisfactory solutions to the problems of the application
of international humanitarian law in armed conflicts considered
to be of' a non-international character, discussed in Chapters
One and Two. The deplorable high 'threshold' of' Protocol II as
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laid down in Article 1 of the Protocol, and the deplorable
amputation of 'substantive' rules from the draft Protocol as
adopted at Committee level, will remain a stigma on the
forehead of the Diplomatic Conference for a long time to come.
The draft Protocol proposed by the International Committee of
the Red Cross was certainly a better solution, and better still,
from this writer's point of view, is the abolition of the
distinction between armed conflicts of international character
and armed conflicts of a non—international character.
Protocol II, discussed in Chapter Two of' this thesis, is a
disservice to all peoples involved in non—interstate armed
conflict. It is a disservice to wars of national liberation
(however defined), because the authorities against which such
wars are waged tend to characterize them as armed conflicts of
non—international character. The ICRC realized this fact and
therefore drafted a Protocol with a relatively low 'threshold'
in order to cover almost all sorts of non—interstate armed
conflicts, irrespective of the intensity of' the armed conflict,
of its duration, and of' the success of' the insurgents in
controlling a part of the national territory. But this SQlutioc\
was not to the taste of the vast majority of delegations of all
ideological persuasions, who did not seem to distinguish
between the adoption of a resolution at the United Nations
General Assembly and the making of effective laws. This,
however, does not suggest that wars of' national liberation
ought to have been treated as armed conflicts of non—internat-
ional character; it only confirms my suggestion that the
distinction between international and non—international armed
conflicts ought to have been abolished. Indeed, the international
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characterization of' wars of national liberation isa step in
the right direction.
Protocol II is also a disservice to armed conflicts of a
non—international character because its high 'threshold' means
that no law governs the conduct of hostilities until the
conditions of Article 1 of the Protocol have been fulfilled.
This is lawlessness in the name of' the law and vindictiveness
in the guise of legal rectitude. As far as the protection of'
civilians and civilian objects is concerned, which is what
Protocol II is all about, the very existence of a problem of
threshold contradicts with the very essence of the law of armed
conflict and with the International Covenants on Human Rights.
The law of armed conflicts, as far as the conduct of' hostilites
is concerned, is the law of military operations. It is generally
recognized that military necessity has been taken into
consideration in the formulation of rules governing the conduct
of' hostilities. In other words, the law of armed conflicts does
not admit of any military necessity beyond its rules. To suggest
that there are miltary operations which are not governed by the
law of armed conflict until the insurgents have controlled a
part of the national territory, is tantamount to saying that
the unrestrained application of force is a privilege of
governments and is in the interest of the people in whose name
that force was applied to quell rebellion, which is nonsense.
The problem of threshold should vanish from the law of armed
conflict and be replaced by the concept of 'public emergency',
if' it were to be consistent with the International Covenants
on Human Rights. Staes may derogate from their obligations under
these Covenants only in case of public emergency threatening the
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life of the nations and the existence of which is officially
proclaimed. Even then, the derogation is allowed only to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
which cannot conceivably exceed those allowed by the law of
armed conflict s it is very significant that the law of armed
Conflict is now called the "international humanitarian law
applicable in armed conflict." The significance of' this name
is that the law of' armed conflict is but an international law
of' human rights, and it is of absolute importance that the two
regimes of human rights be harmonized. 1bolition of the
distinction between international and non—international armed
conflicts, at least as far as the protection of non—combatants
is concerned, is thus an absolute necessity.
The prisoner—of—war status for captured combatants might be
thought to require a distinction between international and
non—international armed conflicts, allegedly to protect the
right of the state to punish those who seek to change the law
by violent means. But the very existence of an armed conflict
in a state is in itself an irrefutable evidence that the
punishment has lost its deterrent force, and that any more
prosecutions for the sole reason of taking up arms against the
established government would be counter—productive. One may
wonder therefore whether the granting of' prisoner—of—war status
may not be worth trying as a counter—insurgency measure and as
a measure for humanizing the armed conflict. In this writer's
view, the prisoner—of—war status has a deterrent force of its
own, for nothing is more disgraceful for a combatant than his
conviction by a civilized court as a war criminal.
Protection of' the civilian population, individual civilians
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and civilian objects against affects of hostilities is a major
theme elaborated in great detail in Chapters Four and Five of
this thesis. The back—bone of this regulation of the conduct of
hostilities is, of course, the distinction between combatants
and non—combatants and between civilian objects and military
objectives. 8ut the plain reading of' the detailed articles in
Protocol I, Part IV, Section I, let apart discussing them in
detail, gives the impression that the principle of distinction
is on the brink of' becoming extinct. It is probably no exagger-
ation to suggest that the whole regulation of' the conduct of
hostilities, may roughly be reduced to two rules: the rule that
the civilian population and individual civilians should not be
made the object of' attacks directed exclusively against them;
and the so—called proportionality rule. 1\ccording to the
proportionality rule, "an attack which may be ex2ected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated", is to be considered as indiscriminate,
and therefore is prohibited. 1
 This rule has been rightly
criticised at the time on the ground that it calls for a
comparison between things that cannot conceivably be compared.
Moreover, the fact that the rule speaks of "concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated", not of concrete and direct
military advantage actually obtained from the attack, makes the
whole concept of indiscriminate attacks unverifiable.
However, the proportionality rule is not the only weakness
1 •
 Article 51, para. 5 (b), of' Protocol I.
671
in the regulation of the conduct of hostilities. The inroads
on the protection of objects indispensable to the survival of
the civilian population are particularly alarming, and no less
alarming is the meagre protection of the natural environment.
fll in all, the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva (1974-1977)
seems to have achieved very little in the direction of a better
protection of the civilian population, individual civilians and
civilian objects. In this writer's view, nothing short of the
abolition of the 'right' to cause incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, would improve the protection of civilians
and civilian objects. It exceeds the purpose of this Chapter
to suggest a detailed regulation of the responsibility for
causing 'incidental civilian losses' in both, interstate and
non—interstate armed conflicts. It is time for international
lawyers to direct their attention to this matter, for only then,
the law of armed conflict would be put in the service of peace
and peaceful change.
Finally, one may wonder whether international law—making
conferences of the sort held in Geneva in 1949 and 1974-1977,
are really capable of producing a better law of' armed conflicts.
The huge differences among states in military power, military
strategies and interests suggest that such law—making confer-
ences can only produce formal and vague compromises that paper
over differences and present them as agreements. One therefore
wonders whether bilateral and regional treaties on the law of'
armed conflicts would not produce a more humanitarian and
effective law of' armed conflicts.
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